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Abstract 
This paper investigates two issues: how much merger announcements  surprise the market 
and what market  responses  to the announcement reveal  about the motives underlying the 
proposed deal. Using a simultaneous-equations  framework,  w€ model investor 
anticipations  in the first equation  and abnormal returns in the second  equations.  Our 
analysis indicates that investors  can successfully  predict  bidders but not target candidates. 
Cumulative abnormal  returns to bidders whose candidacy was widely anticipated in the 
market prove significantly larger in magnitude  than returns to bidders whose candidacy 
wasn't  anticipated.  Bidder  abnormal  returns differ insignificantly from  zero when market 
expectations  are met, whereas bidder returns prove significantly positive when markets 
are surprised that the firm made a bid. This favorable market response  to the surprise in 
bidder identity suggests that to an important extent managerial  merger motives  serve 
shareholder  interests. 
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Introduction 
l,l Statement  of Purpose 
This dissertation investigates  market responses to the information  conveyed in 
merger announcements. To this end, this study addresses two research questions. How 
much merger announcements surprise the market? What do market responses  to 
announcement surprises  reveal about  managerial motives that drive mergers? 
If outside forces randomly  selected  the firms that propose  and receive  bids, 
merger announcements  would be exogenous.  Consequently, market responses to mergers 
announced by the outside force would measure nothing  but the complete effect of the 
merger disclosure on bidder and target shareholder  wealth. However, managers, not 
outside forces, decide whether and when their firms  propose  or solicit a merger bid. The 
managerial decision to propose or solicit a bid is not random. The information  managers 
have about firm operations and prospects feeds into managerial motives -motives  to 
generate  shareholder value  and opportunistic benefits - to shape the decision of whether, 
with whom, and when to merge. Opportunistic benefits are any monetary  or nonmonetary 
consequences  of managerial  decisions that increase utility of the manager and decrease 
shareholder  wealth. 
Investors  know that managers choose to merge when and only when it serves 
managerial interests. Investors evaluate firm, industry and management  characteristics 
that may motivate  mergers to assess both the likelihood  of mergers and the effect of 
mergers  on shareholder  value. Investor anticipations about  bidder and target  candidacy 
concern the extent to which markets successfully predict the identity of bidder  and target 
candidates and the timing of merger announcements.  The counterpart of investor 
anticipations -- announcement  surprises -- concerns the extent to which markets cannot 
predict  the identities of the merger partners  and the timing  of announcements. 
A crucial  assumption of event studies  is that analysts can identify  a short window 
of time in which the market  learns event-related information.  Investor anticipations mean 
that some of the merger-related  information  is stale at the time of announcements.  In an 
informationally efficient market, share prices incorporate new information  rationally and 
instantaneously.  In such markets, share prices incorporate the expected  impact of 
anticipated mergers prior to the announcements  (Schipper and Thompson, 1983; Asquith, 
et a1.,1983; Malatesta and Thompson,  1985). To the extent that a merger is anticipated, 
bidder and target returns  around merger  announcements do not reflect market  reslxlnses 
to all information that announcements  convey. Stock price changes reflect market 
responses to new information  that wasn't anticipated  prior to the announcement. 
This study begins by estimating  investor anticipations  about bidder and target 
candidacy and developing a measure of announcement surprises.  The Iarger the 
announcement surprise, the more information the announcement  reveals about previously 
unobservable  motives of management. Then,  this study  investigates  market responses  to 
information  about previously unobservable motives. 
Investors evaluate the new information that announcements  reveal and price post- 
announcement enterprises. To price enterprises, investors would like to understand  the 
motives driving managerial decisions and have access to all information available  to 
management. Managers' unique position  as decision makers  provides them  with 
"private" information  about business prospects  (Myers and Majluf,  1984). Managerial 
private information and motives  are, by definition,  not publicly known. However, 
investors  do observe managerial decisions, which investors  presume to be based on 
managerial motives  and private information. 
Mergers are investment  decisions from which investors can learn about 
managerial  private information and motives. Merger announcements reveal bidder and 
target managerial preferences  to join forces. To be unanticipated, information must throw 
light on previously  unobservable information and motives of management. If investors 
judge the net effect of the unanticipated information to be detrimental  to shareholder 
wealth, returns around  announcements would be negative.  If investors evaluate the net 
effect to benefit shareholders,  price changes would be positive. This study seeks to draw 
conclusions about how faithfully merger motives serve  shareholder  incentives by 
analyzing market responses to unanticipated information. 
1,2 The endogeneity of investor anticipations and market responses to merger 
announcements 
Investor anticipations and market responses  to announcements are endogenous. 
Investors  evaluate the information about previously unobservable motives that 
announcements reveal to price post-announcement  enterprises. Investor anticipations 
determine how unanticipated this information is. Market responses to announcements  and 
investor anticipations are endogenous  since market responses to announcements depend 
on how unanticipated the information that announcements  convey are. 
The endogeneity of investor anticipations and market responses  means that 
parameter estimates of a single-equation  model of market  responses  would exhibit 
simultaneous-equations  bias. Heckman  (1979) developed a two-stage selection model 
designed to eliminate  this kind of simultaneous-equations bias. 
Heckman  built his selection  model to study the wages women earn. Members  of 
the sample (women  who receive  wages)  choose  to work. The choice means there is 
endogenous  self-selection  incorporated in the data on wages. The decision to work 
depends  on the wages women  can earn. Hence,  the decision  to work and the wage earned 
are mutually  determined. 
We adapt Heckman's  two-stage selection model to study investor  anticipations 
and market  responses to merger announcements.  We imbed market responses to merger 
announcements in a two-stage  framework. The first-stage equations model investor 
anticipations  about bidder and target candidacy. The second-stage equations model 
market responses to merger announcements. 
First-stage  equations model the likelihood  that a firm proposes and receives  at 
least one bid in the next quarter. We use these models  of bidder and target candidacy to 
study how much a proposed deal surprises the market  and to obtain  measures of 
unanticipated information that announcements  reveal. 
Second-stage  equations model market responses to announcements. We identify 
market responses to merger announcements  with abnormal returns around merger 
announcements. To extract  market responses  to announcements,  and distinguish  them 
from stock price changes  due to ordinary operations  of the bidder  and target  candidate, 
we need to model "normal  returns". A market model benchmarks normal returnsl.  Daily 
abnormal returns are the difference between  observed  and normal returns. 
The endogeneity of investor anticipations  and market responses to announcements 
means that error terms from the first-stage and second-stage equations are correlated. 
Heckman's  two-stage selection model relies on the correlation structure in the error terms 
to eliminate the simultaneous-equations  bias using an instrumental variable: Heckman's 
lambda. 
Second-stage  models of abnormal returns use Heckman's lambda to study market 
responses to unobservable motives. Algebraically,  Hechnan's lambda is an inverse  odds' 
ratio calculated  from the coefficient  estimates of candidacy models. For a bidder' 
candidate,  Heckman's  lambda is an inverse transformation  of the probability  of proposing' 
a bid, whereas  for a target candidate, it is an inverse  transformation of the probability  of' 
receiving a bid. Intuitively,  Heckman's lambda  maps into a measure of announcement' 
surprise.  The larger the announcement surprise about bidder and target canclidacy, the' 
larger are bidder and target  Heckman's  lambda, respectively. A large announcement' 
surprise  implies that investors foresaw little about managerial motives.  The larger the' 
announcement surprise, the more information  announcements reveal about motives that' 
are unobservable prior to the announcement. 
t Brown and warner (1985) analyze the advantages and disadvantages  associated with using different
models  to benchmark  normal returns  in event  studies. 
1.3 Modeling investor  anticipations about bidder and target candidacy' 
Managers may engage in mergers for several  reasons.  On the one hand,  managers 
may seek merely to generate shareholder value. Theoretical  models establish that 
managers  may merge to generate shareholder value by: channeling human and financial 
capital to better uses; accessing economies  of scale and scope; and enhancing  market 
power [Gort  (1969); Holmes  and Schmitz  (1995); Fluck and Lynch (1999); Jovanovic 
and Rousseau  (2002)1. Alternatively,  incentive conflicts between managers  and 
shareholders  may also motivate mergers by allowing opportunistic  managers  to generate 
value for themselves  at the expense of shareholders [Jensen and Meckling (1976); Jensen 
(1986); Datta et al. (2001);Harlzell et al. (2004)1. 
Two opposing  views  explore whether  and how managers might use mergers 
financed with overvalued equity either to generate  shareholder wealth or to protect 
opportunistic benefits managers might enjoy. On the one hand,  overvalued  equity  may 
motivate mergers by enabling managers to generate value for pre-merger  shareholders at 
the expense of post-merger shareholders. Rhodes-Kropf  and Viswanathan  (2004) and 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argue that managers  generate long-run value for pre-merger 
shareholders  by using their overly "expensive" equity to buy targets cheap. In the short 
run, once investors  infer that shares are overvalued, shareholder wealth  declines. On the 
other hand, Jensen (2005) argues  that overvaluation intensifies incentive  conflicts 
between managers  and shareholders. Hence, overvalued equity may tempt managers to 
destroy shareholder  value in an attempt to protect opportunistic benefits at the expense of 
both pre- and post-merger shareholders. This class of mergers  destroys shareholder  value 
in both the short  and long run. 
1.3.1 Summary of findings on investor  anticipations 
We run cross-sectional probit regressions to estimate separately  the likelihood that 
a firm proposes and receives at least one bid in the next quarter. Each regression 
incorporates proxies for motives to generate shareholder  value and opportunistic benefits. 
In our data, proxies for the potential of managers to generate shareholder value 
and opportunistic  benefits  prove significantly related  to investor  anticipations. Investors 
rely on firm and industry characteristics  such as the frequency  of merger activity in the 
industry, prior merger activity of the firm, profitability,  cash reserves, and asset size to 
predict candidacy.  Profitable firms with sizable cash balances, experiencing price run- 
ups, and which engaged  in mergers in the past prove significantly more likely to make 
bids, Profitable firms  with small market  shares,  cash balances,  price  run-ups,  operating in 
industries with high frequencies of merger  activity and which  engaged in mergers  in the 
past prove significantly  more likely to receive bids. 
We find that a mix of motives underlies the merger decision. To capture  the 
extent of investor  anticipations  fully, we must develop proxies for shareholder value and 
opportunistic  benefits. Focusing on a single characteristic of the firm or the industry 
(such as whether the firm had prior merger activity or whether  the industry is going 
through a high frequency  of merger activity) would underestimate investor anticipations 
about  bidder  and target  candidacy. 
Models of investor anticipations about bidder and target candidacy  provide,' 
predictions  for the probability  that a firm proposes or receives at least one bid in the next 
quarter. The predictive power of our models of bidder candidacy  proves higher than the 
predictive power of our models of target candidacy. The low predictive power of the 
target-candidacy  models  suggests  either:  (i) that investors cannot foresee  target  candidacy 
as successfully as they can foresee bidder  candidacy, or (ii) that investors can foresee 
target candidacy  as successfully as they can foresee bidder candidacy, but the models do 
not as adequately portray the predictability of target candidates  as they do of bidders. 
If investor inability to predict target candidates  successfully is driving the low 
predictive  power of the target-candidacy  models, then the information  that 
announcements reveal about target  candidates is staler than the information they reveal 
about bidder candidates. The staler the information,  the smaller should be market 
responses in an efficient market. Consequently,  on average, market responses to 
announcements of receiving bids should be more  substantial  than market responses to 
announcements  of proposing  bids. 
Surveying  merger studies, Jensen and Ruback (1983), Jarrell, Brickley and Netter 
(1988)  and Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford  (2001) report that cumulative  abnormal 
returns to target shareholders  are substantial (around twenty percent) whereas cumulative 
abnormal retums to bidder shareholders  are approximately 0. Competing bidders and the 
threat of competitors might explain why target shareholders enjoy significantly higher 
abnormal returns than bidder shareholders  do [Jennings and Mazzeo (1993)]. Roll (1936) 
suggests  that bidder management's  inability to assess correctly the value that mergers 
generate (or in Roll's words "managerial  hubris") may also explain why target abnormal' 
retums  are higher. 
Evidence that target candidacy is less predictable  than bidder candidacy does not 
totally explain the disparity between target and bidder abnormal returns. However,  our 
finding clarifies that the information  announcements convey about targets is staler than 
the information about  bidders. The staler the information, the smaller the market 
responses should be. Consequently, this asymmetry in investor anticipations  about 
bidder  and target candidacy helps to explain  why target abnormal returns are larger  in 
magnitude  than bidder  abnormal returns. 
L,4 Modeling  market responses  to merger  announcements 
Market responses to merger announcements  reflect how price the new inforrration 
that announcements convey.  First, we explain  how the second-stage models use 
Heckman's  lambda to estimate market responses to information about previously 
unobservable  managerial motives.  Then, we investigate what market  responses to 
information about unobservable  motives imply about how faithfully managers serve 
shareholder  interests. 
L.4.1 Heckman's lambda as a measure of announcement  surprises and the 
information revealed about managerial  motives 
Bidder and target Heckman's  lambdas represent the degree of surprise about 
bidder  and target candidacy, respectively. The larger the surprises about  merger 
candidacy, the more information announcements  convey about motives of management. 
To isolate the change in investor  expectations about the effect of managerial  motives on' 
bidder and target shareholder wealth, the second-stage  models of market respon$es use 
Heckman's lambda. 
Merger motives look to increase shareholder value and opportunistic  managerial 
benefits. We cannot directly  disentangle the information about motives  to generate 
shareholder value from the motives  to generate  opportunistic  benefits.  The coefficient of 
Heckman's  lambda estimates market responses to information about unobservable 
motives. When markets infer managerial  motives to focus mostly on the shareholder 
value that mergers  generate, market responses  to information  about motives  should  be 
positive. However, when markets infer that managerial  motives predominantly concern 
opportunistic benefits management  reaps through the merger,  market responses should be 
negative. 
L.4.2 Information  that merger  announcements disclose 
Merger announcements  disclose the provisional intent of bidder and target 
management  to join forces. Joining forces means combining bidder and target businesses 
into a single enterprise. Combining bidder and target enterprises changes  the cash flows 
previously projected for the separate enterprises.  The riskiness  of cash flows also figures 
to change  as a result of the merger. 
The real-options approach to valuing a firm provides an insightful  franrework 
within which to think about whether and how a merger might qeate or destroy  value. 
Real options give companies that make investments  the right, but not the obligation,  to 
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exploit opportunities  to make incremental investments (or disinvestments)  in the future at' 
lower cost than would have been  possible without the current  investment. 
Prior to a merger announcement, bidder  and target management  hold respective 
options (options that are not directly  tradable) to acquire and to sell the target firrr. The 
exercise  price for these options is the offer price (some combination  of stock,  cash and 
other securities) proposed  to target shareholders.  When and if the merger goes through, 
pre-merger enterprises  cease to exist  as independent  entities; shareholders  relinquish their 
ownership  stake in the pre-merger enterprises. Bidder shareholders trade in their stock in 
the pre-merger  firm and pay the offer  price  to secure the expected cash flows associated 
with the post-merger enterprise.  Target shareholders sell the target firm for the offer 
price,  a price that may include an ownership  stake in the post-merger  enterprise2. 
Exercising merger options changes  real options about how to employ post-merger 
enterprise  assets, how to invest in additional real and financial assets, and whether to 
disinvest in the enterprise's  post-merger assets. What is called "merger  fit" depends on 
the extent to which the change in the distribution  of cash flows serves bidder and target 
shareholder interests. Investors  evaluate the merger fit to forecast the shareholder value 
that the merger generates. 
Merger terms  and negotiating environment determine  how the shareholder value 
that the merger generates is distributed between bidder and target shareholders.  Merger 
announcements  specify the provisional terms of the merger contract. Merger terms 
enumerate how the bidder  and target  management plan to carry out the transition from 
 Smith and Triantis  (2001) provide a detailed  analysis of merger activity in the real options framework. 
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operating as stand-alone enterprises to operating  as a combined enterprise. The concept 
of a negotiating  environment  relates to whether competing bidders are vying for the 
tatget, how receptive target management  is to a merger and whether target management 
can resist if they choose. 
t.4.3 RegressionStrategy 
Numerous empirical studies calculate  changes in bidder and target stock prices 
around merger announcements  to study market responses to the information these 
announcements  disclose3. Each merger announcement is unique in the information it 
discloses about: timing of the merger;  firm, management, and industry  characteristics  of 
merger partners; terms of the contract;  and characteristics of the stock market at the time 
of the announcement.  These empirical studies focus on one particular aspect of the 
information that merger announcements  reveal and investigate how cross-sectional 
differences in the information  disclosed affect bidder and target  cumulative  abnormal 
returns. In contrast, this study first determines how stale the infonnation  that 
announcements  reveal is before it assesses how the information affects stock prices. 
We identify market  responses with bidder  and target cumulative  abnormal returns 
centered  on merger announcements. We measure announcement surprises with 
Heckman's  lambda.  The pecking order theory of Myers  and Majluf  (1934) predicts  that 
managers  of overvalued  firms are more likely use equity to finance investment  pdects, 
whereas  managers  of undervalued firms  are more likely to use cash. The mix of cash and 
"For a review of the literature and evidence on bidder and target abnormal  returns  refer 0o Jensen and
Ruback  (1983), Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1938) and Andrade,  Mitchell and Stafford (2001). 
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equity used might therefore  indicate an effort to take advantage of temporary mispricing 
in share prices. Regressions of bidder  and target abnormal  returns  on Heckman's lambda 
and an indicator for all-equity  deals can test this hypothesis. 
Cross-sectional  differences  in the information  disclosed should affect cumulative 
abnormal returns. We include controls for the merger fit and negotiating  environment. 
Proxies for merger fit include whether the firms are located in the same state, whether  the 
firms operate in the same line of business,  and whether  the bidder and target are public 
firms. Proxies for the negotiation environment  include whether the target has anti- 
takeover provisions at the time of the merger  bid, whether target management is receptive 
to a merger, and whether the target is in banlcruptcy  proceedings at the time of the bid. 
1.4.4 Summary of findings  on bidder and target abnormal  returns 
Markets are surprised by merger announcements  for small, unprofitable firms that 
have  small price run-ups and cash  balances  and little prior experience with mergers. 
Market responses  to bids from such firms prove significant and positive. The positive 
market response implies that investors assess  mergers  to be positive net present value 
projects for this type of firms. 
We cannot distinguish  how the information that announcements  convey breaks 
down between the pursuit of shareholder value or opportunistic  benefits. The positive 
market response implies  only that, on balance,  unanticipated  managerial  motives  produce 
value for bidder  shareholders. 
13 
Markets are surprised by merger announcements  for large, unprofitable firrrs that 
have large price run-ups  and cash balances and whose managers have little prior 
experience with mergers either personally  or in their industry. Market responses ro 
announcements to bids received by these firms prove  positive  and significant.  However, 
the market  responses to target surprises  are less significant  than those to bidder  surprises. 
Furthermore, the significance of market responses  to target surprises is lost in different 
specifications of the retums regressions. Models of target  candidacy perform  poorly in 
predicting target candidates. Consequently, the degree of surprise doesn't change  across 
deals. Hence, Heckman's adjustments  for surprises are not needed. 
1.5 Organization  of this stady 
Chapter  2 reviews  related research on merger  announcements and explains how 
this study fits in the literature. Our contribution in this study is threefold: (i) we develop a 
more complete model of investor anticipations  than is available in previous literature; (ii) 
we analyze what market responses to information  about previously unobservable motives 
mean for how faithfully managers serve shareholder  interests and; (iii) we compile a 
comprehensive  sample of merging and nonmerging  firms in the period from 1982 to 
2004. 
Chapter 3 develops the research methods  that this study employs  and contrasts  our 
research  methods with those of prior studies. We then discuss how to adapt Heckman's 
two-stage framework to model investor  anticipations  and market  fesponses to merger 
announcements.  Finally, we describe the regressors our models use. 
T4 
II
I
Chapter 4 begins by describing  the sampling  procedure for compiling the data on' 
merglng and nonmerging firms.  Then, the chapter discusses the restrictions that the data- 
coverage requirements of different databases  impose on the sample. 
Chapter 5 and 6 estimate  the two-stage model.  Chapter 5 estimates  models  of 
candidacy and cornpares the predictive power of bidder and target-candidacy  models. 
Using the Chapter 5 regressors to calculate Heckman's  measure of surprise as a regressor, 
Chapter 6 estimates regressions of bidder and target abnormal  returns. The focus of the 
chapter is to evaluate  the statistical and economic  significance of Heckman's lambda. 
This analysis seeks to determine  what market  responses to announcement surprises imply 
about managerial motives. 
Chapter 7 carries out some robustness  tests. It analyzes the sensitivity  of our 
findings to different specifications  of the two-stage model. The chapter also investigates 
cross-sectional differences  in market responses to announcements. 
Chapter 8 summarizes the findings and develops  implications.  The chapter 
concludes  by identifying opportunities  for future research. 
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Related literature and how this study fits in the literature 
Previous empirical studies use two approaches  to measure investor anticipations 
about merger activity. The first approach relies on finding a firm or industry 
characteristic  that investors use to distinguish firms, which are more likely to make bids 
from firms that ne not [Schipper and Thompson  (1983); Asquith et at. (1983); Malatesta 
and Thompson  (1985); Fuller et al. (2004); Ismail (2005); Song and Walkling, (2000 and 
2005)1.  The second  approach relies on predictive  models that use characteristics of firm, 
management  and industry to study whether merger activity is predictable [palepu, (1936); 
Ambrose  and Megginson (1992); Akhigbe et at. (2004)1. 
We use an alternative  approach -- a simultaneous-equations  framework -  to 
investigate investor anticipations  and market responses to announcement surprises. In the 
following analysis, we discuss the different  ways in which these studies investigate 
investor anficipations  and contrast our approach with previous research. 
2.1 Studies  using afrrm or industry  characteristic  to measure investor anticipations 
Schipper and Thompson  (1983) and Asquith et at. (1983) are the first to study 
investor anticipations and how investor  anticipations change  the way we interpret 
announcement  abnormal returns. Following their lead, other studies use a strand of papers 
uses a single firm or industry characteristic  to measure investor anticipations [Malatesta 
and Thompson  (1985); Fuller et at. e004); Ismail (2005); Song and Walkling (2000 and 
2005)1. Schipper and Thompson (1983) and Malatesta and Thompson  (1935) focus on the 
existence of merger programs as a way to identify investor anticipations.  Asqtuth et al. 
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(1983), Fuller et al. (2004), and Ismail (2005) differentiate between  anticipated and 
unanticipated announcements by looking  at the frequency of bids. Song and Walkling 
(20fl0 and 2005) measure the time elapsed between  subsequent bids in an industry to 
proxy the surprise associated  with merger announcements. 
Table I describes the sample and methods  of the studies  which focus on a single 
characteristic, and summarizes  the main findings. Panel A describes the studies which use 
merger  programs,  Panel B the studies which use bid frequency, and Panel C the studies 
which use time elapsed between  subsequent  bids. 
2.1.1 Studies focusing  on merger  prograrns 
Schipper and Thompson  (1983),  and Malatesta and Thompson  (1985) analyz.e 
investor  anticipations  in the context  of merger programs. Schipper  and Thompson (1983) 
find supporting evidence for the hypothesis that markets anticipate  announcements of 
merger programs. Malatesta and Thompson  (1985) find evidence  supporting the 
hypothesis that markets anticipate announcements  of individual mergers. 
Schipper and Thompson  (1983)  explain their rationale  for focusing  on merger 
programs as  0... Share prices of firms which undertake acquisition programs should fully 
reflect the expected value  of those  programs  as soon as the entire program is announced 
or anticipated.  ...once the expected value of an entire acquisition program is capitalized, 
changes in the value  of an acquiring firm surrounding  individual merger announcements 
will reflect only the surprise associated  with the terms of the individual mergers." fire 
authors  concentrate  on announcements of merger programs since stock  price reactions 
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around progftlm announcements  measure the expected value of all mergers in the 
program more accurately than stock price reactions around individual announcements  do. 
Schipper and Thompson  (1983) scan the financial  press, and identify thirty firms 
listed on NYSE  that announced merger programs between 1952 and 1968.  Abnormat 
returns in the announcement month  prove  positive and statistically  significant  from zero. 
Furthermore,  positive abnormal returns begin to accumulate about thirty months before 
the announcements.  The authors conjecture that the markets anticipated the 
announcements. 
Schipper and Thompson  (1983)  could not identify the specific announcements 
date in most program announcements.  Hence, the announcement dates can be interpreted 
as the dates when the process  of policy change  towards  acquisitions was completed. The 
absence of accurate announcement  dates and the use of long event-windows confound the 
finding  that markets anticipate merger progam announcements. 
Malatesta and Thompson (1985) develop a model  formalizing  the intuition  that 
stock price reactions to merger announcements  reflect both the economic importance of 
events  and the extent to which  events are surprises. Using the model, the authors  derive 
the hypotheses that the economic  impact of mergers and expected  announcement effect 
are positive, and that acquisitions  are partially anticipated. Malatesta and Thompson 
(1985) use stock price data for thirty firms that announced merger programs  (Schipper 
and Thompson  (1983) sample) to estimate the value of acquisitions made by frequently 
acquiring  firms. Their hypotheses are tested using the parameter  estimates of a market 
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model. The authors find supporting evidence  that the economic impact  of mergers and 
expected announcement  effect are positive, and that acquisitions  are partially anticipated. 
Merger announcements  resolve uncertainty  about: whether  there will be a merger; 
the timing of the merger; and the economic impact of the merger. Malatesta  and 
Thompson  (1985) assume that: acquisition programs are perpetual,  and are anticipated to 
yield acquisition  attempts at a constant frequency;  and the economic impact of each 
merger attempt  is constant. By assumption,  Malatesta and Thompson's  model focuses 
exclusively  on the uncertainty about merger  timing. Hence, in the context of this model 
when the authors discuss partial anticipation of announcements,  they mean that investors 
anticipate  the timing of announcements. 
2.1.2 Studies  focusing  on frequent  bidders 
Asquith  et al. (1983),  Loderer and Martin  (1990),  Fuller et aI. (2004),  and Ismail 
(2005)  reason that initial bids in merger programs are much less anticipated  than 
subsequent  bids.  These studies track the bidding record of firms. The rank of a bid in a 
merger program  is a proxy for whether markets anticipated  the bid or not. Similarly,  bids 
of frequent bidders are more anticipated compared  to bids of infrequent  bidders. The 
authors expect abnormal returns to more-anticipated announcements  to be smaller in 
magnitude than returns to less-anticipated  announcements. Abnormal retums to initial 
bids in merger programs and bids of infrequent  bidders prove significantly  larger in 
magnitude than returns to bids that occur later in the merger  program.  These studies find 
evidence supporting  the hypotheses that initial bids in merger programs,  and bids of 
infrequent  bidders are unanticipated compared to bids of frequent bidders. 
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Asquith,  et al. (1983) sample  the 1979  Fortune  1000 firms which made at least' 
one bid between  1955 and 1963. Two-day  abnormal  retums (starting one day prior and 
ending  on the announcement day) for first bids by frequent bidders are both statistically 
and economically larger in magnitude  than returns to subsequent bids. However, these 
results are not robust to expanding the event-window. 
Loderer  and Martin (1990) sample firms, which  are not covered on CRSP (Center 
for Research  in Security Prices), that make  at least one bid between 1966  and 1984. The 
authors identify acquisition  series, which start after a two-year (or more) of no- 
acquisition hiatus, and end with an analogous two-year no-acquisition  hiatus, for each 
bidding firm. Six-day abnormal returns  (starting  five days prior to and ending on the 
announcement  day) to initial bid announcements  prove significantly greater in magninrde 
than returns to subsequent bids. 
Fuller et al. (2004) focus on frequent bidders in an attempt to hold bidder 
characteristics constant while examining  the pattern of announcement retums. If the same 
firm makes different types of acquisitions  (with different merger terms) in a short  period 
of time, most of the variation in bidder's  returns is due to factors other than new 
information  about the bidder. The authors sample firms making five or more successful 
bids within three years  between 1990 and 2000 to investigate how returns to bidders 
making bids for public, private and subsidiary  targets, using cash and stock vary by 
merger terms and target  characteristics.  Five-day abnormal returns (starting two days 
prior to and ending two days  after the announcement date) to initial bids in the three-year 
bid series are larger in magnitude  than returns to fifth and higher  ranked bids. The finding 
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supports the hypothesis  that initial bids are less anticipated and hence, abnormal  returns' 
to these  bids are larger in magnitude than  subsequent  bids. 
In the same spirit as Fuller et al. (2004), Ismail (2005) compiles  bids from 
frequent  bidders to investigate the variation in bidder's  returns while holding bidder 
characteristics  constant.  Sample bids are compiled  from SDC (Security Data Company) 
merger  database. Sample firms are US, public, nonfinancial  firms covered in CRSP 
which  propose  bids between  1985 and2004. The author  tracks  the acquisition history  of 
firms throughout the sample period, rather than focusing on bids made in three years as 
Fuller  et al. (2004)  do. Five-day abnormal  retums (starting two days prior to and ending 
two days after the announcement  date) to bidders, which do not engage in multiple 
acquisitions, prove significantly  larger than bidders, which do. 
2.1.3 Studies  focusing on the time elapsed between  subsequent bids in the industry 
Song and Walkling (2000 and 2005) develop an intuitive  measure to distinguish 
anticipated from unanticipated  announcements.  The authors name this measure the 
dormant period, and define it as the length of time (in months) in between  succeeding 
merger bids in and industry.  Song  and Walkling (2000 and 2005) classify an 
announcement  as "unanticipated" if the dormant period is greater one year, and as 
"anticipated" if the dormant period is less than  one year. 
Song and Walkling (2000 and 2005) conjecture that unanticipated  merger 
announcements reveal information  about merger prospects  of rivals of the bidder and 
target. The authors hypothesize that rivals of initial acquisition  targets earn abnormal 
returns at the time of the announcement because  of the increased  probability that they 
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will be targets  themselves. Similarly, rivals  of initial bidder rivals earn abnormal  retums 
because  of the increased  probability that they will be bidders themselves. 
Song and Walkling (2000) compile acquisition bids using Mergerstat  Review for 
the period from 1982 to 1991. Rival firms of targets earn significant  and positive returns 
at the time of unanticipated  bids. Furthermore, rivals that subsequently  become targets 
earn significantly higher abnormal  returns than rivals that do not. Song and Walkling 
(2005)  use the SDC merger database to identify bids made by US, nonfinancial  firms 
covered in CRSP  in the period from 1985 to 2001. The authors find that at the time of an 
unanticipated  merger announcement, abnormal returns  to rival firms of bidders that  will 
become  bidders themselves  prove significant  and positive. 
The findings support the hypothesis that unanticipated merger  announcements 
reveal information  about merger prospects of rivals of bidder and target candidates. By 
scrutinizing  merger frequency  in the industry, markets  seem to be anticipating whether  a 
firm will propose or receive a bid prior to its merger announcement.  On the one hand, 
studies using merger programs  and frequency of bids to identify investor anticipations 
provide evidence that investors anticipate  announcements. On the other hand, Song and 
Walkling (2000 and 2005) provide evidence on when investors  start anticipating 
announcements,  and the impact of these anticipations  on share prices. 
2.2 Studits using predictive models to forecast target candidates 
A complementary  body of research uses predictive models to analyze which firms 
become target candidates [Palepu (1986); Ambrose and Megginson  (1992): Akhigbe  et 
d. (2004)1. The objective  of these studies is to determine whether  investors can earn 
22 
abnormal  returns by investing  in firms  that the models  predict as potential targets.  Hence, 
these  studies don't  investigate  investor anticipations; rather they seek to test the market 
efficiency  hypothesis in the context  of mergers. 
Palepu (1986) uses public information  available prior to announcements  to study 
whether investors correctly predict targetcandidates.  The author uses a logit model in 
which the endogenous  variable takes on the value one it the firm receives bid in the next 
year, and zero if it does not. The coefficients of the model are estimated  using a sample 
of mining and manufacturing firms that were acquired  during the period l97l to 1979, 
and a sample  of firms that were not acquired as of 1979. The author finds that the models 
provide a statistically significant explanation of a firm's acquisition probability. 
However,  the magnitude of this explanatory power is low. The model explains only 12.45 
percent  of the variation in acquisition  probability. 
Ambrose  and Megginson  (1992) extend the Palepu (1986) model by incorporating 
measures of insider and institutional shareholdings, and by examining the deterrent  effect 
of various  takeover  defenses. The authors randomly  sample a quarter  of the firms listed 
on NYSE or ASE in 1981, which have data available  on CRSP and COMpUSTAT. Scans 
of Wall Street  Joumal and CRSP in the years 1981 to 1986 identify  which of the sample 
firms received bids in this period. The authors find that extending  the model increases the 
predictive power significantly. However,  explanatory power remains low. 
In contrast to Palepu (1936) and Ambrose  and Megginson (lgg1), Aldrigbe et al. 
(2004) are not interested in the predictability  of target candidates. Rather, they focus on 
how investor anticipations  affect announcement abnormal returns. Akhigbe et at. (2004) 
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interpret the predicted probability  of a bank becoming a target candidate  as a proxy for 
investor anticipations about target candidacy. The higher is the predicted  probability, the 
more markets anticipate the bank to become  a target.  The authors  use these predicted 
probabilities to investigate how abnormal returns vary with investor  expectations. 
Akhigbe  et al. (2N4) compile all bank acquisitions occurring between  1987 and 
2001 using SDC mergers  database. Nontarget banks are all banks that did not receive 
bids between 1987 and 2001,  and which are covered  in CRSP.  A logit model estimates 
the probability of any bank receiving a merger bid. The predictive  power of the model is 
high. The model  classifies  81.1 percent  of the banks  correctly. 
Based  on the median  predicted  probabilities,  Akhighbe  et al. (2W4) split their 
target-bank sample  into two. The authors  fail to find a significant difference in mean 
cumulative  abnormal returns -  event window from one day before to one day after 
announcements  -- between high-probability  (above median) and the low-probability 
(below median) subsamples. The findings  indicate that investor anticipations  are not 
reflected  in share prices prior to the merger announcements. 
2.3 Sndies using conditianal  event-study methodology 
Eckbo, Maksimovic and Williams (1990) use a simultaneous-equations 
framework to study abnormal bidder and target retums.  The authors model investor 
anticipations of: merger activity; regulatory authorities'  challenge  of mergers; and legal 
resolution of any merger challenges.  We also use a simultaneous-equations  framework to 
study investor anticipations  and announcement returns. However, Eckbo, Maksimovic 
and Williams (1990) study sffesses the information  revealed in the regulatory challenge 
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and the legal resolution of the challenge  whereas this study stresses the unanticipated' 
information  revealed about managerial motives. 
Eckbo, Maksimovic  and Williams (1990) compile a sample of horizontal mergers 
(which  shareholders approved) between  1963 and 1981. The authors track the mergers  ro 
determine  whether they face regulatory  challenges and how these challenges are resolved. 
Some of the announcements  are faced with regulatory challenges to the proposed 
mergers. Some of the challenges  receive a favorable judgment  that allows them to 
complete  the merger while others do not. 
The Eckbo, Maksimovic  and Williams  (1990) model can successfully  predict 
bidders, but not target candidates.  As a result, the correction for simultaneous-equations 
bias proves  significant in bidder cumulative  abnormal regressions,  ofld not target 
regressions.  The authors conjecture that managers' of bidders, but not targets, have 
private information about potential synergies from proposed mergers. The coefficient  of 
managerial private information proves positive suggesting  that markets react favorably to 
revelations  about managerial private information. 
2,4 What this study adds to the literature 
This study advances the literature  in three ways: (i) we analyze what market 
responses to announcement surprises reveal about unanticipated  managerial  motives; (ii) 
we develop a more complete model of investor  anticipations;  and (iii) we compile a 
comprehensive sample of merging  and nonmerging  firms during the period from 19g2 to 
2004. 
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The endogenous  nature of investor anticipations  and market responses means that' 
announcement abnormal-returns  reflect the change in expectations about merger value 
and stand-alone enterprise  value. The econometrically correct  way to study market 
responses  to announcements is to model the selection  and structural equations  together. 
The selection equation  models managerial merger choice. The structural equation models 
market responses to merger announcements,  i.e. abnormal returns. 
The first-stage selection  model lets us adjust  the structural equation  for the self- 
selection bias by generating Heckman's  lambda. Heckman's lambda is a continuous, 
instrumental variable that allows  us to analyze and test market responses  to previously 
unobservable motives. 
Merger progrtrms, the frequency  of merger bids, and the time elapsed between 
bids are used to differentiate anticipated and unanticipated  deals, and to boil the selection 
equation to a single instrumental  variable. While this approach  represents an easy  and 
intuitive way to address investor anticipations,  we believe that to capture investor 
anticipations,  it is better to incorporate multiple merger motives that include elements of 
outstanding theories. The result  is that models of investor anticipations  capture the extent 
of investor anticipations more accurately  than do models that focus on a single  firm or 
industry characteri stic. 
. The predictive models of Palepu (1986) and Ambrose and Megginson  (1992) 
model the selection  equation and incorporate  multiple merger motives. However, these 
studies do not consider the inherent link between investor anticipations  and 
announcement returns.  Their sole aim is to determine whether target candidates can be 
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predicted  using public information.  Furthermore,  in estimating their models, the authors 
do not consider the full universe of merging  and nonmerging  firms; rather, they focus on 
subsets of the merging  and nonmerging firms mainly for ease of computation. 
Akhigbe et aI. Q004) use a predictive  model with multiple merger motives  to 
estimate  investor anticipations.  The authors  consider the link between  investor 
anticipations and announcement returns.  However, their model of investor  anticipations 
and announcement  returns is econometrically unsound.  The authors plug the predicted 
merger probabilities  into the structural equation without considering the distributional 
properties  and the correlation structure of the errors in the selection and structural 
equations.  The authors only consider  mergers of financial firms whereas we focus on 
nonfinancial firms. 
Our study differs from the Eckbo, Malaimovic  and Williams  (1990)  in three 
respects. First, we focus on how investor anticipations and announcement  abnormal 
returns whereas Eckbo, Maksimovic  and Williams (1990) stress the effects of the 
regulatory  challenges  and the resolution  of these challenges.  Second, we consider the 
effect of information  asymmetries and conflicts of interest in our model, whereas Eckbo, 
Maksimovic and Williams  (1990) assume incentive conflicts and information 
asymmetries away. We believe that relaxing  the Modigliani and Miller (1953) 
assumptions  of no frictions yield interesting results  about  how market frictions  change 
managerial investment  decisions and affect investors' pricing of the post-merger 
enterprise. Third, our sample is composed of both merging and nonmerging  firms 
whereas  the Eckbo, Maksimovic and Williams (1990) sample consists of only merging 
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firms. Prabhala (1997) shows that conditional  event study methods yield more precise 
and efficient  results only when the sample  consists  of both event and non-event  firrrs. 
Research  Methods 
This section describes  the research method we use to investigate  market rcsponses 
to announcements.  First, we review the research methods that related studies employ to 
model market responses, and discuss the problems associated  with using a single- 
equation model. Second, we develop a two-equation framework  to model  investor 
anticipations and market responses,  and explain our strategy to identify the system of 
equations. Third, we describe the predictors  of bidder and target candidacy, and the 
variables that affect  market responses to announcements. 
3.7 Single-equatinn models that investigate mark et responses to announcements 
In their surveys about merger  studies,  Jensen and Ruback  (1983), Jarell, Brickley 
and Netter (1988) and Andrade, Mitchell  and Stafford (2001), find that a single equation 
models market responses to announcements.  Cumulative abnormal returns to bidder and 
target shareholders (henceforth  CAR) are defined as cumulated  returns around a merger 
announcement that are benchmarked against "normal" returns, which the merging  firms 
would have realized  had they not announced the merger.  A market model with CRSP 
equally-weighted  or value-weighted index as the market portfolio generates normal 
retums. CARs identify market responses to announcements.  Equations 1 and 2 represent 
the sin'gle-equation  models that investigate, respectively, bidder and target cumulative 
abnormal  returns. We let CARB and CARr represent bidder and target cumulative 
abnormal returns. The regressors  (X) are proxies for factors that determine  the abnormal 
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returns to bidder and target shareholders . Lt B and u, are assumed to be mean-zero, 
constant variance error terms. 
I CARB-Xnas*ttB, 
2 CAR. - Xrdr *ur. 
3.1.1 Problems associated with using a single-equation  model 
Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988)  state that "... Many of the studies  reviewed  in 
this paper are event studies that measure the effects  of certain unanticipated  events (such 
as a takeover  or other control contest) on stock prices after correcting for overall market 
influence on security returns. Any finding of abnormal returns,  therefore,  shows how the 
stock market  views the impact  of the event on the firm's corlmon  stockholders." As 
Jarrell,  Brickley and Netter (1988) point  out, for abnormal  returns  to measure  the impact 
of mergers on bidder and target shareholder  value, mergers must be exogenous and 
unanticipated. 
If outside forces randomly selected  the firms that propose and solicit bids, merger 
announcements would be exogenous  and complete surprises.  However,  it is managers, 
and not outside forces who determine whether and when their firm proposes  or solicits a 
bid. Furthermore,  investors evaluate publicly available information about the firm, 
industry,  and management team  to assess  both the likelihood of mergers  and their effect 
on bidder and target shareholder  value. Consequently, investor anticipations about bidder 
and target candidacy mean that merger announcements  are neither exogenous nor 
unanticipated. 
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Abnormal returns around  announcements don't measure the impact  of mergers, 
rather they measure the impact  of unanticipated information that announcements  convey. 
Single-equation  models of bidder and target  abnormal returns ignore the endogeneity of 
market responses and investor anticipatibns. However, the endogeneity  of merger 
announcements  means that u, andu, in equations 1 and 2 ue not mean-zero, constant- 
variance error  terms. Furthermore,  if the regressors  in equations  1 and 2 include  variables 
that investors  may use to predict bidder  and target candidacy,  then the error terms, 
u, andu, , and the regressors  are correlated. 
Malatesta  and Thompson  (1985), Fuller  et al. (2004),  Ismail  (2005)  and Song and 
Walkling (2000 and 2005) use instrumental variables  -such  as the existence of merger 
programs, the frequency  of merger bids, or the time elapsed between bids- to address the 
problem of endogeneity in the single-equation  model. While this approach represents an 
easy  and intuitive  way to address investor  anticipations, a two-equation framework that 
explicitly  models the correlation  structure between investor anticipations  and market 
responses  is the econometrically  correct model to use. Furthermore, the two-equation 
model incorporates  multiple merger motives to estimate investor anticipations whereas 
the single-equation  model relies on a single firm or industry characteristic. 
3.2 Developing a  two-equalion model to investigate mark et responses  to 
announcentents 
Oar goal is to link investor anticipations  and market responses. We first analyze a 
model that abstracts from two market frictions:  incentive conflicts and information 
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asymmetries between  shareholders and management. Then, we introduce incentive 
conflicts and information asymmetries  into the model and analyze  how these frictions 
alter the research  method.  Finally,  we discuss  the assumptions  we make to identify the 
system of equations. 
3.2.1 Benchmark model with no incentive  conflicts and information  asymmetries 
The benchmark  model assumes incentive conflicts and information asymmetries 
between shareholders  and management away. Assuming incentive conflicts away means 
that management  works solely to generate shareholder  value. The absence of information 
asymmetries means that managerial motives are transparent. Transparency  signifies that 
announcements  cannot provide new information about managerial  motives. We let 
MrandMrdenote,  respectively, bidder and target managerial motives to propose and 
solicit a bid. Equations 3 and 4 partition the bidder and target management's  merger 
decision, respectively: 
M B > 0 bidder proposes a merger  bid;3 
M B < 0 bidder doesn't propose  a merger bid. 
M r > 0 target  solicts a merger  bid; 
M r < 0 target doesn't solicrt a merger bid. 
Managers self-select into the sample.  But investors  do not need to draw inferences 
about managerial motives. Hence, investor anticipations  about bidder and target 
candidacy  and market responses to announcements are not linked. Merger 
announcements  only disclose information about the confidential items of negotiation  and 
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the terms of the merger  contract.  Econometrically, a single-equation structural  model is 
sufficient to study the impact of merger announcements  on bidder and target shareholder 
value. Equations  5 and 6 model market responses to announcements. The regressors (X) 
represent  proxies for the confidential items of negotiation, and merger terms. ea alrrd7r 
ate mean-zero,  constant-variance error terms. 
,.
5 CARB I M r> 0 - CAR, - X sda *Uni 
6 CAR, lM, > 0 = CARr = Xr&r * Ur. 
3.2.2 Two-equation model with incentive  conflicts and information asymmetries 
We inffoduce two market frictions, information  asymmetries  and incentive 
conflicts,  and investigate  how these frictions alter the research  method. The presence of 
incentive conflicts  means  that managers  may strive to generate opportunistic benefits  at 
the expense  of shareholder  value. Information asymmetries arise because we assume that 
managers, as decision-makers,  have  timelier and finer information than investors about 
current and planned operations of the firm. Information asymmetries between 
management  and investors mean that managerial motives  are opaque. 
Equations 7 and8 model managerial merger choice to, respectively,  propose and 
solicit bids. M| andMi denote imperfectly  observable bidder  and target managerial 
motives, respectively. The regressors,  Zs and 27, raptasent firm, industry,  management 
characteristics  that investors might use to predict bidder and target candidacy. 
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Zryrand'Zry,  represent investor anticipations about bidder and target managerial 
motives,  respectively. e, and e, represent  unanticipated  managerial  motives. 
M; =ZnTn + €B; 
M; > 0 bidder proposes a merger bid; 
M; < 0 bidder doesn't propose. 
M; =zrT, + tr; 
M ; > 0 hrgetsolicits  a merger bid; 
M; < 0 hrget doesn't solicit. 
Equations 9 and 10 model, respectively, bidder  and target cumulative  abnormal 
returns  conditional on firms proposing and soliciting  bids. Upon observing 
announcements,  investors draw inferences about motives driving mergers.  The inferences 
drawn about managerial  motives influence how investors price the post-announcement 
enterprises.  Therefore, the error terms in equations 7 and 9, and8 and l0 are correlated. 
CARB I M;> 0 = Xfn + (sn I M;> 0 )f,, * U ni 
10 CAR, lM; >0 = Xfr + (€rlM; >0 )Fo *er. 
In this model,  investors learn from merger announcements  in two ways. First, 
announcements reveal information  about the confidential items of negotiations, and 
merger terms (X"and'Xr).  Second, announcements  also reveal information about 
previously unobservable  managerial motives (e u I Mi > 0 and e, I M ] > g.  Hence, 
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market responses to merger announcements are tied to anticipations  about bidder and' 
target  candidacy. 
3.2.3 Estimation  of the two-equation model 
To study the wages women earn, Heckman  (1979) develops a two-stage selection 
model with a correction  for simultaneous-equations bias. Members of the sample choose 
to work. The choice  means  there is self -selection.  The decision to work depends on the 
wage that women can earn;  the working  decision  and the wage earned  are simultaneously 
determined. 
We adapt Heckman's two-stage selection model to study how investor 
anticipations  influences market  responses to announcements. The first stage anallzes the 
merger decision and investor anticipations.  Equations  7 and 8 represent  the merger 
decision and investor anticipations.  The second stage analyzes cumulative abnormal 
returns to bidders and targets.  Heckman's lambda is an instrumental variable  consffucted 
from the merger decision (first-stage selection  model) parameter  estimates. Heckman's 
lambda adjusts for the simultaneous-equations  bias that arises in a single-equation 
structural model when the structural and selection  equations  a.re both influenced  by the 
same variables.  In bidder and target equations, Heckman's lambdas  are inverse 
transformations of the probability of proposing  and soliciting a bid respectively. The 
more an announcement surprises the market, the more information  about  unanticipated 
merger motives is  revealed, and the larger is Heckman's lambda. We let 
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\9j|r'.j.-l-Fffi,j=B,T.F,quations1land12representthesecond-),j =(t,lM*, >ol=JFZ J")
stage structural  models of bidder and target CARs,  respectively: 
ll CARBIM;  >0 = Xf s * trrf* reBi 
T2 CAR, lM; > 0 = Xfr + 4f^r +U, 
A priori one cannot assign a negative or positive coefficient estimate  to 
Heckman's lambda in the regressions  of cumulative abnormal  returns. Unanticipated 
managerial motives promise  to be a mix of the shareholder value and opportunistic 
managerial  benefits the merger  generates. Heckman's lambda is an inverse  transform of 
investor anticipations.  It measure surprise. Its coefficient would be positive when 
investors  assess merger motives to promote interests of shareholders  more  than 
opportunistic motives  might harm them. 
3.2.4 Identification in the two-stage  model 
Econometrically, the nonlinear  character of Heckman's lambda identifies the two- 
stage selection model.  One can use the same set of variables  linearly  in the selection and 
structural equations,  and both equations  would  be identified. A solid rationale for 
isolating variables that might drive the merger  decision  without affecting market 
responses to announcements  (and vice versa) provides a stronger basis for identifying  the 
model. 
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Prior to the announcement,  investors approximate  managerial motives using 
publicly available information. To estimate  investor anticipations about bidder and target 
candidacy, we only use information  publicly available prior to announcements.  In 
estimating market responses to announcements,  we introduce proxies for the confidential 
items of negotiations,  merger terms, the fit between merger partners, and unanticipated 
managerial motives. 
We exclude public information available prior to the announcement  from our 
model of announcement abnormal  returns on the grounds that, in an efficient market, 
share  prices should already  reflect this information.  We do not include information  on the 
items of negotiations,  merger terms and merger fit in the selection model on the grounds 
that investors  don't have access to this confidential information  prior to announcements. 
Information  on merger terms and partner identity is private knowledge prior to the 
announcement. 
The assumption  about market  efficiency identifies the system of equations. In 
robustness  tests, we relax the assumption of market efficiency. We introduce proxies for 
information available  prior to the announcement in the structural model to analyze how 
sensitive our results are to the assumption about market efficiency. 
3.3 Describing the endogenous variables  used to estimate the two-equalion  model 
This section describes  the exogenous variables  that we use to estimate models of 
bidder and target equations (equations  7 and 8), and market responses to announcements 
(equations 11 and 12). First, we describe the proxies  for managerial motives  that may 
predict  bidder and target candidacy. Second,  we describe the proxies for the confidential 
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items of negotiation,  merger terms, and bidder and target fit that may influence' 
cumulative abnormal returns  to bidder  and target shareholders. 
3.3.1 Predictors of bidder and target candidacy 
In a Modigliani-Miller  (1958) world with no market frictions, markets would 
completely anticipate managerial motives. Merger announcements  would only reveal 
information  about confidential items of negotiation  and merger terms. In reality, markets 
can only partially anticipate managerial  motives due to information  asymmetries  and 
conflicts  of interest. In this chapter,  we review studies that analyze the merger motives of 
management.  We rely on these studies to identify predictors of bidder and target 
candidacy. 
In a Modigliani-Miller (1958) world with no incentive  conflicts and information 
asymmetries managers  would only work to generate shareholder wealth.  The Modigliani- 
Miller model implies that bidder  and target management,  respectively,  would  propose 
and solicit bids only when the merger serves shareholder interests. Two important 
frictions that change the predictions of the Modigliani-Miller  model are: incentive 
conflicts between management and shareholders, and information asymmetries  between 
bidder and target management,  and shareholders. 
Some  models emphasize the incentive conflicts between  shareholders  and 
managers and highlight the importance of opportunistic managerial  benefits in motivating 
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merger activity4. Management  has two conflicting goals: to increase shareholder wealth' 
and to increase  opportunistic benefits at the expense of shareholders. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) stress information  asymmetries and show that 
mispricing  in share prices may alter investment  decisions. Managers  as decision-makers 
have private information  about firm operations and prospects. Two opposing views 
investigate  whether  managers utilize their information  advantage  in mergers  to serve 
shareholders  or to protect managerial opportunistic benefits. On the one hand, managers, 
who believe  their stock to be overvalued, may try fo generate long-run value for pre- 
merger shareholders at the expense of post-merger shareholders  [Hansen (1937); 
Schleifer and Vishny (2003); Rhodes-Kropf  and Viswanathan (2004)1. On the other hand 
overvaluation  may intensify incentive conflicts between managers and shareholders. 
Managers may be tempted to destroy shareholder  value using mergers financed with 
overvalued equity in an attempt  to protect opportunistic benefits at the expense of both 
pre- and post-merger shareholders (Jensen, 2005). Table 4 tabulates  theoretical studies 
according  to their focus  on different merger motives, and their assumptions about market 
frictions. 
We want to explain how the individual  regressors  that predict candidacy relate to 
relevant managerial  motives and constraints. We first review the studies that focus on 
shareholder  value creation, and describe  the proxies we adopt to represent motives to 
generate shareholder value.  Then, we review studies that introduce information 
n Jensen and Meckling O976) model managerial investment decisions  when imperfect contacting  and
costly monitoring allow management  to pursue opportunistic  benefits. Jensen (2004), Datta d at (ZOO1), 
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&asymmetries and incentive conflicts,  and how introducing  these frictions change the' 
predictions of the Modigliani-Miller  model. Finally, we describe the proxies we adopt to 
represent motives to generate opportunistic benefits,  and motives to exploit information 
asymmetries. 
3.3.1.1 Proxies for managerial  motives to generate  shareholder value 
A strand  of theoretical and empirical  studies fest whether and how the different 
ways in which managers generate shareholder value affect announcement  abnormal 
retums or operating  performance  [Gort (1969); Holmes and Schmitz (1995); Mitchell  
Mulherin (1996); Fluck and Lynch (L999); Maksimovic   Phillips (2001); Andrade, 
Mitchell,  and Stafford (2001)1. Another strand of empirical  studies investigates whether 
investors can predict target candidacy  using proxies that represent motives to generate 
shareholder value [Palepu (1986);  Ambrose and Megginson  (1992): Akhigbe  et al. 
(2004)1. We are interested in identifying  proxies to represent  managerial merger motives. 
Hence, our focus is to review theoretical  models that develop  the different  ways in which 
mergers may generate shareholder value, and describe the proxies empirical  studies use 
to represent managerial motives to generate shareholder  value. We then discuss which of 
these  proxies  we adopt, and why. 
and Hartzell  et al. (2ffi4) study how opportunistic benefits  motivate merger actlity. 
40' 
3.3.1.1.1  Review  of theoretical  studies thal stress the dffirent  ways in which ,nergers 
generate  shareholder value 
Theoretical  studies, that assume incentive conflicts and information asymmetries 
away, focus on how mergers may generate shareholder  value. These studies establish that 
mergers may generate shareholder  value by: capitalizing on differences in valuation 
about  the firm; channeling human  and financiat capital to better uses; accessing 
economies  of scale and scope; and enhancing  market power [Gort  (1969);  Holmes and 
Schmitz  (1995); Fluck and Lynch (1999)1. 
Gort (1969) cites two reasons that may motivate  management to propose  and 
receive merger bids. First, consolidation  may increase  revenues  by enhancing market 
power, and/or decreases  costs by achieving  economies  of scale and scope. Second, bidder 
and target shareholders may disagree about  the value of the target firm. In the second 
case, both parties may expect to gain from the merger even  though  neither  party foresees 
a rise in value from combining businesses. The author models  discrepancies in valuation 
arising from how different  investors weigh and process information.  The author also 
hypothesizes that economic  disturbances, such as rapid changes in technology and stock 
prices, make differences in information-processing capacity more important, which in 
turn prompt mergers. 
Unlike Gort (1969), Holmes and Schmitz  (1995)  and Fluck and Lynch (lggg) 
concentrate  on how managers may achieve  economies  of scale and scope rather than 
focusing on the firm and industry characteristics  that may aid the firm in achieving 
economies of scale and scope. Holmes and Schmitz  (1995) develop  a model of business 
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failure and sale. In this model,  two components of the management and business pairing 
(namely,  match quality and business quality)  determine firm value.  Intuitively, match 
quality refers to how much shareholder value a particular management-business pairing 
will generate. Business  quality  refers to the potential  of the business to generate 
shareholder  value, independent  of the quality of the management-business pairing. The 
authors  show that mergers  generate  shareholder  value by channeling  investment 
opportunities  (firms with high business quality) to management teams who are better 
equipped to manage  them (managers  which have high match quality). 
Fluck and Lynch (1999) develop  a model in which the target and bidder  use 
mergers  to access  capital markets that are not available to them as stand-alone  firms. 
Mergers  generate  shareholder value by enabling  managers  to finance  positive net present 
value, which they would not have been able to finance without  the merger. 
3.3.1.1.2 Descriptions  of the proxies we adopt to represent motives  to generate 
shareholder  value 
Table 5 tabulates  the empirical implications of theoretical  merger  studies, the 
empirical  studies that test these implications, and the proxies used to represent the 
managerial motives. Panels A, B and C respectively  categorize the empirical predictions 
according to the theoretical  model's assumptions about frictions such incentive conflicts 
and information asymmetries. First, this section reviews the proxies that Table 5 
tabulates.  Second,  it describes the proxies we adopt. Third, this section predicts a positive 
or negative relation  between  the proxies, and bidder and target candidacy. 
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3.3.1.1 .2,l Sales shock and square of sales shock 
Some studies  test whether industry-wide  shocks  affect announcement  abnormal 
returns  [Gort (1969); Palepu (1986);  Mitchell and Mulherin (1996); Maksimovic  and 
Phillips (2001); Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001)1. Mirchell  and Mulherin (1996) 
argue that economic  disturbances would cause rapid changes in employee  and sales. The 
authors  use two variables sales shock and employment shock to measure whether the 
industry experienced differences in sales and employee  growth relative to all the 
industries. Sales (employment)  shock is the absolute  value of the difference  between 
industry sales (employment)  growth and average sales (employment)  growth for all 
industries. 
We adopt  the Mitchell and Mulherin  (1996) sales-shock variable  as a proxy for 
economic disturbances  that may motivate mergers. We define sales shockas the absolute 
value of the difference  between the industrys  two-year  sales growth and the median sales 
growth for all firms.  Sales growth is the ratio of net sales 9 quarters prior to the 
announcement  minus net sales 1 quarter prior to the announcement  to net sales 9 quarters 
prior6. kr light of both the economic disturbance hypothesis,  and the information 
asymmetry models, we predict that firms in industries experiencing  sales shocks are more 
likely to both make  and receive  acquisition bids. To account for convexity  in the sales- 
t-!" 
4 lryl-ttage variables  that rely on industry classification, the two-digit SIC codes reported in CRSp-
COI\{PUSTAT identify indusffies.  If there are fewer than five firms in an industry, the single-digit SIC
code is used. 
6 If data on net sales 9 quarters prior are missing, we find the next nonmissing sales data and calculate  the 
two years sales growth by extrapolating. For example, if we only have nonmisiing  data 5 quarters prior, the
two- year sales  growth  is the ratio of net sales 5 quarters prior minus  net sales I quarter  prior to net sales 5
quarters prior multiplied by two. This procedure  of extrapolation is used in all pioxies tirat rely on lagged 
data. 
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shock variable,  we include a second  variable, the square of sales shock. Firms may desire 
to reallocate  resources if the shock is direr, Hence, we predict that the coefficient of the 
square of sales shock variable  is positive  in both the bidder  and target-candidacy  models. 
3.3.1.1.2,2  Share turnover 
Gort (1969) predicts that discrepancies in valuation  cause merger activity. We 
define share turnover as the ratio of the number of shares  traded  to number of shares 
outstanding, and use it as a proxy for discrepancies  in valuation. The fewer shares traded 
relative to shares outstanding, the less transparent  the share price is and the harder it is to 
discern  the extent of discrepancies in valuation between bidder  and target  management. 
We predict that the more  opaque  the shares  of a firm are, the more likely managernent  is 
to propose  and receive bids. 
3.3.L.1.2.3  Sales growth 
The need to respond to economic  disturbances and develop economies of scale 
and scope, as well as the possibilities  for building market power support the idea that 
growth in demand  might predict  bidder  and target  candidacy. Growth in production [Gort 
(1969)1,  growth in sales [Palepu (1986); Ambrose and Megginson (1992); and, Mitchell 
and Mulherin (1996)1,  growth in assets  [Ak*rigbe  et al. (2001)], and growth in employees 
[Mitchell and Mulherin (1996)]  are used to test the hypothesis that demand growth 
predicts bidder  and target candidacy. 
We use sales  growth to proxy for growth in demand. According  to Gort (L969), 
when investors  disagree about  the valuation of firm, it is cheaper to grow through 
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acquisitions than it is through capacity  expansions. Hence, on the one hand Gort (1969)' 
predicts that demand growth encourages  merger activity. On the other hand, Gort (1969) 
cites that if developing  economies  of scale and scope is motivating management, then 
demand growth discourages  mergers since it is cheaper to build capacity than it is to buy 
it in growing industries.  Hence, we can't predict the sign of the sales growth variable in 
bidder  and target-candidacy  models. 
3.3.1.1.2.4  Concentration ratio 
Models of economic disturbances  and market power both imply that barriers  to 
entry predict bidder and target  candidacy. Gort (1969) and Eckbo, Maksimovic,  and 
Williams (1990) use the concentration  ratio as a proxy for barriers to entry.  Concentration 
ratio is a measure of how much of the output (according  to Gort (1969)) or sales 
(according to Eckbo,  Maksimovic,  and Williams (1990)) the four largest firms in the 
industry  control. 
We adopt Eckbo, Maksimovic, and Williams'  (1990) proxy for barriers  to entry 
and define concentration ratio as the ratio of sales of the largest four firms (in terms of 
sales)  to total industry  sales.  However, Baumol  (1952) defines  perfectly  contestable 
markets as markets in which entry is absolutely  free and exit is absolutely  costless. In a 
perfectly contestable market, the threat of entry is sufficient to force an incumbent  to set 
prices at marginal cost. Hence, a high concentration  ratio need not indicate high barriers 
to entry, but economies  of scope enjoyed by incumbents. If economies  of scope  exist, 
concentration ratio might predict bidder  and target candidacy. 
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3.3.I".1 .2.5 Change in size 
Some  studies investigate  whether  and how the desire to reduce cost through 
economies of scale and scope might affect bidder abnormal returns. If economies  of scale 
or scope exist, changes in the average  size of firm (measured  pre-merger) and in the 
number of firms in the industry would predict bidder and target candidacy.  Gort (1969) 
uses the change in size and the change in number  of firms in the industry  to investigate 
this issue. However, some other empirical  studies use size and not the change in size in 
their studies  [Palepu (1986); Ambrose and Megginson  (1992); Maksimovic and Phillips 
(2001); Moeller et al. (2004)1. Similarly, Eckbo, Maksimovic, and Williams  (1990)  use 
the number of nonmerging  firms, rather than the change in size to study how the structure 
of the industry affects merger activity. 
We use the log of assets to proxy size.  The hypothesis of economies  of scale 
predicts  that larger  firms are more likely to propose bids and that smaller  firms  are more 
likely to solicit bids. We define change  in sizeT  as the ratio of the change in the book 
value of assets of the firm nine quarters prior to the announcement to assets one quarter 
prior to the announcement. 
3.3.\.1.2.6 Return on assets 
Financial ratios such as Tobin's Q, average excess return, accounting  return on 
equity, return on assets, and capital-to-asset  ratio [Lang et aI. (1989); Palepu (1986); 
 If data on total assets  9 quarters prior are missing, we find the next  nonmissing sales data and calculate the 
two years sales growth  by extrapolating. For example,  if we only have nonmissing data four quarters prior, 
the  change in size is the ratio of the change in assets  in the previous year prior to announcement over  assets 
5 quarters prior multiplied  by two. 
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Ambrose and Megginson  (1992); Akhigbe et at. (2004)l and ratios,  such as total factor 
productivity and value added per worker [Maksimovic  and Phillips (2001)], that represent 
whether  the firm is on the frontier of the production function, may be used  to proxy for 
the concepts of "business  and match  quality"  that Holmes  and Schmitz  (1995)  develop. 
Lang et al. (1989) define Tobin's Q as the ratio of the firm's market value to the 
replacement  cost of its assets. Ambrose and Megginson  (1992) define average excess 
return as the difference  between  observed returns and expected  returns -generated using a 
market  model. Palepu (1986) defines  accounting return on equity as the ratio  of net 
income before extraordinary  items and discontinued operations to common and preferred 
equity. Akhigbe  et at. (2004) defines  capitalto-asset  ratio as the ratio of total equity  to 
total assets. Maksimovic  and Phillips (2001) define total factor productivity as the output 
produced for given amount of inputs  minus predicted  output - predicted  output estimated 
using a translog industry-production-function.  Maksimovic and Phillips (2[[I)define 
value  added per worker as the ratio of sales minus  the cost of materials  to the number of 
workers. 
We use profitability to proxy for business and match quality. We define returns 
on assets  (ROA) as the ratio of book value of net income before extraordinary  (or 
nonrecurring)  items to total assets. Economies-of-scale  hypothesis predicts that profitable 
firms are more likely to achieve  efficiency  gains and are more likely to propose bids. 
Unprofitable  firms make more likely target candidates since they show greater room for 
improvement. 
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3.3.1.1.2.7  Mismatch  in resources  and growth opportunities 
Fluck and Lynch (1999)  show that firms may engage in mergers to overcome 
financial difficulty.  Financial synergy may enable the post-merger enterprise to recognize 
and pursue  options to invest in additional  assets and projects. Palepu (1989), and 
Ambrose  and Megginson (1992) test whether a mismatch  in capital resources of the firm 
and its sales growth opportunities predict  target  candidacy.  The authors hypothesize that 
firms with high (low) growth opportunities  and constrained (unconstrained) access to 
capital  markets are more likely to receive (propose) acquisition bids. The authors  also use 
leverage  and liquidity to proxy for financial constraints. 
We adopt the mismatch in resources  and growth opportunities variable of palepu 
(1989)' and Ambrose  and Megginson  (1992).  Mismatch in resources  and growth 
opportunities  indicator takes on the value one if the two-year sales growth is larger 
(smaller)  than the industry median and the ratio of long-term debt to total assets is lower 
(higher) than the industry median. We predict that firms with a mismatch in capital 
resources and growth opportunities  are more likely to make and solicit bids. 
3.3.1.2 Proxies for managerial  motives to generate opportunistic benefits 
A strand of theoretical  and empirical studies investigates whether motives  to 
generate opportunistic  benefits  motivate  mergers  [Manne  (1965);  Jensen  and Meckling 
(1976);  Jensen  (1986)1. This chapter  reviews  the theoretical  models that stress managerial 
motives  to generate opportunistic benefits,  and the empirical  studies that develop proxies 
for how management generates  opportunistic  benefits. We then discuss  which of these 
proxies  we adopt,  and why. 
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3.3.1.2.1 Revipw of theoretical  studies that stress the dffirent ways in whieh ,nergers 
generale  shareholder value 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) model incentive conflicts between managers and 
shareholders.  Mergers are investment projects that may present managers with the 
opportunity to generate private benefits. Managers may enjoy monetary  and nonmonetary 
opportunistic benefits related with managrng a larger company. Monetary  benefits 
include possible increases in salary  and bonuses that the manager  may enjoy for 
managing a larger company. Nonmonetary benefits  may include possible  increases  in 
status or openings to further the career of the managers.  These monetary and 
nonmonetary  benefits  are opportunistic since they increase the utility of managers at the 
expense of shareholders.  The model  implies that managers may engage in mergers not to 
generate shareholder  value, but to generate opportunistic benefits. 
To mitigate incentive  conflicts, compensation contracts and corporate-governance 
rules seek to influence management  to act in shareholder interests.  Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) show that the better  managerial incentives align with shareholder  interests, and the 
more  effective monitoring is, the more intent  management  is to increase shareholder 
value, and the less likely it is to engage  in activities that destroy shareholder value. 
The Jensen and Meckling (1976)  model implies  that management may engage in 
mergers to generate opportunistic benefits. Consequently,  the model predicts that 
management who wish to generate opportunistic benefits  is more likely to propose  bids. 
Monitoring, and better-designed  compensation contracts reign in the managerial  desire to 
49' 
generate opportunistic  benefits  through  mergers, and decrease the probability that' 
managers engage  in merger activity. 
Manne (1965) views mergers as disciplining  mechanisms, and not as projects that 
can be used to generate  opportunistic benefits. According to Manne,  firms, whose 
managers enjoy large opportunistic  benefits and destroy large amounts of shareholder 
value, are more likely to become target candidates.  These firms make likely target 
candidates since there  is room to generate  shareholder  value by improving monitoring, 
and redesigning the compensation  contracts to better align the incentives of managers 
with those of shareholders. 
Jensen (1986) defines free cash flor.u as cash flow left after the firm has invested 
in all positive NPV projects. Jensen argues that managers  with an abundance  of free cash 
flow are more likely to squander shareholder  value. The empirical implication of Jensen's 
argument  is that firms with more free cash flow are more likely to become bidders. 
3.3.1.2.2 Descriptions of the proxies we adopt to represent managerial  motives to 
generale  opp ortunistic b eneftts 
Empirical models that focus on how incentive  conflicts between  managers and 
shareholders affect abnormal returns to bidder and target shareholders  pose two research 
questions. First question investigates the monetary  opportunistic-benefits that bidder and 
target management  may enjoy as a result of completing mergers, and how these benefits 
affect announcement returns [Grinstein  and lkibar Q003); and, Hafizell et aI. e004)]. 
Second  question investigates nonmonetary opportunistic benefits and, the conditions. 
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under which managers find it easier to generate and consume opportunistic  benefits' 
[Lang  et aI. (1991); Datta et al. (2001)]. 
Monetary opportunistic-benefits  that managers may enjoy include potential 
bonuses that may received for completing  deals, increases in salary tied to managing 
larger companies, and grants of new options for engaging  in mergers. Merger 
announcements  disclose whether  and how much monetary  benefits bidder and target 
management will edoy.  Prior to announcements, there is no public information about 
these benefits.  Hence, we cannot use information about these benefits to predict bidder 
and target candidacy. However,  it is possible to identify the conditions that make it easier 
for management to generate and consume monetary and nonmonetary  opportunistic 
benefits. 
3.3.1.2.2.1 Equity-based  compensation and ownership stake 
There is no consensus in the literature on how stock options and managerial 
equity ownership affect firm performances.  Some studies argue that on average CEO 
ownership and equity-based  compensation  are too low [Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1988)1.  If equity-based incentives and managerial  ownership are indeed  on average too 
low, then management  with high equity stake and whose compensation  depends more on 
the firm's perforrnance  is "better" motivated to serve shareholder  interests. As such, these 
firms should perform better. An alternative  view suggests that firms and managers 
contract optimally; managerial ownership  and equity rewards  are optimal [(Demsetz and 
8 Core, Guay  and Larcker (2005) provide a detailed survey  of the executive compensation  and incentives 
literature. 
51 
khn (1985)1.  This view predicts no ex-ante relation  between firm performance and 
equity rewards and managerial ownership. 
Datta et al. (2!001) investigate how executive compensation  packages affect the 
shareholder value mergers generate. The authors analyze the equity-based  compensation 
of top managers.  Equity-based  compensation is the Black-Scholes value of new options 
granted to the top five executives in the year preceding  the acquisition  divided by their 
total compensation in the same year. The authors  find a positive  relation between  equity- 
based compensation, and announcement  returns, and a negative relation between equity- 
based compensafion  and the premium paid. The authors also introduce  a proxy for the 
equity ownership of CEOs. Executive  stock ownership  is defined as the sum of all 
previously granted/acquired common  and restricted  stock owned by the top 5 executives 
owned at the year-end preceding  the acquisition divided by the total number of shares 
outstanding.  The evidence indicates that higher equity ownership and equity-based 
compensation can be used to align  managerial incentives  with those of shareholders. 
We adopt the proxies for Datta et at. (2001), equity- based compensation  and 
ownership stake. Equity-based  compensation is the ratio of the Black-Scholes value of 
options  granted to the CEO to total compensation in the year prior to the announcement. 
Ownership stake is the ratio of shares  owned by the CEO to total number of shares 
outstanding in the year prior to the announcement.  In light of the conflicting views in the 
literature, we cannot make any clear predictions  on whether and how equity rewards and 
managerial ownership predict  bidder and target  candidacy. 
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3.3.1.2.2.2 Retirement years and governance  index 
The balance of power between shareholders  and managers influence whether and 
what kinds  of mergers managers  engage in. The balance of power between shareholders 
and managers depend on how much power the manager has over the board. The more 
power rnanagers have relative  to shareholders,  the more entrenched managers are. 
Managerial  enffenchment relates to the power of management to determine corporate 
strategy without  fear of reprisal  from the board of directors.  Entrenched  managers may or 
may not choose to serve the interests  of shareholders. 
Hartzell et al. (2004) argue that the longer a CEO works  for a company,  the 
harder it is to dismiss her. Decreasing the threat of dismissal may tempt managers  to 
engage in value  destroying activity.  The authors use the expected number of years until 
retirement  (retirement  years)  as a proxy for how entrenched  the CEO is. The authors 
define retirement  years as the maximum of 0 or 65 minus the age of the CEO. We define 
retirement  years  as the number  of years the CEO has under the company's  pension  plan. 
The more  years the CEO worked the more entrenched is the CEO. We predict that the 
desire to generate  opportunistic'benefits is less checked in entrenched managers.  On the 
one hand, the desire to generate opportunistic benefits  enlarges the set of deals available 
to bidders. On the other hand, the desire to protect opportunistic benefits  restricts the set 
of deals available  to targets. 
Other proxies for managerial  power include  indicators  for whether: the CEO is 
also the chairman  of the board; the CEO is on the nominating committee; CEO is founder 
[Grinstein and Fkibar (2001); Moeller (2005)]. The percentage of independent  board 
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members is another proxy for managerial power [Grinstein  and tlribar (2001); Moeller, 
200s)1. 
Anti-takeover defenses -- such as poison pills, anti-takeover  charter amendments, 
classified boards,  fair-price requirements, voting rights,  supermajority  requirements, 
blank-check preferred-stock authorizations,  and dual-class recapitalizations - may also 
reinforce the power of management in resisting mergers  [Ambrose and Megginson 
(1992)1. Moeller (2005) use the governance index constructed by Gompers, Iishi and 
Metrick (2003) to measure the balance of power between  shareholders  and managers. 
The index is constructed  from twenty-four  unique  corporate-governance  variables  based 
on charter and bylaw provisions,  firmJevel provisions, and state laws. The variables can 
be classified into five categories: tactics  for delaying hostile bidders, voting rights, 
director protection,  other takeover defenses and state laws. The governance  index is 
composed of variables (variables concerning  delaying hostile bidders and takeover 
defenses)  that can allow managers to deter unwanted merger attempts. The higher is the 
index,  the more power managers have relative  to shareholders. 
We use the governance  index  constructed by Gompers,  Iishi and Metrick  (2003) 
to measure the balance of power between  shareholders and managers.  We predict that 
management with more power over boards (higher values of the governance index, and 
more retirement  years) are more likely to make bids, and more likely to resist bids. 
3.3.1.3 Proxies for managerial  motives to exploit information asymmetries 
A strand of theoretical  and empirical studies investigates whether motives to 
exploit  information  asymmetries  motivate mergers [Myers and Majluf (198a); Hansen 
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(1987); Rhodes-Kropf  and Viswanathan (2004)1. This chapter reviews the theoretical' 
models that stress  managerial motives to exploit information asymmetries. We then 
describe the proxies that empirical  studies  develop  to test the theoretical models. We go 
on to discuss  which of these proxies  we adopt,  and why. 
i.3.1.3.1 Revicw of theoretical  stuilies that investigate how managernent rnay exploit 
info rmatin n as y mm e trie s 
Myers  and Majluf (1984)  model  investment  decisions  when  there are information 
asymmetries but no incentive conflicts between managers  and shareholders. This means 
that managers have  private information about the operations  and prospects of the firm, 
which lets them price the firm more accurately than shareholders  can. If markets misprice 
shares of the firm, it affects how managers finance positive net-present-value  projects. 
Managers  choose to issue equity if the firm is overvalued, but use cash if the firm is 
overvalued. Under these circumstances,  investors rationally infer whether the firm is 
overvalued or undervalued based on its financing  choice,  and reprice the firm 
accordingly. Management of undervalued (or correctly  valued),  who are financially 
constrained  and are cognizant of the information costs associated  with issuing equity, 
may pass up some positive net present  value  projects  that need to be financed  with equity 
since issuing equity incorrectly  signals overvaluation  and decreases the wealth  of existing 
shareholders. For financially  constrained firms, the net present  value of the investment 
project should be sufficiently high to compensate  for the decrease in value that existing 
shareholders  suffer due to the issuance of equity. 
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Bidder and target management  may have proprietary information about the value 
of their own firms and/or the value of the merged  firm. Mergers  are a good setting  in 
which to apply this information-asymmetry  model [Hansen (1987); Rhodes-Kropf  and 
Viswanathan  (20001. However, as Jensen (2005) emphasizes incentive conflicts between 
managers  and shareholders  may lead managers to use mergers to generate or protect 
opportunistic benefits by exploiting  their inforrnation advantage. 
3.3.1.3.1.1  Theoretical  studies that only assume information asymmetries between 
bidder and target managers 
In merger transactions,  the information asymmetry may exist between partners. 
Bidder and target management  may both have proprietary information about the value of 
their own firm, but may not have as much information  about the value of the 
counterpart's  firm. 
Assumptions  about who has what private information  determine whether and 
under what conditions a merger goes through. Rhodes-Kropf  and Viswanathan (2004) 
investigate the merger decision when the only the bidder has proprietary  information. 
Hansen (1987) investigates the merger decision under two conditions: when only the 
target has proprietary  information; and, when both the target and the bidder have 
proprietary information. 
Hansen  (1987) shows that when only the target has proprietary information, 
bidder  management always prefers to finance the merger using equity. When cash is used 
to finance  the merger, the target will sell only when its value is less than the offer made. 
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Bidders can offset this lemon problem by offering equity and sharing  in any gains that' 
target shareholders  might enjoy due to mispricing in their stock. 
When both the bidder and target have  proprietary information, the bidder signals 
its value using the mix of equity and cash in the offer. The targetrationally infers the 
value of bidder firm from the type (cash or equity) and size (the percentage of equity 
offered) of the offer made, and accepts the offer if it is greater than target  value. Hansen 
(L987) shows that the probability  of the bid being rejected offsets the gains from cheating 
the target  by falsely signaling that the bidder  is of higher value  than it actually is. As in 
Myers  and Majluf, when  the bidder is financially constrained  and cannot  offer  cash, the 
value the merger generates  should be sufficiently high to compensate  existing 
shareholders for the decrease in value resulting from an equity offer. Otherwise,  bidder 
management will pass up some  value-creating  mergers. The Hansen model predicts that: 
undervalued firms who are financially  constrained are less likely to make bids; and, 
undervalued firms are less likely to solicit bids. 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan  (2004) model the merger decision when bidder 
management has proprietary information  about value of both their firm and the merged 
enterprise. The model assumes  that: there is more than one bidder for the target; and the 
bidders bid in a second-price auction. In a second-price  auction, the winner pays the price 
bid by the second-highest  bidder. A second-price  auction ensures that all bidders bid their 
true valuation  of the merged firm. 
The assumption that all mergers generate shareholder  value and the use of second- 
price auctions ensures that mergers generate  shareholder value for target shareholders. 
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However, the information asymmetry  about bidder value and the incremental shareholder 
value created in the merger obstructs the target  from differentiating  between a bid with an 
overvalued bidder, and an incremental  shareholder-value that is low, and a bid with and 
undervalued bidder, and an incremental  shareholder-value that is high. Targets engage in 
mergers that generate  shareholder value. Yet, the mergers that go through are not 
necessarily the deals that would have generated the most value for target shareholders. 
To overcome the problem posed by information  asymmetries, target management 
always  asks for a cash bid if the bidder  has cash on hand or can get financing  elsewhere. 
However,  to the extent that the bidders cannot finance the merger using cash, the problem 
persists. 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan  (2004) predicts that: overvalued  bidders are more 
likely to win takeover battles; bidders  that can generate more  shareholder value from the 
post-merger enterprise  are more likely to win takeover battles; bidders in overvalued 
sectors  are more likely to win takeover battles; and mispricing in security prices has 
cofirmon  industry-wide and market-wide components. As a result, mergers cluster across 
industries  and time. 
3.3.1.3.1.2 Theoretical studies that assume information  asymmetries and incentive 
conflicts 
Overvalued  equity exacerbates  incentive  conflicts  between managers and 
shareholders (Jensen, 2005).  Managers  of overvalued firms may engage in mergers to 
sustain overvaluation  and protect the opportunistic benefits they gain due to 
overvaluation.  These mergers hurt the core business and destroy shareholder value. 
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The more overvalued bidders are the more opportunistic benefits management  has 
at stake. Hence, overvalued firms  are more likely to propose  and less likely to receive 
bids. 
Where information asymmetries  exist between management  and investors, the 
literature predicts that abnormal returns to bidders and targets in equity-financed  mergers 
are more negative than retums in cash-financed  mergers. These studies differ in their 
prediction  about the long-run  market responses to equity-financed mergers. On the one 
hand, Hansen (1987) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan  (2004) maintain that mergers 
generate shareholder value. Hence, even though equity-financed  mergers reveal 
overvaluation in the short run, they generate both bidder and target shareholder value in 
the long run. On the other hand, Jensen  (2005) maintains that managers may merge  to 
protect opportunistic  benefits, in which case mergers destroy  shareholder  value both in 
the short and long run. 
3.3.1.3.2  Descriptions of the proxies we adopt to represent  managerinl  motives to 
e xp lo it inform atia n as y tnm etric s 
3.3.1.3,2.1  High-information-asymmetry  indicator 
Mispricing  of shares may be due to hidden  information or opaqueness in 
accounting reports. The ratio of market-to-book  value of common stock (market-to- 
book) is a loose proxy for mispricing. Market-to-book is a measure  of the effect of 
"intangible  assets"  that accountants  find too hard to quantify  and put on the books. 
Hence, market-to-book measures  opaqueness  as well. The higher is market-to-book, the 
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more overvalued  and more opaque the firm may be. Palepu (1986), Ambrose  and' 
Megginson (1992), and Akhigbe,  et al. (2004) use market-to-book  to predict target 
candidacy. Price-to-earnings  ratio is like book-to-market ratio also a measure of 
mispricing and opaqueness  in shares. Palepu (1986),  Ambrose  and Megginson  (1992), 
and Akhigbe, et al. (2004) use market-to-earnings  to predict tuget candidacy. 
We construct the high information-asymmetry indicator to address  both 
mispricing and uncertainty  in share prices. High information-asymmetry  takes on the 
value one if the share is overvalued  (higher book-to-market  than the industry median) and 
opaque  (lower share  turnover  relative to the industry median).  Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan (2004) hypothesize  that overvalued and opaque firms are more likely to 
make and solicit acquisition bids in order to exploit the overvaluation  in their shares. 
3.3.1.3.2.2  Price run-up 
We define price run-up  as changes  in share  prices  in the two years prior to the 
announcement,  and use it as a proxy for mispricing.  The higher  the price run-up, the more 
overvalued the firm is. According to Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan  (2004), overvalued 
firms are more likely to propose  and less likely  to receive bids. 
3.3.1.4 Proxies for multiple  merger  motives 
3.3.1.4.1  Merger  intensity 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) assume information  asymmetries,  and 
predict that mergers cluster  across industries  and time. Gort (1969) assumes information 
asymmetries  away, and also predicts that mergers cluster.  These two hypotheses are 
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observationally  equivalent.  We vse merger  intensity  to analyze whether  prior merger 
activity  in the industry predicts bidder and target  candidacy. 
We define merger intensity as the ratio of the number  of firms, which made or received 
bids in the last two years,  to the number of firms in the industry  one quafier prior to the 
announcement. We hypothesize  that the higher the merger  intensity,  the more  likely the 
firms in that industry are to make  and receive  bids. 
3.3,1.4.2  Previous  rnergers 
Managers  may engage in a program of mergers to generate shareholder  value, 
secure opportunistic benefits, and/or exploit information asymmetries  [Holmes and 
Schmitz (1995); Schipper  and Thompson  (1983); Maletesta and Thompson  (19g5); 
Asquith et al. (1'983); Loderer  and Martin (1990); Fuller et at. (2004); Ismail (2005). We 
track the merger record of firms to construct a variable  Qtrevious mergers) that counts the 
number of times a firm received or solicited bids in the 8 quarters  prior to the 
announcement. We predict that firms which have engaged  in merger activity before  are 
more likely to both make and solicit acquisition  bids. 
3.3.1.4.3 Cash ratio 
Lang et al. (I991)test  the free-cash-flow hypothesis of Jensen (1986) using the 
ratio of c4sh flows to total assets. The authors find that bidder abnormal returns are 
significantly negatively  related to cash flow for firms with low Tobin's e. The study 
provides  evidence that managers in firms with more free cash flow enjoy opportunistic 
benefits  related to mergers,  and as a result the shareholders  suffer. 
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We use cash ratio, the ratio of cash and marketable  securities to total assets one 
quarter prior to the announcement, to proxy  free cash flow. According to Jensen (1986) 
firms with more free cash flow are more likely to make and less likely to solicit  bids. 
However, cash ratio may also proxy for financing constraints.  Fluck and Lynch (1999) 
predict that firms with more cash are more likely to both make and solicit bids. 
Consequently,  we predict a positive relation between bidder candidacy and cash flows, 
and we can't predict a relation between  cash flows and target candidacy. 
3.3.2 Variables that influence  market responses to announcements 
This section explores  the variables  that may influence  market responses. Partner 
identity determines whether and how much shareholder value combining  the bidder  and 
target generates. First, this section describes  the proxies for the fit of the bidder  and the 
target. The confidential  items of negotiation and merger terms influence how the 
shareholder  value the merger  generates is distributed between bidder and target 
shareholders.  Second, this chapter describes the variables to proxy for confidential items 
of negotiation  and merger terms. 
3.3.2.1 Proxies for fit of bidder and target 
Merger announcements disclose the identity  of the merger partner. By joining 
forces, the merger partners combine the assets-in-place of the stand-alone  enterprises. 
Combining assets-in-place  change  the value  and composition of the real options that can 
be written on them. The more fit the merger partners are, the more shareholder  value the 
merger generates by increasing the value of existing options and by generating  new 
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options. A merger may increase the value of real options through  decreases in capital 
requirements for investments,  or increases in projected cash flows and option timing 
flexibility [Smith  and Triantis (1995)]. This section describes the proxies investors  may 
use to represent the different  ways in which the merger generates (or destroys) 
shareholder  value. 
3.3.2.1. 1 Same-industry  indicator 
Operating  in the same line of business affects the extent to which the assets-in- 
place for the stand-alone  enterprises  complement and substitute each other. An important 
aspect of the fit between  the merging firms relates to whether the merger is increasing the 
scope of business (diversifying  mergers) or whether the merger is decreasing  the scope of 
business (focus-increasing  mergers). There is a considerable amount of research looking 
into whether diversifying  operations is beneficial [Villalonga (2004); Campa and Kedia 
(2002)1.  Although the magnitude of the diversification  discount widely varies  across 
studies, consensus in the literature  is that diversified firms fare worse than their focused 
counterparts. We construct  an indicator, same industry, which takes on the value one if 
the merging firms are in the same industrye.  We hypothesize  that focus-increasing 
mergers generate more shareholder  value than diversifying  mergers. 
e We use the four-digit SIC codes  as reporled  in SDC to define industries. If there are less  than five firms in
an industry,  we use the three-digit  SIC codes and if there are less than five firms in the three-digit  SIC
codes we use the two-digit SIC codes.  We do not use the SIC codes  reported  in CRSp-COMpUSTAT  since
we don't have CRSP-COMPUSTAT  data for all our merging firms. 
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3.3.2.1.2  Sarne.  state  indi,cator 
Having similar  corporate cultures may also influence the fit between the partners. 
Corporate  culture is hard to quantify.  One measure  that is easy to quantify  and is 
positively  related to corporate culture is geographic proximity. Firms operating in closer 
proximity are likely to have a similar culture.  Same state is an indicator variable that 
takes on the value one if main operations  of bidder and target are in the same state. There 
are two conflicting views on corporate culture and how it affects the fit between  partners. 
Similar  firms may benefit more from  mergers since they have an easier  time adjusting to 
operating  together.  An opposing view argues  that differing  firms benefit  more  from 
mergers since cultural diversity  offers more opportunities for improvement  [Chakrabarti, 
et at. (2005)). 
3. 3.2. I. 3 Bidd,er-public  and targ et- public ind,i.cators 
The ownership structure  of the merger partner is another  factor that affects  the 
bidder and target  returns. Bradley and Sundaram  (2004) find that bidder returns are lower 
when the target  is a public firm. We use two indicators, target public  and bidder public, 
which take on the value one if the target and bidder are public firms respectively.  We 
hypothesize that targets, which are public, secure  more value for their shareholders 
perhaps because  their bargaining power relative  to private  firms is higher. 
3.3,2.1.4  Deal value and relalive  value 
Asquith et al. (1983) suggest  that the larger the value of the deal relative to the 
size of the bidder and the target, the greater the magnitude of bidder and target 
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cumulative  returns should  be. Moeller et al. (2005) find that in their sample deals with 
value of over I billion  dollars erode bidder shareholder by 7.38 dollars  per 100 dollars 
invested in the period  from 1991 to 2001.  This evidence suggests that the absolute  as well 
as relative size of deals affect bidder returns. 
We use two variables, deal value and relative value,  to represent the absolute  and 
relative  size of proposed deals. We define deal value as the value of the deal in billion 
dollars. We define relative  size as the ratio of the value of the deal (in millions)  to the 
market value of common  stock (in millions)rO. 
3.3.2.2 Proxies for confrdential  items of negotiation,  and merger terms 
Merger announcements  disclose information about the confidential items of 
negotiation and merger terms. Investors  use the information about confidential  items of 
negotiation  and merger terms to determine how the value that mergers generate is divided 
between  bidder and target  shareholders. This chapter describes the proxies for 
confidential items of negotiation  and merger terms. 
3.3.2.2. 1 All-equity indicator 
We use the variable, all-equity  indicator, to proxy for information revealed about 
medium of payment.  The alt-equity  indicatortakes on the value  1 if target  shareholders 
are paid using only bidder stock and 0 otherwise.  We predict that an all-equity  payment 
decreases  abnormal returns to both bidder  and target shareholders. 
1t^q?9 :t-Oiles value  of deal in 1,000,000 dollars. We divide deal value by 1,000, and report it in
1,000,000,000 dollars. CRSP-COMPUSTAT  compiles number of shares outsranding (in millions) and the 
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3.3.2.2.2 Unwelcoming-  attitude indicator' 
Jennings and Mazzeo (1993) investigate the structure of takeover bids, and the 
frequency of observing competing bids. The authors find that target managemenr 
resistance is associated  with an increased likelihood of competition  arising and with an 
increase in target  shareholder wealth  between the announcement  and outcome  dates.  An 
initial negative  or unsolicited CEO  recommendation  to the board  about the merger 
strengthens bargaining power of the target  since  the bidder has to present  a sufficiently 
enticing bid to overcome the initial resistance.  On the flip side, resistance might deter the 
bidder from continuing with the merger. 
We use an indicator to proxy for target CEO resistance  to the deal. Unwelcoming- 
attitude indicator takes on the value one if management's initial recommendation  is 
negative or management  did not solicit the bid. 
3.3.2.2. 3 Anti-take  ov er-defens  e s indi.cator 
Ambrose  and Megginson  (1992)  investigate how anti-takeover  measures  affect 
the probability  that a firm receives  a merger bid. The premise is that having anti-takeover 
measures  in place makes a hostile takeover more unlikely. To the extent this premise 
holds, anti-takeover  defenses strengthens target bargaining power  since he bidder has to 
secure target management approval. An indicator variable (anti-takeover dcfenses) 
represents  whether the target  has anti-takeover  defenses in place. 
closing price  of common stock in that quarter.  We define market value  of cornmon stock as the  product  of 
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3.3.2.2.4 Target-bankrupt  indicator' 
Target bargaining power varies inversely with any urgency that target 
shareholders feel about selling the firm. The exfteme is shareholders  of bankrupt firms 
that are in dire need. Target shareholders  may also be using the merger to transfer value 
from their creditors.  The target bankrupt indicator takes on the value one if the target is 
in bankruptcy  proceedings at the time of the merger announcement. 
We hypothesize  that competition,  resistance from target management, and target 
anti-takeover measures  strengthen the bargaining power of target shareholders whereas 
bankruptcy  proceedings weaken it. We expect bidder and target abnormal returns to 
respond  to differences  in bargaining  power. 
common shares outstanding  and closing price of common  stock. 
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Sampling Frame 
To estimate investor anticipations and to investigate market responses  ro 
announcements, we need to identify  subsamples  of merging  and nonmerging firms. We 
first describe our sampling procedure  for identifying merging and nonmerging firms. 
Then, we enumerate our data sources for the variables and discuss the restrictions  that the 
data sources impose on our sample. 
4.1 lilentification  of the merging and nonmerging  subsamples 
Bidder and target subsamples are compiled  from the Security Data  Company's 
(henceforth  SDC) US Mergers and Acquisitions database. A nonmerging  firms 
subsample  is compiled  from the CRSP-COMPUSTAT combined  database. Appendices A 
and B report the SDC and CRSP-COMPUSTAT  command files we use to download, 
respectively,  the subsamples of merging and nonmerging  firms. Appendix C contains the 
STATA command file we use to ready the sample of merging and nonmerging  firms for 
econometric  analysis. 
4.1.1 Sampling  frame for merging firms 
SDC began recording  merger deals in 1977.7o obtain as comprehensive a sample 
as we can, we start our dataset at this date. We sample  firms that announce mergers 
between  January l, 1977 and December  31, 2004. The earliest  announcement  date is 
1111611977, and the latest announcement  date is 12130/2004. We stop sampling deals on 
December 3I,2004 because  we can only obtain financial-statement  information  up to this 
date. 
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Deals that clearly transfer  control rights  between  bidder and target management' 
convey more information  than deals in which control  rights are not transferred.  By only 
sampling  deals that show  an intent to transfer control rights, we focus on announcements 
that reveal considerable information.  Intent to transfer control rights is characteri zedby 
two conditions: bidders  own less than fifty percent of outstanding  target shares; and 
propose  to own more than fifty percent of outstanding target shares when and if the 
merger is completed. 
The data items in SDC labeled as menumain  and formc classify  transactions into 
12 and 10 categories, respectively.  We rely on the SDC definitions to exclude all 
transaction categories  that show no intent to transfer control rights. 
The menumain  data item in SDC classifies merger transactions  into 12 categories: 
disclosed value, undisclosed  value, leveraged buyouts,  tender offers, spinffi, 
recapitalizations, self-tenders,  exchange  offers, repurchases, .SP, acquisition of 
remaining  interest,  and privatizationrr . Disclosed  and undisclosed  value transactions are 
self-explanatory.  Leveraged  buyouts  (LBOs) include deals when an investor group, 
investor or firm offers to acquire a company, taking on extraordinary  amounts of debt 
with plans to repay it with funds generated from the company,  or with revenue  earned by 
selling off the newly acquired company's  assets. A deal is an LBO if the investor  goup 
includes management or the transaction  is identified as such in the financial press,  and 
ttThe definitions  of data items are compiled from  SDC help files. 
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100 percent of the company is acquired.  Tender offers are formal offers of deternrined' 
nomination to acquire a public company's  shares made to equity holdersl2. 
The formc data item in SDC classifies merger deals into 10 categori  es: merger, 
acquisition,  acquisition  of majority interest, acquisition  of partial interest,  acquisition of 
remaining interest, acquisition  of assets, acquisition of certain essets, recapitalization, 
buyback, and exchange  offer. Formc classifies deals as: acquisition of majority  interest if 
the acquirer holds less than fifty percent  of target shares and seeks to acquire fifty percent 
or more; rnerger if either a combination of business  takes place,  or a hundred  percent  of 
the stock of a public  or private  company is acquired and; acquisition  if a hundred percent 
of a company is spun off or split off13. 
12 We exclude spinoffs, recapitalizations, self-tenders,  exchange offers, repurchases, Sps, and, acquisitions
of remaining interest to make sure that there is a hansfer  of contol between two different  enterpriies. . We 
exclude privatizations  since the transfer of control from government-controlled  firms requires a separare 
analysis that also investigates  the regulatory environment. Spinoffs are tax-free distributions  of shares of a
company of a unit, subsidiary, division, or another  company's stock, or any portion thereof, to its 
shareholders. Recapitalizatioru  are deals in which the compiny issues a special one-time dividend in the
form of cash, debt securities, preferred  stock, or assets, while allowing shareholders  to retain an qluity 
interest in the company.In exchange  offers, a public company offers to exchange  new securities  for its
outstanding securities. A company offers to buy back its equity securities or securities convertible  into
equity through in a self-tender  offer. Self+enders are all deals in which  a company announces a self-tender
offer, recapitalization, or exchange  offers. Repurchases arc deals in which a ro-iuny buys back its shares
in the open market or in privately negotiated  transactions, or a company's board authorizes  the repurchase 
of a portion of its shares.  ,SP covers all deals in which a company ii acquiring a minority stake (i.e. up to
49.99 percent or from  50. 1 to 99.99 percent) in the t-get co-pa ny. It acquisiiions  of remaining interest, a 
company  is acquiring the remaining minority stake (i.e. from at least 50.1 percent  ownership to i00 percent
ownership) which it did'not already own in a target company. Privatizations  are deils in which a 
Ffv:rltmenl  or government-controlled entity sells shares or assets to a non-government entity." W9 exclude acquisitions of partial interest, acquisitions of remaining  interest, acquisitions of assets, 
acquisitions of certain assets,  recapitalizations, buybacks and exchange offers  to make sure that there is a
transfer of control between two different  enterprises. Acquisition of partial interest are deals in which the 
acquirer  holds  less than 50 percent and is seeking to acquire less than 50 percent or the acquirer  holds more 
than 50 percent and is seeking to acquire less than 100 percent  of the target shares. Acquisition  of assets 
and acquisition of certain assets are deals in which respectively,  the assets and .tertain assets,' of a 
company' subsidiary, division, or branch  are acquired.  Menumain and formc  report identical definitions  for 
exchange offers, acquisitions of remaining interest,  and recapitalizations. Buybicla are deals in which  the
company buys back its equity securities or securities  convertible into equiiy, either on the open market, 
through  privately  negotiated  transactions,  or through  a tender offer. 
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Sample firms are nonfinancial  US enterprises.  We restrict the universe to US 
firms since share price, financial statement, executive compensation  and corporate 
governance  data restrictions  on foreign firms are very strict. The financial  regulatory 
environment forces different information that the announcements  of financial institutions 
reveal. 
For a deal to be included  in the sample either the bidder or the target needs to be a 
public company since share price information  cannot be observed for non-public firms. 
SDC  classifies  the organizational  form of firms according to what is declared in financial 
statements  and business news sources. SDC distinguishes five organizattonal forms: 
governrnent,  joint venture,  private, public,  and subsidiary.  In the government 
organization form, a govemment holds the controlling ownership  stake. kr the joint- 
venture organizational  form, two or more corporate bodies co-operate on a project  or 
business according  to the rules  specified in the joint-venture  contract. A firm that is not 
listed on a major exchange is classified  as private whereas a firm, which is listed, is 
classified as public. A subsidiary is a division of another  company.  The parent company 
may be government-owned,  joint venture, private or public. Any firm SDC is unable to 
identify as belonging to the above five categories  is classified  as unknown in type. 
Applying  our selection criteria to the SDC database produces 18,325 deals. We 
classify  any firm with a one-digit SIC code of 6 as a financial  firm. Of the 18,325  deals 
that SDC compiles as having  nonfinancial  bidder and targets, we drop 53 deals  because 
either the bidder  or the target is a financial firm. We drop 41 more deals in which the 
7L 
CUSIPsTa and names  of the bidder and target are identical  since these firms escaped  the 
SDC filter. Finalty, the merging-firms  sample covers 18, 23t deals in which a US, 
nonfinancial  firm made  a bid with the intent to buy target control rights in another  US 
nonfinancial firm. 
4.1.2 Sampling  frame for nonmerglng  firms 
New information about firms arrives every day. New information  leads investors 
to re-estimate  both the probability of merger activity along and the expected value on 
shareholder  value. It is not possible to identify every new piece of information that 
affects investor expectations  about merger activity. Recognizing that investors 
dynamically  update their expectations, we want to use data that are recorded at frequent 
intervals. Quarterly industrial  CRSP-COMPUSTAT  database compiles the most frequent 
financial-statement  data. The observation unit in the database  is a firm quarter. 
We apply  the same sample-selection criteria to the nonmerging firms  as we apply 
to the merging firms. We construct  the universe of US, nonfinancial  firm-quarters. The 
sample covers 110 quarters running  from the third quarter of 1977 to fourth quarter of 
2004. We then identify these quarters as bidder, target, or nonmerging  firm-quarters. 
Based on SDC announcement dates from our merging-firms  sample, a quarter is 
identified  as a bidder-quarter for any firm that proposes at least one bidl5 in the next 
financial-statement-release  quarter, and a target-quarter for any firm that receives  at least 
i: l":  provides  the six-digit CUSIP, which uniquely identifies  an issuer of securities  (a firm). A firm may propose or solicit more than one bid in any one quarter. 
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one bid in the next quarter. A quarter is a nonmergrng firm-quarter for any firm ttrat 
neither  proposes nor receives any bids in the next quarter. 
To construct  predictors  for bidder and target  candidacy,  we need to uniquely 
identify firms as bidders, targets or nonmerging  firms in each quarter. We drop any firm 
quarter  which we cannot  uniquely  identify as bidder, target or nonmerging firm-quarter. 
The unique identifier in CRSP-COMPUSTAT  database is the GVKEY16 number. Some 
firm-quarters  are perfect double countsl7. We drop the extras. Some firms change the 
release dates of their financial  statements. As a result, around the change in release dates, 
some nonmerging  firms have two sets of data (one set for the previous fiscal year date, 
and one set for the new fiscal year date) in the same  quarterls. We sort the data according 
to the observation  number  assigned by STATA and drop the first observation  for double- 
counted firms that result from  a change in the fiscal year. 
The bidder subsample  covers 8,092 quarters; the target  subsample  3,855  quarters; 
and the nonmerging  subsample 5L5,209 quarters.  3,896 firms propose 8,406 bids in 8,092 
quarters. 3,M2 firms solicit3,932 bids in 3,855 quarters.  14,105 firms neither propose 
nor solicit  bids in 51.5,209 quarters. 
4,2 Data restrictions 
To construct  predictors of bidder and target candidacy, we need to extract data 
from financial statements, managerial  compensation  contracts and the governance 
t6GVKEY  is the unique  company identifier  that COMPUSTAT database uses. COMPUSTAT User Manual 
provides  detailed  information  about GVKEY.
" All the data items  are identical  in these double-counts.
t8 The data items in these double-counts  are not identical. 
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environment  of the firm. We take financial-statement data from CRSP-COMPUSTAT 
quarterly industrial  database. Compensation-contract data come from COMPUSTAT 
Executive Compensation database (henceforth HGCOMP). Governance  datacome from 
Investor Responsibility Research Center  database  (henceforth IRRC). 
We identify the repricing of post-announcement enterprises with abnormal returns 
centered on announcements. EVENTUS calculates  returns centered  on event dates. To 
price the post-announcement enterprises,  investors  evaluate  the fit between the bidder and 
tatget, the merger terms, and the negotiation  items. The Research Methods  chapter 
describes the variables we use as proxies. Data on merger terms and negotiation items 
comes from SDC. 
First, we describe the relevant data sources. Then, we analyze the restrictions  that 
data coverage on EVENTUS,  CRSP-COMPUSrAT, EXECOMP, and IRRC impose on 
the sample  of merging  and nonmerging-firm  samples. 
4,2.1 The restrictions  imposed by EVENTUS  data 
4,2.1.1 Calculating 3-day, 7-dayr 15-day,  and 29-day announcement  returns 
This study analyzes on the short-term price impact of merger announcements  on 
bidder and target shareholders.  We identify the price impact with abnormal returns. 
Abnormal retums are the difference  between  observed  and "normal" returns. To calculate 
abnormal returns, one must benchmark  "normal returns". We use the market-model to 
estimate "normal refums" for the merglng  firmsle. 
le Brown  and Warner  (1985) provide a detailed  analysis of different  short-horizon event-study  methods. 
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Bidder and target cumulative abnormal returns  around merger  announcenrents  are' 
obtained from the EVENTUS database, Appendix  D presents the EVENTUS command 
file that we use to compile the abnormal retums.  Market-model estimation  starts 256 days 
prior to the announcement and stops 30 days prior to the announcement. We require that 
each firm to have at least 30 observations for the market-model  estimation. 
We study 3-day, 7-day, 15-day  and 29-day cumulative  abnormal  returns centered 
on merger announcements.  EVENTUS  calculates cumulative abnormal returns 
ftenceforth CARs) by summing daily abnormal returns over respectively  the three,  seven 
and eleven-day event  windows. 
EVENTUS fails to report  3-day,7-day, 15-day and,29-day CARs for respectively, 
7.27 percent,  7.27 percent, 7.25 percent,  and 7.23 percent, of the bids proposed. 
EVENTUS fails to report 3-day,7-day,l5-day  and 29-day  CARs for respectively,  8.90 
percent, 8.83 percent, 8.83 percent,  and 8.80 percent, ofthe bids received. 
4.2"1.2 Confirming announcement  dates 
Identifying the correct announcement  date is crucial to calculating abnormal 
returns.  We rely on the announcement dates SDC provides. To check the reliability  of 
SDC announcement dates, we randomly picked 74 deals and checked the validity of the 
announcement  dates on kxisNexis and Factiva. 
To construct the random  sample, we first sort the deals according  to 
announcement  dates, and assign  observation numbers. Second,  the RANDBETWEEN 
function of EXCEL provides  50 random numbers that can range  from 1 to L2,338, and24 
random numbers that can range  from !2,239 to l8,23L  Third,  using the random numbers, 
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we pick the sample of 74 deals. Table 8 lists bidder and target names, the announcerrent' 
dates SDC provides, and the corresponding  announcement dates we find in IrxisNexis 
for these deals. For the deals in which SDC and lrxisNexis disagree about  the 
announcement date, we run an additional search in Factiva. 
In 62 of the 74 deals, the announcements  dates we find in lrxisNexis  match 
perfectly with the announcement dates SDC provides.  We could not find any mention of 
7 deals in lrxisNexis. In 3 deals, the SDC and IrxisNexis announcement  dates  diverge 
by 3 days. IrxisNexis announcement date is on a Monday,  whereas  the SDC 
announcement  date is a Friday or Thursday.  We conjecture that a late-Friday 
announcement  would be reported in the newspapers on Monday. Hence, we are not 
worried about the discrepancy  in announcement  dates for these three deals .ln 2 of the 
deals, SDC provides incorrect announcement  dates. 
The announcement dates on Factiva agree  with the SDC announcement dates  for 
one of the seven deals  that we fail to find an announcement date in kxisNexis. For one 
missing announcement, Factiva reports the announcement date as one day later than  the 
SDC date. For another missing announcement,  Factiva reports the announcement  date as 
two months earlier to than SDC. For 5.41 percent of the deals, neither IrxisNexis  nor 
Factiva searches find and announcement  date. 
SDC reports  incorrect  announcement dates in 2 deals. In one deal,  SDC records 
the date in which the target rejects the offer as the announcement  date. However, the 
Factiva  search shows  that at the time of refusal  of the first bid, the bidder  announces 
intention to launch  the second  bid for the same company.  In the other  deal, SDC reports 
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the date  the bidder files for protection under Chapter 11 as the announcement date. The' 
correct announcement  date is 2 months prior to the date that SDC reports. 
In 2.70 percent of the deals we checked, SDC announcement  dates  are incorrect. 
Incorrect announcement dates mean that we can't identify market responses  to 
announcements.  However, SDC provides reliable announcement dates for the vast 
majority of deals.  This justifies our using  SDC to compile the sample of merging  firms. 
As a robustness  test, we use longer event-windows to overcome small discrepancies  in 
announcement  dates - such as 3-day discrepancies, 
4,2,2 The restrictions imposed by CRSP-COMPUSTAT  data 
Financial statements are a major source of firm-specific information  that investors 
can use to evaluate future merger activity.  Restricting ourselves to the CRSP- 
COMPUSTAT  database lets us construct the proxies that require financial-statement 
data. CRSP-COMPUSTAT  does not have the required  coverage for 6.56 percent of 
bidder quarters, 7.50 percent of target quarters,  and 17.99  percent2o of nonmerging-firm 
quarters. As SDC starts compiling merger data beginning  1977, we surrender eight firm- 
quarters from third quarter of 1977 to third quarter of 1979 to build the previous  mergers 
and merger intensity variables that rely on the merger record of both merging  and 
nonmerging  firms. 
To investigate whether the requirement of CRSP-COMPUSTAT  data coverage 
changes the composition of bidder  and target firms, we analyze the distribution  of bidder 
n 53L of 8,092 bidder quarters, 289 of 3,855 target  quarters,  and 92,701of 515,209 nonmerging quarters 
don't meet the CRSP-COMPUSTAT  coverage requirement. 
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and target cumulative abnormal returns. Table  9 partitions nonmerging firms  according to' 
CRSP-COMPUSTAT  coverage. Table reports mean, standard deviation, and number of 
observations for 3-day,7-day,  15-day, and 29-day bidder and target CARs of bids that 
CRSP-COMPUSTAT  covers in Panel A, and that it doesn't cover  in Panel B. Panel C 
reports the t-statistic for the t-test of the null hypothesis  that the mean CARs in the two 
subsamples are equal. On the one hand, bidder CARs  around bids that CRSP- 
COMPUSTAT  covers prove significantly  lower than CARs that it doesn't cover. On the 
other hand, we observe no significant difference  for target CARs. 
The difference  in means indicates that there may be other significant  differences 
in the two subsamples. Table 10 investigates whether  the distribution  of bids that CRSP- 
COMPUSTAT  covers and doesn't cover  come from a common population. Panel A and 
B report the z-statistic  for the Mann-Whitney,  the p-value for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov, 
and the 12 -statistic for the Kruskall-Wallis test in the bidder and target samples, 
respectively. All three tests reject the null hypothesis  of a common population for the 
distribution  of 3-day bidder  CARs  in the two subsamples.  However, the tests fail to reject 
the null hypothesis  for the distribution of 7, 15, and 29-day bidder CARs and target 
CARs in all windows. 
By requiring CRSP-COMPUSTAT data coverage, we exclude a preponderance  of 
bidders  whose deal making the market approves. The difference in mean bidder CARs 
between the two subsamples  indicates  that bids which  CRSP-COMPUSTAT covers 
aren't representative of the population  of all bids. In light of this evidence, we stress that 
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our results relate to the subsample  of bids that CRSP-COMPUSTAT  covers and not that 
aYerage  CARs  in this subsample  lie below  those found in the universe of all bids. 
4.2;.3 The restrictions imposed by EXECOMp  data 
The compensation  contract is an important  tool for aligning shareholder  and 
managerial incentives.  Investors can usb information about managerial compensation in 
estimating  the degree of incentive conflict, merger probabilities, and the impact of merger 
proposals. We obtain data on management characteristics  and executive compensation 
from the E)(ECOMP  database. 
The frequency  of data in the E)GCOMP database is annual. E)CECOMP covers 
firms that were or currently are included  the S&P 1500 index. Observations  in 
E)GCOMP start in 1992. EreCOMP covers 1,635 bidder-years,  488 target-years, and 
12,7 07 nonmerging-fi  nn-years. 
We check how EXECOMP affects the representativeness of the sample and how 
these differences restrict  the inferences our analysis produces. Table  11 investigates 
whether the distributions  of CARs differ between the subsamples of firms that 
E)(ECOMP  covers and those it doesn't cover. The table compares mean, standard 
deviation and number of observations  of bidder  and target CARs for bids that 
E)(ECOMP covers in Panel A with deals that E)(ECOMP  doesn't cover in Panel B. 
Panel C reports the t-test for the null hypothesis  that the means are equal in the two 
subsamples. On the one hand, bidder  CARs in all event  windows prove significantly 
lower for bids that EXECOMP  covers than those  that it doesn't cover. On the other hand, 
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only the 2:19-day target CAR proves significantly  lower in the subsample with E)(ECOMP 
coverage. 
Table 12 tests whether the distributions  of CARs in the two subsamples come 
from a common population. Table reports the z-statistic for the Mann-Whitney,  p-value 
for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov,  and the 12 -statistic for the Kruskal-Wallis tests for 
bidders in'Panel A, and for targets  in Panel B. All three  tests reject the null hypothesis of 
a common population  for bidders, and fail to reject the null for targets. 
The distribution of bidder CARs prove significantly  different for the subsample of 
bids that E)(ECOMP covers. The distribution of target CARs doesn't  differ in the two 
subsamples.  The bidder subsample  that is covered in EXECOMP is not representative of 
the SDC-CRSP  bidder firms  sample in terms  of abnormal cumulative returns. 
The difference in means and the difference in distributions  of bidder CARs 
indicate that the subsample  which E)(ECOMP  covers  isn't representative  of the 
population. E)(ECOMP  picks firms that realize significantly lower CARs. Our 
benchmark model of bidder and target candidacy  excludes predictors that rely on 
EXECOMP  data. In the robustness tests, we develop specifications  that include 
predictors that rely on EXECOMP,  and test whether introducing these variables improves 
our estimates  of investor  anticipations. 
4.2.4 The restrictions imposed by the IRRC data 
Monitoring and governance affect managerial  incentives and decisions.  Investors 
can use information about monitoring  and governance procedures to estimate probability 
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and impact of merger proposals.  We obtain corporate governance variables from Investor 
Responsibility  Research Center  (henceforth IRRC) database. 
We lose great amount of data when we impose IRRC coverage.  Currently  the 
IRRC database covers six years of data (1990, Igg3,lgg| 1998, 2000,  2002 and2004). 
IRRC does not cover 94.28 percent of the nonmerging  -quarters, 89.39 percent of bidder- 
quarters and 93.33 percent of target-quarters. We study how the data restriction  changes 
the distribution of CARs and if these differences  limit the inferences  our analvsis 
produce. 
Table 13 describes the distributions  of 3, 7, 15, and 29-day  CARs for bids that 
IRRC coversi  in Panel A and for bids that IRRC doesn't  cover in Panel  B. panel C reports 
the t-test for the null hypothesis that the means of the distributions  are equal in the two 
subsamples. Mean bidder CAR (in all event-windows)  and,29-day  target CAR of bids 
that IRRC covers prove significantly  lower than bids that IRRC doesn't  cover. 
Table 14 tests the null hypothesis  that the CAR distributions of bids that IRRC 
covers  and of bids that it doesn't  cover  come from a cornmon  population.  Table  reports 
the z-statistic for the Mann-Whitney,  p-value  for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov , and the rz - 
statistic for the Kruskall-Wallis  tests for bidders  in Panel A, and for targets in panel B. 
All three tests reject the null hypothesis of a common  population for bidders,  and fail to 
reject the null for targets. 
The distribution of bidder CARs prove significantly  different for the subsample of 
bids that IRRC covers.  The distribution  of target CARs doesn't differ in the two 
subsamples.  The evidence indicates that the subsample  of bids that IRRC covers may not 
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representative of the population. IRRC selects firms that rcalize significantly  lower' 
CARs. In our benchmark  model of bidder and target candidacy, we exclude predictors 
that rely on IRRC  data. In the robustness tests, we develop specifications  that include 
predictors  that rely on EXECOMP,  and test whether introducing  these variables improves 
our estimates  of investor  anticipations. 
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Predicting  bidder and target candidacy 
To identify bidder and target candidates,  we presume that investors  use variables 
that proxy for managerial  motives. Chapter 3 describes the variables that might predict 
bidder  and target candidacy.  Chapter 4 enumerates  the data sources that we use to 
construct  the variables. This chapter  investigates what variables (if any) can differentiate 
between bidder, target, and nonmerging quarters. We estimate models of bidder and 
target candidacy, and investigate to what extent  investors anticipate  bidder and target 
candidacy. 
To estimate  investor  anticipations about  bidder  candidacy, we run ninety-seven 
probit regressions. To estimate parallel investor  anticipations of receiving  bids, we run 
another set of ninety-seven probit regressions.  In both bidder and target regressions, the 
sample covers  data from third quarter  of 1979 to the fourth quarter of 2004. With two 
exceptions, the regressions  are quarterly. The observations from the third quarter of t979 
to the fourth quarter of 1980 and the observations  from the third to fourth quarters of 
2004 ate pooled into two cross-sections since the number of bidders or targets in these 
quarters  is fewer than 10. 
In bidder and target regressions,  the endogenous  variable takes on the value 1 if 
the firm proposes and receives  at least one bid in the next quarter, respectively, and 0 
otherwise. We compile predictors  of bidder and target candidacy from three databases: 
financial-statement  data come from CRSP-COMPUSTAT  database; managerial- 
compensation-contract  data come from E)(ECOMP  database; and monitoring-data come 
from IRRC database.  Since including  E)(ECOMP and IRRC data severely  restricts our 
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samples of merging and nonmerging  firms2l, this chapter  only examines variables that are 
constructed using financial-statement  data. Chapter 7 tests specifications of bidder and 
target-candidacy  models that introduce  variables compiled from EXECOMP and IRRC. 
5.1 Models  for hidder candidacy 
Probit regressions estimate equation 13 in 97 periods. M , is a dummy variable 
that takes on the value I if the firm proposes  at least one bid in the next quarter, and 0 
otherwise.  Chapter 3 describes  the predictors that we use to estimate equation 13. 
M 
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Table 15 reports the mean,  standard  deviation, 25fr, 50s, and 75fr percentile 
values of the marginal-probability estimates. Marginal-probability  estimates are the 
derivatives  of the probability  to propose  a bid with respect  to a particular exogenous 
variable. Equation  14 explains how STATA  estimates marginal probabilities.  Marginal 
probabilities  are estimated  at the median  values for the continuous variables and at zerc 
for the high-information-asymmetry and resource-growth-mismatch  indicators. 
21 Chapter 4 discusses the data reshictions that E)GCOMP  and IRRC databases  impose. 
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#A<Z: y!) = AQi fi)fi  wherei = ROA, ..., previous rnergers,(tt..' 
T4 @ = cumulative density function of standard normal distribution' 
Q = propability density function of standard  normal distribution' 
The null hypothesis of no investor  anticipations would be confirmed  only if no 
regression  slope differs insignificanfly  from 0. The last to second column in Table  15 
reports  the t-statistic for the t-test that tests the null hypothesis.  We reject the null 
hypothesis for all the variables except resource-growth  mismatch, concentration ratio, 
merger intensity,  and size. Investors can anticipate bidder candidacy using proxies for 
managerial motives. 
In proposing bids, we confirm the importance of three managerial motives:  to 
generate shareholder value, to secure  opportunistic benefits, and to exploit  information 
asymmetries. Investor anticipations  about bidder candidacy  are influenced by proxies that 
represent  motives to: generate shareholder value (such as ROA and sales-shock 
indicator), generate  opportunistic benefits (such as cash ratio), and exploit information 
asymmetries (such as price runup and high-information-asymmetry  indicator). 
5.1.1 Proxies for motives to generate shareholder  value 
Management  may generate shareholder  value in three ways: by exploiting 
discrepancies  in valuation [Gort (1969)]; by reallocating  resources to withstand economic 
disturbances [Gort (1969);  Mitchell and Mulherin  (1996); Maksimovic and Phillips 
(2001); Andrade  et aL (200L)l; by achieving  economies of scale and scope  [Gort  (1969); 
Holmes and schmitz (1995); Fluck and Lynch (1999)l; and by expanding  market power 
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[Gott (1969)]. Our findings lend some support to all three hypotheses  about how mergers' 
may generate shareholder  value. 
Share turnover  and concentration ratio represent  motives to exploit discrepancies 
in valuation.  Table 15 shows that the coefficient of share turnover is significant and 
negative. The higher is the disagreement  about the value of the firm (as proxied by higher 
trading in its shares),  the less likely it is to propose a bid in the next quarter. We fail to 
find a significant relation between  concentration  ratio and bidder  candidacy.  The findings 
lend no support to the hypothesis  that discrepancies about the value of firms motivate 
merger proposals. 
Sales shock  and, square of sales shock proxy for motives to reallocate resources  to 
manage economic disturbances. The economic-disturbances  hypothesis is supported by 
the finding in Table 15 that firms who are experiencing  larger sales shocks prove 
significantly  more likely to propose bids. We also hypothesize that the direr a shock is the 
more motivated management  should be to reallocate resources. However, Table 15 shows 
significant  contradictory evidence in that the direr a shock is (the higher the square of 
sales shock) the less likely are firms to propose  bids. 
Sales growrft proxies  for motives  to achieve  economies of scale and scope  and to 
build market  power. Gort (1969) argues that there should  be a positive  relation between 
growth in demand  and bidder candidacy  if management wants to prevent competition 
while increasing capacity. However, if management  wants to increase capacity to achieve 
economies of scale and scope, there should be a negative  relation since, according to Gort 
(1969), it is cheaper to build capacity  than buy capacity. The coefficient  of sales growth - 
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the proxy for growth in demand- is negative  and significant in Table 15. The negative' 
coefficient  indicates that achieving  economies of scale and scope may motivate mergers. 
Larger firms may be more likely to propose  bids than smaller  firms since it is 
easier for larger firms to achieve economies  of scale and scope through proposing  bids 
than soliciting them [Palepu (1986); Ambrose and Megginson (1992); Maksimovic  and 
Phillips (200I); Moeller et al. (2004)1. An increase in size may also indicate  the desire to 
expand. Size  and change  in size proxy for the level and the change in the size of a firm. In 
Table 15, the coefficient of size is insignificantly  positive and the coefficient of change in 
size is significantly negative. The evidence  fails to support the hypothesis that larger 
firms and firms that are increasing in size are more likely to propose  mergers. 
Mergers  may enable firms to gain access to additional sources of capital [Fluck 
and Lynch (1999)1, and to acquire growth options that the bidder management  can better 
manage than the target management  [Holmes  and Schmitz  (1995)1.  Resource-growth- 
mismatch indicator  represents motives to access new sources of capital.  The indicator 
identifies firms with either growth opportunities but insufficient capital access, or 
insufficient  growth  opportunities  and capital access. Table 15 finds no evidence to 
support this hypothesis  as the resource-growth  miSmatch indicator  proves insignificant. 
ROA proxies for managerial competence.  The more competent  management is the higher 
should be the financial performance of the firm. The coefficient  of ROA proves positive 
and significant. The more competent management  is the more likely is the firm to 
propose a bid. The negative coefficient  of sales growth and the positive coefficient of 
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ROA provide some evidence to support  the hypothesis that motives to achieve  economies 
of scale and scope might motivate  merger  proposals. 
5.1.2 Proxies for motives to exploit information asymmetries 
Management  may generate shareholder value [Shleifer and Vishny (2003); 
Rhoades-Kropf  and Viswanathan (2004)l or opportunistic benefits (Jensen, 2004) when it 
tries to exploit mispricing  in the value of the firm. Price runup and high-information- 
asymm etry indicator proxy for motives to exploit management's information  advantage 
when markets  misprice the value of the firm. Both hypotheses  predict  a positive relation 
between the same proxies. Therefore, the two hypotheses are empirically 
indistinguishable. 
Table 15 shows  that firms with larger price runups are significantly  more likely to 
propose  bids. This finding supports  the hypothesis  that managers of overvalued firms are 
tempted to acquire firms  they would not have  acquired if their equity was not overvalued. 
Overvaluation with uncertainty about  value  drives merger activity. Double-sided 
information asymmetry models [Rhoades- Kropf and Viswanathan  (2004)] reason that for 
target management to acquiesce  to bids proposed by overvalued  bidders, they must be 
fooled into thinking the bidder is less overvalued  than it is. The high-information- 
asymmetry  indicator  is a proxy for both overvaluation and opaqueness in share  prices. In 
Table 15, the coefficient of the high-information-asymmetry  indicator is positive and 
significant. This finding supports the Rhoades-Kropf and Viswanathan hypothesis  that 
mergers are motivated by overvaluation  and opaqueness  in share prices. 
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5.1.3 Proxies for multiple motives 
We explore  the possibility of multiple  merger motives. Cash ratio, merger 
intensity, and previous rnergers  may represent  more than one category of merger motives. 
Cash ratio and previous mergers  may proxy for motives that seek  shareholder value  and 
opportunistic  benefits. Merger intensity may proxy for motives that seek shareholder 
value and to exploit  information  asymmetries. 
Fluck and Lynch (1999) predict that firms with restricted  capital access are more 
likely to propose bids to access capital markets that they couldn't  access as stand-alone 
firms. In this case, cash ratio may proxy for motives to achieve economies  of scale  and 
scope in financing new projects. Jensen (1986) offers a contradictory hypothesis and 
predicts that management  with abundant  free-cash  -flows are more likely to propose 
mergers to generate opportunistic benefits. This suggests  that cash ratio might also proxy 
for motives to generate  opportunistic benefits.  Jensen predicts a positive whereas Fluck 
and Lynch predict  a negative influence  of cash ratio on bidder candidacy. Table 15 shows 
that the coefficient  of cash ratio is significant  and positive. The findings  support Jensen's 
free-cash-fl  ow hypothesis. 
It is well known that individual firms  that have a history of merger activity are 
more likely to propose bids [Schipper  and Thompson (1983); Maletesta and Thompson 
(1985);  Asquith et al. (1983);  Loderer  and Manin (1990); Fuller et.al. (2004); Ismail 
(2005)]. Motives to generate shareholder  value may prompt management  to acquire more 
than one company. It is also possible that management seeking to generate  opportunistic 
benefits may engage in a succession of mergers.  Similarly, if mispricing in shares persists 
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for some time, management  may acquire a string of firms to exploit  their information' 
advantage. Table 15 shows  that firms with a history of engaging  in mergers are more 
likely to propose bids. Of all the predictors  of bidder candidacy, merger intensity proves 
most significant. 
According to Gort (1969),  mergers  cluster  because economic  disturbances  are 
both date-specific and industry-specific.  According  to Rhoades-Kropf  and (2004) 
clustering occurs because mispricing  is both date-specific and industry-specific. Merger 
intensity may proxy for managerial  motives  to generate  shareholder value  and to exploit 
information asymmetries.  Table 15 finds that the higher the merger intensity in the 
industry, the higher is the probability  that firms propose  bids. However, the coefficient of 
merger  intensity proves insignificant. 
5.2 Models for target candidacy 
We follow the same strategy in estimating  investor anticipations  about  target 
candidacy  that we employ in analyzing bidders.  Probit  regressions estimate equation 15 
in 97 periods. M, is an indicator that takes on the value 1 if the firm receives at least one 
bid in the next quarter, and 0 otherwise.  Chapter 3 describes the proxies for each of the 
three categories of motives  that predict target candidacy. 
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Table 16 reports  the mean,  standard  deviation, 25fr, 50ft, and 75ft percentile 
values of the marginal-probability estimates. Marginal-probability  estimates are the 
derivatives  of the probability  to receive a bid with respect  to a particular exogenous 
variable. Equation  16 explains how STATA estimates marginal probabilities.  Marginal 
probabilities  are estimated  at the median  values for the continuous variables and at zero 
for the high-information-asymmetry and resource-growth-mismatch  indicators. 
)
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The null hlpothesis  of no investor anticipations would be confirmed  only if no 
regression  slope differs insignificantly  from 0. The last to second column  in Table  16 
reports the t-statistic for the t-test of 0 slopes. We reject the null hypothesis  for all the 
variables  except share turnover. As in investor anticipations about bidder  candidacy, a 
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mix of motives prompts management to solicit bids. Investor  anticipations  about target' 
candidacy are influenced by proxies that represent motives: to generate'shareholder  value 
(such as ROA and sales-shock  indicator) and to generate opportunistic benefits (such as 
cash ratio). 
5,2.1 Froxies for motives to generate shareholder  value 
ROA, resource-growth  mismatch, sales shock, square of sales shock, sales 
growth, change  in size,  concentration ratio and share turnover proxy  for the different 
ways in which management may generate shareholder  value through mergers. ROA, 
resource-growth-mismatch indicator, sales growth,  size and change in size represent 
motives  to generate value by achieving economies of scale and scope. Share turnover  and 
concentration  ratio represent  motives  to merge due to disagreement about the value  of the 
target. Sales shock and square of sales shock represent  motives to generate value by 
reallocating  resources when faced with industry-wide shocks. Our findings lend some 
support to all three hypotheses  about how mergers  may generate  shareholder value. 
The findings only partially  support the Holmes  and Schmitz (1995) hypothesis 
that to utilize superior management,  firms with more qualified management will acquire 
firms with less qualified management. Tables  18 and 19 show  that firms with higher 
ROA - proxy for managerial quality - prove significantly  more likely both to propose and 
solicit bids, respectively. 
Table 16 finds that firms with a mismatch in the growth opportunities  and the 
access  to finance the opportunities prove more likely to receive bids. The finding lends 
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support to the Fluck and Lynch (1999) hypothesis that financial synergies may motivate 
mergers. 
Size and change in size are firm characteristics that might identify firms which are 
motivated to achieve economies of scale and scope [Gort (1969); Maksimovic  and 
Phillips (2001)1. If firms are trying to achieve economies  of scale and scope, smaller 
firms are more likely to be target candidates  since it is harder for them to achieve 
economies of scale and scope through making bids than soliciting  them. A decreasing 
trend in size might also identify likely target candidates.  Table 16 finds that probability to 
solicit a bid is decreasing  in size. We also find that probability to solicit a bid is 
decreasing  in the change in size. Table 16 also shows that the coefficient  of sales growth 
proves significant  and negative. Firms losing market share may merge to exit the 
industry. The findings provide some support for the economies-of-scale-and-scope 
hypothesis. 
We find no evidence that discrepancies  in the value of firms, which should cause 
higher trading volumes, motivate  mergers. Table 16 finds that the higher  the 
concentration ratio, the significantly less likely are firms to receive  bids. Gort (1969) 
hypothesizes that the higher  the barriers  to entry (as proxied  for by higher concentration 
ratios), the more investors disagree  about the value  of firms in the industry, and a larger 
number of firms engage in mergers.  Our findings do not provide any support  for the 
hypothesis that discrepancies  in valuation  motivate  firms  to solicit  bids. 
Sales shock and square of sales shock represent  motives to reallocate resorrces to 
manage economic disturbances.  Table 16 finds supporting evidence for this hypothesis in 
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that firms that are experiencing  larger sales shocks  prove more likely to receive bids. As' 
in bidder models, we find contradictory  evidence to the hypothesis  that the direr a shock 
is (proxied by square of sales shock),  the more likely a firm is to propose a bid. 
5.2.2 Proxies for motives to exploit information asymmetries 
Information-asymmetry  models argue  that, while some  managers who think their 
firm is overvalued may want to exploit their information  advantage  by buying other firms 
"cheap", other managers may want to take advantage of their private information by 
selling their "expensive"  firm. Prtce runup proxies for overvaluation in share prices. In 
contradistinction  to the predictions of information-asymmetry  models, Table 16 shows 
that the coefficient  of price runup  is negative  and significant.  Firms,  whose  share prices 
increased  in the previous  two years, are less likely receive bids. One reason  may be that a 
runup in prices makes targets prohibitively  expensive  to buy. 
Uncertainty  about private values enables  managers to hide their true goals. The 
double-sided  information-asymmetry models predict that overvalued firms with greater 
uncertainty  about their value are more likely to receive acquisition bids. This  prediction  is 
unsupported since the coefficient of high-inforrnation-asymm  etry indicator proves 
negative and significant. To the contrary, undervalued  firms with greater transparency  in 
their share price are significantly  more likely to be target candidates. Our findings 
indicate that information asymmetries  may not motivate  managers to receive bids. 
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5,2.3 Proxies for multiple motives' 
Firms with little cash on hand and needs  to finance projects may solicit bids to 
access capital  markets  [Fluck and Lynch  (1999)]. Pursuit of economies of scale and  scope 
implies  a negative influence of cash ratio on target candidacy.  Jensen (1986)  also predicts 
a negative influence of firm's cash ratio on target  candidacy. According  to the free-cash- 
flow hypothesis,  managers with cash on hand are reluctant to solicit bids since mergers 
destroy the opportunistic  benefits that cash holdings afford. Table 16 shows that the 
probability of receiving  bids decreases with cash ratio. Firms with higher cash holdings 
may be less likely to receive bids either because management  is reluctant  to relinquish  the 
control of cash or because  higher cash holdings  obliterate motives  to merge in order to 
access capital  markets. 
Firms that have a history of merger  activity are more likely to receive  bids 
[Holmes  and Schmitz (1995); Manne (1965)].  Receiving  a bid in the past indicates that 
the firm may have high business-quality.  The signal of high business-quality  makes the 
firm a more likely  target  candidate  [Holmes and Schmit (1995)]. Manne (1965)  refers  to 
mergers as a disciplining  mechanism that gets rid of management  teams which are 
incapable  or unwilling to generate shareholder  value.  Hence, an unsuccessful  bid in the 
past may indicate that there is the potential to generate shareholder  value with a new 
management team.  Furthermore, Mitchell and Lehn (1990) find that firms which 
previously  proposed bids that destroyed shareholder value  make likely targetcandidates. 
The coefficient  of previous mergeru proves positive and significant.  Prior  merger history 
predicts target  candidacy. 
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Information-asymmetry  models and the economic-disturbances  hypothesis predict' 
that mergers  cluster  across time and industry.  Merger  intensity  captures  the clustering 
effect.  We find that firms  operating  in industries with higher  levels of merger  intensity 
are more likely to solicit  bids. 
5.3 Comparing  the predictive power of models for bidder and target cand,idacy 
Table 17 and Table 18 investigate the predictive power of bidder and target 
candidacy models, respectively.  Panels A of Table l7 and Table 18 report  the mean, 
standard deviation,  25s, 50th, 75tr percentile values for the probability of bidding in the 
bidder and nonbidder subsamples as estimated by bidder-candidacy  models, and the 
probability to receive bids in the target and nontarget subsamples  as estimated by target- 
candidacy models. Nonbidder subsample covers targets and nonmerging  firms, and 
nontarget subsample covers bidders and nonmerging  firms. Panel B in both tables reports 
the mean, standard deviation, 25ft, 50ft, 75ft percentile values for the X2 statistic for the 
likelihood-ratio  test and pseudo R2. 
In our sample, the fraction  of firms that propose at least one bid in any quarter  is 
1.78 percentzz.If  investors  don't anticipate bidders,  the average probability for any firm 
to bid should be 1.78 percent. Panel  A of Table  17 reports that the average probability of 
bidding  is 19.78 percent  for bidders and 1.35 percent for nonbidders.  Investors are 
correctly identifying that bidders are more probable  to propose  bids than nonbidders. 
2 The sample covers 7,559 bidder  quarters, and 423,975  nonbidder quarters.  Hence, the fraction of firms 
proposing at least one bid in a quarter is75591423975=.0178. 
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Panel B of Table 17 reports the average R2 in the cross-sectional  reglessions as 37 
percent, and a range of 23 percent to 73 percent. The null hypothesis  that the model  has 
no explanatory  power is rejected in all ninety-seven  regressions. Investors  can anticipate 
bidder  candidacy  as is evidenced by the predictive power  of the models. 
The fraction  of firms receiving a merger bid in any quarter  is 0.85 percent23.  The 
null hypothesis  that investors don't anticipate target  candidacy implies that the average 
probability for any firm to receive bids should  be 0.85 percent. Panel A of Table 18 
reports that the average  probability to receive bids is 6.87 percent for targets and 0.76 
percent  for nontargets. Investors  are predicting that targets are more likely to receive  bids 
than nontargets. 
Investors don't seem to be doing as good a job in predicting target candidates  as 
they do in predicting bidder candidates.  Panel B of Table 18 reports that the average  R2 is 
27 percent with a range  of 13 percent  to 68 percent.  In all but 9 periods, the R2 in the 
bidder model  is higher  than it is in the target model. 
23 The sample  covers 3,564 target quarters, and 419,086  nontarget quarters. Hence, the fraction of firms 
receiving at least  one bid in a quarter is 35641419086=.0085. 
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Market  responses to merger  announcements 
This chapter  investigates whether and how bidder and target cumulative abnormal 
returns vary with investor anticipations  about bidder and target candidacy. We first 
describe the distribution  of bidder and target cumulative abnormal  returns. We then 
investigate  whether investor anticipations  affect the distribution  of bidder and target 
abnormal returns. Finally, we analyze whether and how investor anticipations  affect 
bidder and target abnormal returns in a two-stage model in which we control for the 
economic  fit of the bidder  and target  and the confidential  items of negotiation. 
6.7 Univariate  analysis 
6.1.1 The distribution  of bidder and target abnormal  returns 
This section describes  the distribution  of bidder and target abnormal  returns  using 
different event windows.  Some bidders and targets  show multiple bids on event days. 
124 bidders propose 264bilds on the same  day, and22  targets  receive 46 bids on the same 
day. We can't distinguish  separate market responses  for bids proposed  and received on 
the same days.  Consequently,  we exclude  the bidders  and targets that  propose or receive 
more than one deal on the same day. In Chapter 7, we test whether  our results are robust 
to including  these deals. 
Table 19 reports the mean, standard  deviation, 25h,50h,75ft  percentile values for 
the distribution of 3-day, 7-day, 15-day,  and 29-day cumulative abnormal returns for 
bidders in Panel A and for targets in Panel B. The mean bidder abnormal  returns rango 
98 
from 0 percent to 1.09  percent whereas  mean target returns  range from 19.92 percent to' 
25.57  percent. 
6.1.2 Investor anticipations  and the distribution of bidder and target cumulative 
abnormal returns 
Evidence in cited in Chapter 5 rejects the null hypothesis  that investors don't 
anticipate bidder  and target candidacy.  We now investigate whether and how investor 
anticipations affect bidder and target abnormal  returns. Announcements  that surprise the 
market should convey more information  than announcements  that the market widely 
anticipated.  Consequently, we hypothesize that abnormal  returns to more-predictable 
bidder and target  candidates  should be larger in magnitude than returns  to less-predictable 
bidder  and target  candidates. 
6.I.2.1 Cumulative  abnormal returns to anticipated and unanticipated  bidder 
candidates 
To test whether abnormal returns to more-predictable  bidders differ from returns 
to less-predictable  bidders,  we split our sample  of merging firms into two subsamples of 
anticipated bidders and unanticipated  bidders. The probability to become a bidder is an 
inverse measure of how much  the bidder surprises  the market.  The higher is the 
probability  of proposing  a bid, the more widely anticipated is the bidder. If the predicted 
probability  of bidding is in the top 25tr percentile,  we identify a bidder as anticipated, and 
if the predicted probability  is in the bottom 25fr percentile, we identify a bidder as 
unanticipated. 
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Figure 1 through Figure 4 displays how the distributions  of 3, 7,15, and}9-day' 
cumulative abnormal returns to anticipated bidders differ from those of unanticipated 
bidders. The plots of returns to anticipated and unanticipated  bidders diverge most at the 
tails of the distributions.  The tails of the return distributions are the places we expect 
investor anticipations to show themselves.  The plots suggest that the magnitude  of returns 
to unanticipated  bidders is larger than  those to anticipated  bidders. 
Table 20 reports the mean,  standard deviation, and the number  of observations  for 
3-day, 7-day,15-day,  and29-day cumulative abnormal returns to unanticipated bidders in 
Panel A and to anticipated  bidders in Panel B. The first column in Panel C reports the t- 
statistic  for the t-test of the null hypothesis that the means of absolute values of CARs are 
equal in the two subsamples.  As suggested by the figures, the magnitude of CARs to 
unanticipated  bidders proves significantly  higher than magnitude of CARs to anticipated 
bidders. The difference in magnitude supports our hypothesis that unanticipated  deals 
convey more information  than  anticipated deals. 
The t-statistics for the t-test, reported in the last to second  column  in Panel C, 
reject the null hypotheses  that the mean of CARs to anticipated and unanticipated  deals 
are equal. CARs to unanticipated bidders prove significantly  higher than anticipated 
bidders. The positive market response to unanticipated  deals suggests that, on average, 
markets evaluate unanticipated  deals to be positive net-present-value projects.  The 
information  deals convey about unanticipated managerial  motives serve shareholder 
interests. 
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The p-value for the variance-ratio  test, reported in the last  column in Panel C,' 
leads us to reject the null hypotheses that the variance of CARs to anticipated  and 
unanticipated deals is equal. The distributions  of CARs prove significantly tighter 
around the mean for anticipated  bidders than they do for unanticipated bidders. The 
tighter distribution of retums to anticipated bidders implies that announcements  made 
by anticipated bidders disturb markets less than announcements  of unanticipated 
bidders. This result confirms our hypothesis that  anticipated  deals would convey less 
information  and generate a tighter  distribution  of returns. 
Table  21 tests whether the distributions of abnormal  returns  in the anticipated  and 
unanticipated  samples come from a common population. The table reports the z-statistic, 
p-value, and chi2-statistic  for the Mann-Whitney,  Kolmogorov-Smirnov, and Kruskall- 
Wallis tests that the two subsamples  are drawn from a common population, respectively. 
We reject  the null hypothesis  of a common population  in all tests and event windows 
except for the Mann-Whitney  test in the 7-day window. The distributions of CARs to 
unanticipated  and anticipated bidders prove different. 
To check whether  the results  are robust  to alternative definitions of anticipation, 
we experiment  with different breakpoints. We identify  a bidder  as anticipated if the 
predicted probability  is larger than the median  for all bidders, and as unanticipated if the 
predicted probability  is smaller than the median. Table 22 rcports the mean,  standard 
deviation, and the number of observations  for 3-day, 7-day, 15-day, and 29-day 
cumulative abnormal  returns  to unanticipated bidders  in Panel A and to anticipated 
bidders in Panel  B. The first column in Panel  C reports the t-statistic  for the t-test of the 
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null hypothesis  that the means of absolute  values of CARs are equal in the two' 
subsamples. The magnitude of 3-day and 7-day CARs to unanticipated bidders prove 
significantly higher than CARs to unanticipated  bidders. The magnitude of 15-day and 
29-day CARs to unanticipated  bidders prove insignificantly higher. The last two  columns 
in Panel  C report  the t-statistic and p-value  for the t-test and variance ratio test of the null 
hypotheses  that, respectively, the mean and variance of CARs are equal in the two 
subsamples. The results remain qualitatively the same. CARs  to unanticipated bidders 
prove significantly  higher and tighter around the mean than CARs to anticipated bidders. 
Previous  studies find that mean bidder CARs using different  event-windows vary 
around 0 percent pensen and Ruback (1983);  Andrade  and Stafford  (2001)1.  A finding of 
no abnormal  retums implies that (i) bidders engage in mergers that, on average, generate 
no value for their shareholders, or; (ii) abnormal  returns around announcements  are 
flawed estimates of market responses  to mergers. 
The finding of larger  magnitude  of CARs to unanticipated bidders lends support 
to the hypothesis  that CARs may be flawed measures of market responses  to mergers.  In 
an efficient  market, prices of bidder  shares  should incorporate  the expected  impact of 
investor anticipations  prior to announcements. In this case, as the findings confirm, 
average CARs attenuate  towards 0. However, when we identify  a subset of unanticipated 
bidders, we find that CARs prove significantly  positive.  The evidence suggests that 
relying on CARs around announcements  to draw conclusions  about the shareholder  value 
anticipated  deals generate (or destroy) is misleading. 
r02' 
6.1,2.2 Cumulative abnormal returns to anticipated and unanticipated  target 
candidates 
As in our analysis  of bidder retums, we split target candidates  into two groups: 
anticipated  and unanticipated  candidates. If the predicted probability of receiving a bid is 
in the top (bottom)  25'fr percentile, we identify a target as anticipated  (unanticipated). 
Figure 5 through  Figure 8 display  how the distributions  of 3, 7, 15, and 29-day 
cumulative abnormal returns to anticipated targets differ from those of unanticipated 
targets. The plots of anticipated and unanticipated  targets overlay each other more than 
those of anticipated  and unanticipated bidders. 
Table 23 investigates  whether the distributions  of CARs to anticipated  and 
unanticipated  targets differ. The table reports mean, standard deviation, and the number 
of observations  for 3-day, 7-day, 15-day, and 29-day cumulative abnormal returns to 
unanticipated  targets in Panel A and to anticipated targets in Panel B. The first column in 
Panel C reports  the t-statistic for the t-test of the null hypothesis  that the means of 
absolute values  of CARs are equal in the two subsamples.  The magnitude of CARs to 
unanticipated bidders differs insignificantly  from magnitude of CARs to anticipated 
bidders. The t-statistics and p-values  for the t-test, reported in the last two columns  in 
Panel C, fail to reject the null hypotheses  that the mean and variance  of CARs are equal 
in the two subsamples. The findings  offer no evidence that distributions of CARs to 
anticipated  and unanticipated  targets differ. 
Table  24 tests whether the distributions of abnormal retums in the anticipated and 
unanticipated target samples come from a common  population. Table reports the z- 
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statistic, p-value, and chi'-statistic  for the Mann-Whitney, Kolmogorov-Smirnov, and' 
Kruskall-Wallis  tests that the two subsamples are drawn from a common  population, 
respectively. We fail to reject the null hypothesis. The distributions  of CARs to 
unanticipated  and anticipated  targets don't prove different. 
We also use an alternative  definition  of anticipation to split the sample.  We 
identify  atarget candidate  as anticipated  if the predicted probability  to receive a bid is 
larger than the median  and as unanticipated if the predicted  probability is smaller than the 
median. Table 25 investigates if  the distributions of CARs to anticipated  and 
unanticipated targets differ. The results remain qualitatively  the same except for the tests 
of variances. The tests reject the null hypothesis  that the variances  of distributions  are 
equal in the two distributions. The distributions of CARs in the unanticipated  subsample 
are significantly  tighter around the mean than those in the anticipated subsample. If 
unanticipated deals convey more  information, CARs to unanticipated  targets should 
prove looser  around the mean than CARs to anticipated targets.  The failure of target- 
candidacy  models  to successfully  identify anticipated target candidates, and the use of a 
less precise identification  scheme in categoizing anticipated and unanticipated deals may 
explain this result. 
6.2 Two-stage model of investor  anticipations  and market responses 
Section 6.1 suggests that investor anticipations  about bidder candidacy  affect 
cumulative abnormal  returns around announcements. This section analvzes investor 
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anticipations and CARs in a two-stage model  where we control  for the fit and bargaining 
power  of bidders and targets. 
6.2.1 Regressions  of bidder abnormal returns 
Equation 17 seeks to explain whether and how investor anticipations  affect 
market responses to merger proposals.  The first four columns of Table 26 estimate 
different specifications of regression-equation  17. In all specifications, the endogenous 
variable is the 7-day bidder  cumulative  abnormal returns (CRr). CARs may only be 
calculated  upon a merger announcement  (Mr=l). Equation 18 describes how we 
construct Heckman's  lambda  using the estimates of bidder-candidacy models (-Zuf 
") 
that Table 15 reports. 
L7 (CMr lM u - 1) = Xfs * lrf^u *Un, 
Q?2,T,)18  A"=
1-O(-ZrTr) 
In specification 1 of Table 26, the regressor  ( X ) is the indicator for an all-equity 
deal. The economic  fit between  bidder and target determines how much total shareholder 
value that the merger  generates. The bargaining power of bidder management  relative to 
target management determines how the total shareholder value  that the merger  generates 
is shared between bidder and target shareholders.  The next three specifications  introduce 
regressors  that proxy for the economic fit and bargaining power of bidders  and targets. 
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The fifth specification uses all regressors  except Heckman's lambda  to let us benchmark' 
the results against a single-equation  model that equation  19 describes. 
19  (CMrlM, =l) = XBu + er. 
Table 27 investigates whether introducing industry and time fixed effects alter  the 
results presented  in Table 29.Table  27 follows the same strategy  as Table 26 to estimate 
equations 17 with one exception; it introduces  industry  and year fixed-effects. krdustry 
indicators for 2-drgit SlC-codes  and year indicators for announcement  years  arc included 
but not reported. 
6.2.1.1 Heckman's lambda as a proxy for managerial  motives 
Heckman's lambda  is an inverse transformation of the probability of proposing a 
bid. The larger is Heckman's  lambda,  the larger is the surprise about bidder candidacy 
and the more information announcements  convey about unobservable motives. We 
expect Heckman's lambda to be significant if investors anticipate announcements.  In 
Table 26 and Table 27, the coefficient  for Heckman's lambda proves positive and 
statistically significant in all specifications. The simultaneous-equation  results support the 
findings of Section 6.1 that announcement  surprises influence bidder abnormal returns. 
Heckman's lambda is economically as well as statistically  significant. For a 
standard deviation change in Heckman's  lambda, bidder  returns change by 48 to 5l basis 
points in different specifications  of Table 26 and Table 27. Even though, we cannot pull 
apart the distinct pieces of information revealed,  the positive market response to surprises 
about bidder candidacy implies that investors  infer managerial motives to serve 
shareholder interests.  For the market response to be positive, the information  that 
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announcements  convev about motives  must  be more about the shareholder value the' 
merger creates, and less about  opportunistic managerial benefits or overvaluation  in share 
prices. 
Table 26 and Table 27 show that bidder cumulative  abnormal retums are 
significantly lower in equity-financed deals. The indicator  for an all-equity deal proxies 
for latent motives  to exploit  information asymmetries by financing the deal using 
overvalued equity. This finding  is in line with the Myers and Majluf (1986)  pecking- 
order hypothesis  that markets  assess the firm as overvalued  when equity  is used  to 
finance investment  projects. 
Both Heckman's lambda and all-equity  indicator  prove significant in all 
specifications.  All-equity indicator proxies for previously unobservable motives to 
exploit information asymmetries whereas Heckman's lambda proxies  for previously 
unobservable  motives  to generate bidder shareholder-value, to secure  opportunistic 
benefits, and to exploit information asymmetries.  The significance  of both all-equity 
indicator and Heckman's lambda means that investors  price the information about 
motives to exploit information  asymmetries as well as to generate shareholder value and 
to secure opportunistic benefits. Consequently,  we interpret the sign of Heckman's 
lambda as expressing previously unobservable motives to generate  value for bidder 
shareholders and to secure opportunistic benefits over and above the motives to exploit 
information  asymmetries that all-equity indicator represents. 
The fifth specifications in Table 26 and Table 27 benchmark the results of a 
single-equation  model by including all regressors  except for Heckman's lambda.  In 
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specification  4, the t-value  tells us that excluding Heckman's lambda would decrease the 
R2. The R2 in specification 5 is lower  than that in specification 4. This finding  supports 
the hypothesis that investor anticipations  about bidder candidacy contribute to our 
understanding of market responses to merger announcements. A single-equation  model 
isn't as powerful in explaining  market responses to merger announcements as the two- 
stage model. However,  the small adjustments  in the size of other significant slope 
coefficients tell us that the information Heckman's  lambda captures is largely orthogonal 
to that imbedded in other regressors.  Ignoring the endogeneity in investor anticipations 
and market  responses lead to an omitted-variable  bias rather than a simultaneous- 
equations  bias. 
6.2.1.2 Controls for the confidential items of negotiation and merger  fit 
Specifications 2 through 4 in Table 26 and Table 27 introduce  controls for the 
merger fit and confidential  items of negotiation.  The economic  fit between the bidder  and 
target determines how much total shareholder value the merger generates.  Three 
indicators  proxy for the economic fit: whether the merging  firms operate  in the same 
industry, whether they are located  in the same state, and whether the bidder and target  are 
public firms. Confidential items of negotiation  when revealed show the relative 
bargaining power of bidders  and targets. The relative bargaining power determines how 
the total value is shared between bidder and target  shareholders.  Three indicators proxy 
the relative bargaining  power of bidders and targets: whether  the target  management 
initially resists the merger, whether  the target is in bankruptcy  proceedings, and whether 
the target has anti-takeover  defenses  in place. 
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&6.2.7.2.7  Controls for the merger frt' 
Operating in the same line of business affects  the extent to which the assets-in- 
place of the stand-alone  enterprises complement and substitute each other [Campa  
Kedia (2002);  Villalonga (2004)1.  The same- industry  indicator controls  for differences in 
market responses to focus-increasing  and focus-decreasing (or diversifyrng)  deals. 
Geographic  proximity  may also affect  the economic  fit in two ways: firms closely 
situated  may have closer corporate  cultures which in turn may increase or decrease the 
total shareholder  value that the mergers generate [Chakrabarti et al. (20O5)]; or local 
deals may work to the advantage bidder  shareholders since geographic proximity  may 
mean that bidder management  has superior information  about the target than funher- 
away competitors [Kedia et aI. (2005)].  The same-state  indicator controls  for differences 
in market responses  to differences  in the geographic  proximity  of merger partners. The 
ownership  structure is another factor that may affect market  responses to announcements 
since the ownership  structure of the bidder and target affect  the liquidity of shares and  the 
access to capital markets. The target-public  and, bidder-public indicators controls for 
market responses to the differences in ownership  structure. 
The second specification  in Table 26 andTable 27 introduce the three proxies for 
the economic  fit. Heckman's lambda continues  to be both economically  and statistically 
significant  when we control  for the economic fit. However, none of the proxies for 
merger fit prove statistically significant. Differences  in industry, state or ownership 
structure don't affect market responses to bidder  announcements  significantly. 
109 
6.2.1.2.2 Controls for the relative bargaining power of bidders  and targets' 
Bidder management may sweeten the deal for target shareholders  when faced 
with target managerial-resistance  [Jennings andMazzeo  (1993)]. Unwelcoming-attiude 
indicator  controls for differences  in reception  of the merger proposal.  Anti-takeover 
defenses  strengthen target management ability to resist takeovers  and increase  the 
bargaining  power of target management  [Ambrose and Megginson (1992)1. Anti- 
takeover-defenses  indicator controls for market responses to the presence of anti-takeover 
defenses. Target bargaining  power varies inversely with the need of target shareholders to 
sell the fnm. Target-bankrupt indicator controls for the extreme  case of the need to sell, 
target  bankruptcy. 
The third specifications  in Table 26 and Table 27 introdace  proxies for the 
relative  bargaining power  of bidders and targets. As expected,  an unwelcoming target 
management  significantly lowers bidder abnormal returns.  Unwelcoming-attitude 
indicator proves both statistically and economically insignificant.  The positive coefficient 
of target-bankrupt indicator implies that management  of targets in bankruptcy 
proceedings with a desire to get something  out of the wreckage  (perhaps by transferring 
value from creditors)  may  be willing to settle for a worse deal for. However the effect is 
insignificant. 
The fourth specification in Table 26 and Table 27 introdaces proxies  for both the 
merger fit and bargaining  power of bidders and targets.  The coefficients for the economic 
fit and relative bargaining power remain qualitatively unchanged.  Only the unwelcoming- 
attitude proves statistically significant. 
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6.2.2 Regressions  of target abnormal returns' 
We use the same regression strategy to analyze  market responses  to reception of 
bids that we use to analyze proposal of bids. Equation  20 explains whether and how 
investor anticipations  affect market responses to announcements  of bids that firm receive. 
The first four columns of Table 28 estimate different specifications  of regression- 
equation 20.In all specifications,  the endogenous  variable is the 7-day biddercumulative 
abnormal returns (CRr). CARs are conditional  on observing merger announcements 
(M, = 1). Equation 21 describes how we construct Heckman's  lambda using the 
estimates  of target-candidacy  models (- Zryr) that 
20 (CAR, I M, - 1) = Xrf, * trr f^, * U, 
)_ _  QGZTTT)Zt  ^  L- O (-ZrTr) 
In specification I of Table  28, the regressor ( Xr) is the indicator  for an all-equity  deal. 
The next three specifications  introduces additional  regressors that proxy for the economic 
fit and bargaining power  of bidders and targets.  The economic fit between bidder and 
target determines how much total shareholder  value that the merger generates. The 
bargaining  power of bidder management relative to target management detennines how 
the total shareholder value that the merger generates is shared  between bidder and target 
shareholders.  Equation 22 descibes a single-equation  model of market responses. The 
fifth specification of Table 28 uses all regressors  except Heckman's lambda to estimate 
equation22. 
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22  (CAR, lM, =l) = Xf, + er.' 
Table 29 investigates  whether introducing industry and time fixed effects changes the 
results presented  in Table  28. Table 29 follows the same strategy  as Table 28 to estimate 
equations 20 with one exception; it introduces  industry  and year fixed-effects.  Industry 
indicators for 2-di$t SlC-codes  and year indicators for announcement  years  are included 
but not reported. 
6,2.2.1 Heckman's lambda  as a proxy for managerial motives 
In all specifications  of Table 28, coefficient of Heckman's lambda proves positive 
and significant.  However, when we control  for industry and year fixed-effects  in Table 
29, coefficient of Heckman's lambda  remains  positive  but proves statistically 
insignificant.  Introducing industry and year fixed-effects erodes the economic  as well as 
statistical significance of Heckman's lambda. For a standard deviation  change in 
Heckman's lambda, tar9et  returns change by tI2 to 117 basis points in different 
specifications  in Table  28, and,by 62 to 64 basis points inTable  29. 
In bidder regressions,  a standard deviation change in lambda is of the same order 
of magnitude  as a change in lambda from the 25k to the 75ft percentile2a.  However,  in 
target regressions,  a standard  deviation change in lambda doesn't correspond to a change 
in lambda from the 25h to the 75th percentile. A standard  deviation change in lambda is 
6.01 percent in specifications  of Table 28 and 5.77 percent in Table 29 whereas a change 
  A standard deviation change in lambda is 13.21 Vo and achange in lambda from 25b to 75e percentile is 
13.29 Vo in specifications  reported in Table 26 andTable2T. 
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in lambda from 25ft to 756 percentile is 3.12 percent in Table 28 and 3.03 percent in' 
Table29. 
For a standard deviation  change in lambda or a 50 percent change in lambda from 
25ft to 75fr percentile,  bidder returns ranges from 48 to 51 basis points for specifications 
of Table 26 andTable 27.However,  the range in target returns is halved for a 50 percent 
change in lambda from 25fr to 75ft percentile when compared  to a standard deviation 
change in lambda. For a 50 percent  change in lambda, target returns ranges from 57 to 59 
basis points  for specifications  of Table 28 and from 31 to 32 basis points  inTable 29. 
The smaller  variation  in target lambda and the failure of candidacy models to 
estimate target candidacy as well as bidder candidacy  suggests that investors can't 
anticipate target candidates as well as they do bidder candidates.  Because announcements 
convey  more information  about the target than they do about  bidders,  the abnormal 
returns to target shareholders prove greater in magnitude  than abnormal returns to 
bidders. 
. A crucial assumption  of event studies is that analysts learn event-related 
information in a short window of time. Investor ability to anticipate events means  that 
some merger-related information is stale at the time of announcements.  We find an 
asymmetry between the staleness  of information  concerning bidder and target  candidates. 
The information that announcements  reveal about targets is less stale. Without controlling 
for the differences in staleness, it is wrong to conclude that target shareholders  enjoy the 
lion's share of the value that mergers  generate. 
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Our findings indicate  that, at least to some extent,  the asymmetry  in investor' 
anticipations about bidder and target candidacy  drives the disparity in bidder and target 
abnormal  returns. To investigate  the disparity between bidder and target CARs,  Panel A 
of Table 30 classifies  bidders and targets  into 10 categories  according to the predicted 
probability of proposing and receiving  bids, and compares CARs of equally  anticipated 
bidders and targets. Panel B of Table 30 reports the average of differences in the 10 
categories,  and  the difference in CARs across all deals. Panel B shows that when we 
control for investor  anticipations the difference in CARs is reduced  by 3 percent. The 
evidence supports our hypothesis  that to some extent the asymmetry in investor 
anticipations  causes the disparity  in bidder and target  returns. 
As in bidder regessions,  we introduce equity-only indicator and proxies for the fit 
and bargaining power of bidders and targets to control for the information  that 
announcements  convey. In all regression specifications, the equity-only indicators prove 
significant and negative. The finding supports  the Myers  and Majluf  (1936)  pecking- 
order hypothesis. 
The fifth specification  in Table 28 and Table 29 benchmarks the results  of a 
single-equation  model by including all regressors except for Heckman's lambda. 
Excluding  Heckman's lambda decreases the R2 less in target regressions than it does in 
bidder regressions.  This finding  supports the hypothesis investor anticipations  about 
bidder candidacy matter  more in analyzing  CARs than anticipations  about target 
candidacy.  Again, the information  Heckman's lambda  captures  is largely orthogonal to 
that imbedded in other  regressors.  Ignoring  the endogeneity in investor anticipations 
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about target candidacy  and market responses leads to an omitted-variable  bias rather  than' 
a simultaneous-equations  bias. 
6,2,2.2  Controls for the merger fit and relative bargaining power of bidders and 
targets 
We follow the same  regression  strategy  in analyzing  target CARs as we do in 
analyzingbidder  CARs. Specifications  2 through 4 in Table 28 and Table 29 introduce 
controls for the merger fit and relative bargaining power of bidders and targets. Same- 
industry, same-state, and bidder-public  indicators  proxy for the economic fit. 
Unwelcoming-attitude, target-bankrupt  and anti-takeover-defenses  indicators proxy for 
the relative bargaining  power of bidders and targets. 
6,2,2.2.1  Controls for the mergerfit 
The second specification in Table 28 and Table 29 introduces  regressors  that are 
proxies  for the fit between the merger partners. Of the three proxies for the economic fit 
only same-state indicator proves significant in both tables.  On the one hand, Table 28 and 
Table 29 shows  that target  returns are significantly  lower when the target and bidder main 
operations  are in the same  state. On the other hand, Table 26 and Table 27 tell us that 
bidder  returns are higher when the arget and bidder main operations are in the same 
state. 
Chakrabarti et al. (2005) interpret  geographical  proximity as proxying the 
similarity in corporate culture.  Similar firms may have  an easier time working  together. If 
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this is the case, bidder shareholders  seem to be reaping all the benefits from any synergies 
due to similar corporate culture whereas target shareholders  are bearing  all the costs. 
Another view on geographic proximity argues that bidders  in close proximity  may enjoy 
an edge in negotiations  since they know the target  better and can negotiate  a better deal 
lKedia et al. (2005)]. According  to Kedia et aI. (2005), in deals where the bidder and 
target  are located  close, the higher  negotiation power of bidder management means that 
bidder shareholders  enjoy higher returns, and target shareholders suffer from lower 
returns. The findings lend support  to this hlpothesis. 
6.2.2.2.2 Controls for the relative bargaining  power of bidders  and  targets 
The third specification in Table 28 and Table 29 introduces  regressors  that  proxy 
for the relative bargaining  power of bidders and targets. Of the proxies for relative 
bargaining power of bidders and targets, only target-bankrupt  indicator proves 
significant.  CARs to targets in bankruptcy proceedings prove significantly lower. There 
is less target  shareholder value  generated  in these mergers relative to deals in which the 
target is healthy. Judges and creditors are often the decision-makers in bankruptcy. 
Consequently,  mergers may be generating value  for other stakeholders  such as creditors 
and employees. 
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Robustness  Tests 
The findings in Chapter 6 indicate that investor anticipations  influence  market 
responses to merger announcements.  In a single-equation model of market responses that 
ignores investor  anticipations, bidder CARs are biased downward by omitted-variable 
bias.  Target CARs aren't as much affected by omitted-variable bias as bidder  CARs. This 
chapter investigates  whether any respecification of the two-stage model, sampling 
experiment or relaxing  of the market-efficiency  assumption undermines  the influence  of 
investor  anticipations  on market responses. 
We investigate four respecifications  for candidacy models to analyze whether we 
can predict candidacy more successfully and whether the respecifications  weaken the 
influence of investor  anticipations  on market responses. The first respecification  expands 
the estimation  window from a quarter  to a year. The second respecification  introduces 
proxies for the characteristics  of monitoring  and managerial  compensation  conftact. The 
third respecification uses the full SDC-sample of merging firms by not requiring 
coverage on CRSP-COMPUSTAT  to predict  candidacy.  The fourth  respecification  splits 
the sample into two subsamples  to investigate time-series differences in coefficients of 
the candidacy models. 
We investigate three respecifications  for models of market responses to analyze 
whether the importance of investor anticipations weakens. First respecification  uses 
different event windows. The second respecification  includes  bidders  and targets that 
announce multiple mergers on the same day. The third respecification  introduces new 
proxies for the merger fit and bargaining  power of the bidder  and target. 
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We assume that markets  can efficiently construct models  of candidacy and of 
cumulative abnormal returns. We relax  the assumption of market efficiency  to investigate 
to what extent the influence of surprises on cumulative abnormal  returns  is robust to the 
assumption about market efficiency. 
Our principal contention is that, on average, unanticipated  merger  announcements 
more  clearly  evidence how mergers affect  bidder shareholder wealth. The last section of 
this chapter explores the average market response by investigating  cross-sectional 
differences in how investor anticipations  affect bidder abnormal returns. 
7.1 Altemative specifications of bidiler and target-candidacy rnodels 
7.1.1 Predicting  bidder and target candidates using a longer event- window 
This section uses annual instead of quarterly data to estimate  investor 
anticipations.  When new information arrives,  investors update their estimates of which 
firms are likely to propose and receive merger  bids. This is why we prefer data that are 
recorded  at frequent intervals  to estimate models of candidacy. Running annual probit 
regressions  means that the information used is staler  than the information in quarterly 
regressions. However, because the predictive power of candidacy  models  increases, it is 
easier to predict  bidder and target  candidacy in an annual  interval. 
The subsample of merging firms remains  the same.  Our procedure  for sampling 
nonmerging firms remains the same, except now annual CRSP-COMPUSTAT  database 
generates the subsample  of nonmerglng  firms. We require that CRSP-COMPUSTAT 
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cover the sample firms. As a result, our sample covers  5,92I bidder years, 3,370 target' 
years, and 94,9 L4 nonmerging  years. 
Table 31 and Table  32 report the marginal-probability  estimates of bidder and 
target candidacy  models.  The models  are run for 25 annual cross-sections that cover data 
from L979 to 2O03.The endogenous variable takes on the value one if the firm proposes  a 
bid during the next year in Table 31 and if the firm receives a bid in Table 32. The 
predictors  of candidacy are the same proxies for managerial motives  used in Table 15 and 
Table 16. 
The results remain  qualitatively  same. Whether we use annual or quarterly 
prediction windows, larger and more-profitable  firms with greatr;r cash reserves that 
engaged in mergers in the previous  two years prove more likely to propose bids. More- 
profitable firms with smaller cash reserves,  whose stock price declined in the prior two 
years, and that engaged in mergers in the prior two years prove more likely  to receive 
bids. The last column of Table 31 and Table 32 report the t-statistic  for the t-test of the 
null hypothesis that the mean of the distribution is equal to zero. The t-statistics  show that 
only one coefficient  flips signs,  and is significant: that for the squared  sales shock. 
Table 33 and Table 34 investigate whether the predictive power of candidacy 
models improves using annual forecast-windows.  Panel A reports the summary statistics 
for the distribution  of probabilities of proposing and receiving bids. The fraction of firms 
that proposes a bid in the sample is 6.03 percent and the fraction that receives a bid is 
3.35 percent. Models of candidacy  accurately estimate the probability of proposing and 
receiving bids to be higher for bidder  and target candidates  than the fractions observed in 
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the sample. The predicted  probability of proposing  bids for bidders is 45.82 percent,  and' 
the predicted probability of receiving bids is 19.05 percent. Furthermore,  the mean 
probability of proposing and receiving  bids for bidder and target candidates is 26 percent 
and 14 percent higher in annual models than in quarterly models25. As reported  in Panel 
B of Table 33 and Table 34, the fit of the annual  candidacy models is better both in terms 
of pseudo R2 and the chi2-statistic of the likelihood-ratio  test. 
Table 35 reports regressions  for bidder CARs in Panel A and for target CARs in 
Panel B. The first specification  in both panels  introduces Heckman's lambda and all- 
equity indicator as explanatory variables.  Heckman's lambda remains positive and 
significant  in bidder regressions. The results remain qualitatively the same as in bidder 
regressions shown  in Table 26. However, Heckman's lambda  remains  positive but loses 
significance  in target regressions. Expanding the prediction-window  erodes the predictive 
power of target  candidacy  models. 
The coefficient  of all-equity indicator  is negative and significant in all 
specifications.  The second specification  introduces  explanatory variables that control for 
differences in the fit and relative  bargaining power  of bidders and targets.  The results 
remain qualitatively  same except  for the target-public indicator in bidder regressions. The 
coefficient of bidder-public flips signs. However,  the coefficient is statistically 
insignificant. 
6 Table 17 and. Table 18 report summary statistics on predicted probabilities  and goodness-of-fit 
diagnostics  for the quarterly bidder and target-candidacy  models. 
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7.1.2 Predicting  candidacy  using characteristics of managerial compensation' 
contracts  and the power of board monitoring 
Managerial incentives  affect all managerial  decisions including  the merger 
decision. Therefore, investors may rely on characteristics  of management and the 
governance  environment to predict  bidder and target  candidacy.  Management 
characteristics  that might determine how closely managerial incentives serve  shareholder 
interests include: the proportion of a CEO's wealth that is dependent  on firm 
performance;  CEO tenure; and the power of the CEO over the decisions of the board. The 
effectiveness of board monitoring  also affects managerial incentives to serve shareholder 
interests. 
We introduce regressors  to represent  managerial incentives. These regressors  are 
constructed from annual E)(ECOMP and IRRC  data. Financial influencers are 
constructed from annual CRSP-COMPUSTAT  data. We estimate annual, cross-sectional 
probit regressions. The observation  unit is a firm year. IRRC data only cover  the years 
t990,  1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004. E)(ECOMP data cover the years from 
1.992 to 2004. The intersection  of these datasets only covers the years L993, L995, 1998, 
2000, and2002. 
Explanatory variables  that we introduce in this section  include: equity-based 
compensation, ownership stake, retirement  years, and governance  ind,ex26. Equity-based 
compensation  (fraction  of CEO compensation from stock options) and CEO ownership- 
stake represent incremental  and cumulative pay-performance sensitivity, respectively. 
L2l' 
When managers are entrenched, they can determine  corporate  strategy  with little' 
fear of reprisal from the board of directors. CEO ownership  stake can increase managerial 
entrenchment. The number of years of credited service that the CEO has under the 
company's pension  plan (retirement  years) can also proxy for managerial entrenchment. 
The corporate  governance index of Gompers, Iishi and Metrick (2003)  measwes 
the balance of power  between  shareholders and managers. The higher is the corporate- 
governance index and the number  of years worked in the company,  the more entrenched 
the manager is. The more entrenched the manager, the fewer penalties  she faces should 
she choose to engage in value-destroying  merger activity. 
Table 36 and Table 37 investigate whether models of candidacy  are robust to 
introducing proxies for management  and board characteristics.  In Table 36 and Table 37, 
the endogenous variable  takes on the value  one if the firm proposes and receives a bid 
during the next year, respectively. In each year, two specifications are run. First 
specification  includes all the proxies for firm and industry characteristics  - the same 
proxies  used in Table 31 and Table 32- and new proxies  for management  and board 
characteristics. Second specification  includes only the proxies for firm and industry 
characteristics.  Panels A of Table 36 and Table 37 report marginal probability 
coefficients for bidder and target-candidacy  models, and Panels B report goodness-of-fit 
diagnostics. 
Panels A of Table  36 shows  that none of the variables  that proxy  for management 
and board characteristics  proves  to be a significant  predictor of bidder candidacy. Only 
26 Section  3.3.1 .2.2 explains  these explanatory variables. 
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the prior track record of mergers  proves to be a predictor of bidder candidacy in all years 
and across  all specifications.  Significant firm-specific predictors: such as share tumover, 
size, and change in size in 1998; and, such as sales growth  and merger  intensity in 2000 
become insignificant  when we include proxies for management and board characteristics. 
When we include proxies for management and board characteristics,  previously 
insignificant  predictors: such as cash ratio in 1993; such as ROA and cash  ratio in 1995; 
and, such  as sales  shock and price runup in 1998 become  significant. 
Panels  A of Table 37 shows  that none of the variables  that proxy for management 
and board characteristics  proves to be a significant predictor of target candidacy  either. 
Only the prior track record  of mergers  proves to be a predictor of bidder and target 
candidacy  in all years and across all specifications. Significant  firm-specific predictors: 
such as resource-growth  mismatch  indicator, size and change  in size in 1993; such as size 
and change  in size in 1995; such as price  runup and change  in size in 1998; such as sales 
shock, merger intensity,  size, and change  in size in 2000; and, such as high-information- 
asymmetry indicator in 2002 become insignificant  when we include  proxies  for 
management and board characteristics.  When we include proxies for management and 
board characteristics,  previously  insignificant predictors: such as sales shock  and share 
turnover  in 19931, and such as ROA in 1995 become  significant. 
One interpretation  of the findings is that proxies  for managerial enffenchment, 
incremental  and cumulative equity compensation don't determine bidder and target 
candidacy.  Another interpretation is that the gaps in IRRC and EXECOMP data preclude 
us from drawing  conclusions  using these specifications. 
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Panels A and B of Table 38 seek to explain bidder and target cumulative' 
abnormal  returns, respectively. Heckman's lambda is estimated using the coefficients  of 
candidacy models that Table  36 and Table 3,7 report.  The first specification in both panels 
includes Heckman's  lambda and all-equity indicator. Heckman's lambda is no longer 
significant in either bidder or target regressions.  The increased standard erors caused by 
data restrictions  that E)GCOMP  and IRRC  impose  explain the insignificance of 
Heckman's  lambda. In Panels A and B of Table 38, the standard enors of Heckman's 
lambda more than double when compared to the standard  effors of comparable 
specifications  in Table 26 andTable2827. 
Heckrnan's lambda flips signs and becomes negative in bidder regressions.  The 
evidence in Section 4.2 shows that the distribution  of CARs for bidders  covered  in 
E)(ECOMP and IRRC differ from the distribution  of CARs for bidders  that aren't 
covered.  Moeller et aI. (2005) find that bidder returns  to large deals prove significantly 
lower than small deals. The mean deal size for bidders covered bv E)GCOMP  and IRRC 
is I,437 million dollars  whereas  the mean deal size for bidders  that aren't cbvered  is 387 
million  dollars. The difference  is statistically as well as economically significant. 
The difference  in deal sizes in the two samples may explain the difference  in the 
distribution  of CARs and the flip in the sign of Heckman's lambda. Table  39 investigates 
whether  the difference in deal sizes explains  the change in the sign of Heckman's 
n The standard  errors of Heckman's  lambda in the first two specifications in Panel A of Table 38 are 
2.337o  and 2.34Vo,  and are 22.26Vo and 20.94Vo  in Panel B of Table 38. The standard  errors  of Heckman's 
lambda in comparable  specifications - specifications 1 and, 4 - are l.16%o in Table 26, and arc 8.2I% arfr 
8.22Vo in Table 28. 
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lambda. The first specification  introduces deal size to control for market responses to 
differences in deal size. Introducing  deal size changes neither the magnitude nor 
significance of the regressors.  Differences in deal sizes don't account for the change in 
the sign of Heckman's  lambda. The second specification  introduces controls  for 
differences  in slope coefficients for all the regressors in large deals. A large deal is a deal 
whose value exceeds the median deal value in the bidder subsample. The second 
specification  shows that market responses  to announcement  surprises of large  deals  are 
more negative  (but insignificant)  than responses to surprises  of small deals. The Wald test 
fails to reject the null hypothesis of 0 coefficients for all slope controls2s.  The findings 
fail to support our hypothesis that the presence of larger deals explains  the negative 
market responses to announcement  surprises. 
The candidacy  models that generate Heckman's lambda include proxies for 
managerial compensation contract and board monitoring.  The negative sign of 
Heckman's lambda may be explained  by the controls  for board  monitoring  in the 
candidacy  models.  We hypothesize  that market responses to announcement surprises of 
poorly-governed  bidders  should be negative whereas  market  responses to surprises of 
well-governed  bidders should be positive. 
The governance  index of Gompers, Iishi and Metrick (2003) measures the balance 
of power between shareholders  and managers. The higher the index, the more power 
managers have relative to shareholders.  Bidders are classified as poorly-governed  if the 
governance index is higher  than the median  and as well-governed if it is lower. Table 40 
* The F-statistic is 1.42 and the associated  p-value is 0.2266. 
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introduces  an interaction term for announcement surprises of poorly-governed bidders  to' 
test our hypothesis.  Market  responses to announcement surprises  about  poorly-governed 
bidders prove significantly  lower than market r€sponses to surprises  of well-governed 
bidders. 
Although,  Table 26 shows that the average market response to surprises is 
positive, subsets of deals might exist in which the response  to surprises is positive.  The 
evidence in Table 40 suggests that the subsample  of bidders covered in IRRC and 
E)(ECOMP is one such sample where announcement  surprises of bidders with weak- 
govemance are met with negative market responses. 
The second specifications in Panels A and B of Table 38 includes proxies  that 
control for differences in the fit and relative  bargaining power of bidder and target. In 
both panels, including  the controls  changes neither the magnitude  nor the significance of 
Heckman's  lambda. 
7.1.3 Predicting  bidder  and target candidates using industry-fixed effects 
Requiring CRSP-COMPUSTAT coverage restricts the merging-firms  subsample. 
This section investigates  whether relaxing the requirement  of CRSP-COMPUSTAT 
coverage, and only using data provided by SDC to predict bidder and target  candidacy 
significantly  alters our results about market responses to announcement surprises. 
sDC provides  sIC codes for all merging firms, and cRSp-coMpusrAT 
provides  SIC codes  for all nonmerging firms. This section uses 2-digit  SIC codes to 
predict  bidder and target candidacy. The sample covers all the merging firms reported in 
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SDC and takes  nonmerging firms from the CRSP-COMPUSTAT  that meet our sampling' 
rules. 
The sample covers I7,68t bidder-quarters, 18,065 target-quarters,  and 436,463 
nonmerging-quarters.  The sample covers data from the third quarter of 1977 to the fourth 
quarter of 2004. We pool the first 12 quarters from third quarter  of 1977 to second 
quarter of 1980 into three annual cross-sections since the number of bidders  or targets is 
fewer than 10 in these quarters. We also pool the third and fourth quarters of 2004 into a 
single cross-section since  there  are fewer than 10 bidders  and targets in the fourth quarter 
of 2004. This results in 100 periods. Except for the first three and the last period, all 
periods are quarters. 
The exogenous variables  in the candidacy  models are indicators for 2-digit SIC 
codes. We merge SDC and CRSP-COMPUSTAT  to compile z-digltSlC  codes2s.The  2- 
digit SIC codes produce 58 industry indicators. SDC and CRSP-COMPUSTAT  cover 
some of the same  merging firms. For these firms, we have both SDC and CRSP- 
COMPUSTAT  SDC-codes.  20.88 percent of the time, the 2-digit SIC codes that SDC and 
CRSP-COMPUSTAT provide  don't coincide. 
We run 100 probit regressions  of bidder candidacy. The endogenous  variable 
takes on the value one if the firm proposes a bid in the next quarter. Table 41 reports 
pseudo  R2 and the chi2-statistic  for the likelihood-ratio test from the 100 cross-sectional 
probit regressions.  The bidder-candidacy  models that only use industry indicators prove a 
poorer fit than models that use proxies  for firm and industry characteristics.  In Table 4L, 
te If there are fewer than 5 firms in an industry, we use the single-digit  industry  SIC code in that quarter. 
127 
the mean  R2 decreases  by 32 percent and the mean  12-statistic  by 226 when  compared  to 
the same goodness-of-fitness  diagnostics  reported in Table 17 for models that include 
proxies for firm-specific  characteristics. 
To estimate parallel models of target candidacy,  we follow the same regression- 
strategy  as we do in estimating models of bidder  candidacy. The endogenous variable 
takes on the value one if the firm receives  a bid in the next quarter. Table 42 repofis 
pseudo  R2 and the chi2- statistic  for the likelihood-ratio test from the 100 cross-sectional 
probit regressions. Excluding firm-specific  regressors decreases  the goodness of fit of 
target models as well as bidder models. In Table 42, the mean R2 decreases by 23 
percent and the mean 12-statistic  by 4l when  compared  to the same  goodness-of-fitness 
diagnostics reported  in Table 18. 
When we exclude firm-specific regressors,  bidder models no longer outperform 
target models. Table 4I andTable  42 reportthat  the average  pseudo-R2 is 3.92 percent in 
bidder models and 4.43 percent in target models, respectively.  The findings  indicate that 
firm-specific regressors are important  predictors of bidder  candrdacy, but not of target 
candidacy. 
The importance  of industry-specific regressors in predictingtarget  candidacy  may 
also explain why the significance  of Heckman's lambda in target CAR regressions 
disappears  when we control for industry fixed-effects. Table 29 reports target  regressions 
which include Heckman's  lambda (estimated  using only firm-specific  predictors) and 
industry indicators. Table 42 shows that industry-indicators  are important  predictors of 
target candidacy  and belong in the candidacy  models. This is why, when industry 
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indicators are included in the CAR regressions and not the target-candidacy  models, the' 
significance  of market responses to surprises about target candidacy  disappears. 
Panels A and B of Table 43 report  regressions  of bidder and target CARs on 
Heckman's  lambda - estimated using coefficients  reported in Table 4l and Table  42 -, 
all-equity  indicator, and proxies for the fit and relative bargaining  power of bidders and 
targets. By excluding firm-specific  regessors, we estimate Heckman's lambda for larger 
subsamples  of bidders and targets.  The sample  of bidders in Panel A of Table  43 doubles 
to 14,206 from 7,171 bidders in Table 26. The sample of targets in Panel B of Table 43 
more than  doubles to9,625 from 3,331 targets in Table  28. 
Panel A of Table 43 shows that Heckman's  lambda  in bidder regressions remains 
positive but loses significance. Models of bidder  candidacy that rely only on industry 
indicators prove less powerful in distinguishing  between bidder candidates  and 
nonmerging firms than models that rely on firm-specific  characteristics.  The failure to 
distinguish  between bidder candidates and nonmerging  firms means that there's little 
variation in the surprise about bidder candidates.  The lack of variation may explain why 
the proxy for the surprise, Heckman's  lambda, loses significance. 
Panel B of Table 43 shows that Heckman's lambda in target regressions  remains 
positive and significant.  Industry  indicators predict target candidacy more successfully 
than bidder candidacy. Because there is variation in surprise about  target candidacy, 
Heckman's  lambda proves  significant. 
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7.1.4 Time-series differences  in the coefficients estimated by candidacy  models' 
Holmstrom  and Kaplan (2001) refer to the  80s as a decade of leveraged hostile 
takeovers whereas friendly mergers characteize the  90s. The authors study differences 
in corporate  governance across the two decades and  how these differences affect merger 
activity. Holmstrom  and Kaplan (2001) stress that merger  motives change through time. 
We split our sample into two equal subsamples. This section investigates  the stationarity 
of the model  parameters  in the two subperiods. 
The first subsample  covers data from the third quarter of 1979 to the second 
quarter of 1992. The second subsample  covers data from the third quarter  of 1992 to the 
fourth quarter of 2004. The observations in third quarter of 1979  to the fourth quarter of 
1980, and the observations  in the third and fourth quarters of 2004, are pooled  into two 
cross-sections  since the number of bidders or targets in these quarters is small (fewer than 
l0). The remaining  periods are quarters. 
Table 15 and Table 16 report the estimates  of bidder and target-candidacy  models 
that use quarterly  data. Panels A and B in Table 44 andTable 45 compare the distribution 
of coefficient estimates in the two subperiods.  Panel C tests the hypothesis that the 
distributions of coefficients  in the two subperiods come  from a common  population. 
Mann-Whitney, Kolmogorov-Smirnov,  and Kruskall-Wallis tests reject the null 
hypothesis for share turnover,  cash ratio and previous  mergers  both in the bidder  and 
target subsamples.  The three tests also reject the null hypothesis for the high information- 
asymmetry indicator in the bidder regressions  and for merger intensity in the target 
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regressions.  The evidence indicates that the influence of some firm-specific and industry-' 
specific  predictors  differ in the two subperiods. 
Equation 23 presents pooled time-series,  cross-section probit regressions of 
candidacy that investigate  parameter  stationarity across the two time periods.Ma and M7 
are indicators  that take on the value 1 if firm proposes and receives a bid in the next 
quarter, respectively. Post92 indicator takes on the value one if the observation  is in the 
second subperiod and 0 otherwise.  The interaction  terms between  post92 indicator  and 
the variables control for differences in the two time periods. 
23	 M j = postg2indicator*  fpostezindicdto' + ROA, * ffoo * 
ROAj * post92indicator*  yRoA'postez + sales growth, * y'ro""'*o + 
srowth' postez  +s ales growth  * p o st92 indicato  r * rsaks  
resource-growth-mismatch  indicator,  x ,lesource'gtowthmismatchindicator  + 
sales - shock squared, * ,sates'shocksquared  * 
squared'  postsz +sales - shock squared, * po st92 indicator  * ysates-shock  
ratio +concentration  ratio , *' yconcentration  
ratio'poste2  +concentration  ratio j * post92 indicator *  fcorcentration  
cash ratio , 
* ymshratio  * cash ratio , * post92 indicator  * yc^hratio'postez  + 
size, * y'j* + size, * postg2indicator*  ysize'Postez + 
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indiearor'psty2
resource-growth-mismatch  indicator, * post92 indicator *  ,Resource-stontthmism^tch  
shock'Poste2* sales shock , * ysatu 
shack * sales  shock,  * post92 ind.icator  *  rsates  
nnuP'Postez  +* price runup i * yfn"" 
**  + price runup j * post 92 indicator * rPrice ' 
share turnoverj * ,shareturnove'  + share turnoverj * postg2indicator* ,shareumover'Postvt  *' 
ornation-^svmmetryindicator +high-inf ormation-asymmetry  indicator,  x ,hish-ifr  
high-inf ormntion-asymmetry  indicator,  * postg2indicatorx  yhieh-inr  ornation-as>mmetryindifuor'poste2 
* + merger int ensity , ,merseri*enstry + merger int entsity , 
* post92 indicator  * fmersefinensttv'postsz 
*  in size'Poste2 ** change in size , 
in siu + change in size , 
* postg2indicator  * ,chanse  ,chanse  
rerrets *previous mergers  j * ,Previou  
previous mer gers j * p o st92 indic ato r *, Previorc mersers'  poste2 
+ e i;  where j = bidder, target. 
The first columns in Panels A of Table 46 and Table 47 report  the coefficient 
estimates for bidder  and target  candidacy  models, respectively. The second columns in 
Panel A report p-values for Wald test of the null hypothesis that the individual 
coefficients are zero.  We reject the null hypothesis for ROA, price  runup, cash ratio,  size, 
and previous mergers in bidder-candidacy  model, and for merger intensity and previous 
mergers in target-candidacy  model.  The influence of ROA, price runup, cash ratio, size, 
and previous mergers in predicting bidder candidates  decreases in the subsample 
covering  the 90's. In the second subsample, the influence  of merger  intensity in 
predicting target  candidacy increases but the influence of previous  mergers decreases. 
The evidence in Panel A of Table  46 and Table 47 indicate that the influences  of 
the predictors for candidacy change in the two subperiods.  Panels B of Table 46 and 
Table 47 repofi  the p-value  for the Wald test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients  of 
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all the interaction variables are equal  to 0. The null hlpothesis  of parameter stationarity  is 
rejected in both the bidder and target-candidacy  models.  Panels  B of Table 46 andTable 
47 also report  pseudo  R2 and 12-statistic for the Wald test of the null hypothesis that all of 
the coefficients are equal to 0. 
7,2 Akemative specifications of CAR regressions 
7.2.1 using alternative event-windows  to cumulate  abnormal returns 
Evidence examined in Chapter 4 indicates that SDC may incorrectly  record 
announcement  dates. One way to remedy this problem  is to expand  the event window 
used to cumulate bidder  and target  abnormal returns. This section investigates how robust 
the results about market  responses to announcement  surprises are to using different event 
windows. 
Table 48 reports regressions  of bidder abnormal returns  that are cumulated using 
3,'7, 15, and 29-day  event windows. Market responses to announcement  surprises about 
bidder candidacy, as measured  in the coefficient  of Heckman's  lambda, proves positive 
and significant  in all windows. For a standard  deviation change in Heckman's lambda, 
bidder abnormal returns change by 33 to 116 basis points in different  windows. 
Heckman's  lambda proves economically  as well as statistically significant. 
In Table 48, as the event window  expands from 3 to 29 days, the statistical and 
economic  significance  of the two significant regressors, Heckman's lambda and all- 
equity indicator, increase. The economic and statistical  significance of the only other 
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significant regressor, unwelcoming-attitude  indicator, decreases as the event window' 
expands. 
In larger event windows,  market responses  to information  about previously 
unobservable motives (as measured  by the coefficients of Heckman's  lambda)  are 
significantly more pronounced.  The Chow test rejects the null hypothesis  that the 
coefficients of Heckman's lambda are equal  in different windows.  The Chow test fails to 
reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients of all-equity  are equal in the shorter  event 
windows.  Any inaccuracy in announcement dates means that longer windows measure 
market responses to events more accurately than shorter  windows. Hence, the effect of 
unanticipated managerial motives may be more apparent in longer windows.  Another 
explanation  is that investors  need some time to evaluate and price the information 
revealed in announcements. 
Table 48 also includes controls  for the merger fit and relative bargaining  power of 
bidders and targets. That the coefficients of target-public, anti-takeover-defenses,  target 
bankrupt indicators change signs in different windows supports the hypothesis  that they 
aren't reliable predictors.  These indicators  prove insignificant  in all windows. 
Table 49 compares regressions of target abnormal returns cumulated over 3,  1,15, 
and 29-day event windows. Market responses to announcement  surprises about target 
candidacy  prove positive and significant except in the 29-day window. For a standard- 
deviation change in Heckman's lambda, target abnormal  returns change by roughly the 
same  amount (99 to 118 basis points)  in different windows. 
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Announcement surprises  about bidder candidacy show more variation than do' 
surprises about  target candidacy. The standard  deviation in bidder  lambdas is 13.21 
percent  whereas the standard deviation in target lambdas  is 6.01 percent. Markets can 
more successfully  distinguish  between bidder candidates  and nonmerging firms than they 
can between  target candidates and nonmerging firms. Since markets anticipate bidders 
better, bidder share prices incorporate the anticipated effect of mergers prior to 
announcements  more than do target share prices. 
Table 49 also includes  controls  for confidential items  of negotiation and the 
merger fit. Target CARs to all-equity financed deals prove significantly  lower. As a 
proxy for motives to exploit mispricing in share prices, an all-equity financing  suggests 
that shareholders  would have realized greater retums had they received cash in return for 
their shares. The results  for the proxies for confidential  items of negotiation and merger 
fit remain qualitatively  the same (as discussed in Section 6.2.2.2) except that then 
insignificant  coefficients of same-industry and unwelcoming-attitude change  signs. 
Table 30 shows that the asymmetry  in investors' ability to identify bidder and 
target candidates  accounts  for 3Vo of the disparity in bidder and target l-dayCARs. Table 
50, Table 51, and Table 52replicate  the analysis of Table 30 in the 3-day,15-day,  and 
29-day event windows, respectively.  In the 3-day and 15-day windows, when we control 
investor anticipations  of candidacy, the disparity between bidder and target returns 
decrease  by 2.85  and 2.22 percent,  respectively. However,  in the 29-day window, the 
disparity widens by 75 basis points. 
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7.2,2 Including bidders and targets that announce multiple mergers on the same' 
day 
We exclude bidders  and targets that announce multiple mergers on the same day 
because we can't separate the individual market responses. This section investigates 
whether our findings are robust to including bidder and targets that announce multiple 
rnergers  on the same  day. 
Assuming  that markets anticipate  multiple and single announcements equally, we 
expect more information  to be revealed in multiple-announcement  days than single- 
announcement days. Consequently,  we hypothesize that CARs to bidders that propose 
multiple bids are larger in magnitude  than retums to bidders that propose a single bid. 
Target  management which  receives more than one bid on the same day need to sort out 
the bids to decide which bid to accept. Jennings and Mazzeo (1993) investigate  the 
structure of takeover bids and the frequency of observing competing  bids. Competing 
bidders bid up the price at which target shareholders  can sell the firm. Hence, we 
hypothesize  that  CARs to targets that receive  multiple bids are larger in magnitude  than 
returns to bidders that propose  a single bid. 
Panel A of Table 53 reports mean probabilities  predicted  by bidder-candidacy 
models and l-day CARs to single and multiple  announcements. On average, markets 
anticipate multiple announcements of bidders more than they anticipate single 
announcements.  The null hypothesis of equal anticipation of single and multiple 
announcements  is rejected. Furthermore,  bidder CARs to multiple announcements  prove 
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significantly higher than to single bids. The evidence  supports the hypothesis that 
multiple  bids reveal more information than  single bids. 
Panel B of Table 53 reports mean probabilities predicted  by target-candidacy 
models and 7-day CARs for single and multiple announcements.  As in proposals of bids, 
markets anticipate  reception  of multiple  bids more than  they anticipate  reception of single 
bids. The null hypothesis  of equal anticipation of single and multiple bids is rejected. 
Target CARs for multiple announcements prove insignificantly  higher than CARs for 
single bids. 
Panel A and B of Table 54 reportbidder and target regressions  of CARs to single 
bids and all bids -including multiple bids. Qualitatively,  including multiple bids hardly 
changes the coefficients. 
7,2.3 Introducing additional exogenous variables  to the bidder and target 
regressions 
Asquith et al. (1983) suggest  that the larger  the value of the deal relative to the 
size of the bidder and the target, the  greater the magnitude of bidder and target 
cumulative  returns should  be. Moeller et al. (2005) find that sample deals whose value 
exceeds 1 billion dollars erode bidder shareholder  value by 7.3S$ per 100$ invested in the 
period from 1991 to 2001. 
We use two variables, deal value  and relative value, to represent  the absolute and 
relative size of proposed deals. We define  deal value to be the value of the deal in billion 
dollars. We define relative  size as the ratio of the value of the deal (in millions) to the 
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market  value  of common stock (in millions)3O.  Table 55 reports  the effect of introducing' 
these  variables into the bidder  and target  regressions. 
Market responses  to announcemert surprises about bidder and target candidacy 
remain positive and significant  when relative value and deal value are introduced.  With 
the introduction of deal value and relative value,  the change in bidder  CARs  for a 
standard deviation change in Heckman's  lambda decreases only from 48 to 45 basis 
points, and the change  in target CARs decreases only from 11,2 to 100 basis  points. 
Findings about investor  anticipations  are robust to including these variables  in the 
regressions.  We couldn't include these variables in our original specifications,  since SDC 
doesn't  compile dollar value of deals for all deals. 
Relative  value proves positive  and significant in both bidder and target 
regressions.  The larger the deal relative to bidder and target shareholder-conffibuted 
capital, the greater is the positive impact of the announcement.  As in Moeller  et aI. 
(2005),  the larger the deal,  the greater is the erosion in bidder shareholder value. We find 
no such erosion in target shareholder  value. 
Except for same-industry  and anti-takeover-defense  indicators, the influence of 
the control variables  remains qualitatively same when we introduce relative value and 
deal size. The insignificant  coefficients  of same-industry and anti+akeover-defense 
indicators  change and remain insignificant. 
30 SDC compiles value of deal in 1,000,000 dollars. We divide  deal value by 1,000,  and report it in 
1,000,000,000 dollars. CRSP-COMPUSTAT  compiles number of shares outstanding (in millions) and the 
closing price of common stock in that quarter.  We define market  value  of common stock as the product of 
common  shares outstanding and closing price of common stock. In constructing relative size, for 
comparability,  both market  value  and deal value  are in million dollars. 
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7,3 Testing our stralegy for identifying the equations  in the two-stage rnodel' 
Econometrically,  one can use the same set of variables linearly in the equations 
modeling candidacy and in the equations  modeling  cumulative abnormal returns and both 
equations would be identified. However,  a solid rationale for isolating variables that drive 
candidacy without affecting market responses  to announcements (and vice versa) 
provides a stronger  basis for identifying  the model. 
To identify the two-stage model, we use pre-announcement information  in 
estimating candidacy models and post-announcement  information in estimating 
regressions of cumulative abnormal  returns.  In an efficient market, share prices should 
reflect publicly information  quickly. This is our rationale for excluding variables that use 
pre-announcement  information in the regressions  of cumulative abnormal returns. 
This section relaxes the assumption  of market efficiency and investigates  the 
robustness  of the influence of announcement surprises to our identification strategy.  We 
introduce  proxies that rely on pre-announcement information  in the CAR regressions. By 
introducing pre-announcement information in CAR regressions,  we allow for the 
possibility  that markets fail to incorporate information in share prices rationally and 
instantaneously. 
Table 56 reports regressions for bidder  CARs that alternatively include and 
exclude the four powerful predictors  of candidacy:  previous  mergers, size, cash ratio, and 
merger intensity. In the second and third specifications  of Table 56 that include previous 
mergers and size, market responses to surprises about bidder candidacy  remain positive 
but lose significance. In the fourth and fifth specifications  of Table 56 that include  cash 
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ratio and merger  intensity, market responses to surprises about bidder candidacy  remain' 
positive and significant. 
Heckman's lambda constrains the way in which the variables  enter the equations 
that model cumulative abnormal  returns. Heckman's lambda loses significance because 
previous  mergers and size may show no further  effect beyond that of predicting bidder 
candidacy. It is also possible that previous  mergers and size may be correlated  with new 
information that announcements  reveal. 
The evidence  in Section  7.2.3 indicates  that larger deals decrease  the value  that 
accrues to bidder shareholders.  Large firms may find it easier to undertake big mergers. 
Hence, the size of the firm may be proxying for deal size in the bidder regressions.  The 
sixth specification of Table 56 includes previous  mergers, size, deal value, and relative 
value. In this specification, market responses to surprises  about bidder candidacy  prove 
positive  and significant.  The robustness tests indicate that the influence  of surprises on 
bidder  CARs is robust to relaxing the market-efficiency  assumption  and introducing pre- 
announcement  information  in the bidder  regressions. 
Table 57 reports regressions  for target CARs that include the four powerful 
predictors of target candidacy: previous  mergers, size, cash ratio, and merger intensity.  In 
the second specification that includes previous mergers, market responses  to surprises 
about.target candidacy  remain positive but lose significance.  In the third through fifth 
specifications of Table 57 that include  size, cash ratio and merger  intensity, market 
responses  to surprises about target candidacy remain positive and significant. 
r40' 
The sixth specification of Table 57 includes previous  mergers,  size,  deal value,' 
and relative value. In this specification,  market responses to surprises about bidder 
candidacy prove positive  but insignificant. The robustness  tests indicate that the influence 
of surprises on bidder CARs isn't robust to relaxing the market-efficiency  assumption 
and introducing pre-announcement information (in the form of previous mergers)  in the 
target regressions. 
7.4 Investigating cross-sectional dffirences in market responses  to announcemenl 
sutprises 
Our principal contention  is that, on average, unanticipated  merger  announcements 
more clearly evidence  how mergers  affect bidder shareholder  wealth.  This section 
explores the average market response by investigating cross-sectional  differences in how 
investor anticipations  affect bidder abnormal returns. 
Empirical  studies  consistently find that bidder and target shareholder value 
decreases when bidder  management compensates  target shareholders using equity 
[Jensen and Ruback (1983);  Brickley et aI. (1988); Andrade  et al. (2O01)].  Table  58 
investigates whether the difference  between  CARs for all-equity financed  deals and deals 
that aren't financed solely with equity  changes  with investor  anticipations about bidder 
candidacy. A bid is classified  as anticipated  if the predicted  probability  of bidding  is 
larger than the median  probability and as unanticipated  otherwise. A bid is classified as 
all-equity financed if target shareholders  are paid using bidder shares only and as not all- 
equity  otherwise. 
L4l' 
The four-way  split of bidder cumulative abnormal  retums  isolates the influence  of' 
the two sources  of surprise in announcements: namely surprise about  the identity  of the 
bidder  and surprise  about  the method  of financing  used. Table 58 shows that both 
surprises influence bidder CARs. Holding  the method of financing used constan!  the 
magnitude of retums to unanticipated  bidders prove larger than returns  to anticipated 
bidders. Similarly, when we fix the level  of anticipation, returns to all-equity  deals  prove 
significantly  lower than returns to not-all-equity deals. 
Moeller et al. (2005) find that the largest  deals in their sample significantly 
destroy shareholder  value. Table 59 investigates whether market response to big and 
small deals, changes  with investor anticipations about bidder candidacy. Large deals are 
deals that exceed the median  value of all deals in our sample  and are small deals 
otherwise. As in Moeller and, et.al. (2005), bidder cumulative  abnormal retums to big 
deals prove  significant and negative, and bidder  cumulative abnormal returns to small 
deals prove significant and positive. 
Table 59 shows that both surprises influence  bidder CARs. When we hold the 
deal size constant, the magnitude of retums to unanticipated  bidders proves larger than 
returns to anticipated  bidders in small deals and  smaller in large deals. In large deals, the 
surprise about deal size is unwelcome  news whereas the surprise  about bidder identity is 
welcome.  Hence surprise about the bidder identity pulls returns  closer to zero. When we 
hold the level of anticipation constant, returns to big deals prove significantly  lower than 
returns to small  deals. 
142' 
Conclusions 
8.1 Surnmary  offr.ndinss 
This study investigates market responses to information that merger 
announcements convey. We address two research questions. How much  nerger 
announcements surprise the market? What do market responses to announcement 
surprises  reveal about  managerial motives  that drive mergers? 
8.1.1 Findings about  the extent of announcement  surprises 
That investors can anticipate merger activity is evidenced by the predictive  power 
of our candidacy  models  compared to the null hypothesis.  In our sample, the fraction  of 
firms that propose at least one bid in any quarter is 1.78 percent. If investors  could not 
anticipate bidders, the average  probability for any firm to bid should be 1.78 percent. 
Candidacy  models indicate that the average  probability of bidding is 19.78 percent for 
bidders and 1.35 percent  for nonbidders. 
The fraction of firms receiving a merger bid in any quarter is 0.85 percent.  The 
null hypothesis of no investor anticipations  about target candidacy  implies that the 
average probability  for any firm to receive bids should be 0.85 percent. Our models 
estimate that the average  probability  to receive bids is 6.87 percent for targets and 0.76 
percent for nontargets.  Investors are predicting that targets are more likely to receive bids 
than nontargets. 
We also find that models of bidder  candidacy  predict better than models of target 
candidacy  do. Both pseudo-R2s  and chi2-statistics for likelihood-ratio tests are higher for 
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models of bidder candidacy than for target candidacy. The average pseudo-R2  in bidder' 
models is 10 percent  higher  than the average in target  models. 
8.1.2 Findings about how the extent of announcement  surprises influences  market 
responses 
Univariate and multivariate  analysis of bidder CARs show that surprises about 
bidder and target candidacy affect market responses to announcements.  The magnitude of 
bidder returns to less-anticipated  deals proves significantly higher than returns  to more- 
anticipated deals.  Furthermore,  the market response to announcement  surprises  proves 
positive. The greater the surprise, the more information  announcements  reveal about 
unobservable motives. 
Investors must guess how much managers intend to generate  value for bidder 
shareholders as against securing opportunistic  benefits  for themselves. The positive 
market response to announcement  surprises indicates that, on avetage, unanticipated 
mergers  serve bidder shareholder interests. Even though, we can't distinguish the 
information about different motives, the positive market response  implies that investors 
judge the net effect  to be welcome news for bidder  shareholders. 
Investor anticipations  don't influence target CARs as much as bidder CARs. The 
failure of candidacy  models  to predict target  candidacy  means  that selection  bias doesn't 
affect inferences from single-equation  models of target CARs very much. 
Including the proxy for announcement  surprises, Heckman's lambda, changes 
neither the significance  nor the magnitude  of other regressors in bidder regressions. This 
t44' 
finding indicates that Heckman's  lambda.and  the other regressors  are orthogonal. A' 
single-equation model of market responses  suffers from an omitted variable bias. By 
modeling investor anticipations and market responses together,  we show that 
announcement surprises significantly  affect how we measure  market responses to merger 
announcements. 
8.2 Implications of our fi,ndings and directions for future research 
8.2.1 Measuring the impact of mergers on shareholder value 
Event studies  assume that markets  learn about event-related information  in a short 
window of time. Investor anticipations  about bidder candidacy invalidate this assumption. 
To the extent that  investors anticipate  bidder candidacy,  bidder abnormal  returns around 
announcements don't measure market's  full assessment  of the deal. Within  the event 
window, bidder abnormal returns measure market responses only to the unanticipated 
information that announcements  convev. 
To measure market assessments  of the value  of a deal to bidder shareholders in a 
single-equation context, researchers  need to focus on a universe of "shockef'bidders. 
Shocker bidders  are bidders  whose candidacy markets did not anticipate at all. We find 
no evidence that shocker bidders  exist  in our sample. Investor anticipations about bidder 
candidacy  imply that it is a mistake  to measure market assessments of deal value solely 
by analyzing  bidder cumulative abnormal returns around announcements. 
r45' 
Ideally, researchers would track changes in candidacy probabilities  through time.' 
This would let them cumulate  market responses  to all the pieces of information that is 
revealed  prior  to the formal date of announcement. 
8,2.2 Implications  for disparity in deal values for bidders and targets  found in 
single-equation  studies 
We find that CARs observed in announcement  windows convey more incremental 
information about the value of mergers to targets than bidders.  The incremental 
information that announcements  reveal about targets is greater because investors are less 
able to anticipate  target candidacy.  Before concluding that target shareholders enjoy the 
lion's share in merger deals, abnormal returns must be adjusted  for selection bias. 
To investigate the distribution  of shareholder value that mergers divide between 
bidder and target shareholders,  we need to adjust returns  to equalize the role of 
anticipations in bidder and target selection.  Only if markets  anticipate bidder and target 
candidates  equally, would bidder and target abnormal  retums reflect the true distribution 
of value between  bidder and target shareholders. Once we match bidders  and targets 
according  to the probability to propose and receive bids, the difference between bidder 
and target  CARs  reduce  by 3 percent  from 20.54 to l7.46percent. 
Our models of candidacy  can only partially estimate investor anticipations. It is 
too costly if not infeasible for us to proxy for the universe  of information  publicly 
available prior to announcements  that investors may use to predict candidacy. The failure 
to proxy for the universe  of relevant  information  means  that we're  underestimating 
investor  anticipations.  To the extent we underestimate  investor  anticipations,  our findings 
r46 
about the decline  in the disparity between  bidder and target CARs is only a lower bound' 
for the true difference. 
8.2.3 Managerial  merger  motives 
We find that a complex  mix of managerial motives drive mergers. Managers seek 
both to generate shareholder value and to secure opportunistic benefits.  Concentrating  on 
a single firm or industry characteristic such as previous  mergers of the firm or time 
elapsed until the last merger in the industry  would underestimate  investor anticipations 
about candidacy. To portray investor anticipations  about mergers in an unbiased  fashion, 
researchers must proxy the full range of managerial merger motives. 
147 
References' 
Akhigbe, Aigbe, Jeff Madura and Ann Marie Whyte, 2004, "Partial anticipation  and' 
gains  to bank merger targets", Journal of Financial Services, 25,55-71.. 
Ambrose,  Brent W. and William L. Megginson, 1992,'The role of asset structure, 
ownership  structure, and takeover defenses in determining acquisition likelihood", 
Journal of Financial and Quantative Analysis,2T  , 575-589. 
Amemiya, Takeshi, 1985, Advanced Econometrics, Harvard  University  Press. 
Andrade,  Gregor, M. L. Mitchell and Erik Stafford,  2001,  "New evidence and 
perspectives on mergers", Journal of Economic  Perspectives 15, 103-120. 
Asquith, Paul, Robert  F. Bruner  and David V. Mullins,  1983, "The gains to bidding firms 
from merger", Journal of Financial Economics  1 1, I2I-I39. 
Baumol, William,  1982, "Contestable markets: an uprising in the theory of industry 
structure",  American  Economic  Review,  7 2, l-I5. 
Boone,  Audra and Harold J. Mulherin, 2002, "Corporate  restructuring and corporate 
auctions",  Working  Paper. 
Bradley,  Michael, Anand Desai and Han Kim, 1988, "Synergistic  gains from corporate 
acquisitions and their division between the stockholders  of target and acquiring 
firms'', Journal of Financial  Economics ,21,3-40. 
Bradley, Michael  and Anant Sundaram,  2004, "Do acquisitions drive perfonnance oI 
does performance  drive acquisitions?"  SSRN Working  Paper. 
148' 
l--' 
Braguinsky, Serguey and Boyan Jovanovic,  2004, "Bidder discounts and target premia in 
takeovers",  American Economic  Review 94, 46-56. 
Brickley,  James A., Gregg A. Jarrell,  and Jeffry.M. Netter,  1988, "The market for 
corporate control: the empirical  evidence since 1980", Journal of Economic 
Perspective s, 2, 49 -68. 
Campa,  Jose M. and Simi Kedia, 2002, "Explaining  the diversification  discount", Journal 
of Finance  57. L73l-I762. 
Carleton, Willard T., David K. Guilkey, Robert S. Hanis and John  F. Stewart,  1983, "An 
empirical  analysis of the role of the medium of exchange in mergers",  Journal of 
Finance,  38,813-826. 
Chakrabati, Rajesh,  2005, "Mars-Venus  marriages:  culture and cross-border M&A", 
Working  Paper, European  FMA  Meeting,  Siena. 
Chemmanur,  Thomas  and Imantz Paeglis, 2002, "The choice of medium of exchange  in 
acquisitions:  a direct test of the double-sided asymmetric  information hypothesis , 
Working  Paper, Boston College. 
Co1e, John, Wayne  Guay,  and David Larcker, 2005, "Equity Incentives" in "Top Pay and 
Performance:  International and Strategic Approach:  Chapter  8", Elsevier 
Butterworth-Heineman  n. 157 -17 2. 
Cornett, Marcia Millon and Hassan Tehranian, t992,"Changes  in corporate performance 
associated with bank acquisitions",  Journal of Financial Economics ,3l,2ll-234. 
149' 
Cornett,  Marcia  Millon, Gayene Hovakimi&tr,  Darius Palia and Hassan  Tehranian,  20A3,' 
"The impact of manager-shareholder conflict on acquiring bank retuflrs", Journal 
of Banking and Finan ce, 27, 103-131. 
Demsetz, Harold  annd Kenneth  Irhn, 1985, "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: 
Causes and Consequences", Journal of Political Economy, 93, 1155-1177. 
Dong, Ming, David Hirshleifer, Scott Richardson  and Siew H. Teoh, 2002, "Does 
investor misvaluation drive the takeover market?"  Working  Paper. 
Datta,  Sudip, Mai Iskandar-Datta and Karthik  Raman, 200I,  "Executive compensation 
and corporate acquisition  decisions",  Journal of Finance, 56,2299-2333. 
Eckbo, Espen B., 1983, "Horizontal  mergers, collusion, and stockholder wealth", Joumal 
of Financial Economic  s, Il, 24L-273. 
Eckbo, Espen B., Ronald M. Giammarino and Robert L. Heinkel, L990, "Asymmetric 
information  and the medium of exchange in takeovers: theory and tests", Review 
of Financial Studies 3, 651 -67 5. 
Eckbo, Espen 8., Vojislav Maksimovic and Joseph Williams, 1990, "Consistent 
estimation of cross-sectional models in event studies", Review of Financial 
Studies  3, 343-365. 
Fishman, Michael  J.,1989, "Preemptive  bidding and the role of the medium of exchange 
in acquisitioils",  Journal of Finance,  44, 4I-57 . 
150 
Fluck, Zsazsannaand Anthony W. Lynch,lggg,"Why  do firms merge and then divest?' 
A theory of financial  s5mergy", Journal of Business  72,319-346. 
Fuller, Kathleen, Jeffrey Netter and Mike Stagemoller,  2002, "What do returns to 
acquiring firms tell us? Evidence  from firms that make many  acquisitions?", 
Journal of Finance, 57, L763-17g3. 
Gompers,  Paul A., Joy l. Ishii and Andrew  Metrick, 2003, "Corporate governance and 
equity prices", Quarterly  Journal of Economics,  118, 107-155. 
Gort, Michael, 1969,"An economic  disturbance theory of mergers", Quarterly Journal of 
Economics,  83, 624-642. 
Grinstein, Yaniv and Paul llribar, 2004, "CEO compensation  and incentives: evidence 
from M&A bonuses", Journal of Financial  Economics,  73, IL9-I43. 
Habbard, Glenn and Darius Palia, 1999, "4 reexamination of the conglomerate merger 
wave in the 1960s: an internal  capital markets view", Journal of Finance, 54, 
rl31-1L52. 
Hansen, Robert, 1987, "4 theory for the exchange  medium in mergers and acquisitions", 
Journal of Business, 60, 7 5-95. 
Harford, Jarrad, 1999,"Corporate cash reserves and acquisitions",  Journal of Finance, 54, 
1969-1152. 
151 
Harrison, J. M. and Kreps, D. M., 1978, "speculative  investor  behavior in a stock  market' 
with heterogeneous  expectations",  Quarterly  Journal of Economics  92,323-336. 
Hartzell,  Iay, Eli Ofek, David Yermack,  2004, "What's in it for me? CEOs whose firms 
are acquired",  Review of Financial Studies, 17,37-61. 
Heckman, James I., 1978, "Dummy endogenous variables in a simultaneous  equation 
system", Econometri  ca 46, 93L-961. 
Heckman,  James 1.,1979, "Sample  selection bias as a specification error",  Econometrica 
47, t53-L62. 
Holmes,  Thomas J. and James A. Schmitz, L995, "On the turnover of business firms and 
business managers", Journal of Political  Economy 103, 1005-1038. 
Holmstrom, Bengt and Steven  Kaplan, 200L, "Corporate governance and merger activity 
in the IJS", Joumal  of Economic  Perspectives, 1.5, L2L-144. 
Ismail,  Ahmad,  2005, "WilI multiple acquirers ever learn? The US evidence from  single 
versus multiple acquirers?" Working Paper, American University  of Beirut. 
Jennings, R.H. and M.A.Mazzeo, L993, "Competing bids, target management  resistance, 
and the sffucture of takeover bids". Review of Financial Studies,  6, 883-909. 
Jensen, Michael C. and William H. Meckling,  1976, "Theory of the firm: managerial 
behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure",  Journal of Financial Economics 
3,305-360. 
Jensen, Michael C. and Richard S. Ruback,  1983, "The market for corporate conkol. The 
scientific evidence",  Journal of Finan cralEconomics, II, 5-50. 
152' 
Jensen, Michael C., 1986, "Costs of free cash flow, corporate  finance, and takeovers",' 
American  Economic  Review, 7 6, 323-329. 
Jensen, Michael C., 2005, "Agency costs of overvalued  equity", 34, Financial 
Management,  5-15. 
Jovanovic, Boyan  and Peter L. Rousseau, 2002,  "The Q-theory  of mergers", American 
Economic  Review,  92, 198-204. 
Kedia, Simi, venkatesh  Panchapagesan,  and vahap B. uysal, 2005, "Geography and 
Acquirer Returns ", S SRN: http ://ssrn.com/abstrac t=87 | 5 13 . 
Kane, Edward J., 1983, "Policy implications of recent structural  changes in financial 
markets",  American  Economic Review, 73, g6-L00. 
Kane, Edward J., 2000, "Incentives for banking megamergers: what motives might 
regulators infer from event study'', Journal of Banking, Money  and Credit 32, 
671-701. 
Kaplan, Steven and Michael Weisbach,  1992, "The success of acquisitions: evidence 
from  divestures",  Journal of Finance 47, 107 -138. 
Lang, Larry H.P., Rene M. Stulz and Ralph A. walkling, 1989,  Managerial 
performance,  Tobin's q and the gains from successful tender offers", Journal of 
Financial  Economics  24, L37-L54. 
Lang,Lany  H.P., Rene M. Stulz and Ralph A. Walkling, 7991, "A test of the free cash 
flow hypothesis",  Journal of Financial  Economics 29,3L5-335. 
153 
lrhn, Kenneth and Mark Mitchell,  1990, "Do bad bidders become  good targets?", 
Journal of Political  Economy,  98,372-398. 
Loderer,  Claudio and Kenneth Martin, 1990, "Corporate  acquisitions  by listed fiflxls", 
Financial  Management,  19, 17 -33. 
Maddala, G. S., 1983, Limited dependent  and qualitative variables in economeffics, 
Cambridge  University  Press. 
Maeseneire,  Wguter De,Ward Van Den Berg  and Han Smit,  2005, "Acquisitions  as a real 
options bidding game",  Erasmus  University, Working Paper. 
Maksimovic,  Vojislav and Gordon Phillips, 2001, "The market for corporate assets: who 
engages  in mergers  and asset sales  and are there efficiency  gains?", Journal  of 
Finance  56,20L9-2065. 
Malatesta, Paul and Rex Thomson, 1.985, "Partially anticipated  events", Journal of 
Financial  Economics, 14, 237 -250. 
Manne,  Henry G., 1965, "Mergers and the market for corporate control", Journal of 
Political  Economy,  73, ll0-120. 
Miller, 8., Lg77, "Risk, uncertainty, and divergence  of opinion", Journal of Finance 32, 
1 151-1 168. 
Mitchell, Mark L., and Kenneth khn, 7990, "Do bad bidders become  good targets?", 
Journal of Political  Economy 98,372-379. 
Mitchell, Mark L. and Harold J. Mulherin, L996, "The impact of industry shocks on 
takeover and restructuring  activity", Journal of Financial Economics  41,lg3-22g. 
t54' 
Modigliani, F. and M. Miller, 1958, "The cost of capital, corporation  finance  and the' 
theory of investment",  American Economic Review, 26I-297. 
Moeller,  Sara 8., Frederik Schlingenmann  and Rene M. Stulz, 2004, "Fim size and the 
gains  from acquisitions",  Journal of Financial  Economics,  7 3, 20L -228. 
Moeller,  Sara 8., Frederik Schlingenmann and Rene M. Stulz, 2005, "Wealth destruction 
on a massive scale? A study of acquiring-firm  returns in the recent merger wave", 
Journal of Finance,  60,757-782. 
Moeller, Thomas, 20[.5, "Let's make a deal! How shareholder  control impacts merger 
payoffs", Journal of Financial Economics,  7 6, 167 - 790. 
Morck R., A. shleifer, and R. Vishny, 1988, Management  ownership and market 
valuation: An empirical analysis,  Journal of Financial Economics 20,293-315. 
Morris, S., 1996, "Speculative  investor behavior  and learning",  Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 1 1 1. I 1 1 1-1133 
Myers, S. and N. Majluf, 1984, "Corporate  financing and investment decisions  when 
firms have information that investors  do not have",  Journal of Financial 
Economics,  L87-22I. 
Palepu, Krishna  G., 1986, "Predicting takeover  targets", Journal of Accounting and 
Economics  8.3-35. 
Pontiff, Jeffrey, Andrei Shleifer and Michael S. Weisbach,  1990, "Reversions  of pension 
assets after takeovers", RAND Journal of Economics  , 2L, 600- 6L3. 
155 
Prabhala, N. R., 199-1,  "Conditional methods in event studies and an equilibrium' 
justification  for standard event-study procedures", Review of Financial  Studies 
10, 1-38. 
Rhoades-Kropf, Matthew and S. Viswanathan,  2004, "Market valuation and merger 
waves", Journal of Finance,  59,2685  -2718. 
Rhoades-Kropf,  Matthew, David Robinson, and S. Viswanathan,  2005, "Valuation waves 
and merger activity: The empirical evidence", Journal of Financial  Economics, 
77,56t-603. 
Roll, Richard, 1986, "The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers",  Journal  of Business 
59,I97-216. 
Schwert, William, 2000, "Hostility in takeovers: In the eyes of the beholder?",  Journal of 
Finance,  55,2599-2@0. 
Shipper,  Katherine and Rex. A. Thompson, 1983, "Evidence  on the capitalized  value of 
merger activity for acquiring  firms", Joumal  of Financial Economics, 11, 85-l19. 
Shleifer,  Andrei and Robert W. Vishny,  2003, "Stock market  driven acquisitions", 
Journal of Financial  Economics  70,295-311. 
Smith, K. W. and Alexander.  J. Triantis, 1995, "The Value of Options in Strategic 
Acquisitions," in Real Options in Capital  Investment,  ed. L. Trigeorgis, 
Greenwood Publishing  Group, 135-L49. 
Song, Moon H., Rene M. Stulz, and Ralph A. Walkling,  1990, "The distribution of target 
ownership  and the division of gains in successful takeovers", Journal of Finance 
45,817-833. 
t56' 
Song, Moon H. and Ralph A. Walkling,2000,  "Abnormal returns to rivals of acquisition 
targets: A test of the  acquisition  probability hypothesis"', Journal of Financial 
Economics, 55, 143-17 l. 
Song, Moon H. and Ralph A. Walkling, 2005, "Anticipation, acquisitions  and bidder 
returns", Working Paper, FMA European  Meeting, Siena. 
Villalonga, Belen, 2004, "Does diversification cause the 'diversification  discount?"', 
Financial  Management,33 (2), 5-27 
Wulf, Julie, 2004, "Do CEOs in mergers trade  power for premium? Evidence from 
merger of equals", Journal of Law, Economics  and Organization,Forthcoming 
Wooldridge, Jeffuey M.,2002, Econometric  analysis of cross section and panel data, MIT 
Press. 
157 
Figure 1 - Distribution of 3-day cumulative  abnormal returns to anticipated  and 
unanticipated  bidders 
Figure plots the distribution of 3-day cumulative abnormal returns to anticipated and unanticipated  bidders. 
A bidder is classified as anticipated  if the predicted  probability  of bidding is greater than the 75e percentile 
and is identified  as unanticipated  if the predicted  probability  is less than the 258 percentile. 
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Figure 2 - Distribution of 7-day cumulative  abnormal returns to anticipated  and 
unanticipated  bidders 
Figure plots the distribution of 7-day cumulative abnormal returns  to anticipated and unanticipated  bidders. 
A bidder is classified  as anticipated  ifthe predicted  probability ofbidding is greater than the 75fr percentile 
and is identified  as unanticipated if  the predicted probability  is less than the 25h percentile. 
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Figure 3 - Distribution of 15-day cumulative  abnormal returns  to anticipated  and 
unanticipated  bidders 
Figure plots the distribution of 15-day cumulative abnormal  returns to anticipated and unanticipated 
bidders. A bidder is classified  as anticipated  if the predicted probability of bidding is greater  than the 75h 
percentile and is identified  as unanticipated  if the predicted probability is less than the2lb percentile. 
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Figure 4 - Distribution  of 29-day cumulative abnormal  returns to anticipated and 
unanticipated  bidders 
Figure plots the distribution of 29-day cumulative abnormal  returns to anticipated and unanticipated 
bidders. A bidder  is classified as anticipated  if the predicted probability of bidding is greater than the 75h 
percentile  and is identified  as unanticipated  if the predicted  probability  is less than the 25fr percentile. 
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Figure 5 - Distribution of 3-day cumulative  abnormal returns to anticipated  and
unanticipated  targets 
Figure plots  the distribution  of 3-day cumulative abnormal  returns to anticipated and unanticipated  targets. 
A target is classified  as anticipated  if the predicted probability of receiving a bid is greater  than the ZS6 
percentile and is identified as unanticipated  if the predicted probability  is less than the 25h percentile. 
3-day window' 
--{- Unanticipated --u- Anticipated 
Figure 6   Distribution of 7-day cumulative  abnormal returns to anticipated and
unanticipated  targets 
Figure plots the distribution of 7-day cumulative abnormal returns to anticipated and unanticipated  targets.
A target is classified as anticipated if the predicted probability of receiving  a bid is greater than ttre-ZSft 
percentile  and is identified as unanticipated if the predicted probability  is less than the iSb percentile. 
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Figure 7 - Distribution of 15-day cumulative  abnormal returns to anticipated  and 
unanticipated  targets 
Figure plots the distribution of 15-day cumulative abnormal returns  to anticipated and unanticipated  targets.. 
A target is classified as anticipated  if the predicted probability of receiving a bid is greater than the 75h 
percentile  and is identified  as unanticipated  if the predicted  probability is less than the 25ft percentile. 
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Figure 8 - Distribution of 29-day cumulative  abnormal returns  to anticipated  and 
unanticipated  targets 
Figure plots the disfibution of Z9-daycumulative abnormal returns  to anticipated and unanticipated  targets- 
A target is classified as anticipated if the predicted probability of receiving  a bid is greater than the 75e 
percentile  and is identified  as unanticipated  if the predicted  probability is less than the 25ft percentile. 
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Table 1 - Studies that use a firm or industry characteristic to measure investor anticipations  
Sampling frame refers to how the authors compiled the sample used in the different studies. Abnormal returns describe how abnormal returns are  
calculated. Findings summarize the main results of the different studies.  
Authors  Sampling frame  Abnormal returns  Findings  
Panel A - Studies focusing on merger programs  
Schipper and  Scan financial press to  A market model, with  Abnormal returns in the merger program  
Thompson, 1983  identify NYSE listed  the CRSP equally- announcement month prove positive and  
firms that announced  weighted index  differ significantly from zero. Positive  
merger programs  benchmarks monthly  abnormal returns begin to accumulate about  
between 1952 and 1968  abnormal returns  thirty months before an announcement.  
Malatesta  and  Scan financial press to  Time-series market  Find supporting evidence that the economic  
Thompson, 1985  identify NYSE listed  
firms that announced  
model regressions for  
each firm estimate  
impact of mergers and expected  
announcement effect are positive, and that  
- merger programs  
between 1952 and 1968  
intercept and beta  
coefficients, which are  
then used to test  
hypotheses.  
acquisitions are partially anticipated.  
Panel B - Studies focusing on frequent bidders  
Asquith, Bruner and  Sample the 1979  Daily abnormal returns  Two-day (one day prior to the end of the  
Mullins, 1983  Fortune 1000 firms,  
which made at least one  
bid between 1955 and  
1963.  
are benchmarked by ten  
beta-ranked portfolios.  
announcement day) abnormal returns to first  
bids by frequent bidders are both  
statistically and economically larger in  
magnitude than returns to subsequent bids.  
Loderer  and  Martin,  Compile firms using  A market model  Six-day abnormal returns (starting five days  
1990  reports of Mergers and  estimates daily  prior to and ending on the announcement  
Acquisitions (which are  abnormal returns.  day) to first bids by frequent bidders prove  
covered on CRSP) that  significantly greater in magnitude than  
make at least one bid  returns to subsequent bids.  
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between 1966 and 1984 ' 
Fuller, et al.  2004  Sample firms making  Abnormal returns are  Five-day abnormal returns (starting two  
five or more successful  calculated relative to  days prior to and ending two days after the  
bids within three years  the value-weighted  announcement date) for the first bids in the  
between 1990 and  market index.  three-year merger series are larger in 
2000.  magnitude than returns to fifth and higher  
ranked bids.  
Ismail, 2005  Use SDC merger  A market model with  Five-day abnormal returns (starting two  
database to identify US,  the CRSP value- days prior to and ending two days after the  
public, nonfinancial  weighted index  announcement date) to bids of acquirers,  
firms covered on CRSP  benchmarks daily  which only make one bid in the sample  
which make bids  abnormal returns.  period, are statistically and economically  
between 1985 and  smaller in magnitude than returns to bids of  
2004.  acquirers which make more than one bid.  
Panel C - Studies focusing on the time elapsed between subsequent bids in the industry  
Song and W alkling,  
2000  
Song and W alkling,  
2005  
Compile acquisition  
bids using Mergerstat  
Review  for the period  
from 1982 to 1991.  
Identify bids made by  
US, nonfinancial firms  
covered in CRSP  
A market model  
estimates daily  
abnormal returns.  
A market model  
estimates daily  
abnormal returns.  
Rival firms of targets earn significant and  
positive two-day abnormal returns (one day  
prior to the end of the announcement day) at  
the time of unanticipated announcements.  
Rival firms of bidders earn significant and  
positive returns at the time of unanticipated  
bids.  
from1985 to 2001 using  
SDC merger database.  
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Table 2 - Definitions of proxies used in related studies  
Table defines the proxies used in related studies that investigate merger activity.  
Variable definition  
Accounting return  
Variable name  
The ratio of net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations to  the common and  
on equity  preferred equity of a firm in the previous year.  
Acquisition activity  The number  of mergers  occurring in  the  state in which  the  bank is  headquarter in  the prior two  
in the state  years.  
Additional bonus  Indicator variable taking on the value one if the CEO received additional bonuses and merger related  
dummy  compensation at the time of the merger  
Average excess  The  difference  between  observed  returns  and  expected  returns  in  the  four  years  prior  to  
return  announcements. Expected return estimated by a market model, and expressed as daily returns.  
Augmentation of  Indicator variable taking on the value one if the CEOs golden parachute is augmented at the time of  
parachute dummy  the merger  
Bonus  Is the annual bonus awarded to the CEO in the year of the acquisition  
Capital-to-asset  The ratio of total equity capital to total assets.  
ratio  
Cash flow  According to  Lang et a/.(1991) is  the ratio of operating income before depreciation minus interest  
expense, taxes, preferred dividends, and common dividends to assets. According to Maksimovic·and  
Phillips (2001) is sales minus materials cost of goods sold less capital expenditures divided by sales  
CEO power index  According to  Grinstein and Hribar (2003) is the sum of three dichotomous indicator variables, and  
ranges from 0 to 3.  3 is for the most powerful and 0 for the least powerful CEOs. The three variables  
included in the index are:  whether the CEO is the chairman of the board; whether the CEO is on the  
nominating  committee;  and  whether  the  board  size  is  lower  than  the  median  board  size  in  the  
sample.  
Change in  The annual change in concentration ratio  
concentration ratio  
Change in  The net change in institutional shareholdings of the firm during the prior quarter.  
institutional  
holdings  
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Change in  
institutional  
holdings  
The net change in institutional shareholdings of the firm during the prior quarter.  
Change in labor  
productivity  
The ratio of annual change in output to the annual change in input.  
Change in number  
of firms  
Annual change in the number of firms in the industry  
Change in size  Annual change in book value of assets  
Commercial loan  
concentration  
Ratio of commercial and industrial loans to total assets.  
Concentration  
ratio  
According  to  Gort  (1969)  is  the  proportion  of  industry  output  contributed  by  the  four  largest  
producers  in  the  industry.  According  to  Eckbo  et  al.  (1990)  is  the  proportion  of industry  sales  
contributed by the four industry-sales leaders.  
Consumer loan  
concentration  
Ratio of consumer loans to total assets.  
Core deposit ratio  Ratio of non-interest bearing demand, time, and, saving deposits to total assets in the prior year.  
Detrended  
industrial  
production  
Actual  less  predicted  industrial  production.  Predicted  industrial  production  estimated  from  a  
regression of industrial production on a yearly time trend.  
Downstream  
demand indicator  
Four-digit sic code industry measure of downstream economic activity of Bailey, et.  al (1998).  
Employee shock  The difference between industry employee growth and average employee growth for all industries.  
Employee g}"owth the log of the ratio of employees in 1977 to employees in 1981.  
Equity-based  
compensation  
Is  the Black-Scholes value of new options  granted to the top five  executives in the  year preceding  
the acquisition divided by their total compensation (excluding value realized by exercising previous  
options) in the same year.  
Fraction of insider  
directors  
According to Moeller (2005) is the fraction of board members classified as insiders.  
Free cash flow  According  to  Lang,  et al.  (1991)  is  operating income  before  depreciation  minus  interest expense,  
taxes, preferred dividends, and common dividends.  
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(;overnanceindex  Index constructed by Gompers, Iishi  and Metrick (2003)  to  measure the balance of power between  
shareholders and managers. Consists of twenty-four unique corporate-governance variables based on  
charter and bylaw provisions, firm-level  provisions,  and state laws.  The variables can be classified  
into  five  categories:  tactics  for  delaying  hostile  bidders,  voting  rights,  director  protection,  other  
takeover  defenses  and  state  laws.  The  governance  index  is  composed  of  variables  (variables  
concerning  delaying  hostile  bidders  and  takeover  defenses)  that  can  allow  managers  to  deter  
unwanted merger attempts.  
(;rowth  According  to  Gort  (1969)  is  an  index  of physical  production.  According  to  Palepu  (1986),  and  
Ambrose  and  Megginson  (1992)  is  the  annual  rate  of change in  net  sales,  averaged over the  three  
years  prior to  announcement.  According to Mitchell  and Mulherin  (1996)  is  the log of the ratio  of  
employees/sales  in  1977  to  employees/sales  in  198l.According  to  Akhigbe,  et  al.  (2004)  is  the  
growth rate in assets in the prior year.  
(;rowth-resources- 
mismatch dummy  
An indicator taking on the value one if firm growth is smaller than the COMPUST AT average, firm  
liquidity  is  greater  than  the  COMPUSTAT  average,  and  firm  leverage  is  smaller  than  the  
COMPUSTAT average,  or if firm  growth is  greater than the COMPUSTAT average, firm liquidity  
is  smaller than  the  COMPUSTAT  average,  and  firm  leverage  is  greater  than  the  COMPUSTAT  
average.  
Levera~e The ratio of long-term debt to preferred and common equity, avera_g_ed over theprior threeyears.  
Liquidity  The ratio of cash and marketable assets to total assets, averaged over the prior three years.  
Industry dummy  According to  Palepu (1986)  an indicator variable taking on  the value one if at least one acquisition  
occurred in  a firm's  four-digit  SIC  industry in  the prior year.  According  to  Andrade  et.al.  (2001),  
identifier for top five industries based on average annual merger activity.  
Market-to-book  According  to  Palepu  (1986)  and  Ambrose  and Meggingson  (1992)  is  the  ratio  of market value  of  
common equity to its book value at year-end prior to the announcement.  
Market-to-book  
dummy  
Indicator taking on the value one if market-to-book ratio is greater than one.  
Number of  
segments  
The number of different three-digit sic codes in which the plants of the firm operate  
Number of  
nonmerging firms  
According  to  Eckbo  et al.  (1990)  is  the  number of nonmerging firms  in  the  four-digit  SIC  coded  
industry of the target  
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Ownership stake  According  to  Datta et al.  (2001)  is  the  log  of one  plus  the  sum of all  the common  and  restricted  
stock  owned  by  top  five  executives  over  total  shares  outstanding.  According  to  Hartzell,  et  al.  
(2004)  is  the  ratio  of shares  owned by the CEO  to  total  shares  outstanding.  According to  Moeller  
(2005) is an indicator variable that takes on the value one if target CEO controls at least 5% of target  
shares outstanding.  
Outside block  
holdings  
According  to  Moeller  (2005)  is  indicator  variable  that  takes  on  the  value  one  if outside  block  
holdings (holder's of at least 5% of the firm's shares) do not exceed 10%.  
Price-earnings  
ratio  
The ratio of stock price to its earnings per share at year-end prior to the announcement.  
Percent of  
institutional  
shareholdings  
The percent of the firm's shares owned by institutional managers.  
Percent of officer  
and director  
shareholdings  
The shares held by the firm's officers and directors.  
Poison pill, anti- 
takeover charter  
amendments,  
blank-check  
preferred -stock  
authorizations,  
classified boards,  
fair-price  
requirements,  
supermajority  
requirements,  
voting rights, and  
dual-class  
recapitalizations  
Indicator variables taking on the value on if the said anti-takeover defense is in place at the time of  
announcement.  
Quality of loan  
portfolio  
The ratio of non-performing loans to total assets.  
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Real estate loan  
concentration  
Ratio of real estate loans to total assets.  
Riegle-Neal act  
dummy  
Indicator taking on the value one if the acquisition occurred after 1994.  
Run up  The percentage change in the stock _price in the prior year.  
Sales shock  The  difference  between  industry· sales  growth  and  average  sales  growth  for  all  industries.  Sales  
growth the log of the ratio of sales in 1977 to sales in 1981.  
Size  According to Gort (1969), Palepu (1986) and Ambrose, and Megginson (1992) is the net book value  
of assets.  According  to  Maksimovic  and  Phillips  (2001)  is  the  annual  value  of shipments  in  real  
1982 dollars.  According to Akhigbe,  et al,  (2004) and Moeller et al.  (2004) is the natural log of the  
market value of firm's equity at year-end prior to  the announcement.  Moeller et al.  (2004)  also use  
the natural log of the book value of assets.  
Takeover index  According  to  Eckbo  et  al.  (1990)  is  the  weighted  average  of the  number  of acquisitions  in  the  
target's two-digit SIC code industry in the prior three years.  
Tangible assets-to- 
total assets  
The ratio  of property,  plant,  and  equipment to  the  net book value  of assets  at  year-end prior to  the  
announcement.  
Technical  
personnel ratio  
Number of engineers, chemists, surveyors per 10,000 employees  
Tobin's Q  The ratio of the firm's market value to the replacement cost of its assets.  
Total factor  
productivity (TFP)  
Actual amount of output produced for a given amount of inputs minus predicted output. Assumes a  
translog  production  function  and  estimates  the  production  function  for  each  industry.  Predicted  
output  is  what  the  plant  should  have  produced  given  the  amount  of inputs  it  used  (based  on  the  
industry_production function).  
Value added per  
worker  
Ratio of sales minus materials to number of workers  
Value ratio  According  to  Maksimovic  et al.  (1990)  is  the  log  of the  ratio  of book value of assets  plus  market  
value of equity of the bidder to the target.  
Years to  
retirement  
According to Hartzell et al.  (2004), the maximum of 0 or 65 minus the age of CEO.  
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Table 3 - Studies that use predictive models to forecast target candidates  
Sampling  frame  refers  to  how  the  authors  compile  the  sample  used  in  the  different  studies.  Variables  describe  the  variables  used  to  predict  target  
candidates.  Sign  reports  the  sign  of the  estimated  coefficients.  * means  coefficient  is  significant  at  at  least  5%.  Predictive  power  summarizes  the  
predictive power of the models.  
-
Sampling Frame  Variables  Sign  Predictive power  
Palepu  Sample  163  firms  that  were  Average excess return  -*  The model  
(1986)  acquired  during  the  period  Accounting return on equity  +  explains only  
1971  to  1979,  and  randomly  Growth-resources mismatch dummy  +*  12.45% of the  
sample  256  firms  that  were  
not acquired as of 1979.  
Growth  
Liquidity  
Leverage  
-* 
-
- 
variation in  
acquisition  
probability.  
Industry dummy  -*  
Size  -*  
Market-to-book value  -1+  
Price-earnings ratio  +  
Ambrose and  
Megginson,  
1992  
Randomly sample a quarter  
of the firms listed on NYSE  
or ASE in 1981, which have  
Average excess return  
Growth-resources mismatch dummy  
Growth  
-
-
- 
Greater predictive  
power than the  
Palepu (1986)  
data available on CRSP and  Liquidity  +  model. However,  
COMPUSTAT. Scans of  
Wall Street Journal and  
CRSP in the years 1981  to  
Market-to-book value  
Price-earnings ratio  
Size  
+ 
-
- 
predictive power  
is still low.  
1986 identify which of the  Tangible assets-to-total assets  +*  
sample firms received bids in  Percent of institutional investor shareholdings  +  
this period.  Percent of officer and director shareholdings  -*  
Poison pill  
Antitakeover charter amendments  
-
- 
Classified boards  
Fair-price requirements  
+ 
- 
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Voting rights  +*  
Supermajority requirements  +  
Blank-check preferred-stock authorizations  -* 
-Dual-class reca_pitalizations  Akhigbe, et  Sample all bank acquisitions  Size  +*  Predictive power  al.2004  occurring between 1987 and  Growth  +  high; classifies  
2001 using SDC mergers  Return on assets  -*  81.1% ofthe 
database. Nontarget banks  Capital-to-asset ratio  +*  banks correctly.  
are all banks that did not  Quality of loan portfolio  +* 
receive bids between 1987  Run up  +* 
and 2001, and which are  Market-to-book dummy  -* 
covered in CRSP.  Core-deposit ratio  +*  
Real estate loan concentration  +*  
Commercial loan concentration  +*  
Consumer loan concentration  +  
Riegle-Neal act dummy  +* 
-Acquisition activity in the state  
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Table 4 - Tabulation of theoretical  studies  according  to their focus on managerial 
merger motives and market frictions 
Table tabulates theoretical studies according to their implications  about managerial merger motives 
(shareholder value generation versus opportunistic  benefits generation), and which market frictions the 
authors  assume  exist (such as the presence  of discrepancies in valuations, incentive  conflicts, and/or 
information  asymmetries). 
merger Generation of Generation  of 
Market motives shareholder  value opportunistic benefits 
frictions 
No frictions Modigliani    Miller, 
1958; Holmes   Schmttz, 
1995; Fluck    Lynch, 
1999; 
Discrepancy  in valuations Gort (1969) 
Incentive conflicts Manne, L965 Jensen and Meckling, 
1976;  Jenseil, 1986; 
Information  asymmetries Myers and Majluf,  1984; 
Hansen,  L987; Rhodes- 
Kropf and Viswanathan, 
2004 
Information asymmetries Jensen,2005; 
and incentive  conflicts 
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Table 5 - Tabulation  of theoretical merger models, their empirical implications, the 
empirical studies that test these implications, and the proxiesused  in the studies 
Table tabulates  empirical implications  of theoretical merger models, the empirical models that test these 
implications,  and the proxies  that are used to test these implications. 
Theoretical Empirical Bmpirical 
studies implications studies 
Panel A: Theoretical models  that assume 
incentive  conflicts away 
Gort (1969)	 Economic 
disturbances 
(such as rapid 
changes  in 
technology, 
deregulation)
predict bidder 
and  target 
candidacy. 
Gort (1969)	 Prior  merger 
activity in  the 
industry  predicts 
bidder  and target 
candi dacy. 
Gort (1969)	 Demand growth 
predicts  bidder 
and  target 
candid acy. 
Gort (1969)	 Barriers  to entry
predict bidder 
and  target 
candidacy. 
Gort (1969)	 Change  in 
averuge size of 
firms  predict 
bidder  and target 
Proxies 
Technical  personnel ratio' 
and change in labor' 
productivity;' 
Industry dummy;' 
Sales shock; employee' 
shock' 
Riegle-Neal act dummy. 
Takeover  index 
Industry dummy, 
acquisition activity in the 
state 
Growth; 
Growth; 
Growth 
Detrended  aggregate 
production; downstream 
demand  indicator 
Growth 
Growth 
Concentration  ratio; 
Concentration  ratio 
Change in srze; 
Size; 
Size; 
Gort (1969); 
Palepu (1986); 
Mitchell and 
Mulherin 
(ree6); 
Akhigbe,  et 
a1.2004. 
Eckbo,  €t 
(1eeO); 
Akhigbe, 
aL.2004 
el. 
et 
Gort (1969); 
Ambrose and 
Megginson, 
1992; 
Mitchell  and 
Mulherin 
(ree6); 
Maksimovic and 
Phillips  (2001); 
Palepu (1986); 
Akhigbe,  et 
aL.2004; 
Gort (1969); 
Eckbo   et aI., 
1990 
Gort (1969); 
Palepu (1986); 
Ambrose and 
Megginson, 
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&
Gort (1969) 
Gort (1969) 
Holmes  . 
Schmitz, 
1995; 
Holmes  
Schmitz, 
1995;
Fluck '
Lynch, 1999 
Holmes  
Schmitz, 
r995 
candidacy. 
Number of new 
entrants predict 
bidder and target 
candidacy. 
Changes in the 
share of leading 
industry 
producers 
predict bidder 
and  target 
candidacy. 
The match 
quality between 
management  and
the  business 
predicts  bidder 
and  target 
candidacy. 
Business quality 
(according  to 
Holmes  and 
Schmitz) or 
profitability as a 
proxy  for 
business  quality 
(according  to 
Fluck and 
Lynch) predicts 
bidder and target 
candidacy 
Prior  merger 
activity  predicts 
target candid acy. 
1992; 
Maksimovic and 
Phillips, 2001; 
Akhigbe, et 
a1.2004. 
Gort (1969); 
Eckbo, €t  e,I. 
1990; 
Gort (L969); 
Lang, et al. 
1989; 
Palepu (1986); 
Ambrose  and 
Megginson, 
1992; 
Akhigbe,  et 
a1.2004. 
Maksimovic and 
Phillips, 2001 
Schipper and 
Thompson  1983; 
Asquith et al., 
1983; 
Malatesta  and 
Thompson, 
Size; 
Size 
Change  in number of firms; 
Number of  nonmerging 
firms; 
Changes in  concentration 
ratio; 
Tobin's Q 
Average  excess return, 
accounting  return  on equity; 
Average  excess return; 
Return on assets, capital-to- 
asset ratio, quality of loan 
portfolio, core-deposit  ratio, 
real estate  loan 
concentration,  commercial 
loan concentration,  and
consumer  loan 
concentration 
Total factor productivity; 
value added per worker; 
cash flow 
174' 
&Fluck '
Lynch, L999 
Manne, 
1965 
Jensen and 
Meckling, 
L976. 
Jensen and 
Meckling, 
1976 
Mismatch in 
capital  resources 
and  growth 
opportunities
predict bidder 
and  tnget 
candidacy. 
Managerial 
control benefits
predict bidder 
and  target 
candidacy. 
Monitoring, 
better 
compensation 
contracts predict 
bidder and target 
candidacy 
1985; Fuller, et 
aL.,2004; 
Ismail,2005 
Palepu  (1986); 
Ambrose  and 
Megginson, 
1992. 
Arnbrose and 
Megginson, 
1992; 
Datta et  al., 
2001; 
Grinstein  and
Fkibar (2003); 
Hartzell  et 
aL.2004 
Ambrose  and 
Megginson, 
1992; 
Datta, €t  al., 
2001 
Grinstein  and 
Hribar (2003); 
Haftzell  et 
aL2004; 
Moeller,2005. 
Growth-resources  mi smatch 
dummy, liquidity, leverage; 
Growth-resources  mismatch 
dummy, liquidity. 
Tangible  assets-to-total 
asset 
Equity-based  compensation 
Bonus 
Augmentation of parachute 
dummy, additional bonus 
dummy. 
Percent of  institutional
investor  shareholdings, 
percent of  officer and
director  shareholdings,
poison pill,  antitakeover 
charter amendments, 
classified  boards, 
fair-price  requirements, 
voting rights, supermajority 
requirements, blank-check 
preferred-stock 
authonzattors, dual-class 
recaprtahzations; 
Ownership stake, equity- 
based compensation 
CEO power  index 
Years  to  retirement, 
ownership  stake 
Ownership stake, fraction of 
inside directors, outside 
block holders 
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Jensen, 1986	 Free cash flow Lang et al., I99l Free cash flow 
predicts  bidder 
and  t arget 
candidacy. 
Panel C: Theoretical studies that assume  information  asvmmetries' 
Hansen, Overvalued Palepu  (1986); Market-to-book value, 
1987; 
Rhodes- 
Kropf  and 
equity predicts 
bidder and target 
candidacy. 
Ambrose  and 
Megginson, 
price-earnings  ratio; 
Market-to-book value, 
price-earnings  ratio; 
Viswanathan 
,2004; 
1992; 
Akhigbe,  et 
Runup,  market-to-book 
dummy; 
Jensen, aL.2004 
2005. 
Rhodes- 
Kropf  and 
Prior  merger 
activity in  the 
Eckbo,  €t 
(1ee0); 
Al. Takeover  index 
Viswanathan 
,2004 
industry predicts 
bidder and target 
Akhigbe, 
aL.2004 
et Industry dummy, 
acquisition  activity in the 
candidacy. state 
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Table 6 - Description of the variables we use to represent managerial motives, and the predicted signs for these variables  
Table describes the variables we use to represent managerial motives, and lists the predicted signs for these variables.  
Variable  Definition  Predicted  
sign in  
bidder- 
candidacy  
models  
Predicted  
sign in  
target- 
candidacy  
models  
Cash ratio  Ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets.  +  +1- 
Change in size  The log of the ratio of the change in book value of assets of the firm in the 2  
years prior to the announcement to assets  l_quarter prior to the announcement.  
+  +  
Concentration  
ratio  
The ratio of sales of the largest four firms  (in terms of sales) to total industry  
sales.  
+  +  
Equity-based  
compensation  
Ratio of the Black-Scholes value of options granted to the CEO to total  
compensation in the year prior to the announcement.  
+1- +1- 
Governance  
index  
Index  constructed  by  Gompers,  Iishi  and  Metrick  (2003)  to  measure  the  
balance of power between shareholders and managers. Consists of twenty-four  
unique corporate-governance variables based on charter and bylaw provisions,  
firm-level  provisions,  and state laws. The variables can be classified into five  
categories:  tactics  for  delaying  hostile  bidders,  voting  rights,  director  
protection,  other takeover defenses  and  state  laws.  The  governance  index  is  
composed  of  variables  (variables  concerning  delaying  hostile  bidders  and  
takeover  defenses)  that  can  allow  managers  to  deter  unwanted  merger  
attempts.  
+  - 
High  
information- 
asymmetry  
Takes on the value one if the share is overvalued (higher book-to-market than  
the industry median) and opaque (lower share turnover relative to the industry  
median).  
+  +  
Merger  The ratio of the number of firms in the industry, which made or received bids  +  +  
177 ' 
intensity  in the last two years, to the number of firms in the industry.  
Ownership  
stake  
Ratio of shares owned by the CEO to total number of shares outstanding in  
the year prior to the announcement.  
+1- +1- 
Previous  
mergers  
Counts the number of times a firm received or solicited bids in the 8 quarters  
prior to the announcement.  
+  +  
Price run-up  Changes in share prices in the two years prior to the announcement  +  +  
Return on  
assets (ROA)  
The ratio of book value of net income before extraordinary (or nonrecurring)  
items to total assets one quarter prior to the announcement.  
+  - 
Retirement  
years  
Number of years the CEO has under the company's pension plan.  +  - 
Sales growth  
Sales shock  
The ratio of net sales 9 quarters prior minusl quarter prior to net sales 9  
quarters ~rior to the announcement  
The absolute value of the difference between the industry 2-year sales growth  
and the median sales growth for all firms.  
+I- 
+  
+1- 
+  
Share turnover  
Size  
Square of sales  
shock  
Ratio of the number of shares traded to number of shares outstanding.  
The log of total assets in the quarter before the announcement.  
+  
+  
+  
- 
Square of sales shock  +  +  
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Table 7 - Description of the endogenous variables we use in bidder and target announcement-returns regressions, and  
the predicted signs for these variables  
Table describes the endogenous variables we use in announcement returns regressions and lists the predicted signs for these variables.  
Variable  Definition  Predicted  
sign in  
bidder  
models  
Predicted  
sign in  
target  
models  
Panel A - Proxies to represent bidder and target fit  
Same industry  Indicator that takes on the value one if the merging firms are in the same  
industry  
+  +  
Same state  Indicator that takes on the value one if main operations of bidder and target  
are in the same state  
+1- +1- 
Bidder (target)  
public  
Indicator that takes on the value one if the bidder (target) is public.  - - 
Deal value  The value of deal in million dollars.  ?  ?  
Relative value  The ratio of the value of the deal to the market value of common stock.  ?  ?  
Panel B - Proxies to represent merger terms and negotiation environment  
All-equity  
indicator  
Indicator that takes on the value one if target shareholders paid using only  
bidder shares of stock.  
+  +  
Unwelcoming  
attitude  
Indicator that takes on the value one if management's initial recommendation  
is negative or management did not solicit the bid.  
- +  
Anti-takeover  
defense  
Indicator that takes on the value one if the target has anti-takeover defenses .  - +  
Target  Indicator that takes on the value one if the target is in bankruptcy proceedings  +  - 
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bankrupt  at the time of the merger announcement ' 
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Table 8 - Comparison of SDC announcement dates with Lexis Nexis announcements  
Table tabulates  the announcements dates  that SDC  reports,  and  the  announcement dates  found  in  LexisNexis  and Factiva searches, for  74 deals  that  
were randomly picked.  
Random  
number  Bidder name  Target name  SDCdate  
LexisNexis  
date  Factiva  
Reason for  
discrepancy  
A von Products  
21  Inc  Tiffany   Co  11/21/1978  N/A  11/22/1978  
3/22 is  
Hecla Mining  Sunday, 3/20  
150  Co  Day Mines Inc  3/20/1981  3/22/1981  3/20/1981  is Friday  
Campbell Soup  Snow King Frozen  
322  Co  Foods Inc  9/11/1981  9/11/1981  
G Heileman  
673  Brewing Co Inc  Pabst Brewing Co  5/28/1982  5/28/1982  
951  Signal Cos Inc  
Wheelabrator-Frye  
Inc  11/9/1982  11/9/1982  
1063  Tracor Inc  Houston Atlas Inc  117/1983  117/1983  
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American  
Hospital Supply  
Corp 1313  
1501  Texscan Corp  
Haemonetics Corp  
Computer Video  
Systems Inc  
5/9/1983  6/211983  
7/25/1983  7/25/1983  
On 5/9/1983:  
Haemonetics  
Corp.said that  
it has had  
discussions  
with several  
suitors  
regarding the  
possible sale  
of the  
company. On  
6/2/1983  
:American  
Hospital  
Supply Corp  
and  
Haemonetics  
Corp jointly  
announced  
that they have  
reached  
agreement in  
principle for  
the  
acquisition of  
Haemonetics  
by American  
Hospital  
6/211983  Supply Corp.  
182 ' 
Arthur  
1898  Treacher's Inc  
American Fuel  
Technologies  
2118  Inc  
Waste  
Management  
2408  Inc,Genstar  
E-H  
International  
2612  Inc  
Louisiana Land  
2950    Exploration  
Safeguard  
3811  Scientifics Inc  
Union Pacific  
Corp 3823  
HoyaCorp  
USA(Hoya  
4517  Corp)  
El Charro Inc  
Travelers  
Petroleum Inc  
SCA Services Inc  
Tylus Sytems Inc  
Clam Petroleum Co  
CompuCom  
Systems  
(Safeguard)  
Beard Co  
Micro Mask Inc  
12/611983  
2/22/1984  
6/11/1984  
9/11/1984  
3/6/1985  
1111611987  
12/3/1987  
7/1711989  
12/6/1983  
N/A  
6/11/1984  
9/10/1984  
3/611985  
N/A  
12/3/1987  
7117/1989  
12/511983  
9/10/1984  
1111611987  
American  
Fuel  
Technologies  
said it  
acquired  
Travelers  
Petroleum Co.  
183 ' 
Pennsylvania  
4526  NUl Corp  Enterprises Inc  
LexisNexis:  
Pennsylvania  
Enterprises,  
Inc., Wilkes- 
Barre, Pa., a  
water and gas  
utility, said it  
was  
terminating  
its letter of  
intent to be  
acquired by  
Carey Energy  
Corp.,  
because  
Carey had not  
met a July 21  
deadline for  
obtaining  
financing.  
FACTIVA:  
Carey Energy  
Corp's  
affiliate  
Utilities  
Investment  
Inc said it  
remains  
committed to  
resolving  
7/24/1989  5/17/1989  7/24/1989  problems  
184 ' 
surrounding  
its acquisition  
of  
Pennsylvania  
Enterprises  
Inc, after  
Pennsylvania  
terminated its  
letter of intent  
to be acquired  
by Utilities  
Investment.  
4885  Medtronic Inc  Bio-Medicus Inc  5/16/1990  5115/1990  
185 ' 
On 4/4/1990:  
Tele-Optics  
Inc.  
announced  
that Corvus  
Corp. has  
exercised its  
previously  
disclosed  
option to  
acquire an  
approximate! y  
44 percent  
equity interest  
in Tele- 
Optics. On  
6/25/1990:  
James E.  
Davis,  
announced  
that Corvus  
Corp., its 44  
percent  
stockholder,  
recently filed  
for protection  
under Chapter  
11  of the U.S.  
Bankruptcy 
4935  Corvus Corp  Tele-Optics Inc  6/25/1990  4/4/1990  NIA  Code.  
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4969  
Gold Coin  
Mining  
PPC Industrial  
Coating  7/26/1990  NIA  N/A  
5233  
International  
Standards  
Group  Iroquois Brands Ltd  3/15/1991  3/15/1991  
5534  
Cadence Design  
Systems Inc  
Valid Logic  
Systems Inc  10/2/1991  10/2/1991  
5553  
Sunrise  
Technologies  
Inti Inc  Laser Biotech Inc  10/14/1991  10/14/1991  
5887  
Critical Care  
America Inc  
Winter Pk Surgical  
Center  4/3/1992  4/3/1992  
5932  
6415  
Rochester  
Telephone Corp  
Tomen America  
Inc(Tomen  
Corp)  
Utica-Rome  
Cellular  
Goldtex Inc  
5/1/1992  
2/8/1993  
5/1/1992  
2/8/1993  
6779  
Physician Corp  
of America  
Family Health  
Systems Inc  8/9/1993  8/9/1993  
6856  
Stratus  
Com_l)uter Inc  
Shared Financial  
Systems Inc  9/13/1993  9/13/1993  
6863  
United Water  
Resources Inc  GWCCorp  9/16/1993  9/16/1993  
7348  
Integrated Labs  
Inc  
Data Information  
Services Inc  4/12/1994  4/1211994  
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Digital  
7502  Solutions Inc  CBL Medical Inc  6/1411994  6/14/1994  
US Wireless  
7543  Data Inc  Direct Data Inc  6/30/1994  6/30/1994  
General  Pacific Northwest  
7636  Cellular Corp  Cellular  7/29/1994  N/A  N/A  
Stratus  
7663  Computer Inc  TCAM Systems Inc  8/8/1994  8/8/1994  
CFI  Genesys Solutions  
7766  ProServices Inc  Group Inc  9/19/1994  9/19/1994  
Worldwide  
Golf Resources  American Turf  
7945  Inc  Manufacturing  12/1/1994  12/1/1994  
Effective  
Management  
8067  Sys Inc  Intercim Corp  1/23/1995  1/23/1995  
Pacific  
Physician  Team Health  
8261  Services Inc  Grp(Pacific Pys)  4/3/1995  4/3/1995  
Adobe Systems  Frame Technology  
8491  Inc  Corp  6/22/1995  6/22/1995  
National Electronic  
8889  Envoy Corp  Info Corp  10/31/1995  10/31/1995  
Rock Bottom  Big River Grill    
9569  Restaurants Inc  Brewing  6/4/1996  6/4/1996  
188 ' 
9873  
Miller  
Industries Inc  
TN  
Vulcan  
International Corp  9/3/1996  9/3/1996  
9994  
Alliance  
Pharmaceutical  
Co!P_  
MDV Technologies  
Inc  101711996  1017/1996  
10204  
Fidelity  
Holdings  KB&R Holdings  12/1211996  12/12/1996  
10235  InaCom Corp  Networks Inc  12/20/1996  12/23/1996  
12/23 is  
Monday and  
12/20 is  
Friday.  
10391  
Industrial  
Holdings Inc  
LSS-Lone Star  
Houston Inc  2/6/1997  2/10/1997  
2/10/1997 is  
Monday, 217  
is Friday  
10602  
Universal  
Health Services  
Inc  
George Washington  
UnivHosp  4/3/1997  4/3/1997  
10788  
Metzler Group  
Inc  
Resource  
Management Inti  6/2/1997  6/2/1997  
10799  
Main Street  
Athletic Clubs  
Inc  
Southeastern  
Mineral Rights  6/4/1997  6/4/1997  
10833  
Henry Schein  
Inc  
Health-Tech  
Sys(Henry Schein)  6/16/1997  6/16/1997  
12464  
Huntsman  
Packaging Corp  
Applied Extrusion  
Technologies  817/1998  8/7/1998  
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12608  
BEA Systems  
Inc  WebLogic Inc  9/28/1998  9/28/1998  
12869  
LifeQuest  
Medical Inc  
Dexterity  
Inc(Teleflex Inc)  12/21/1998  12/21/1998  
13550  
Wind River  
Systems Inc  RouterW are Inc  711/1999  7/1/1999  
13979  Black Box Corp  
DataComLink,T  U  
Electric  11112/1999  11112/1999  
14149  
14675  
14728  
Tangible Asset  
Galleries Inc  
Key  
Technology Inc  
Cox Radio Inc  
Gehringer  & Kellar  
Inc  
Farmco Inc  
Midwestern  
Broadcasting Co  
12/30/1999  
5/17/2000  
6/2/2000  
NIA  
5/17/2000  
6/2/2000  
NIA  
15048  
15405  
15471  
Bottomline  
Technologies  
Inc  
Bingo.com Inc  
Macro media  
Inc  
Flashpoint Inc  
Lottery Channel Inc  
Allaire Corp  
8/28/2000  
12/18/2000  
1116/2001  
8/28/2000  
12/18/2000  
1116/2001  
15518  Ariba Inc  
Agile Software  
Corp  1/29/2001  1129/2001  
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16038  
Vertical  
Computer  
Systems Inc  EnFacet Inc  9/5/2001  NIA  N/A  
16136  Divine Inc  Data Return Corp  11/2/2001  11/2/2001  
16163  
Phillips  
Petroleum Co  
Inc  Conoco Inc  11/18/2001  11/18/2001  
16232  
US  Unwired  
Inc  IWO Holdings Inc  12/20/2001  12/20/2001  
16478  
Providential  
Holdings Inc  Slim Tech Inc  4/30/2002  4/30/2002  
16564  
Tasker Capital  
Corp  Rephresh Inc  6/10/2002  6/10/2002  
16675  
Imaging  
Technologies  
Corp  Greenland Corp  8/13/2002  8/13/2002  
17024  
Genaissance  
Pharmaceuticals  DNA Sciences  4/1/2003  4/1/2003  
17540  
Paradigm  
Genetics Inc  
Tissuelnformatics  
Inc  1/29/2004  1/29/2004  
17802  
Mercury  
Computer  
Systems Inc  
Advanced Radio  
Corp  6/2/2004  6/2/2004  
191 ' 
18086  
Natural Gas  
Services· Group  
Inc  
Screw Compression  
Systems Inc  
18109  
Fun City  
Popcorn Inc  
Lev  
Pharmaceuticals  
c~ 
10/19/2004  10119/2004  
1115/2004  11/5/2004  
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Table 9 - Distribution of bidder and target CARs according to CRSP-COMPUSTAT coverage  
Table  partitions  nonmerging  firms  according  to  CRSP-COMPUSTAT  coverage.  Panel  A  and  B  report  mean,  standard  deviation,  and  number  of  
observations for 3-day, 7-day,  15-day, and 29-day bidder and target CARs of bids that CRSP-COMPUSTAT, respectively, covers and doesn't cover.  
Panel C reports the t-statistic for the t-tests of the null hypothesis that the mean CARs in the two subsamples are equal. Means and standard deviations in  
%.  
Panel A - Bids that CRSP- 
COMPUSTAT covers  
Panel B - Bids that CRSP- 
COMPUSTAT doesn't cover  
Panel C- 
T-test  
Standard  
Mean  Deviation  Observations  
Standard  
Mean  Deviation  Observations  t-statistic  
3-day bidder CAR  
7-day bidder CAR  
15-day  bidder  
CAR  
29-day bidder  
CAR  
0.92  10.67  7,193  
1.09  13.00  7,193  
0.73  16.82  7,194  
0.00  22.39  7,194  
2.42  12.82  350  
2.46  16.94  350  
3.75  23.65  351  
2.50  30.38  352  
-2.55  
-1.90  
-3.21  
-2.00  
3-day target CAR  
7 -day target CAR  
15-day  target  
CAR  
29-day target  
CAR  
19.92  27.22  3,344  
21.68  28.63  3,346  
23.57  30.77  3,346  
25.57  34.87  3,346  
20.09  23.09  194  
22.89  25.11  195  
25.63  27.24  195  
25.39  31.79  196  
-0.09  
-0.58  
-0.91  
0.07  
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Table 10- Tests for a common population for bids that CRSP-COMPUSTAT covers and that it doesn't cover  
Table investigates whether the distribution of CAR for bids that CRSP-COMPUSTAT covers and doesn't cover come from a common population. Panel  
A and B report the z-statistic for  the Mann-Whitney, the p-value for  the Kolmogorov-Smimov, and the  K 2  -statistic for the Kruskal-Wallis tests in the  
bidder and target samples, respectively.  
Panel A - Bidder subsample  Panel B - Target subsample  
Mann- Mann- 
Whitney  Kolmogorov- Kruskal- Whitney  Kolmogorov- Kruskal- 
test  Smirnov test  Wallis test  test  Smirnov test  Wallis test  
che- Chi2- 
z-statistic  p-value  statistic  z-statistic  p-value  statistic  
3-day CAR  -1.94  0.01  3.74  -0.17  0.31  0.03  
7-day CAR  -1.43  0.07  2.05  -0.93  0.44  0.86  
15-day CAR  -1.55  0.01  2.42  -1.29  0.40  1.67  
29-day CAR  -1.00  0.00  1.00  0.04  0.89  0.00  
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Table 11 - Distribution of bidder and target CARs according to EXECOMP coverage  
Table partitions nonmerging firms according to EXECOMP coverage. Panel A and B report mean, standard deviation, and number of observations for  
3-day, 7-day,  15-day, and 29-day bidder and target CARs of bids that EXECOMP, respectively, covers and doesn't cover. Panel C reports the t-statistic  
for the t-tests of the null hypothesis that the mean CARs in the two subsamples are equal. Means and standard deviations in%.  
Panel A - Bids that EXECOMP  
covers  
Panel B - Bids that EXECOMP  
doesn't cover  
Panel C- 
T-test  
Standard  Standard  
3-day bidder  
Mean  Deviation  Observations  Mean  Deviation  Observations  t-statistic  
CAR  
7-day bidder  
-0.59  6.60  1363  1.38  11.57  4,519  -6.00  
CAR  
15-day  bidder  
-0.50  8.56  1363  1.68  13.94  4,519  -5.49  
CAR  
29-day bidder  
-0.84  11.24  1363  1.43  17.94  4,520  -4.41  
CAR  
3-day target  
-1.16  15.14  1363  1.10  23.46  4,520  -3.35  
CAR  
7 -day target  
18.59  21.73  353  19.69  26.37  2,410  -0.75  
CAR  
15-day  target  
19.99  23.16  353  21.60  27.96  2,413  -1.03  
CAR  
29-day target  
21.37  23.80  353  23.71  30.40  2,413  -1.39  
CAR  21.96  31.34  353  25.91  34.30  2,414  -2.04  
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Table 12- Tests for a common population for bids that EXECOMP covers and that it doesn't cover  
Table investigates whether the distribution of CAR for bids that EXECOMP covers and doesn't cover come from a common population. Panel A and B  
report the z-statistic for the Mann-Whitney, the p-value for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov, and the  K 2 -statistic for the Kruskal-Wallis tests in the bidder and  
target samples, respectively.  
Panel A • Bidder subsample  Panel B - Tar2et subsample  
Mann- Mann-
Whitney  Kolmogorov- Kruskal- Whitney  Kolmogorov- Kruskal-test  Smirnov test  Wallis test  test  Smirnov test  Wallis test  
Chi2- Chi2-z-statistic  p-value  statistic  z-statistic  p-value  statistic  
3-day CAR  -5.26  0.00  27.64  -0.14  0.49  0.02 
7-dayCAR  -4.29  0.00  18.38  -0.15  0.17  0.02 
15-dayCAR  -3.85  0.00  14.82  -0.69  0.14  0.47 
29-day CAR  -2.84  0.00  8.04  -1.22  0.02  1.49  
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Table 13 - Distribution of bidder and target CARs according to IRRC coverage  
Table partitions nonmerging firms  according to  IRRC coverage. Panel A and B report mean, standard deviation, and number of observations for 3-day,  
7-day,  15-day, and 29-day bidder and target CARs of bids that IRRC, respectively, covers and doesn't cover. Panel C reports the t-statistic for the t-tests  
of the null hypothesis that the mean CARs in the two subsamples are equal. Means and standard deviations in %.  
Panel A- Bids that IRRC covers  
Panel B- Bids that IRRC doesn't  
cover  
Panel C- 
T -test  
Standard  
Mean  Deviation  Observations  
Standard  
Mean  Deviation  Observations  t-statistic  
3-day bidder  
CAR  
7 -day bidder  
CAR  
15-day  bidder  
CAR  
29-day bidder  
CAR  
-0.65  6.50  703  
-0.80  8.34  703  
-1.48  10.58  703  
-1.79  14.51  703  
1.14  11.08  5,179  
1.45  13.41  5,179  
1.23  17.29  5,180  
0.90  22.63  5,180  
-4.18  
-4.32  
-4.05  
-3.07  
3-day target  
CAR  
7 -day target  
CAR  
15-day  target  
CAR  
29-day target  
CAR  
18.58  21.32  191  
19.47  23.88  191  
21.07  24.70  191  
20.34  37.16  191  
19.62  26.13  2,572  
21.54  27.64  2,575  
23.58  29.98  2,575  
25.78  33.68  2,576  
-0.54  
-1.01  
-1.13  
-2.14  
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Table 14- Tests for a common population for bids that IRRC covers and that it doesn't cover  
Table investigates whether the distribution of CAR for bids that IRRC covers and doesn't cover come from a common population. Panel A and B report  
the z-statistic for the Mann-Whitney, the p-value for the Kolmogorov-Smimov, and the  K 2 -statistic for the Kruskal-Wallis tests in the bidder and target  
samples, respectively.  
Panel A - Bidder subsample  Panel B - Target subsample  
Mann- Mann- 
Whitney  Kolmogorov- Kruskal- Whitney  Kolmogorov- Kruskal- 
test  Smirnov test  Wallis test  test  Smirnov test  Wallis test  
Chi2- che- 
z-statistic  p-value  statistic  z-statistic  p-value  statistic  
3-day CAR  -3.99  0.00  15.90  -0.20  0.98  0.04  
7-day CAR  -3.72  0.00  13.81  -0.20  0.79  0.04  
15-day CAR  -4.51  0.00  20.36  -0.48  0.58  0.23  
29-day CAR  -3.68  0.00  13.56  -1.14  0.15  1.31  
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Table 15 - Bidder-candidacy models  
Panel A reports the mean, standard deviation, 25th, 50th,  75th percentile values of the marginal coefficient estimates. Ninety-seven cross-sectional probit  
regressions of bidder dummies - indicator that is 1 if the firm proposes a bid in the next quarter, and 0 otherwise - on predictors, which proxy for  
managerial motives, generate the marginal-coefficient estimates.  Marginal probabilities are estimated at the median values for the continuous variables  
and at zero for the high information-asymmetry and resource-growth mismatch indicator variables. Last column in Panel A reports the t-statistic for the  
t-test of the null hypothesis that the mean of the coefficient is equal to 0. Panel B reports pseudo R2• Marginal probability estimates and pseudo R2 are in  %.  
Standard  25th  5oth  75th  
Mean  Deviation  percentile  
Panel A - Summary statistics for marginal-probability estimates  
percentile  percentile  T -statistic  
ROA  
Resource-growth  
1.31  2.21  0.13  0.57  1.34  5.84  
mismatch  
Sales shock  
Sales shock squared  
Sales growth  
Pricerunup  
Share turnover  
High information- 
0.01  
0.63  
-2.94  
-0.01  
0.01  
-0.10  
0.14  
2.15  
7.35  
0.03  
0.03  
0.38  
-0.06  
-0.53  
-4.26  
-0.01  
0.00  
-0.14  
0.00  
0.27  
-0.71  
0.00  
0.00  
0.00  
0.08  
1.29  
0.85  
0.00  
0.01  
0.06  
1.00  
2.88  
-3.95  
-3.47  
2.48  
-2.54  
asymmetry  0.05  
Merger intensity  0.11  
Cash ratio  0.36  
Size  0.00  
Change in size  -0.02  
Concentration ratio  -0.01  
Previous mergers  0.91  
Panel B- Goodness-of-fit diagnostics  
0.15  
0.85  
0.47  
0.04  
0.06  
0.22  
0.49  
-0.04  
-0.35  
0.15  
-0.02  
-0.03  
-0.12  
0.54  
0.03  
0.13  
0.32  
0.00  
0.00  
0.01  
0.84  
0.13  
0.49  
0.52  
0.03  
0.01  
0.10  
1.24  
3.33  
1.32  
7.58  
0.84  
-3.76  
-0.45  
18.69  
PseudoR2  37.43  7.79  33  37  40  
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Table 16 - Target-candidacy models  
Panel  A reports  the  mean,  standard  deviation,  25th,  50th,  75th  percentile  values  of marginal probability estimates.  Ninety-seven cross-sectional  probit  
regressions of target dummies - indicator that is 1 if the firm receives a bid in the next quarter, and 0 otherwise - on predictors, which proxy for  
managerial motives, generate the marginal-coefficient estimates.  Marginal probabilities are estimated at the median values for the continuous variables  
and at zero for the high information-asymmetry and resource-growth mismatch indicator variables. Last column in Panel A reports the t-statistic for the  
t-test of the null hypothesis that the mean of the coefficient is equal to 0. Panel B reports pseudo R2.  The marginal probability estimates and pseudo R2  
are in%.  
Standard  25  50  75  
Mean  Deviation  ~ercentile ~ercentile ~ercentile T -statistic  
Panel A- Summary statistics for marginal coefficient estimates  
I  
ROA  0.58  0.92  0.02  0.22  0.84  6.18  
Resource-growth mismatch  0.02  0.13  -0.05  0.03  0.10  1.65  
Sales shock  0.99  3.16  -0.77  0.15  1.80  3.08  
Sales shock squared  -4.73  13.74  -3.58  -0.58  0.97  -3.39  
Sales growth  -0.03  0.04  -0.04  -0.01  0.00  -6.49  
Price runup  -0.03  0.06  -0.05  -0.01  0.00  -4.83  
Share turnover  0.00  0.28  -0.10  0.00  0.08  -0.1  
High information-asymmetry  -0.09  0.16  -0.16  -0.06  0.00  -5.13  
Merger intensity  0.25  1.24  -0.32  0.19  0.73  1.99  
Cash ratio  -0.23  0.64  -0.43  -0.04  0.15  -3.54  
Size  -0.06  0.06  -0.09  -0.05  -0.02  -11.38  
Change in size  -0.13  0.14  -0.18  -0.09  -0.03  -9.06  
Concentration ratio  -0.05  0.26  -0.09  -0.01  0.07  -1.89  
Previous mergers  0.61  0.36  0.33  0.56  0.87  16.48  
Panel B- Goodness-of-fit diagnostics  
Pseudo R2  27.80  9.41  21  26  33  
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Table 17 - Goodness-of-fit diagnostics for bidder-candidacy models  
Panel A reports the mean,  standard deviation, 25th,  50th,  75th  percentile values of the probability of bidding for bidders and nonbidders as estimated by  
the bidder-candidacy models. Nonbidder subsample covers targets and nonmerging firms.  Panel B reports the mean, standard deviation, 25th,  50th,  75th  
percentile values for the X2 statistic of the likelihood-ratio test and psetJdo R2.  Predicted probabilities and Pseudo R2 are in%.  
Standard  
Mean  Deviation  percentile  percentile  percentile  N  
Panel A - Distribution of probability of bidding by bidders and nonbidders 
 
Nonbidderfirms  1.35  5.17  0.16  0.36  0.68  423,975  
Bidders  19.78  24.03  4.82  7.92  25.77  7,559  
Panel B - Goodness-of fit-diagnostics  
Pseudo R2  37.43  7.79  33  37  40  97  
X2 statistic  276.47  110.12  182.91  262.61  356.36  97  
Table 18 -Goodness-of fit-diagnostics for target-candidacy models  
Panel A reports the mean, standard deviation, 25th, 50th, 75th percentile values of the probability to receive bids for targets and nontargets as estimated by  
the target-candidacy models. Nontarget subsample covers bidders ahd nonmerging firms.  Panel B reports the mean, standard deviation,  25th,  50th,  75th  
percentile values for the X2  statistic of the likelihood-ratio test and pseudo R2• Predicted probabilities and Pseudo R2 are in%.  
Standard  
Mean  Deviation  percentile  percentile  percentile  N  
Panel A - Distribution of probability to receive bids by targets and non targets 
 
Nontarget firms  0.76  3.03  0.07  0.22  0.57  426,622  
Targets  6.87  10.18  2.14  3.68  6.93  3,564  
Panel B - Goodness of fit diagnostics  
PseudoR2  27.80  9.41  21.00  26.00  33.00  97  
X2 statistic  107.00  37.61  77.71  99.57  136.21  97  
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Table 19 - Distribution of bidder and target cumulative abnormal returns  
Table reports the mean, standard deviation, 25th, 50th, 75th percentile values for the distribution of 3-day, 7-day, 15-day, and 29-day cumulative abnormal  
returns for bidders in Panel A and for targets in Panel B. CARs are in%.  
Standard  
Mean  Deviation  25th ~ercentile 50th ~ercentile 75th ~ercentile N  
Panel A - Bidder subsam~le 
3-day window  
7-day window  
15-day window  
29-da~ window  
0.92  
1.09  
0.73  
0.00  
10.67  
13.00  
16.82  
22.39  
-3.13  
-4.59  
-6.64  
-9.64  
0.20  
0.33  
0.14  
-0.24  
3.87  
5.50  
7.04  
9.14  
7,193  
7,193  
7,194  
7,194  
Panel B - Target subsam~le 
3-day window  
7-day window  
15-day window  
29-da~ window  
19.92  
21.68  
23.57  
25.57  
27.22  
28.63  
30.77  
34.87  
3.80  
4.46  
5.17  
5.27  
15.16  
17.07  
19.37  
22.51  
29.81  
32.89  
36.05  
41.68  
3,344  
3,346  
3,346  
3,346  
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Table 20 - Cumulative abnormal returns to anticipated and unanticipated bidders  
Table  reports  the  mean,  standard  deviation,  and  the  number  of observations  for  3-day,  7-day,  15-day,  and  29-day  cumulative  abnormal  returns  to  
unanticipated bidders in Panel A and to anticipated bidders in Panel B.  A bidder is  classified as anticipated if the predicted  probability of bidding is  
greater than the 75th percentile probability and is  identified as  unanticipated if the predicted probability is less than the 25th percentile. The first column  
in Panel C reports the t-statistic for  the t-test of the null hypothesis that the means of absolute values of CARs are equal in the two subsamples. The last  
two columns in Panel C report the t-statistic and p-value for  the t-test and variance ratio test of the null hypotheses that the mean and variance of CARs  
are equal in the two subsamples, respectively. The means and standard deviations are in%.  
Panel A - Unanticipated  
bidders  
Panel B - Anticipated  
bidders  
Panel C • Tests for equality of means and  
variances  
CAR  
windows  
Standard  
Mean  Deviation  N  
Standard  
Mean  Deviation  N  
T-test (for  
absolute values  Variance  
of CAR),  T-test,  ratio test,  
t-statistic  t-statistic  p-value  
3-day  
7-day  
15-day  
29-day  
1.48  12.48  1776  
1.69  14.72  1776  
1.17  17.50  1777  
0.61  22.59  1777  
0.40  10.20  1812  
0.34  11.30  1812  
-0.57  16.39  1812  
-1.81  20.10  1812  
5.46  2.86  0.00  
5.54  3.09  0.00  
2.91  3.08  0.01  
4.17  3.39·  0.00  
Table 21 - Testing for differences in the distributions of cumulative abnormal returns in anticipated and unanticipated  
bidder subsamples  
Table reports the z-statistic, p-value, and che-statistic for Mann-Whitney, Kolmogorov-Smirnov, and Kruskall-Wallis tests  of the null hypotheses that  
the distribution  of cumulative abnormal returns  to  anticipated and unanticipated bidders come from a common population.  A bidder is  classified as  
anticipated if the predicted probability of bidding is  greater than the 75th  percentile and is  identified as  unanticipated if the predicted probability is  less  
than the 25th percentile. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mann-Whitney test  Kolmogorov-Smirnov test  Kruskall-Wallis test  
CAR windows  z-statistic  p-value  Chi2 -statistic  
3-day  2.12  0.00  4.50  
7-day  1.57  0.00  2.45  
15-day  2.56  0.00  6.53  
29-day  2.72  0.00  7.37  
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Table 22 -Cumulative abnormal returns to anticipated and unanticipated bidders, alternative specification  
Table reports the mean, standard deviation, and the number  of observations for  3-day, 7-day,  15-day, and 29-day cumulative abnormal returns  to  
unanticipated bidders in Panel A and to anticipated bidders in Panel B.  A bidder is classified as anticipated if the predicted probability of bidding is  
greater than the median probability and is  unanticipated if the predicted probability is  less than the median.  The first column in Panel C reports the t- 
statistic for the t-test of the null hypothesis that the means of absolute values of CARs are equal in the two subsamples. The last two columns in Panel C  
report the t-statistic and p-value for the t-test and  variance ratio test of the null hypotheses that, respectively, the mean and variance of CARs are equal  
in the two subsamples. The means and standard deviations are in %.  
Panel A - Unanticipated  
bidders  
Panel B - Anticipated  
bidders  
Panel C - Tests for equality of means and  
variances  
Car window  
Standard  
Mean  Deviation  N  
Standard  
Mean  Deviation  N  
T-test (for  
absolute values  Variance  
of CAR),  T-test,  ratio test,  
t-statistic  t-statistic  p-value  
3-day  
7-day  
15-day  
29-day  
1.16  11.09  3561  
1.39  13.52  3561  
1.07  16.39  3562  
0.88  22.67  3562  
0.63  10.12  3609  
0.76  12.41  3609  
0.37  17.18  3609  
-0.87  22.01  3609  
3.04  2.11  0.00  
2.54  2.06  0.00  
0.42  1.75  0.01  
1.01  3.30  0.08  
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Table 23  - Cumulative abnormal returns to anticipated and unanticipated targets  
Table  reports  the  mean,  standard  deviation,  and  the  number  of observations  for  3-day,  7-day,  15-day,  and  29-day  cumulative  abnormal  returns  to  
unanticipated targets in Panel A and to anticipated targets in Panel B.  A target is classified as anticipated if the predicted probability of receiving a bid  
is  greater than the  75th percentile probability and  is identified as  unanticipated if the predicted probability  is  less than the  25th percentile. The first  
column in Panel C reports the t-statistic for the t-test of the null hypothesis that the means of absolute values of CARs are equal in the two subsamples.  
The last two columns in Panel C report the t-statistic and p-value for the t-test and variance ratio test of the null hypotheses that the· mean and variance  
of CARs are equal in the two subsamples, respectively. The means and standard deviations are in%.  
Panel A - Unanticipated  
targets  
Panel B - Anticipated  
targets  
Panel C - Tests for equality of means and variances  
Car  
window  
Standard  
Mean  Deviation  N  
Standard  
Mean  Deviation  N  
T -test (for absolute  
values of CAR),  T-test,  Variance ratio  
t-statistic  t-statistic  test, p-value  
3-day  
7-day  
15-day  
29-day  
18.23  24.06  831  
20.14  25.58  832  
22.64  27.92  832  
23.66  33.71  832  
17.71  25.14  832  
19.36  26.19  832  
20.97  28.73  832  
23.27  33.05  832  
0.26  0.43  0.20  
0.57  0.61  0.50  
0.50  1.20  0.41  
0.09  0.24  0.56  
Table 24 - Testing for differences in the distributions of cumulative abnormal returns in anticipated and unanticipated  
target subsamples  
Table reports the z-statistic, p-value, and chi2-statistic for  Mann-Whitney, Kolmogorov-Smirnov, and Kruskall-Wallis tests  of the null hypotheses that  
the distribution of cumulative abnormal  returns  to  anticipated and unanticipated targets come from  a common population.  A bidder is  classified as  
anticipated if the predicted probability of bidding is  greater than the 75th percentile and is identified as  unanticipated if the predicted probability is  less  
than the 25th percentile.  
Mann-Whitney test  Kolmogorov-Smirnov test  Kruskall-Wallis test  
Car window  z-statistic  p-value  Chi2 -statistic  
3-day  -0.97  -0.59  0.00  
7-day  -1.05  -0.72  0.01  
15-day  -1.41  -0.72  0.00  
29-day  -1.35  -0.74  0.01  
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Table 25  - Cumulative abnormal returns to anticipated and unanticipated targets, alternative specification  
Table  reports  the  mean,  standard  deviation,  and  the  number  of observations  for  3-day,  7-day,  15-day,  and  29-day  cumulative  abnormal  returns  to  
unanticipated targets in Panel A and to anticipated targets in Panel B.  A target is  classified as anticipated if the predicted probability to  solicit a bid is  
greater than the median probability in the sample and is identified as unanticipated if the predicted probability is less than the median. The first column  
in Panel C reports the t-statistic for  the t-test of t.he  null hypothesis that the means of absolute values of CARs are equal in the two subsamples. The last  
two columns in Panel C report the t-statistic and p-value for  the t-test and variance ratio test of the null hypotheses that the mean and variance of CARs  
are equal in the two subsamples, respectively. The means and standard deviations are in%.  
Panel A - Unanticipated  
tar_gets  
Panel B - Anticipated  
targets  
Panel C · Tests for equality of means and  
variances  
Car  
window  
Standard  
Mean  Deviation  N  
Standard  
Mean  Deviation  N  
T-test (for  
absolute values  Variance  
of CAR),  T-test,  ratio test,  
t-statistic  t-statistic  p-value  
3-day  
7-day  
15-day  
29-day  
19.61  25.83  1667  
21.25  27.50  1668  
23.14  29.33  1668  
25.00  33.54  1668  
20.17  28.41  1662  
21.97  29.37  1663  
23.90  32.06  1663  
25.89  35.69  1663  
-0.97  -0.59  0.00  
-1.05  -0.72  0.01  
-1.41  -0.72  0.00  
-1.35  -0.74  0.01  
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Table 26 - Regressions of bidder CARs  
The endogenous variable is the 7-day bidder cumulative abnormal returns. Absolute values oft-statistics are reported in the second rows.  *denotes  
significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Coefficient estimates and R2are in%.  
S~ecification 1  S~ecification 2  S~ecification 3  S~ecification 4  S~ecification 5  
Heckman's lambda  3.71  3.75  3.60  3.64  
All equity indicator  
(3;20]***  
-0.87  
[3.23]***  
-0.88  
[3.10]***  
-0.90  
[3.13]***  
-0.91  -0.96  
Same industry  
[2.48]**  [2.50]**  
-0.39  
[2.57]**  [2.58]***  
-0.39  
[2.73]***  
-0.36  
Same state  
[1.17]  
0.29  
[1.18]  
0.27  
[1.09]  
0.30  
Bidder public  
[0.81]  
2.76  
[0.75]  
2.68  
[0.84]  
2.43  
Anti-takeover defense  
[0.93]  
0.16  
[0.90]  
0.16  
[0.81]  
-0.16  
Unwelcoming attitude  
[0.08]  
-2.24  
[0.08]  
-2.21  
[0.08]  
-2.23  
Target Bankrupt  
[2.19]**  
2.78  
[2.15]**  
2.82  
[2.17]**  
2.88  
Constant  -1.22  -3.95  
[1.57]  
-1.10  
[1.59]  
-3.74  
[1.62]  
-1.02  
Observations  
R-sguared  
[1.51]  
7,171  
0.24  
[1.27]  
7,171  
0.28  
[1.35]  
7,171  
0.,35  
[1.21]  
7,171  
0.39  
[0.34]  
7,171  
0.25  
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Table 27 - Regressions of bidder CARs with controls for industry and year fixed-effects  
The  endogenous  variable  is  the  7-day  bidder  cumulative  abnormal  returns.  Year  and  2-digit  SIC  industry  indicators  are  included  in  all  regression  
specifications.  Absolute values oft-statistics are reported in the second rows.  * denotes significant at 10%,  **  significant at 5%, *** significant at  1%.  
Coefficient estimates and R2are in%.  
S~ecification 1  S~ecification 2  S~ecification 3  S~ecification 4  S~ecification 5  
Heckman's lambda  3.78  3.83  3.66  3.70  
[3.16]***  [3.19]***  [3.05]***  [3.08]***  
All equity indicator  -0.87  -0.88  -0.90  -0.91  -0.96  
[2.31]**  [2.32]**  [2.38]**  [2.39]**  [2.54]**  
Same industry  -0.51  -0.51  -0.49  
[1.49]  [1.47]  [1.42]  
Same state  0.28  0.26  0.29  
[0.77]  [0.74]  [0.81]  
Bidder public  3.66  3.62  3.36  
[1.22]  [1.21]  [1.12]  
Anti-takeover defense  -0.06  -0.10  -0.46  
[0.03]  [0.05]  [0.22]  
Unwelcoming attitude  -2.09  -2.04  -2.10  
[2.00]**  [1.96]*  [2.01]**  
Target Bankrupt  2.31  2.32  2.32  
[1.29]  [1.30]  [1.30]  
Constant  0.70  -2.97  0.76  -2.86  -0.44  
[0.28]  [0.76]  [0.30]  [0.73]  [0.11]  
Observations  7,154  7,154  7,154  7,154  7,154 ' 
R-sguared  1.94  2.00  2.03  2.09  1.95 ' 
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Table 28- Regressions of target CARs  
The endogenous variable is the 7-day target cumulative abnormal returns.  Absolute values oft-statistics are reported in the second rows.  * denotes  
significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Coefficient estimates and R2are in%.  
Heckman's lambda  
SJ!ecification 1  
19.35  
SJ!ecification 2  
18.64  
SJ!ecification 3  
19.41  
SJ!ecification 4  
18.71  
SJ!ecification 5  
All equity indicator  
[2.36]**  
-4.27  
[2.27]**  
-4.15  
[2.36]**  
-4.31  
[2.27]**  
-4.22  -4.04  
Same industry  
[3.92]***  [3.78]***  
-0.62  
[3.90]***  [3.80]***  
-0.55  
[3.65]***  
-0.60  
Same state  
[0.60]  
-3.36  
[0.54]  
-3.17  
[0.58]  
-3.22  
Target public  
[2.88]***  
4.83  
[2.71]***  
5.03  
[2.75]***  
5.11  
Anti-takeover defense  
[1.75]*  
4.02  
[1.83]*  
3.65  
[1.86]*  
3.63  
Unwelcoming attitude  
[1.13]  
0.49  
[1.02]  
0.50  
[1.02]  
0.17  
Target Bankrupt  
[0.26]  
-18.63  
[0.27]  
-18.29  
[0.09]  
-18.53  
Constant  8.23  5.07  
[3.40]***  
8.20  
[3.33]***  
4.78  
[3.38]***  
18.83  
Observations  
R2  
[1.33]  
3,331  
0.58  
[0.76]  
3,331  
0.94  
[1.31]  
3,331  
0.99  
[0.71]  
3,331  
1.33  
[6.91]***  
3,331  
1.17  
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Table 29  - Regressions of target CARs with controls for industry and year fixed-effects  
The  endogenous  variable  is  the  7-day  target  cumulative  abnormal  returns.  Year  and  2-digit  SIC  industry  indicators  are  included  in  all  regression  
specifications. Absolute values oft-statistics are reported in the second rows.  *denotes significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at  1%.  
Coefficient estimates and R2are in%.  
S~ecification 1  S~ecification 2  S~ecification 3  S~ecification 4  S~ecification 5  
Heckman's lambda  10.63  10.33  10.66  10.40  
[ 1.18]  [1.14]  [1.18]  [1.15]  
All equity indicator  -7.02  -6.77  -6.94  -6.72  -6.66  
[6.05]***  [5.82]***  [5.94]***  [5.73]***  [5.68]***  
Same industry  0.66  0.68  0.63  
[0.61]  [0.63]  [0.58]  
Same state  -2.97  -2.82  -2.85  
[2.51]**  [2.38]**  [2.41]**  
Target public  0.38  0.69  0.55  
[0.12]  [0.23]  [0.18]  
Anti-takeover defense  4.70  4.47  4.51  
[1.29]  [1.23]  [1.24]  
Unwelcoming attitude  1.13  1.07  0.94  
[0.60]  [0.57]  [0.50]  
Target Bankrupt  -14.52  -14.27  -14.41  
[2.64]***  [2.60]***  [2.62]***  
Constant  7.04  8.16  6.83  7.62  14.50  
[0.58]  [0.65]  [0.56]  [0.61]  [1.33]  
Observations  3,314  3,314  3,314  3,314  3,314  
R2  6.76%  6.95%  7.06%  7.24%  7.20%  
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Table 30 - The difference in CARs for equally anticipated bidders and targets  
Table classifies bidders and  targets into  10 categories according to  the predicted probability of proposing  
and  receiving  bids.  Panel  A  reports  differences  in  7-day  CARs,  the  p-value  for  the  t-test  of the  null  
hypothesis  that the  mean of bidder and  target CARs are equal, the number of bidders and targets  in each  
category. Panel B reports the average difference in CARs.  The first row in Panel B reports the average of  
differences in the 10 categories, and the number of bidders and targets. The second row in Panel B reports  
the difference in CARs across all deals, and the number of bidders and targets.  
Panel A - Comparison of CARs to equally-anticipated bidders and  
targets  
Predicted  Difference in  Number  Number  
~robabilit! (in %)  CARs (in%)  P-value  of bidders  of targets  
0-10%  20.89  0.00  4,007  2,765  
10-20%  16.88  0.00  868  339  
20-30%  19.20  0.00  687  91  
30-40%  17.06  0.00  440  50  
40-50%  12.19  0.00  244  31  
50-60%  15.86  0.00  193  25  
60-70%  28.77  0.01  174  17  
70-80%  21.24  0.04  138  3  
80-90%  10.94  0.08  145  5  
90-100%  11.56  0.04  275  5  
Panel  B  - Difference  in  bidder  and  target  CARs  averaged  across  all  
categories and all deals  
Difference in  Number  Number ' 
CARs (in%)  of bidders  of targets ' 
Average of 10 categories  17.46 ' 
All deals  20.54  7,171  3,331 ' 
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Table 31- Bidder-candidacy models that use an annual event-window  
Table reports summary statistics for the marginal coefficient estimates of 25 annual cross-sectional pro bit regressions. The endogenous variable takes on  
the value 1 if the firm proposes a bid in the next year, and 0 otherwise.  Marginal probabilities are estimated at the median values for the continuous  
variables and at zero for  the high information-asymmetry and resource-growth mismatch indicator variables. The t-statistic is  for the t-test for  the null  
hypothesis that the mean of the distribution is equal to 0. Marginal coefficient estimates in %.  
Standard  25  50  75t  
Mean  Deviation  J!ercentile  J!ercentile  J!ercentile  T -statistic  N  
ROA  0.30  0.47  0.02  0.16  0.40  3.17  25  
Resource-growth  
mismatch  0.05  0.10  -0.02  0.04  0.12  2.59  25  
Sales shock  0.15  1.69  -0.84  0.10  1.24  0.45  25  
Sales shock squared  -1.07  5.79  -3.18  -0.31  1.46  -0.93  25  
Sales growth  -0.01  0.02  -0.01  0.00  0.00  -2.32  25  
Price runup  0.01  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.01  1.41  25  
Share turnover  -0.03  0.08  -0.05  -0.01  0.00  -2.03  25  
High information- 
asymmetry  0.11  0.11  0.03  0.11  0.20  4.81  25  
Merger intensity  -0.13  0.64  -0.36  -0.08  0.21  -0.98  25  
Cash ratio  0.32  0.28  0.14  0.21  0.47  5.80  25  
Size  0.03  0.03  0.01  0.03  0.05  5.81  25  
Change in size  -0.01  0.04  -0.01  0.00  0.01  -1.06  25  
Concentration ratio  -0.05  0.26  -0.21  -0.02  0.09  -0.95  25  
Previous mergers  0.80  0.46  0.47  0.78  0.99  8.69  25  
Pseudo R2  55.76  5.91  52  55  59  25  
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Table 32 - Target-candidacy models that use an annual event window  
Table reports summary statistics for the marginal coefficient estimates of 25 annual cross-sectional probit regressions. The endogenous variable takes on  
the value 1 if the ftrm receives a bid in the next year, and 0 otherwise.  Marginal probabilities are estimated at the median values for the continuous  
variables and at zero for  the high information-asymmetry and resource-growth mismatch indicator variables.  The t-statistic is  for the t-test for the null  
hypothesis that the mean of the distribution is equal to 0. Marginal coefficient estimates in %.  
ROA  
Resource-growth  
Mean  
0.40  
Standard  25th  5oth  75t6  
Deviation  2ercentile  2ercentile  2ercentile  
0.47  0.09  0.30  0.51  
T -statistic  
4.26  
N  
25  
mismatch  
Sales shock  
Sales shock squared  
Sales growth  
Pricerunup  
Share turnover  
IDgh information- 
0.08  
-0.74  
3.22  
-0.01  
-0.11  
0.01  
0.19  
3.14  
8.74  
0.03  
0.14  
0.15  
-0.08  
-1.63  
-2.13  
-0.01  
-0.20  
-0.05  
0.02  
-0.57  
1.93  
0.00  
-0.07  
0.00  
0.25  
1.28  
5.50  
0.00  
0.00  
0.07  
2.02  
-1.18  
1.84  
-2.52  
-3.84  
0.34  
25  
25  
25  
25  
25  
25  
asymmetry  
Merger intensity  
Cash ratio  
Size  
Change in size  
Concentration ratio  
Previous mergers  
PseudoR2  
-0.26  
1.81  
-0.36  
-0.19  
-0.16  
-0.01  
1.12  
36  
0.23  
2.28  
0.87  
0.10  
0.16  
0.57  
0.54  
12  
-0.39  
0.01  
-0.75  
-0.28  
-0.24  
-0.25  
0.81  
28  
-0.22  
1.89  
-0.19  
-0.19  
-0.13  
0.00  
1.03  
33  
-0.11  
3.07  
0.31  
-0.13  
-0.02  
0.28  
1.25  
43  
-5.62  
3.98  
-2.07  
-9.48  
-5.23  
-0.08  
10.42  
25  
25  
25  
25  
25  
25  
25  
25  
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Table 33  - Goodness of fit diagnostics for bidder-candidacy models that use an annual event window  
Panel A reports distribution  of probability of bidding for  bidders and nonbidder firms  as estimated in bidder-candidacy models. Nonbidder firm  
subsample covers targets and nonmerging firms.  Panel B reports pseudo R2 and X2 statistic for the likelihood-ratio test. Predicted probabilities are in%.  
Standard  25th  50th  75th  
Mean  Deviation  percentile  percentile  percentile  N  
Panel A - Distribution of probability of bidding by bidders and nonbidder firms  
Nonbidder firms  2.97  9.90  0.17  0.35  0.64  98,090  
Bidders  45.82  29.88  23.30  31.19  76.69  5,921  
Panel B - Goodness of fit diagnostics  
Pseudo R2  55.76  5.91  52.00  55.00  59.00  25  
Che statistic  974.499  350.439  750.97  1000.75  1246.26  25  
Table 34  - Goodness of fit diagnostics for target-candidacy models that use an annual event window  
Panel  A reports distribution  of probability to  receive a bid for  targets  and  nontarget firms  as  estimated in  target-candidacy models.  Nontarget firm  
subsample covers bidders and nonmerging firms. Panel B reports pseudo R2 and X2 statistic for the likelihood-ratio test. Predicted probabilities are in%.  
Standard  25th  50th  75th  
Mean  Deviation  percentile  percentile  percentile  N  
Panel A - Distribution of probability of bidding by bidders and nontarget firms  
Nontarget firms  2.50  7.25  0.25  0.66  1.58  100,641  
Targets  19.05  16.52  9.27  13.42  21.55  3,370  
Panel B - Goodness of fit diagnostics  
Pseudo R2  36.16  12.40  28.00  33.00  43.00  25  
Chi2 statistic  390.834  117.234  300.81  385  477.26  25  
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Table 35 - Regressions  of cumulative abnormal returns,  which use lfeclman's 
lambda  estimated  by candidacy  models  that use annual estimation windows 
The endogenous variable is the 7-day bidder cumulative abnormal  returns.  Heckman's  lambda is estimated 
using bidder-candidacy  models which use annual prediction window.  Absolute values of t-statistics are 
reported  in the second rows.* denotes significant  atL0Vo, ** significantat5Vo, *** significant  atIVo,The 
regression  coefficients  and R' arc in o/o. 
Heckmants  lambda 
AII equity indicator 
Same industry 
Same state 
BidderlTarget 
public 
Anti-takeover 
defense 
Unwelcoming 
attitude 
Target Bankrupt 
Constant 
Observations 
R' 
Panel A - Bidder  subsample' 
Specification  Specification' 
I 2' 
2.64 2.57' 
[2.79fF** f2.71] *r'x' 
-1.18 -T.27' 
[3.45]'F*{< [3.51] x'rx 
-0.33 
[1.04] 
0.58 
[1.69] * 
-3.r4 
[0.99] 
0.20 
[0.11] 
-1.38 
IL.47l 
2.74 
[ 1.63] 
-0.27 2.90 
[0.52] [0.90]
5,153  5,153 
0.39  0.59 
Panel B - Tareet subsamnle' 
Specification  Specification' 
I 
0.43 
[0.08] 
-3.11 
[2.61]  x't'x 
20.25 
[5.22Jnk**
2,486 ' 
0.28 ' 
2 
a.L7 
[0.03] 
-3. 15 
[2.60]*** 
-2.00 
[1.93] * 
-2.L4 
[1.75] * 
6.30 
[2.30]** 
3.23 
[0.83] 
0.1 I 
[0.06] 
-10.56 
[1.95] * 
15.57 
[3.30]  {< * * 
2,496 
0.95 
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Table  36  •  Bidder-candidacy  models  with  regressors  that  represent  characteristics  of  managerial  compensation  
contracts and board monitoring  
Table reports the marginal coefficient estimates in Panel A and goodness-of-fit diagnostics in Panel B. The endogenous variable takes on the value 1 if  
the firm proposes a bid in the next year, and 0 otherwise. Marginal probabilities are estimated at the median values for the continuous variables and at  
zero for the high information-asymmetry and resource-growth mismatch indicators. The coefficients in bold face are significant at 5%.  
I 1993  1993  I 1995  
P  lA  M    I ane  .  aretna pro b  bT  fti    ts ('  ~)a  IItY coe  ICien  In  0  
1995  1998  1998  2000  2000  2002  2002  
ROA  
Resource-growth  
0.30  0.16  4.47  0.62  0.26  0.07  3.04  0.00  -0.06  0.04  
mismatch  
Sales shock  
Sales shock squared  
Sales growth  
Price runup  
Share turnover  
High information- 
0.14  
-0.28  
2.45  
-0.07  
0.03  
-0.03  
0.12  
0.40  
-3.47  
0.00  
0.00  
0.03  
0.33  
0.59  
0.71  
0.08  
0.14  
0.12  
0.16  
2.93  
-11.32  
0.00  
0.05  
0.01  
-0.25  
5.55  
-28.47  
-0.12  
0.41  
0.02  
-0.07  
0.22  
-2.85  
0.00  
0.01  
-0.07  
0.01  
-1.47  
2.63  
0.15  
-0.02  
-0.22  
0.04  
0.41  
0.18  
-0.03  
0.00  
-0.01  
0.08  
2.27  
-18.80  
-0.12  
0.04  
0.05  
0.11  
0.10  
-1.65  
0.00  
-0.01  
0.00  
asymmetry  
Merger intensity  
Cash ratio  
Size  
Change in size  
Concentration ratio  
Previous mergers  
Equity-based  
0.04  
-0.12  
0.34  
0.03  
-0.01  
0.14  
0.19  
0.14  
0.10  
0.21  
0.04  
-0.01  
-0.05  
0.96  
0.06  
1.01  
-2.42  
0.06  
0.08  
0.37  
1.07  
0.15  
-0.08  
0.10  
0.06  
-0.01  
-0.21  
1.47  
0.74  
0.79  
1.82  
0.15  
-0.24  
1.11  
1.42  
0.20  
0.90  
1.21  
0.12  
-0.12  
0.22  
1.27  
-0.26  
-1.25  
0.82  
-0.24  
-0.05  
-0.03  
2.21  
0.05  
-1.34  
0.04  
0.03  
0.00  
0.06  
0.78  
0.11  
-0.58  
-0.11  
-0.07  
0.11  
0.87  
1.00  
0.15  
-0.36  
0.16  
0.01  
0.01  
0.19  
0.47  
compensation  0.06  -0.20  0.20  0.78  0.45  
Retirement years  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  
CEO ownership stake  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.00  
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(;overnanceindex  I  o.oo  -0.02  0.08  -0.02  0.05 
P ane IB -(;o  d  f. fit d. Iagnos f ICS o  ness-o- 1  
Pseudo R2 (in %)  65  51  48  63  59 
Likelihood-ratio test, ' 
che statistic ' 296.6  
55  53  51  53  48 
1057  356.93  1339  475.18  1365  380.59  1001  432.5  1093  
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Table  37  - Target-candidacy  models  with  regressors  that  represent  characteristics  of  managerial  compensation  
contracts and board monitoring  
Table reports the marginal coefficient estimates in Panel A and goodness-of-fit diagnostics in Panel B. The endogenous variable takes on the value  1 if  
the firm receives  a bid in the next year, and 0 otherwise.  Marginal probabilities are estimated at the median values for  the continuous variables and at  
zero for the high information-asymmetry and resource-growth mismatch indicators. The coefficients in bold face are significant at 5%.  
I 1993  1993  1995  1995  1998  1998  2000  2000  2002  2002  
P ane lA -M  .  I  b  bTt  m·  t(") argma pro  a  1 uy coe  ICien  s  m  
ROA  
Resource-growth  
mismatch  
Sales shock  
Sales shock squared  
Sales growth  
Price runup  
Share turnover  
High information- 
asymmetry  
Merger intensity  
Cash ratio  
Size  
Change in size  
Concentration ratio  
Previous mergers  
Equity-based  
compensation  
Retirement years  
CEO ownership  
0.00  
0.00  
-0.02  
0.05  
0.00  
0.00  
0.00  
0.00  
0.01  
0.00  
0.00  
0.00  
0.00  
0.00  
0.00  
0.00  
0.00  
0.30  -9.73  
0.35  -0.18  
-5.04  7.12  
11.36  0.25  
0.00  0.01  
-0.01  -0.67  
0.07  -0.34  
-0.26  -0.78  
3.23  2.86  
0.02  1.75  
-0.12  0.36  
-0.23  -1.95  
-0.09  2.10  
0.81  1.10  
-1.12  
-0.05  
-0.01  
0.24  0.90  
0.34  1.37  
3.47  3.57  
-2.13  -8.60  
-0.01  0.94  
-0.23  -1.27  
0.01  -0.64  
-0.31  -1.40  
2.07  12.05  
-0.19  -5.00  
-0.14  -1.45  
-0.33  -1.07  
-0.29  -2.71  
1.25  2.04  
3.88  
0.02  
-0.01  
0.54  -0.39  
0.22  0.17  
-5.15  0.00  
5.50  3.58  
0.00  0.07  
-0.44  -0.04  
0.01  0.01  
-0.40  -0.13  
7.14  0.05  
-0.14  1.19  
-0.37  -0.02  
-0.44  -0.09  
-0.81  -0.22  
2.46  0.29  
-0.02  
0.01  
0.00  
0.33  0.17  
-0.08  -0.04  
-9.04  -0.16  
20.64  -41.53  
-0.01  -0.40  
-0.20  0.00  
-0.18  0.06  
-0.26  0.00  
5.81  -1.93  
0.75  -0.53  
-0.30  -0.21  
-0.13  -0.28  
1.28  -0.30  
1.47  0.38  
0.24  
0.00  
0.00  
0.30  
-0.08  
-1.63  
-2.91  
-0.01  
-0.01  
-0.02  
-0.39  
1.65  
0.64  
-0.26  
-0.09  
1.00  
1.02  
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stake  
(;overnanceindex  0.00 
.  
-0.06  0.13  0.06  0.04  
P ane IB  (;od  f fi  d" o  ness-o - It  Iagnostics ' 
Pseudo R2  (in %) ' 51  36  28 ' 
Likelihood-ratio ' 
test, chi2 statistic ' 73.76  414  77.6  
28  
413  
17  26  21  28  33  33  
98.22  595  49.26  385  48.78  351  
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Table 38 - Regressions  of bidder and target CARs, which use Heckman's lambda estimated by bidder-candidacy  
models that include proxies for management and board characteristics  
Panels A and B report regressions of bidder and target 7-day CARs on Heckman's lambda and proxies for the fit and relative bargaining power of bidder  
and target.  Heckman's lambda is estimated using coefficients of candidacy models that include proxies for management and board characteristics.  All  
specifications  exclude  bidder-public  and  target-public  indicators  since  the  variables  show  no  variation  in  the  subsample.  The  second  rows  report  
absolute values oft-statistics. *denotes significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.  The regression coefficients and R2 are in%.  
Specification 1  Specification 2  Specification 1  Specification 2  
Panel A - Bidder subsample  Panel B - Target subsample  
Heckman's  lambda  -3.42  -3.22  7.23  8.10  
[1.47]  [1.38]  [0.32]  [0.39] 
All equity  -1.02  -0.94  -6.71  -9.09  
[1.30]  [1.20]  [1.63]  [2.29]** 
Same industry  -0.59  2.62  
[0.78]  [0.72] 
Same state  -1.01  7.07  
[1.18]  [1.64] 
Anti-takeover defense  -1.41  3.66  
[0.32]  [0.24] 
Unwelcoming attitude  -1.51  -4;77  
[0.77]  [0.77] 
Target bankrupt  0.87  -87.86  
[0.11]  [4.38]*** 
Constant  0.94  1.29  15.64  14.27  
[0.79]  [1.06]  [1.00]  [0.97]  
Observations  531  531  129  129  
R-squared  0.65  1.20  2.15  18.48  
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ITable 39 - Regressions  of bidder CARs that investigates market responses to large 
deals 
Specification  1 reports  regressions of 7-day bidder CARs on Heckman's  lambda, all-equity indicator and
deal value' Specification 2 introduces  controls for the differences  in market responses to large deals. 
Heckrnan's lambda is estimated  using coefficients of bidder and target-candidacy  models that control  for 
characteristics of the managerial  compensation contract  and board  monitoring.  The second  rows report 
absolute values of t-statistics. * denotes significant  at lIVo, ** significant at SVo, *** significant  at IVo. 
The regression  coefficients  and R' are in Vo. 
Heckmanfs  lambda 
Heckman's  lambda, control for large 
deals 
Atl equity 
All-equity, control  for large deals 
Deal value 
Deal value, control for large  deals 
Intercept 
Intercept,  control  for large  deals 
Observations 
R2 
Specification  Specification
12 
-3.99 -L.22 
u.471 [0. 1g] 
-3.69 
[0.52] 
-0.72 L.82 
[0.84]	 [0.87] 
-3.1 1 
[1.36] 
-0.14 150.1  1 
[1.90]*	 [1.90]* 
-L50.24 
[1.81]* 
T.T2 -3.79 
[0.80] [1.06J
5.47 
[1.40] 
433 433 
r.36 2.66 
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Table 40 -  Regressions of CARs that investigates market responses to 
announcements  of poorly-governed bidders 
Specification  I reports regressions of 7-day bidder CARs on Heckman's  lambda and all-equity indicator.
Specification 2 introduces  an interaction term for Heckman's lambda and poorly-governed  indicator. 
Poorly-governed indicator takes on the value  one if governance index [Gompers,  Iishi and Metrick (2003)] 
is higher than the median.  Heckman's lambda  is estimated using coefficients of bidder  and target-candidacy 
models that control for characteristics  of the managerial  compensation  contract and board  monitoring. The 
second rows report absolute  values  of t-statistics. *-denotes significant at I}Vo,  ** significant at SVo, *** 
significant  at l7o. The regression coefficients and Rz are in Vo. 
Specification  Specification
t2 
Heckman's lambda -3.42 -r.73 
IL.471 [0.66]' 
AII equity -L.02 -0.97' 
[1.30J [1.00]'
Heckman's lambda and poor governance' 
interaction  term -3.09 
[1.99]**' 
Intercept 0.94 0.69' 
[0.79]' 
Observations 53 1 451' 
R2 0.65 1.49 
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Table 41 - Goodness-of-fit statistics for bidder-candidacy  models that use 2-dW 
SIC codes 
Table reports pseudo  R2 and the chi2-  statistic for the likelihood-ratio  test from the 100 cross-sectional 
probit regressions. The endogenous variable takes on the value 1 if the firm proposes  a bid in the next year, 
and 0 otherwise.  The regressors are indicators for 2-digit SIC codes. Not all indicators are included in every 
cross-section,  since in some periods there may be no variation in a particular indicator. 
Standard 2lto 50to 7 5'o 
Mean Deviation ercentile rcentile rcentile 
Pseudo R'(in Vo) 3.92 1.19 3.00 4.00 5.00 100 
Chi2 shtistic 54.96 23.53 36.95 50.78 7 L.47 100 
Table 42 - Goodness of fit statistics  for target-candidacy models that use 2-digit SIC 
codes 
Table reports pseudo  R2 and the chi2- statistic  for the likelihood-ratio  test from the 100 cross-sectional 
probit regressions. The endogenous variable takes on the value 1 if the firm receives  a bid in the next year, 
and 0 otherwise.  The regressors are indicators for 2-digit SIC codes. Not all indicators are included  in every 
cross-section,  since in some periods  there may be no variation in a particular indicator. 
Standard 25 50 75 
Mean Deviation rcentile rcentile rcentile 
Pseudo R2 (in Vo) 4.43 L.T9 4.00 4.00 5.00 100 
Chi2 shtistic 65.80 33.42 39.02 58.39 84.50 100 
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Table 43    Regressions of CARs which use Heckman's  lambda estimated bv 
candidacy  models that use indicators for 2-digit SIC codes 
Panels A and B report regressions  of 7-day bidder and target  CARs on Heckman's lambda,  all-equity 
indicator, and proxies for fit and relative bargaining power of bidders and targets. Heckman's  lambda is 
estimated using candidacy  models which use indicators for 2-digit  SIC codes. Absolute values of t-statistics 
are reported in the second rows. * denotes significant  at ll%o, ** significant it SVo, **.x significant at l7o. 
The regression  coefficients  and Rz arcinVo. 
Heckman's lambda 
Alt equity indicator 
Same industry 
Same state 
Bidderltarget 
public 
Anti-takeover 
defense 
Unwelcoming 
attitude 
Target Bankrupt 
Constant 
Observations 
R2 
Panel A - Bidder  subsample' 
Specification Specification' 
I 
7.16 
[1.24] 
-0.43 
[1.70]* 
-4.r5 
[0.94]
14,206 ' 
0.03 ' 
2 
7.22 
u.251 
-0.46 
[1.80]* 
-0.07 
[0.3 1] 
0. 15 
[0.60J
0.16 
[0.35] 
2.63 
[ 1.69] * 
- 1.56 
[2.09]** 
0.53 
[0.48] 
-4.34 
[4.97] 
14,206 
0.07 
Panel B - Target subsamnle' 
Specification  Specification' 
1 2' 
56.49 55.25' 
[3.82fF{<)F [3.72]t*{< 
-0.97 -0.93 
[1.31] Ir.25l 
-1.03 
U.64J
0.22 
[0.33] 
-0.01 
10,021 
2.33 
[0.71] 
1.95 
[1.10] 
-7.7r 
[2.59]*,F* 
-20.07 - l g.gg 
u.7 gl* [1.671* 
9,625  9,625 
0. 1g  0.31 
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Table 44 - Marginal probability coefficients of bidder-candidacy models in the pre- and post- '92 periods  
Table reports summary statistics for  the  marginal coefficient estimates  of bidder-candidacy models.  Panel A reports summary statistics for the first  
subsample which covers data from the third quarter of 1979  to  the  second quarter of 1992,  and Panel B reports summary statistics for the second  
subsample which covers data from the third quarter of 1992 to the fourth quarter of 2004.  The endogenous variable takes on the value 1 if the firm  
proposes a bid in the next quarter, and 0 otherwise.  Marginal probabilities are estimated at the median values for the continuous variables and at zero  
for the high information-asymmetry and resource-growth mismatch indicator variables. Panel C reports:  z-statistic for Mann-Whitney test, p-value for  
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, and chi2 statistic for  Kruskall-Wallis test for  the null hypothesis that the distributions  of the variables in two subsamples  
come from a common population. Coefficient estimates are in %.  
Panel A • Sample covers the  Panel B • Sample covers the  
periods from third quarter of 1977  
to second __guarter of 1992  
periods from third quarter of 1992  
to fourth quarter of 2004  
Panel C - Tests of a common  
population  
25th  50th  75th  25th  50th  75th  
Mann- 
Whitney  
Kolmogorov- 
Smimov  
Kruskall- 
Wallis  
ROA  
Resource-growth  
Percentile  _percentile  
0.21  0.80  
percentile  _percentile  
2.07  0.12  
percentile  
0.32  
percentile  
1.13  
z-statistic  
1.50  
p-value  
0.08  
Chi2  
statistic  
2.25  
mismatch  
Sales shock  
Sales shock squared  
Sales growth  
Price runup  
Share turnover  
High information- 
-0.04  
-0.61  
-4.01  
-0.01  
0.00  
-0.23  
0.00  
0.09  
-0.44  
0.00  
0.00  
-0.01  
0.08  
1.27  
1.08  
0.00  
0.01  
0.01  
-0.09  
-0.42  
-4.59  
0.00  
0.00  
-0.08  
0.02  
0.41  
-0.97  
0.00  
0.00  
0.01  
0.09  
1.32  
0.23  
0.00  
0.01  
0.07  
-0.05  
-0.79  
1.01  
-1.15  
-0.88  
-2.25  
0.58  
0.45  
0.61  
0.43  
0.44  
0.04  
0.00  
0.62  
1.02  
1.33  
0.77  
5.07  
asymmetry  
Merger intensity  
Cash ratio  
Size  
Change in size  
Concentration ratio  
Previous meqers  
-0.05  
-0.35  
0.09  
-0.02  
-0.03  
-0.09  
0.32  
-0.01  
0.08  
0.25  
0.00  
0.00  
0.00  
0.60  
0.06  
0.40  
0.39  
0.03  
0.01  
0.05  
1.15  
0.01  
-0.29  
0.16  
-0.02  
-0.03  
-0.19  
0.78  
0.09  
0.27  
0.41  
0.00  
0.00  
0.06  
1.07  
0.20  
0.69  
0.63  
0.03  
0.01  
0.17  
1.25  
-3.78  
-0.99  
-2.24  
-0.39  
-0.03  
-1.42  
-3.48  
0.00  
0.42  
0.01  
0.72  
0.67  
0.01  
0.00  
14.29  
0.98  
5.04  
0.15  
0.00  
2.02  
12.10  
225 ' 
Table 45 - Marginal probability coefficients of target-candidacy models in the pre- and post- 92 periods  
Table reports  summary statistics for  the marginal coefficient estimates  of target-candidacy models.  Panel A reports summary statistics for the first  
subsample which covers data from  the  third quarter  of 1979 to  the second quarter of 1992, and Panel B reports summary statistics for the second  
subsample which covers data from .the third quarter of 1992 to the fourth quarter of 2004.  The endogenous variable takes on the value 1 if the firm  
receives a bid in the next quarter, and 0 otherwise.  Marginal probabilities are estimated at the median values for the continuous variables and at zero for  
the  high  information-asymmetry  and  resource-growth  mismatch  indicator  variables.  Panel  C  reports:  z-statistic  for  Mann-Whitney  test,  p-value  for  
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, and chi2  statistic for  Kruskall-Wallis test for the null hypothesis that the distributions of the variables in two  subsamples  
come from a common population. Coefficient estimates are in %.  
Panel A - Sample covers the  
periods from 3rd quarter of 1977 to  
2nd  quarter of 1992  
25th  50th  75th  
percentile  percentile  Percentile  
Panel B - Sample covers periods  
the from 3rd quarter of 1992 to 4th  
quarter of 2004  
25th  50th  75th  
percentile  percentile  percentile  
Panel C - Test of a common population  
Mann- Kolmogorov- Kruskall- 
Whitney  Smirnov  Wallis  
Chi2  
z-statistic  p-value  statistic  
ROA  
Resource-growth  
mismatch  
Sales shock  
Sales shock  
squared  
Sales growth  
Pricerunup  
Share turnover  
High information- 
asymmetry  
Merger intensity  
Cash ratio  
Size  
Change in size  
Concentration  
ratio  
Previous me('gers  
0.01  0.29  1.09  
-0.03  0.03  0.11  
-0.48  0.17  2.79  
-7.87  -0.42  0.77  
-0.02  -0.01  0.00  
-0.04  0.00  0.00  
0.00  0.01  0.20  
-0.10  -0.05  0.00  
-0.96  -0.08  0.32  
-0.49  -0.14  0.03  
-0.09  -0.04  -0.01  
-0.17  -0.08  -0.03  
-0.07  -0.01  0.02  
0.32  0.47  0.66  
0.03  0.19  0.59  
-0.09  0.02  0.07  
-0.99  0.15  1.20  
-2.41  -0.61  1.20  
-0.04  -0.01  0.00  
-0.06  -0.02  0.00  
-0.18  -0.03  0.05  
-0.18  -0.08  -0.01  
0.01  0.58  1.33  
-0.28  0.05  0.22  
-0.11  -0.07  -0.04  
-0.19  -0.11  -0.05  
-0.28  0.02  0.12  
0.41  0.70  0.93  
0.63  0.22  0.40  
0.76  0.11  0.58  
1.59  0.28  2.54  
-1.23  0.05  1.52  
0.83  0.89  0.69  
1.47  0.21  2.17  
3.33  0.00  11.11  
1.69  0.07  2.86  
-4.53  0.00  20.53  
-2.53  0.01  6.38  
2.29  0.15  5.23  
0.98  0.47  0.96  
-0.45  0.07  0.20  
-2.29  0.04  5.26  
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Table 46 - Pooled  model of bidder candidacy 
The first column of Panel A reports coefficient estimates  for a pooled probit regression that introduces 
proxies for the fit and relative bargaining  power of bidders and targets,  as well as controls for differences in 
the slope coefficients  of the proxies in the subperiods.  The endogenous  variable takes on the value one if 
the firm proposes a merg€r  bid in the next quarter  and zero otherwise. The first subsample  covers data from 
3'quarter  of 1979 to 2m quarter of 1992. The second subsample  covers data from third quarter of 1992to 
fourth quarter  of 2004. Second column reports  p-values  for the test of the null hypotheses  that the reported 
coefficients are equal to zero.  Panel B reports pseudo R2 and chi2-statistic  for the iikelihood-ratio test. 
PanelA-Estimatesof ooled model of bidder  candidac 
ROA 
Resource-  growth  mismatch 
Sales shock 
Sales  shock  squared 
Sales growth 
Price runup 
Share turnover 
High info rmation -asymmetry 
Merger  intensity 
Cash ratio 
Size 
Change in size 
Concentration ratio 
Previous  mergers 
ROA, post'92 
Resource-growth  mismatch,  post'92 
Sales shock, post  92 
Sales shock squar€d, post  92 
Sales growth, post  92 
Price  runup,  post  92 
Share turnoYer,  post  92 
High information-asymmetry,  post'92 
Merger  intensity, post  92 
Cash ratio, post  92 
Size, post  92 
Change in size, post  92 
Concentration ratio, post  92 
Previous  mergers, post  92 
Coefficient 
estimates value 
0.7 r 0.00 
0.02 0.42 
0.08 0.73 
-0.30 0.46 
0.00 0.46 
0. 1 47o 0.01 
0.00 0.57 
0.03 0.27 
-0.09 0.4L 
0.56 0.00 
0.02 0.00 
0.00 0.78 
-0.02 0.28 
1.00 0.00 
-0.69 0.00 
0.01 0.56 
-0.06 0.81 
0.28 0.50 
0.00 0.44 
-0.1 47o 0.01 
0.00 0.54 
0.05 0.08 
0.L2 0.37 
-0.47 0.00 
-0.02 0.00 
0.00 0.92 
0.01 0.85 
-0.r4 0.00 
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Post'92 indicator 0.00 
Intercent 0.00 
Panel  B - Goodness-of-fit  diaenostics 
Chi2-shtistic,  Ho: all coefficients equal to 0 5r45 
Pseudo R2 33Vo 
Chi3'shtistic, Ifo: coefficients of interaction variables equal to 0 95 
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Table  47 - Pooled model of target candidacy 
The first column of Panel A reports  coefficient estimates  for a pooled probit regression that  infioduces 
proxies for the fit and relative bargaining  power ofbidders and targets,  as well as controls for differences in 
the slope coefficients  of the proxies in the subperiods. The endogenous  variable  takes on the value one if 
the firm receives  a merger bid in the next quafter  and zero otherwise. The first subsample  covers data fiom 
3' quarter of 1979 to 2m quarter of 1992. The second  subsample covers data from third quarter of 1992 to 
fourth quarter of 2ffi4. Second column reports p-values  for the test of the null hypotheses  that the reported 
coefficients are equal tozato. Panel B reports pseudo R2and chi2-statistic  for the iikelihood-ratio test. 
Panel A - Estimates of pooled model of bidder candidacy 
ROA 
Resource-growth  mismatch 
Sales shock 
Sales shock squared 
Sales growth 
Price runup 
Share turnover 
High information-asymmetry 
Merger  intensity 
Cash ratio 
Size 
Change in size 
Concentration ratio 
Previous  mergers 
ROA, post'92 
Resource-growth  mismatch,  post'92 
Sales shock, post  92 
Sales shock squar€do post  92 
Sales growth, post  92 
Price runup, post  92 
Share turnover,  post  92 
High information-asymmetry,  post'92 
Merger  intensity, post  92 
Cash ratio, post  92 
Size, post  92 
Change in size, post  92 
Concentration ratio, post  92 
Previous  mergers, post  92 
Coefficient 
estimates p-value 
0.06 0.47 
0.05 0.05 
-0.03 0.91 
0.23 0.58 
0.00 0.44 
-0.01 0.33 
0.00 0.09 
-0. 16 0.00 
-0.91 0.00 
-0. 15 0.09 
-0.07 0.00 
-0.06 0. 15 
-0.03 0.43 
0.82 0.00 
-0.05 0.56 
-0.04 0. 1g 
0.02 0.96 
-0.05 0.92 
0.00 0.25 
0.00 0.94 
-0.03 0.22 
0.06 0. 19 
1.60 0.00 
0.r7 0.06 
0.00 0.84 
-0.03 0.50 
0.00 0.96 
-0.22 0.00 
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Post  92 indicator -0.09 a.20 
Intercept -2.39 0.00 
Panel B - Goodness-of-fit  diagnostics 
Chi2-shtistic,  Ho: all coefficients equal to 0 1685 
Pseudo  R2 2IVo 
Chi2-statistic, Ho: coeflicients of interaction variables equal  to 0  1015 
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Table 48- Regressions  of 3, 7rl5rand29-day bidder cumulative-abnormal-returns 
Table reports regressions ofbidder abnormal  returns  cumulated using 3-day (-1,1), 7-day (-3,3), l5-day (- 
7,7) and 29-day (-14,14)  windows on proxies for Heckman's lambda, bidder and target fit and bargaining 
power. Absolute  values of t-statistics are reported in the second rows. * denotes significant at llVo,  ** 
significant  at 57o, *** significant at l%o . The regression coefficients, R2, the  change in returns ue in Vo. 
CAR 
cAR (-1, 1) cAR (-3,3) cAR (-7,7) (-l4rl4) 
Heckmants 
lambda 2.50 3.64 5.46 8.76 
[2.63J*{<* [3.131*xx [3.63]*>F'F 14.3gl*x*
All equity 
indicator -0.72 -0.91 -r.28 -2.12 
[2.50]** f2.581*x* [2.80J>F)F{< [3.50J*** 
Same industry -0.26 -0.39 -0.52 -0.23 
[0.97) [1.18] u.221 [0.4u 
Same state 0.31 a.27 0.27 0.L4 
[1.09] [0.75] [o.5gJ [0.23] 
Bidder public -2.09 2.69 1.60 -2.24 
[0.86] [0.90] 10.42J 10.441 
Anti-takeover 
defense 0.25 0. 16 -L.73 -3.22 
[0.15] [0.08] [0.65] [0.91] 
Unwelcoming 
attitude -r.57 -2.2L -0.76 -1.03 
[1.97] * [2.L51xx [0.57] [0.58] 
Target 
Bankrupt 2.L3 2.82 1.37 -L.53 
u.471 [1.59] [0.60] [0.51] 
Constant 1.50 -3.7 4 -4.r3 -3.07 
[0.59] [1.2U [1.03] [0.57] 
Observations 7L7T 7L7 l 7172 7 r72 
R. slluared 0.32 0.39 0.36 0.50 
Change in 
returns  for a 
standard 
deviation 
change  in 
lambda 0.33 0.48 0.72 L.L6 
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Table 49- Regressions  of 3, 7rL5, and 29-day target cumulative-abnormal-returns 
Table reports regressions of target abnormal  returns  cumulated using 3-day (-1,1), 7-day (-3,3), 15-day (- 
7,7) and 29-day (-14,14)  windows on proxies for Heckman's larnbda,  bidder and target fit and bargaining 
power.  Absolute  values of t-statistics are reported in the second rows. * denotes  significant at l0Vo, ** 
significant at sqo, **rr significant * lVo. Theregression  coefficients, R2, the change in ieturns are in Vo. 
Heckmants 
Iambda 
All equity 
indicator 
Same 
industry 
Same state 
Target public 
Anti- 
takeover 
defense 
Unwelcoming 
attitude 
Target 
Bankrupt 
Constant 
Observations 
R2 
Change  in 
returns for a 
std. dev. 
change in 
lambda 
cAR (-1, 1) 
L6.32 
[2.09]** 
-3.86 
[3.63J{<t<* 
-0.67 
[0.68] 
-2.69 
f2.40f** 
6.1 1 
f2.32J** 
4.30 
[1.26) 
-0.01 
[0.00] 
-5.69 
[1.09] 
3.59 
[0.55J
3329 
0.99 
0.99 
cAR (-3,3) 
18.7 L 
12.27f** 
-4.22 
[3.80] {< *{< 
-0.55 
[0.54] 
-3.r7 
f2.711xx* 
5.03 
[1.93] * 
3.65 
[1.02) 
0.50 
[0.27] 
-18 .29 
[3.33] {< * * 
4.79 
[0.71] 
333r 
1.33 
T,L2 
cAR (-7,7) 
20.2r 
12.2gl** 
-4.23 
[3.53]**{< 
-0.34 
[0.30] 
-3.94 
[3.121*x* 
5.36 
[1.81]* 
4.97 
[L27] 
L.36 
10.671 
- 15 .47 
[2.61] * * * 
5.2L 
[0.71] 
3331 
L.29 
r.2l 
CAR 
(-14,14) 
6.44 
[0.64] 
-4.59 
[3.39] * * t 
0.67 
[0.53] 
-4.4I 
[3.10]x** 
7.44 
12.227** 
5.84 
[ 1 .35J
0.22 
[0.10] 
-20.r3 
[3.01] x*'* 
15.50 
[1.89J* 
3331 
1.18 
0.39 
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Table  50 - The difference  in 3-day CARs for equally anticipated  bidders and targets 
Table  classifies bidders and targets  into 10 categories  according to the predicted probability ofproposing 
and receiving bids. Panel A reports  differences  in 3-day CARs,  the p-value for the t-test of the null 
hypothesis  that the mean of bidder and target CARs are equal,  the number of bidders and 0argets in each 
catagory. Panel  B reports  the average difference in CARs. The first row in Panel B reports the average of 
differences in the 10 categories,  and the number  ofbidders  and targets. The second row in Panel B reports 
the difference in CARs across all deals, and the number  of bidders  and krgets. 
Panel  A - Comparison of CARs to equally-anticipated  bidders and 
targets 
Predicted Difference  in Number Number 
probability  (in Vo) CARs (in Vo) P-value of bidders of targets 
0-l0Vo 19.32 0.00 4,007 2,763 
10-20Vo L5.69 0.00 868 339 
20-30Vo 18.59 0.00 687 9T 
30-40Vo 16.94 0.00 440 50 
40-507o 10.4r 0.00 244 3L 
50-60%o L4.62 0.00 193 25 
60-7UVo 26.27 0.01 174 t7 
70-80Vo 19.89 0.03 138 3 
80-90Vo 10.61 0. 13 r45 5 
90-l00%o 9.L4 0.04 275 5 
PanelB-Differencein bidder and target CARs ayeraged across all 
categories and all deals 
Difference  in Number Number 
CARs (in 7o) of bidders of targets 
Average of L0 categories 16.L5 7,17 1 3,329 
All deals 19.00 
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Table 51 - The difiference  in 15-day CARs for equally  anticipated  bidders and 
targets 
Table  classifies bidders and targets  into 15 categories  according to the predicted  probability ofproposing 
and receiving bids.  Panel A reports  differences  in 3-day  CARs,  the p-value for the t-test of the null 
hypothesis  that the mean of bidder and target  CARs are equal, the number of bidders and targets in each 
category.  Panel  B reports the average difference in CARs. The firstrow in Panel B reports the average  of 
differences in the 10 caiegories,  and the number of bidders and targets. The second row in Panel B reports 
the difference in CARs across all deals, and the number  of bidders  and targets. 
Panel A - Comparison  of CARs to equally-anticipated bidders and 
targets 
Predicted Difference in Number Number 
probability  (in Vo) CARs (in 7o) P-value of bidders of targets 
0-l0Vo 23.L7 0.00 4,008 2,765 
10-20Vo 17.66 0.00 868 339 
20-30Vo 20.77 0.00 687 9T 
30-40Vo 20.83 0.00 440 50 
40-5AVo 15.27 0.00 244 3T 
50-60Vo 18.86 0.00 193 25 
60-707o 30. 19 0.00 r74 t7 
70-807o 28.43 0.00 138 3 
80-90Vo L6.43 0.1 1 145 5 
90-l00vo L4.22 0.09 275 5 
PanelB-Differencein bidder and target CARs averaged across all 
_qqtegories  and all deals 
Difference  in Number  Number 
CARs (in 7o) of bidders of targets 
10 cate 
22.80 
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Table 52 - The difference in 29-day CARs for equally anticipated  bidders and 
targets 
Table classifies bidders and targets  into 10 categories  according to the predicted  probability of proposing 
and receiving bids. Panel A reports differences  in 29-day  CARs, the p-value for the t-test of the null 
hypothesis  that the mean of bidder and target  CARs are equal, the number of bidders and targets in each 
category.  Panel B reports  the average difference in CARs. The first row in Panel B reports the average of 
differences in the l0 categories, and the number  ofbidders and targets.  The second row in Panel B reports 
the difference in CARs across all deals, and the number  of bidders  and targets. 
Panel A - Comparison  of CARs to equally-anticipated bidders and 
targets 
Predicted Difference in Number Number 
probability (in 7o)  CARs (in 7o)  P-value of bidders of targets 
0-L0Vo 
10-20Vo 
25.00 
22.23  
0.00 
0.00 
4,008 
868 
2,765 
339 
20-30%o 
30-40Vo 
22.54 
27.05 0.00  
0.00 687 
440 
9L 
50 
40-507o 
50-60Vo 
23.L4 
23.75 
0.00  
0.00 
244 
r93  
3T 
25 
60-70Vo 
70-80Vo 
80-90Vo 
90-10$Vo 
45.81 
33.86 
23.50 
15.05 
0.00 
0.01 
0.03 
0. 15 
174 
138  
r45  
275  
L7 
3 
5 
5 
Panel B - Difference in bidder and target CARs  averaged  across all 
categories and all deals 
Difference  in Number Number 
CARs (in Vo) of bidders of targets 
Average of L0 categories 26.r9 7,r72 3,33r 
All deals 25.44 
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Table 53 - Cumulative abnormal returns and predicted probabilities  to single and 
multiple announcements 
Table reports mean probabilities  predicted by candidacy models and 7-day cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) to single and multiple announcements  in the bidder subsample in Panel A, and in the target 
subsample  in Panel B. Table also reports the t-statistic  of t-test for the null hypothesis that the mean of 
distributions is equal for single and multiple announcements. Predicted probabilities  and CARs ueinVo. 
Single' 
announcements' 
PanelA-Biddersubsam 
Predicted 
probability  to 
propose a bid 20.69 
7-day CAR L.A7 
Observations 7,T7L 
Panel A - Target subsample 
Predicted 
probability  to 
receive  a bid 7.L0 
7-day CAR 2L.6I 
Observations 3,33L 
Multiple  T-test, 
announcements  t-statistic 
27.88 -4.37 
3.22 -2.43 
240 
LT.42 -2,6L 
17.96 0.85 
42 
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Table 54 - Regressions  of bidder and target cumulative  abnormal returns to single 
and multiple announcements 
Table reports  regressions of 3-day cumulative  returns to single announcements,  and single and multiple 
announcements  in the bidder subsample  in Panel A, and in the target subsample in Panel B. Absolute 
values oft-statistics are reported in the second rows* * denotes significant  atI0Vo, ** significantat5Vo,*x* 
significant  at l% . The regression coefficients  and R' arc in Vo . 
Single  AII 
announcement  announcements 
Panel A - Bidder  subsample 
Single  All 
announcement  announcements 
Panel B - Tarset subsample 
Heckmants 
lambda 
All equity 
indicator 
Same industry 
Same state 
Bidder/Target 
public 
Anti-takeover 
defense 
Unwelcoming 
attitude 
Target 
Bankrupt 
Constant 
Observations 
R2 
3.64 
[3.13]*xx 
-0.91 
f2.58lxr'* 
-0.39 
[ 1. 18J
0.27 
[0.75] 
2.69 
[0.90] 
0. 16 
[0.09] 
-2.2r 
f2.L51xx 
2.92 
[1.59] 
-3.74 
U.2L]
7,I7L '
0.39 ' 
3.82 
[3.25]*** 
-0.93 
f2.32f** 
-0.39 
[1.15] 
0,54 
[1.50] 
2.74 
[0.89J
0.40 
[0.19] 
-2.47 
f2.39)** 
2.73 
[ 1.50] 
-3.93 
U.22J
7,4L1 
0.40 
L8.7 T 
12.27)** 
-4.22 
[3.80]  {< * * 
-0.55 
[0.54J
-3.L7 
12.71]  x r'x 
5.03 
[ 1.93] * 
3.65 
u.021 
0.50' 
[0.27]' 
-18.29 
[3.33]  *'r * 
4.7 g 
[0.71]
3,331 ' 
L.33 ' 
18.34 
[2.26]** 
-4.r5 
13.7 5l {<** 
-0.52 
[0.50] 
-3.L2 
[2.69]*** 
4.57 
[ 1.69] * 
3.6r 
U.OzJ
0.62 
[0.34] 
-r7.59 
[3.33] {<** 
5.40 
[0.81] 
3,373 
L.29 
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Table 55- Regressions of bidder and target cumulative  abnormal returns that 
introduce  deal value and relative value 
Table reports regressions of 3-day bidder cumulative  abnonnal returns in Panel A, and target abnormal 
returns in Panel B. Absolute values of t-statistics are reported  in the sec-ond rows. * denotes significant at 
10, ** significant  at 5, significant  at 1. The regression coefficients, and R2, the change  in returns are in Zo. 
PanelA-BidderCARs 
Specification Specification 
Heckmants 
lambda 
Alt equity 
indicator 
Same industry 
Same state 
Bidder/Target 
public 
Anti-takeover 
defense 
Unwelcoming 
attitude 
Target bankrupt 
Deal value 
Relative value 
Constant 
Observations 
R2 
Panel B - Tar 
Specification 
1 
18.7 | 
f2.27J** 
-4.22 
***[3.80]  
-0.55 
[0.54] 
-3.17 
xr'*12.71]  
5.03 
[ 1.93] * 
3.65 
u.021 
0.50 
[0.277' 
-19.29' 
[3.33]ik{<{< 
4.79' 
[0.71]' 
333r' 
L.33' 
t CARs 
Specification 
2 
17.I4 
[2.05]** 
-5.4r 
[4.93J*{c* 
-0.92 
[0.99] 
-2.96 
12.521** 
7.54 
12.691*** 
3.90 
u.0gl 
0. 1g 
[0. 10] 
-24.59 
[3.741*{<* 
-0.19 
[1.93J* 
2.12 
[8.76]**'F 
l.69 
10.251 
3045 
4.22 
t2' 
3.64 
[3.13]x** 
-0.91 
I2.58lxx* 
-0.39 
[1.19] 
0.27 
[0.75] 
2.69 
[0.90] 
0.16 
[0.08] 
-2.2r 
[2.15] *x 
2.92 
[1.59] 
-3.7 4 
u.2u 
717t ' 
0.39 ' 
3.51 
f2.61]*'t'* 
-0.49 
[1.34] 
0.04 
[0. 11] 
0. 13 
[0.33] 
2,90 
[0.92] 
-L.23 
[0.59] 
-2.I5 
f2.0gl** 
L.44 
[0.67] 
-0.37' 
[5.37] *'r *' 
0.87' 
[6.52]***' 
-4.51' 
u.371' 
5338' 
1.59' 
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Table 56 - Testing identification strategy in the bidder subsample  
Table reports results for regressions  of 7-day bidder abnormal returns on proxies for bidder and target fit,  and bargaining power. Specifications 2  
through 5 introduce proxies for managerial incentives that prove significant in models of bidder candidacy. Absolute values oft-statistics are reported in  
the second rows.* denotes significant at 10, **significant at 5, significant at 1.  The regression coefficients, and R2,  the change in returns are in%.  
Heckman's lambda  
Specification  
1  
3.64  
Specification  
2  
3.24  
Specification  
3  
0.28  
Specification  
4  
3.60  
Specification  
5  
3.19  
Specification  
6  
4.71  
All equity indicator  
[3.13]***  
-0.91  
[1.34]  
-0.90  
[0.24]  
-1.24  
[3.09]***  
-0.69  
[2.71]***  
-0.81  
[1.75]*  
-0.96  
Same industry  
[2.58]***  
-0.39  
[2.56]**  
-0.39  
[3.55]***  
-0.38  
[1.91]*  
-0.37  
[2.29]**  
-0.36  
[2.60]***  
0.01  
Same state  
[1.18]  
0.27  
[1.18]  
0.27  
[1.16]  
-0.05  
[1.12]  
0.33  
[1.08]  
0.28  
[0.03]  
-0.04  
Bidder public  
[0.75]  
2.68  
[0.75]  
2.68  
[0.14]  
4.02  
[0.92]  
2.84  
[0.78]  
2.84  
[0.09]  
3.75  
Anti-takeover  
[0.90]  [0.90]  [1.36]  [0.95]  [0.95]  [1.20]  
defense  0.16  0.16  0.24  0.32  0.13  -0.73  
Unwelcoming  
[0.08]  [0.08]  [0.12]  [0.16]  [0.06]  [0.35]  
attitude  -2.21  -2.21  -1.63  -2.25  -2.23  -1.98  
Target Bankrupt  
[2.15]**  
2.82  
[2.15]**  
2.82  
[1.60]  
2.29  
[2.20]**  
2.80  
[2.18]**  
2.72  
[1.93]*  
1.03  
Previous mergers  
[1.59]  [1.59]  
-0.06  
[1.30]  [1.58]  [1.53]  [0.48]  
0.52  
Size  
[0.19]  
-0.93  
[1.59]  
-0.70  
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Cash ratio  
[12.59]***  
-1.94  
[7.73]***  
Merger intensity  
[2.57]**  
-2.99  
Deal value  
[2.42]**  
-0.23  
Relative value  
[3.22]***  
0.70  
Constant  
Observations  
Rz  
-3.74  
[1.21]  
7,171  
0.39  
-3.38  
[0.93]  
7,171  
0.39  
2.59  
[0.83]  
7,171  
2.55  
-3.60  
[1.16]  
7,171  
0.48  
-2.86  
[0.92]  
7,171  
0.47  
[5.19]***  
-2.77  
[0.71]  
5,338  
2.67  
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Table 57 • Testing identification strategy in the target subsample  
Table reports results for regressions of 7 -day target abnormal returns on proxies for bidder and target fit, and bargaining power. Specifications 2 through  
5  introduce proxies for managerial incentives that prove significant in models  of target candidacy.  Absolute values oft-statistics are reported in the  
second rows. * denotes,significant at 10, ** significant at 5, significant at 1. The regression coefficients, and R2,  the change in returns are in %.  
Specification  Specification  Specification  Specification  Specification  Specification  
1  2  3  4  5 6  
Heckman's lambda  
All equity indicator  
Same industry  
Same state  
Target public  
Anti-takeover  
defense  
Unwelcoming  
attitude  
Target Bankrupt  
Previous mergers  
Size  
18.71%  
[2.27]**  
-4.22%  
[3.80]***  
-0.55%  
[0.54]  
-3.17%  
[2.71]***  
5.03%  
[1.83]*  
3.65%  
[1.02]  
0.50%  
[0.27]  
-18.29%  
[3.33]***  
4.03%  
[0.37]  
-4.08%  
[3.67]***  
-0.44%  
[0.43]  
-3.16%  
[2.70]***  
5.29%  
[1.92]*  
3.31%  
[0.93]  
0.65%  
[0.35]  
-17.90%  
[3.26]***  
-2.28%  
[2.10]**  
19.53%  
[2.38]**  
-4.41%  
[3.97]***  
-0.23%  
[0.22]  
-3.25%  
[2.78]***  
5.71%  
[2.07]**  
4.04%  
[1.13]  
1.03%  
[0.54]  
-17.80%  
[3.25]***  
-0.91%  
18.76%  
[2.28]**  
-4.99%  
[4.39]***  
-0.54%  
[0.52]  
-3.35%  
[2.87]***  
4.82%  
[1.76]*  
3.82%  
[1.07]  
0.77%  
[0.41]  
-17.79%  
[3.25]***  
18.52%  
[2.25]**  
-4.42%  
[3.95]***  
-0.66%  
[0.64]  
-3.14%  
[2.69]***  
4.67%  
[1.69]*  
3.89%  
[1.09]  
0.61%  
[0.33]  
-17.86%  
[3.25]***  
13.89%  
[1.23]  
-5.60%  
[5.08]***  
-0.69%  
[0.66]  
-2.92%  
[2.49]**  
8.09%  
[2.88]***  
4.07%  
[1.16]  
0.69%  
[0.37]  
-23.82%  
[3.62]***  
-0.66%  
[0.56]  
-0.80%  
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Cash ratio  
[3.26]***  
7.87%  
[2.45]**  
Merger intensity  
[3.23]***  
6.25%  
Deal value  
[1.59]  
-0.07%  
Relative value  
[0.69]  
2.12%  
Constant  4.78%  18.44%  7.74%  3.89%  3.78%  
[8.74]***  
8.09%  
Observations  
R2  
[0.71]  
3,331  
1.33%  
[1.97]**  
3,331  
1.46%  
[1.14]  
3,331  
1.64%  
[0.58]  
3,331  
1.63%  
[0.56]  
3,331  
1.40%  
[0.83]  
3,045  
4.45%  
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Table 58 - Tabulation  of bidder abnormal  returns according to investor 
anticipations  and method  used to finance  deals 
Table tabulates  7-day bidder  cumulative  abnormal according to investor anticipations  (anticipated 
vs. unanticipated) and method used to finance the merger (all-equity vs. not all-equity). A bid is 
classified. as anticipated  if the predicted probability of bidding is larger than the median 
probability,  and as unanticipated  otherwise. A bid is identified as all-equity financed if urget 
shareholders  are paid using bidder shares only, and as not all-equity otherwise. In the main cells, 
the first line reports mean cumulative abnormal  returns and the second line the number of 
observations.  In the difference cells the first line reports the mean CARs and the second line the t- 
statistic for the two-t-test of the null hypothesis  that the difference is equal to 0. CARs arcinVo. 
Difference 
between 
Unanticipated  Anticipated columns 
Not all-equity  financed	 1,44  L.L6 0.28 
2,691  2,621	 0.83 
All-equity financed	 r.zL  -0.33 1.53 
870  988 2,23 
Difference between  rows	 0.24  L.4g'
0.45  3.22' 
Table 59 - Tabulation of bidder abnormal  returns according to investor 
anticipations  and deal size 
Table tabulates 7-day bidder cumulative  abnormal  according to investor anticipations (anticipated 
vs. unanticipated) and size of the deal  (big vs. small deal).  A bid is classified  as anticipated  if the 
predicted probability of bidding is larger  than the median probability, and as unanticipated 
otherwise. A bid is identified  as big if the reported value of the deal is larger than the median value 
of all deals  in the sample, and as small  otherwise.  In the main cells,  the first line reports mean 
cumulative  abnormal returns and the second line the number  of observations. In the difference 
cells the first line reports  the mean CARs and the second line the t-statistic for the two-t-test of the 
null hypothesis  that the difference is equal to 0. CARs are in Vo. 
Difference 
between 
Unanticipated  Anticipated columns 
Small  deals	 2.55  r.7 5 0.80 
T,409  L,ZTT L.47 
Large deals	 -0.27  -0.96 0.69 
l2g2  L,435 L.64 
Difference between  rows	 2.81  2.7I'
5.36  6.09' 
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Appendix A - Command file that downloads quarterly data from SDC  
Table reports the file that downloads data from SDC.  
Request  
0  
1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
Hits  
121334  
107496  
107495  
75713  
29668  
Request Description  
DATABASES: Domestic Mergers, 1979- 
Present (MA, OMA)  
Date Announced:  11111962 to 3/6/2005  
(Custom)  
Target or Acquiror Public Status : P  
Acquiror Nation: US  
Target Nation : US  
Deal Type: NOT 5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12  
Form of the Deal : NOT AP, AA, AC, AR, B, EO, R  
Custom Report: reportaptil52005 (Columnar)  
-Save as:  
C:\Tanyeri\april52005.txt  
Billing Ref#: 4406728  
Capture File: bostonpc.4406728  
244 ' 
Appendix B -Command file that downloads quarterly data from CRSP-COMPUSTAT  
Panel A reports the  web-query file that downloads quarterly data from CRSP-COMPUSTAT database. Panel B reports the data-request-summary file that the 
web-query produces.  
Panel A- Web-query file  
Annual Updates  
..  
..  
Monthly Stocks  
Daily Stocks  
Indices and Deciles  
Mutual Funds  
..  Monthly Treasuries  
Daily Treasuries  
CRSP/COMPUSTAT  
Merged Database  
Industrial Annual  
Industrial Quarterly  
..  Prices, Dividends    
·  
NOTICE: This page presents a new design for the  
CRSP/Compustat Merged (CCM) Database web query. An  
explanation for how this query differs. The old CCM web  
query is still available, but we recommend using the new  
design.  
CRSP/COMPUSTAT Merged Database - Industrial Quarterly  
Data Query I Documentation I Data Manuals I Retrieve from myWRDS Queries  
Step One: Date Range  
Frequenc  
Beginning 1 1 ~~~ diEnding  
Step Two: Search  
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Earnings - Ann.Fmt.  
Prices2  Dividends    
Earnings - Mon.Fmt.  
Bank Annual  •  
Bank Quarterly  •  
.. & Segments  
Tools  
Events and Names  •  
.. & Returns + Decile  
Assignments  
Market Indices  •  
.. & Mutual Fund Returns  
+ Fama-French  
Quarterly Updates ...  
Choose 1 Of 3 Methods  
[J  1. Company Codes  
I  
•••••  mm  .!Code Lookup  
[J  2. File Containing Company Codes  
~ 3. Entire Database  
Active and nactive Co111Janies  
Conditional Statements (Optional)  
B  AND[J  OR  
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I >  
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C  Fiscal period end date must be within link date range  
C  Entire fiscal period must be within link date range  
(!l  Any part of fiscal period is within link date range  
Step Three: Variables 
 
CRSP/COMPUSTAT Link History  Select All  Clear  
O  IPERM Pi  Historical CRSP PERMNO Link to COMPUSTAT Record  
Pi  Historical CRSP PERMCO Link to COMPUSTAT Record O  First  
Effective Date of Link 0  Last Effective Date of Link Pi  Link Type Code  
Pi  Link Flag 0  Link Used Flag  
Identifying Information/Codes  Select All  Clear  
2l  CUSIP Issue Code 2l  CUSIP Issue Number 2l  Ticker Pi  Company  
Name ° File Identification Code 0  Employer Identification Number  
0  Update Code ~ Incorporation Code - State 0  Incorporation Code - 
Foreign Pi  Stock Ownership Code C  Source Document Code  
n  Canadian Index Code - Current O  Canadian Index Code P'  SPC  
Calendar Year (;?!  SPC Calendar Quarter Pi  Company Location Code - 
248 ' 
State r  Company Location Code - County r  Industry Name ' 
P:  Industry Classification Code p:  North American Industry ' 
Classification System p:  Fiscal Year-end Month of Data p:  Fiscal ' 
Quarter Begin Date p:  Fiscal Quarter End Date ' 
l S&P Information  Select All  Clear  
I r  S&P Industry Index Code - Historical r  S&P Industry Index Relative  
1 I Code r  S&P Major Index Code - Historical r  Exchange Listing and  
~ S&P Index Coder  S&P LT Domestic Issuer Credit Rating r  Footnote  
1- S&P LT Domestic Credit Rating r  S&P Subordinated Debt Rating- 
I Current r  S&P ST Domestic Issuer Credit Rating r  S&P Common  
! 
I Stock Ranking r  Report Date of Quarterly Earnings r  Flow of Funds 
l  
1 Statement Format Code r  Period Footnote - Company Status Alert  
r  Period Footnote - Compatibility Status  
Expanded Data (1993-present)  
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DATA234 --Goodwill ' 
DA TA235 -- Other Intangibles ' 
DA TA236 -- Other Long-term Assets ' 
DA TA237 -- Unadjusted Retained Earnings ' 
...... [)A !.1\~~ ~~ ~~~~rriJICi~~ <:>t~~r <::cJil}'>~~~ensive Income (Loss)  
QF1NT2 --Depreciation and Arrortization (DATA5) ' 
QF1NT3 --Income Taxes- Total (DATA6) ' 
OFTNT4 --Income before EVNet lncome ... (DATA8,69) ' 
QFTNT5 -- Income before 8- Adj for CSE (DATA 1 0) ' 
QFTNT6 -- EPS  (B~ic)-lncVExcl8 (DATA~1~,19) 

SPCE12 -- S&PCore Earnings  12M111 ' 
SFO:D12 -- S&PCore Earnings EPS Diluted 12MII1 ' 
SPCEDPQ -- S&P Core Earnings EPS Diluted - Prelirrinary ' 
SFCBJQ -- S&P Core Earnings EPS Diluted ' 
SFCEEPS12 -- S&PCore Earnings EPS Basic 12M'v1 ' 
•  •••>•••  "'  ~"""""'•••""""""' """"""""'"'-'  "•••••<'•MoM.~... o.-•• ~ ••• o.o,>M,o.o ••• ,  •  ""' ""'"'""'•"'' •••  
Step Four: Output 
 
Primary Sort Variable I GVKEY (default)  
mm ••••••••••• ••••• •••••  • ••••m•mmmm ••• m  m  mmmmm • •• •••••••••••••••  •• ••• •  •  I  
Output Format  
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(  tab-delinited text (*.txt)  
"  "-h-~·~=~=·~~""""'"'~~""'"N ~w·~=•"=~""' 
E-Mail Address (Optional) 
 
[~·········~~· ···~·····' 

How  'Save Query' works-- Using myWRDS Queries ' 
tll<'t~d~r 
··~~. ",_  
~it 

~~5~~t • ._  
.,ce.in;g'; 
, "'  ;.,..,<>  .'  ·s='  ,  
Unless otherwise noted, all material is  
Copyright 1994-2006: The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania  
All rights reserved  
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Appendix C - Stata Command File  
! Data formatting and preparation !  
! File 1 !  
set virtual on  
set memory 900m  
set matsize 800  
set more off  
log using "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\0utput\March162006", replace  
insheet using  "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\Dec122005.txt", clear  
tabmiss gvkey dnum  
!726,377 obs!  
desc  
log off  
tab dnum  
logon  
!dropping SIC's excluded in SDC, all dnum with 6000-6999!  
drop if dnum>5999    dnum <7000  
tabmiss fqenddt fqbegdt fyr gvkey  
!564,131 non missing data!  
!check for double counted firms, by cusip and fiscalquarters!  
format fqbegdt fqenddt %dN/D/Y  
!fqbegdt and fqenddt gives true financial statement coverage!  
!if a firm has the same cnum and financial statement coverage, it means it is double counted!  
252 ' 
bysort cnum fqbegdt fqenddt: egen samecnumdate=count(_n)  
tab samecnumdate  
!1900 with 2 counts. 45 with 3 counts, 24 with 4 counts, 5 with 5 counts. Check if data same!  
bysort gvkey fqbegdt fqenddt cnum datalOl data90 data69 data61 data60 data54 data51  data46 data44 data38 data37 data36 data31  
data30 data24 data22 data21 data20 datal8 datal4 data8 data6 data2 datal: egen samegvkeycnumdatadate=count(_n)  
tab  samegvkeycnumdatadate  
!same data, gvkey, cnum, dates: 788 with count 2 and 3 with count 3; drop the extras!  
bysort gvkey fqbegdt fqenddt cnum datalOl data90 data69 data61 data60 data54 data51 data46 data44 data38 data37 data36 data31  
data30 data24 data22 data21 data20 datal8 datal4 data8 data6 data2 datal: egen flag=min(_n)  
drop if flag-= _n  
!788/2+3/3*2=396 repeating firms dropped!  
drop flag samegvkeycnumdatadate samecnumdate  
tabmiss gvkey cnum  
!563,735 obs!  
!check for cnum double counts!  
bysort cnum fqenddt datalOl data90 data69 data61 data60 data54 data51 data46 data44 data38 data37 data36 data31 data30 data24  
data22 data21 data20 datal8 datal4 data8 data6 data2 datal: egen datecusipdatasame=count(_n)  
tab datecusipdatasame  
!2 double counts with same data!  
bysort cnum fqenddt datalOl data90 data69 data61 data60 data54 data51  data46 data44 data38 data37 data36 data31 data30 data24  
data22 data21 data20 datal8 datal4 data8 data6 data2 datal: egen flag=min(_n)  
drop if _n-=flag  
drop datecusipdatasame flag  
bysort fqenddt gvkey cnum: egen samedategvkeycnum=count(_n)  
tab  samedategvkeycnum  
!778 double counts!  
bysort fqenddt cnum: egen samedatecnum=count(_n)  
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tab  samedatecnum samedategvkeycnum  
!778 double counts due to same gvkey and cnum, 336 double counts due to repeated cusip and different gvkey, 39 triple counts due to  
repeated cusip and different gvkey, 24 4 counts due to repeated cusip and different gvkey, 5 5 counts due to repeated cusip and  
different gvkey!  
list gvkey cnum fqenddt fqbegdt data2  data44 if  samedatecnum= 5  
!some double counts due to changes in gvkey and data. For ex. cnum=372917 has 5 different gvkeys corresponding to five company  
names, subsidiaries with different data. Hence these double counts with different gvkeys I'll leave untouched!  
log off  
list gvkey cnum fyr fqenddt fqbegdt data2  data44 if  samedatecnum= 2    samedategvkeycnum= 2  
logon  
!some double counts due to same gvkey and cusip but changes in fyr. Due to changes in fyr (fiscal year announcement dates), data  
changes as well!  
bysort fqenddt cnum gvkey fyr: egen samedatecnumfyr=count(_n)  
tab samedatecnumfyr  
drop samedatecnumfyr  
!no double counts!  
!drop the first observation in the double counted gvkey cnum with differing fyrs!  
bysort gvkey fqbegdt fqenddt cnum: egen flag=min(_n)  
drop if flag-= _n  
!389 = 778/2  dropped!  
drop flag samedatecnum samedategvkeycnum  
bysort fqenddt gvkey cnum: egen samedategvkeycnum=count(_n)  
tab  samedategvkeycnum  
!no double counts!  
drop samedategvkeycnum  
!year qtr according to fiscal years not true dates, get true dates from fqenddt!  
rename year fiscalyear  
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rename qtr fiscalquarter  
gen year=year(fqenddt)  
gen month=month(fqenddt)  
bysort year month cnum: egen samedatecnum=count(_n)  
tab  samedatecnum  
!336 double counts and 39 triple counts and 24 4 counts and 5 5 counts due to repeated cusip and different gvkey! 
generate samedatecusipdummy=O  
replace  samedatecusipdummy=1 if samedatecnum> 1  
tab samedatecusipdummy  
!404 double cusip counts!  
egen numberofdifferentgvkeys=group(gvkey)  
sum numberofdifferentgvkeys  
!14,278 different gvkeys and 563,345  observations!  
egen numberofdifferentcusips=group( cnum)  
sum numberofdifferentcusips  
!14,270 different gvkeys and 563,345  observations!  
drop samedatecusipdummy samedatecnum  
bysort year month cnum: egen samedatecnum=count(_n)  
tab  samedatecnum  
!336 double counts and 39 triple counts and 24 4 counts and 5 5 counts due to repeated cusip and different gvkey!  
generate samedatecusipdummy=O  
replace  samedatecusipdummy=1 if samedatecnum> 1  
tab samedatecusipdummy  
!404 double cusip counts!  
rename cnum cusip  
255 ' 
sort cusip year month  
tabmiss cusip  
!563,345  !  
gen CRSPobsno= _n  
save "C:\Basak:\Mergers\March2006\Data\December12COMPUSTAT.dta", replace  
insheet using "C: \Basak:\Mergers\March2006\Data \Dec 122005outputSDC. txt", clear 
desc  
drop if dateannounced= ""  
tabmiss dealnumber dateannounced  
!18,325 deals!  
gen str1 onedigitsica=substr( acquirorprimarysic, 1,1)  
gen str1 onedigitsict=substr(targetprimarysic,1,1)  
drop if onedigitsica= "6"  
drop if onedigitsict= "6"  
drop onedigitsict onedigitsica  
tabmiss dealnumber dateannounced  
! 18272 deals!  
gen dateannounced1=date(dateannounced, "mdy")  
format dateannounced1  %d.N/D/Y  
gen dateeffective1=date(dateeffective, "mdy")  
format dateeffective1 %d.N/D/Y  
gen datewithdrawn1=date(datewithdrawn, "mdy")  
format datewithdrawn1  %d.N/D/Y  
drop dateannounced datewithdrawn dateeffective  
rename dateannounced1 dateannounced  
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rename dateeffective1 dateeffective  
rename datewithdrawn1 datewithdrawn  
gen sameacquirortargetcusip=match( acquirorcusip,targetcusip)  
tab sameacquirortargetcusip  
!check if acquiror and target cusip same, 41  with same!  
list targetname acquirorname dealnumber if sameacquirortargetcusip=  1  
!checked names, acquiror and target names and cusips same, hence drop these deals!  
drop if sameacquirortargetcusip=  1  
drop sameacquirortargetcusip  
tabmiss dateannounced  
! 18,231 deals!  
bysort acquirorcusip dateannounced: egen multipleacquirorannouncements=count(_n)  
bysort targetcusip dateannounced: egen multipletargetannouncements=count(_n)  
tab multipleacquirorannouncements  
!multiple acquiror announcements 249 firms with 2 ann. (249*2=498 double counts), 22 with 3, 6 with 4, 3 with 5, 2 with 6!  
tab multipletargetannouncements  
!multiple target announcements  54 firms with 2 (54*2=108 multiples), 1 With 3, 3 with 4!  
!make a long list of acquirers and targets with identifier tdummy=O if acquirer and tdummy=l if target!  
keep dealnumber dateannounced  targetname acquirorname acquirorcusip targetcusip acqtickersymbol targettickersymbol  
rename targetname namel  
rename acquirorname nameO  
rename acquirorcusip cusipO  
rename targetcusip cusipl  
rename acqtickersymbol tickerO  
rename  targettickersymbol ticker1  
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reshape long name cusip ticker, i(dealnumber) j(tdummy)  
!Number of obs. 18231  ->  36462, Number of variables 8  ->  6 j variable (2 values)->  tdummy xij variables: nameO name1  ->  
name, cusipO cusip1  ->  cusip, tickerO ticker1  ->  ticker!  
bysort dateannounced cusip tdummy :egen multipleannouncementsbytdummy=count(_n)  
tab multipleannouncementsbytdummy tdummy  
!find multiple announcements on the same day by tdummy, 303 firms with double (249+54), 23 with 3 (22+1), 9 with 4 (6+3),  3 with  
5, 2 with 6!  
bysort dateannounced cusip:egen multipleannouncements=count(_n)  
tab multipleannouncementsbytdummy multipleannouncements  
!318 with double, hence 16 both recieved and made bids, 1 made a bid and received 2 offers!  
!For each bidder at each announcement organize bids into dealnumber1, ... , dealnumber6, and each target the same way! 
gen announcementrank=1  
sort cusip tdummy dateannounced  
bysort cusip tdummy: replace announcementrank=2 if dateannounced[_n]= dateannounced[_n-1]  
bysort cusip tdummy: replace announcementrank=3 if dateannounced[_n]= dateannounced[_n-2]  
bysort cusip tdummy: replace announcementrank=4 if dateannounced[_n]= dateannounced[_n-3]  
bysort cusip tdummy: replace announcementrank=5 if dateannounced[_n]= dateannounced[_n-4]  
bysort cusip tdummy: replace announcementrank=6 if dateannounced[_n]= dateannounced[_n-5]  
egen uniquecusipdateidentifier=group(cusip tdummy dateannounced)  
sum uniquecusipdateidentifier  
!36064 unique cusips, acquirer-target identity and dateannounced out of 36462 observations.  
(606/2+69/3+36/4+15/5+12/6+35724=36064)!  
reshape wide dealnumber, i(uniquecusipdateidentifier) j(announcementrank)  
!Number of obs. 36462  ->  36064; Number of variables 10  ->  14; j variable (6 values)  announcementrank  ->  (dropped);  
variables:dealnumber  ->  dealnumberl dealnumber2 ... dealnumber6!  
drop uniquecusipdateidentifier  
tabmiss dateannounced  
!36064 unique cusips, acquirer-target identity and dateannounced deals!  
258 ' 
gen year= year( dateannounced)  
gen month=month( dateannounced)  
bysort cusip tdummy year month:egen multipleannouncementsinmonth=count(_n)  
tab multipleannouncementsinmonth  
!find multiple announcements on the same month by tdummy, 444 double announcements, 18 triple ann., 3 four ann., and 1 five ann.!  
bysort cusip year month:egen multipleanninmonthnotdummy=count(_n)  
tab multipleanninmonthnotdummy  multipleannouncementsinmonth  
list dateannounced tdummy dealnumber1 name cusip if multipleanninmonthnotdummy= 3    (multipleannouncementsinmonth= 1 I 
multipleannouncementsinmonth= 2)  
!in the same month 53 firms both received and made bids, 2 firms recieved 2 bids and made 1, 1 firm made 2 bids and recieved 1!  
tab multipleanninmonthnotdummy  
!find multiple announcements on the same month, 988 double announcements, 63 triple ann., 12 four ann., and 5 five ann.!  
sort cusip  
tabmiss dateannounced  
!36,064 observations!  
replace month=month-1  
replace year=year-1 if month= O  
replace month=12 if month= O  
sort cusip year month  
save "C: \Basak:\Mergers\March2006\Data\December162005mergecusips.dta", replace  
merge cusip year month using "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\December12COMPUSTAT.dta"  
sort cusip  
tab_merge  
!matched(3) 4386, CRSP  559,050  SDC 31,682. 36,064 obs in SDC, after merge 4386+31682=36,068 -> 4 extra. 563,345 obs in  
CRSP,  559050 +4,386=563,436 -> 91  extra!  
259 ' 
!Clean CRSP extras: these should be due to multiple announcements in same month!  
tab  multipleanninmonthnotdummy  
tab  multipleanninmonthnotdummy _merge  
!182/2=91 merged firms with double announcements and 3/3*2=2 with triple announcements, total93, these are the ones causing the  
problems. However, we have 93 extra from the announcements we should have 91!  
bysort CRSPobsno: egen flag=count(_n)  
tab flag _merge  
!178/2=89 double +3/3*2=2= 91 extra observations, all in merged subsample!  
tab flag multipleanninmonthnotdummy  
!all coincide with multipleannouncements except 4!  
list gvkey cusip name coname dateannounced tdummy  multipleanninmonthnotdummy dealnumberl if flag= 1    
multipleanninmonthnotdummy= 2, nodisplay noobs  
!Double Sprint Corp Announcements matched with only Sprint Pes or Spring Corp when they should have been matched with both!  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\December162005mergecusips.dta", replace  
!going to keep the ones that are matched to Sprint Pes and convert them to Spring Corp manually!  
keep if (dealnumber1= 929419020  & coname=="SPRINT PCS GROUP") I (dealnumber1==875836020& coname=="SPRINT PCS  
GROUP") I (dealnumber1==870850020  & coname=="SPRINT PCS GROUP")I(dealnumber1==925835020  & coname=="SPRINT  
PCS GROUP")  
keep dealnumberl dealnumber2 dealnumber3 dealnumber4 dealnumber5 dealnumber6 tdummy name cusip ticker dateannounced  
multipleannouncementsbytdummy multipleannouncements year month multipleannouncementsinmonth  
multipleanninmonthnotdummy  
sort cusip year month  
merge cusip year month using "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\December12COMPUSTAT.dta"  
sort cusip  
tab_merge  
drop if _merge= 2  
drop if coname= "SPRINT PCS GROUP"  
260 ' 
append using "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\December162005mergecusips.dta"  
list gvkey cusip name coname dateannounced tdummy  multipleanninmonthnotdummy if _merge= 3    name= "Sprint Corp",  
nodisplay noobs  
drop if coname= "SPRINT PCS GROUP"    _merge= 3  
tab_merge  
tab  multipleanninmonthnotdummy _merge  
!182/2=91 merged firms with double announcements and 3/3*2=2 with triple announcements, total93, these are the ones causing the  
problems. We have 93 (89+4 the extras that were manually corrected) extra from the announcements. EXACT!  
!Clean SDC extras, 11 matched with double cusip counts,clean manually, the coname and name should match (name from SDC the  
primary criteria)!  
tab _merge samedatecusipdummy  
list gvkey cusip name coname dateannounced tdummy dealnumber1  if _merge= 3    samedatecusipdummy= 1, nodisplay  
drop if _merge= 3   samedatecusipdummy= 1   (coname= "GENZYME MOLECULAR ONCOLOGY" I coname=="GENZYME  
BIOSURGERY" I coname=="GEORGIA-PACIFIC TIMBER CO"Iconame=="ZDNET")  
!4 companies dropped, SDC EXACT now!  
tab_merge  
!matched(3) 4,382, CRSP  559,050  SDC 31,682. 36,064 obs in SDC, after merge 4382+31682=36,064 ->NO extra. 563,345 obs in  
CRSP,  559050 +4,384=563,432 -> 87 extra, the 4 deleted were originally in the CRSP universe hence the CRSP should be 91 extra 
due to multiple announcements, OK!  
!check multipleanninmonthnotdummy!  
tab _merge multipleanninmonthnotdummy  
!save the matched (3) sample mergingfirmssampleDec19.dta and the unmatched (1) SDCunmatchedfirmsDec.19.dta, and the  
unmatched (2) CRSPunmatchedfirmsDec19.dta!  
drop flag  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\mergingfirmssampleDec19.dta",replace  
keep if _merge= 2  
261 ' 
drop _merge  
tabmiss tdummy name ticker multipleanninmonthnotdummy dateannounced dealnumberl dealnumber2 dealnumber3 dealnumber4 
dealnumber5 dealnumber6  
drop tdummy name ticker multipleanninmonthnotdummy dateannounced dealnumber1 dealnumber2 dealnumber3 dealnumber4 
dealnumber5 dealnumber6  
tabmiss cusip  
!559,050!  
sort cusip year month  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\CRSPunmatchedfirmsDec19 .dta" ,replace  
use "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\mergingfirmssampleDec19.dta",clear  
keep if _merge= 1  
drop _merge  
keep dealnumber1 dealnumber2 dealnumber3 dealnumber4 dealnumber5 dealnumber6 tdummy name cusip ticker dateannounced  
multipleannouncementsbytdummy multipleannouncements year month multipleannouncementsinmonth 
multipleanninmonthnotdummy  
!these SDC cusips could not be matched by going back 1 month so now we'll go back two months!  
replace month=month-1  
replace year=year-1 if month= O  
replace month=12 if month= O  
drop multipleannouncementsinmonth multipleanninmonthnotdummy  
bysort cusip year month:egen multipleanninmonthnotdummy=count(_n)  
tab  multipleanninmonthnotdummy tdummy  
!in the same month 806 (617+189) firms both received and made bids, (806+182=988 ok), 60 (49+11) triple ann. (60+3=63) ok, 12 
four ann., and 5 five ann.!  
tabmiss cusip  
!31,682 cusips!  
sort cusip year month  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\SDCunmatchedfirmsDec 19 .dta" ,replace  
262 ' 
use "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\mergingfirmssampleDec19.dta",clear  
keep if _merge= 3  
drop_merge  
! these were matched to one month prior statements hence generate a variable that indicates the match statement month, -1  for one  
month prior, -2 for two months prior, and -3 for three months prior, 0 for no match!  
gen statementmatchmonth=-1  
tabmiss cusip  
!4382 matched firm-quarters!  
sort cusip year month  
save "C: \Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\mergingfirmssampleDec 19 .dta" ,replace  
!2 month prior match!  
use "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\SDCunmatchedfirmsDec19 .dta", clear  
merge cusip year month using "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\CRSPunmatchedfirmsDec19.dta"  
tab_merge  
!matched(3) 4,010, CRSP 555,130 SDC  27,679. 31,682 obs in SDC, after merge 4010+27,679=31,689 -> 7 extra.  559,050  obs in  
CRSP, 555,130+4,010=559,140 -> 90 extra!  
!Clean CRSP extras: these should be due to multiple announcements in same month!  
tab  multipleanninmonthnotdummy  
tab  multipleanninmonthnotdummy _merge  
!166/2=83 merged firms with double announcements and 6/3*2=4 with triple announcements 4/4*3=3 with four ann., total90, these  
are the ones causing the problems. EXACT for CRSP!  
!Clean SDC extras, 13 matched with double cusip counts,clean manually, the coname and name should match (name from SDC the  
primary criteria)!  
tab _merge samedatecusipdummy  
list gvkey cusip name coname dateannounced tdummy dealnumberl  if _merge= 3    samedatecusipdummy= 1, nodisplay  
263 ' 
drop if _merge= 3    samedatecusipdummy= 1  &  ( coname= "GEORGIA-PACIFIC TIMBER CO"I coname=="DISNEY (WALT)  
INTERNET GROUP" I coname=="GENZYME TISSUE REPAIR" I coname=="GENZYME MOLECULAR ONCOLOGY" I  
coname= "GENZYME BIOSURGERY")  
!7 companies dropped, SDC EXACT now!  
tab_merge  
!matched(3) 4,003, CRSP 555,130 SDC  27,679. 31,682 obs in SDC, after merge 4003+27,679=31,682  ->exact. 559,050  obs in  
CRSP, 555,130+4,003=559,133  ->the 7 deleted were originally in the CRSP universe hence the CRSP should be 90 (83+7) extra due  
to multiple announcements, EXACT!  
!append the matched (3) sample mergingfirmssampleDec19.dta and the unmatched (1) SDCunmatchedfirmsDec19.dta, and the 
unmatched (2) CRSPunmatchedfirmsDec19.dta!  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\CRSPunmatchedfirmsDec19.dta",replace  
keep if _merge= 1  
drop_merge  
keep dealnumber1 dealnumber2 dealnumber3 dealnumber4 dealnumber5 dealnumber6 tdummy name cusip ticker dateannounced  
multipleannouncementsbytdummy multipleannouncements year month multipleannouncementsinmonth  
multipleanninmonthnotdummy  
!these SDC cusips could not be matched by going back 2 month so now we'll go back 3 months!  
replace month=month-1  
replace year=year-1 if month= O  
replace month=12 if month= O  
drop multipleannouncementsinmonth multipleanninmonthnotdummy  
bysort cusip year month:egen multipleanninmonthnotdummy=count(_n)  
tab  multipleanninmonthnotdummy tdummy  
!in the same month 640 (501+139) firms both received and made bids, (640+166+182=988 ok), 54 (45+9) triple ann. (54+6+3=63) ok, 
8 four ann. (8+4=12), and 5 five ann.!  
tabmiss cusip  
! 27,679  cusips !.  
264 ' 
sort cusip year month  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\SDCunmatchedfirmsDec 19 .dta" ,replace  
use "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\CRSPunmatchedfirmsDec19.dta",clear  
keep if _merge= 3  
drop_merge  
! these were matched to two month prior statements hence generate a variable that indicates the match statement month, -1  for one  
month prior, -2 for two months prior, and -3 for three months prior, 0 for no match!  
gen statementmatchmonth=-2  
tabmiss cusip  
!4003 matched firm-quarters!  
sort cusip year month  
append using "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\mergingfirmssampleDec19 .dta"  
tabmiss cusip  
!8385 cusips!  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\mergingfirmssampleDec19.dta", replace  
use "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\CRSPunmatchedfirmsDec19.dta" ,clear  
keep if _merge= 2  
drop_merge  
tabmiss dealnumber1 dealnumber2 dealnumber3 dealnumber4 dealnumber5 dealnumber6 tdummy name ticker dateannounced  
multipleannouncementsbytdummy multipleannouncements multipleanninmonthnotdummy multipleannouncementsinmonth  
drop dealnumber1 dealnumber2 dealnumber3 dealnum.ber4 dealnumber5 dealnumber6 tdummy name ticker dateannounced  
multipleannouncementsbytdummy multipleannouncements multipleanninmonthnotdummy multipleannouncementsinmonth  
tabmiss cusip  
!555,130 obs!  
sort cusip year month  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\CRSPunmatchedfirmsDec 19 .dta" ,replace  
!3 month prior match!  
265 ' 
merge cusip year month using "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\SDCunmatchedfirmsDec19.dta" 
tab_merge  
!matched(3) 3,870, CRSP  551,331  SDC  23,813. 27,679 obs in SDC, after merge 3,870+23,813=27,683 -> 4 extra. 551,130 obs in 
CRSP,  551,331 +3,870= 555,201-> 71 extra!  
!Clean CRSP extras: these should be due to multiple announcements in same month! 
tab  multipleanninmonthnotdummy  
tab  multipleanninmonthnotdummy _merge  
!12212=61 merged firms with double announcements and 15/3*2=10 with triple announcements, total 71, these are the ones causing 
the problems. EXACT!  
!Clean SDC extras, 6 matched with double cusip counts,clean manually, the coname and name should match (name from SDC the 
primary criteria)!  
tab _merge samedatecusipdummy  
list gvkey cusip name coname dateannounced tdummy dealnumber1 smbl ticker if _merge= 3    samedatecusipdummy= 1, nodisplay  
drop if _merge= 3    samedatecusipdummy= l  &  ( coname= "GENZYME SURGICAL PRODUCTS" I coname=="GENZYME  
MOLECULAR ONCOLOGY"Iconame=="GENZYME TISSUE REPAIR"Iconame=="TELE-COMM TCI VENTRS  -SERA") 
!4 companies dropped, SDC EXACT now!  
tab_merge  
!matched(3)  3,866, CRSP  551,331  SDC  23,813.27,679 obs in SDC, after merge 3,866+23,813=27,683-> Exact. 551,130 obs in 
CRSP,  551,331 +3,866= 555,197+ 4 that were deleted=555,201 -> 71 extra EXACT!  
!append the matched (3) sample mergingfirmssampleDec19.dta and the unmatched (1) SDCunmatchedfirmsDec19.dta, and the  
unmatched (2) CRSPunmatchedfirmsDec19.dta!  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\CRSPunmatchedfirmsDec19.dta",replace  
keep if _merge= 2  
drop_merge  
keep dealnumber1 dealnumber2 dealnumber3 dealnumber4 dealnumber5 dealnumber6 cusip year month tdummy name ticker  
dateannounced multipleannouncementsbytdummy multipleannouncements multipleanninmonthnotdummy  
266 ' 
drop multipleanninmonthnotdummy  
bysort cusip year month:egen multipleanninmonthnotdummy=count(_n)  
tab  multipleanninmonthnotdummy tdummy  
!in the same month 528 (417+101) firms both received and made bids, (528+122+166+182=988 ok), 39 (33+6) triple ann.  
(39+ 15+6+3=63) ok, 8 four ann. (8+4=12), and 5 five ann.!  
tabmiss cusip  
!23,813 cusips!  
sort cusip year month  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\SDCunmatchedfirmsDec 19 .dta" ,replace  
use "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\CRSPunmatchedfirmsDec 19 .dta" ,clear  
keep if _merge= 3  
drop_merge  
! these were matched to three month prior statements hence generate a variable that indicates the match statement month, -1  for one  
month prior, -2 for two months prior, and -3 for three months prior, 0 for no match!  
gen statementmatchmonth=-3  
tabmiss cusip  
!3866 matched firm-quarters!  
sort cusip year month  
append using "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\mergingfirmssampleDec19 .dta"  
tabmiss cusip  
!12,251  cusips!  
save "C: \Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data \mergingfirmssampleDec 19 .dta", replace  
!make sure there is only one bidder and target in each quarter!  
drop year month  
gen year=year(fqenddt)  
gen month=month(fqenddt)  
gen quarter=quarter(fqenddt)  
267 ' 
egen yearquarterind=group(year quarter)  
tab yearquarterind  
tab year month if yearquarterind=  1  
tab year month if yearquarterind= 110  
! 110 quarters, starting 9/1977, ending 1112004!  
bysort yearquarterind cusip tdummy: egen multipleanninquarterbytdummy=count(_n)  
tab multipleanninquarterbytdummy tdummy  
bysort yearquarterind cusip: egen multipleannincusipquarter=count(_n)  
!single: 0->7967 and 1->3831 (total:  11,798) doubles: 0->320, 1->108 (total428); triples: 0->18, 1->3 (total21) and; fours: 0->4, 1- 
>0 (total4)!  
tab multipleannincusipquarter tdummy  
drop multipleannouncementsinmonth multipleanninmonthnotdummy  
!For each bidder in each month organize bids into dealnumber1, ... , dealnumber6, and each target the same way!  
egen uniquecusipquartertdummyid=group(yearquarterind cusip tdummy)  
sum uniquecusipquartertdummyid  
!12,020 unique cusip tdummy identifiers= 11,798+428/2+2113+4/4=12,020!  
gen announcementmonthrank=1  
sort cusip tdummy dateannounced  
bysort cusip tdummy: replace announcementmonthrank=2 if dateannounced[_n]>dateannounced[_n-1]    
yearquarterind[_n]= yearquarterind[_n-1]  
bysort cusip tdummy: replace announcementmonthrank=3 if dateannounced[_n]>dateannounced[_n-2]    
yearquarterind[_n ]==yearquarterind[_n-2]  
bysort cusip tdummy: replace announcementmonthrank=4 if dateannounced[_n]>dateannounced[_n-3]    
yearquarterind[_n ]==yearquarterind[_n-3]  
reshape wide dealnumber1 dealnumber2 dealnumber3 dealnumber4 dealnumber5 dealnumber6 dateannounced  
multipleannouncementsbytdummy multipleannouncements, i(uniquecusipquartertdummyid) j(announcementmonthrank)  
268 ' 
!4 observations pose problem, since they change fyr they are matched to different data but end up in the same yearquarterind, will '
manually change the yearquarterind in these! ' 
log off  · ' 
reshape error  
l9gon  
drop uniquecusipquartertdummyid announcementmonthrank  
save "C: \Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data \mergingfirmssampleDec 19 .dta", replace  
list yearquarterind fyr fqenddt dateannounced cusip dealnumberl if _n= 11374  1-n==11375  1-n= 964l_n= 965  
list yearquarterind fyr fqenddt dateannounced cusip dealnumberl data44 if cusip= "925653" I cusip= "422203", nodisplay  
!2 of the 4 problematic announcements don't have assets data, hence we'll drop these!  
drop if (cusip= "422203"    yearquarterind= 24    fyr= 4) I (cusip= "925653"    yearquarterind= l01    fyr= 7)  
egen uniquecusipquartertdummyid=group(yearquarterind cusip tdummy)  
sum uniquecusipquartertdummyid  
!12,020 unique cusip tdummy identifiers= 11,798+428/2+2113+4/4=12,020!  
gen announcementmonthrank=1  
sort cusip tdummy dateannounced  
bysort cusip tdummy: replace announcementmonthrank=2 if dateannounced[_n]>dateannounced[_n-1]    
yearquarterind[_n ]==yearquarterind[_n-1]  
bysort cusip tdummy: replace announcementmonthrank=3 if dateannounced[_n]>dateannounced[_n-2]    
yearquarterind[_n]= yearquarterind[_n-2]  
bysort cusip tdummy: replace announcementmonthrank=4 if dateannounced[_n]>dateannounced[_n-3]    
yearquarterind[_n]= yearquarterind[_n-3]  
reshape wide dealnumber1 dealnumber2 dealnumber3 dealnumber4 dealnumber5 dealnumber6 dateannounced  
multipleannouncementsbytdummy multipleannouncements, i(uniquecusipquartertdummyid) j(announcementmonthrank)  
!dealnumberll dealnumber21 dealnumber31 dealnumber41 dealnumber51 dealnumber61: first announcementdate in month and the 
different number of announcements at that particular date!  
269 ' 
tabmiss dealnumber11 dealnumber21 dealnumber31 dealnumber41 dealnumber51 dealnumber61 dealnumber12 dealnumber22  
dealnumber32 dealnumber42 dealnumber52 dealnumber62 dealnumber13 dealnumber23 dealnumber33 dealnumber43 dealnumber53  
dealnumber63 dealnumber14 dealnumber24 dealnumber34 dealnumber44 dealnumber54 dealnumber64  
tabmiss multipleannouncementsbytdummy1 multipleannouncementsbytdummy2 multipleannouncementsbytdummy3  
multipleannouncementsbytdummy4  
replace  multipleannouncementsbytdummy1=0 if multipleannouncementsbytdummy1= .  
replace  multipleannouncementsbytdummy2=0 if multipleannouncementsbytdummy2= .  
replace  multipleannouncementsbytdummy3=0 if multipleannouncementsbytdummy3= .  
replace  multipleannouncementsbytdummy4=0 if multipleannouncementsbytdummy4= .  
tabmiss cusip  
!12,020 obs!  
save "C: \Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\mergingfirmssampleDec 19 .dta", replace  
use "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\CRSPunmatchedfirmsDec 19 .dta" ,clear  
keep if _merge= 1  
drop_merge  
tabmiss dealnumberl dealnumber2 dealnumber3 dealnumber4 dealnumber5 dealnumber6 tdummy name ticker dateannounced  
multipleannouncementsbytdummy multipleannouncements multipleanninmonthnotdummy  
drop dealnumberl dealnumber2 dealnumber3 dealnumber4 dealnumber5 dealnumber6 tdummy name ticker dateannounced  
multipleannouncementsbytdummy multipleannouncements multipleanninmonthnotdummy  
tabmiss cusip  
!551,331!  
gen tdummy=2  
sort cusip year month  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\CRSPunmatchedfirmsDec 19 .dta" ,replace  
append using "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\mergingfirmssampleDec 19 .dta"  
tabmiss cusip  
!563,351=551,331+12,020 cusips!  
270 ' 
sort cusip year month  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\December20COMPUST ATCRSPSDCmerged.dta", replace  
desc  datal data2 data6 data8 datal4 datal8 data20 data21 data22 data24  data30 data31 data36 data37 data38 data44 data46 data51  
data54 data60 data61 data69 data90 datalOl  
destring datal, gen(adminexp) force  
destring data2, gen(netsales) force  
destring data6, gen(taxes) force  
destring data8, gen(incomebefext) force  
destring data21, gen(opincomebefdepr) force  
destring data22, gen(interestexp) force  
destring data24, gen(preferreddiv) force  
destring data30, gen(cogs) force  
destring data31, gen(nonopincome) force  
destring data36, gen( cash) force  
destring data37, gen(receivables) force  
destring data38, gen(inventories) force  
destring data46, gen(accpayable) force  
destring data51, gen(longtermdebt) force  
destring data54, gen(liabilities) force  
destring data60, gen(stockholdersequity) force  
destring data61, gen(sharesoutstanding) force  
destring data69, gen(netincome) force  
destring data90, gen(capex) force  
destring datal 01, gen( chngNWC) force  
rename datal4 priceclose  
rename datal8 sharestraded  
rename data20 commondividends  
271 ' 
rename  data44 assets  
drop datalOl data90 data69 data61 data60 data54 data51 data46 data38 data37 data36 data31 data30 data24 data22 data21 data8 data6  
data2 datal  
drop yearquarterind year month quarter  
gen year=year(fqenddt)  
gen quarter=quarter(fqenddt)  
egen yearquarterind=group(year quarter)  
tab yearquarterind  
tab year quarter if yearquarterind= ll yearquarterind==123  
! 123 quarters from 1974/3 to 2005/1!  
drop year quarter  
bysort cusip yearquarterind: egen numberofcusipsperquarter=count(_n)  
tab numberofcusipsperquarter tdummy  
!1426 double counts (41  bidders, 31  targets and 1354 nonmerging), 33 triple counts (all nonmerging), 20 four counts(all nonmerging)  
55 counts (nonmerging)!  
bysort cusip yearquarterind tdummy: egen numberofcusipsperquartertdummy=count(_n)  
tab numberofcusipsperquartertdummy tdummy  
! 1332 double counts (all nonmerging),33 triple counts (all nonmerging), 20 four counts( all nonmerging) 5 5 counts (nonmerging)!  
list gvkey cusip fyr fqenddt netsales coname if numberofcusipsperquartertdummy= 4, nodisplay  
log off  
list gvkey cusip fyr fqenddt netsales coname if numberofcusipsperquartertdummy= 2, nodisplay  
logon  
!multiples mainly due to differing gvkeys for same cusip, different subdivisions of the same company!  
bysort gvkey yearquarterind: egen numberofgvkeysperquarter=count(_n)  
tab numberofgvkeysperquarter tdummy  
!1290 double counts, 42 bidders, 31  targets and 1217 nonmerging!  
272 ' 
bysort gvkey yearquarterind tdummy: egen numberofgvkeysperquartertdummy=count(_n)  
tab numberofgvkeysperquartertdummy tdummy  
! 1194 double counts all nonmerging!  
log off  
list gvkey cusip fyr fqenddt netsales  capex coname smbl if numberofgvkeysperquartertdummy= 2, nodisplay  
logon  
!everything including data but the names seem to be same. I need unique gvkeys so I am going to randomly drop one the 
doublecounts!  
bysort gvkey yearquarterind tdummy: egen flag=min(_n)  
drop if _n-=flag  
!597 (1194/2) of the double counts deleted. Unique gvkey, tdummy, quarters!  
drop numberofcusipsperquartertdummy numberofcusipsperquarter numberofgvkeysperquartertdummy numberofgvkeysperquarter flag 
tabtdummy  
!8134 bidders (more than one announcement possible), 3886 targets (more than one announcement possible), 550,734 no merger firm 
quarters!  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\December20COMPUSTATCRSPSDCmerged.dta", replace  
log off  
! File 2!  
log using "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\0utput\Aprill42006_1 ", replace  
use "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\December20COMPUST ATCRSPSDCmerged.dta", clear  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\April14COMPUSTATCRSPSDCmerged.dta", replace  
!I need unique gvkey yearquarterind. However I have firms making bids and recieving bids with same gvkey in the same quarter!  
bysort yearquarterind gvkey: egen multipleanngvkeyinquarter=count(_n)  
273 ' 
tab multipleanngvkeyinquarter tdummy  
!42 bidders and 31 targets, 23 nonmerging!  
list gvkey cusip fyr yearquarterind netsales coname if multipleanngvkeyinquarter= 2    tdummy= 2, nodisplay  
!Drop the firms which make and recieve bids in the same quarter!  
drop if multipleanngvkeyinquarter= 2  
tabtdummy  
!8092 bidders, 3855 targets, 550,711 no merger firm quarters!  
!lets look at years!  
tab yearquarterind tdummy if yearquarterind<20 I yearquarterind>120  
gen year=year(fqenddt)  
gen quarter=quarter(fqenddt)  
tab year quarter if yearquarterind>122  
!1  (1974/3) to 124 (2005/2) no merging-firms in quarters 1-12 and 123-124!  
drop if yearquarterind<13 I yearquarterind> 122  
tabtdummy  
!8092 bidders, 3855 targets, 515,209 nonmerging firm quarters!  
bysort gvkey tdummy: egen repeatgvkeytdummy=count(_n)  
tab repeatgvkeytdummy tdummy  
egen countflag=count(_n) if repeatgvkeytdummy> 1  
tab countflag tdummy  
egen uniquegvkeyaidentifier=group(gvkey) if tdummy= O  
egen uniquegvkeytidentifier=group(gvkey) if tdummy= 1  
egen uniquegvkeynidentifier=group(gvkey) if tdummy= 2  
sum uniquegvkeyaidentifier uniquegvkeytidentifier uniquegvkeynidentifier  
drop uniquegvkeynidentifier uniquegvkeytidentifier uniquegvkeyaidentifier repeatgvkeytdummy countflag  
tab multipleannincusipquarter  
tab multipleanninquarterbytdummy  
274 ' 
!same since we dropped firms that make and recieve bids in the same quarter!  
tab multipleanninquarterbytdummy tdummy  
!first generate variables that rely on merger history!  
!Generate bids made, bids recieved!  
tsset gvkey yearquarterind  
for num 117: gen multipleannincusipquarterX=LX.multipleannincusipquarter  
for num 117: replace multipleannincusipquarterX=O if multipleannincusipquarterX= .  
replace multipleannincusipquarter=O if multipleannincusipquarter= .  
gen  
previousmergers=(multipleannincusipquarter+multipleannincusipquarter1 +multipleannincusipquarter2+multipleannincusipquarter3+  
multipleannincusipquarter4+multipleannincusipquarter5+multipleannincusipquarter6+multipleannincusipquarter7)  
drop multipleannincusipquarter1-multipleannincusipquarter7  
tabmiss previousmergers  
!2 digit sic industry classification!  
gen sic2digit=int( dnum/1 00)  
replace sic2digit=sic2digit*10 if sic2digit<l0  
!sic 10-99, nothing between 60-69!  
bysort sic2digit yearquarterind: egen firmsinindustryq=count(_n)  
replace sic2digit=int(sic2digitll0)* 10 if firmsinindustryq<5  
drop firmsinindustryq  
bysort sic2digit yearquarterind: egen firmsinindustryq=count(_n)  
tab firmsinindustryq if firmsinindustryq <10  
!all industry-quarters have more than 4 firms!  
drop firmsinindustryq  
sort sic2digit yearquarterind  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\April14COMPUSTATCRSPSDCmerged.dta", replace  
!merger intensity!  
275 ' 
gen acquirordummy=O  
replace acquirordummy=1 if tdummy= O  
gen targetdummy=O  
replace targetdummy=1 if tdummy= 1  
gen mergerdummy=O  
replace mergerdummy=1 if acquirordummy= 11 targetdummy==1  
bysort sic2digit yearquarterind: egen mergerfirmsinindustry=sum(mergerdummy)  
bysort yearquarterind sic2digit: egen firmsinindustry=count(_n)  
tab firmsinindustry  
tabmiss firmsinindustry  
gen mergerintensity=mergerfirmsinindustry/firmsinindustry  
tabmiss mergerintensity  
keep mergerintensity yearquarterind sic2digit  
egen unique=group(sic2digit yearquarterind)  
sum unique  
!6039 industries in quarters!  
drop unique  
bysort sic2digit yearquarterind: egen firmsinindustry=count(_n)  
tab firmsinindustry  
!max. of 1042 firms in an industry in a quarter!  
bysort sic2digit yearquarterind: egen flag=min(_n)  
drop if _n-=flag  
tabmiss sic2digit  
!6039 obs!  
drop flag  
tsset sic2digit yearquarterind  
for num 1/7: gen  mergerintensityX=LX.mergerintensity  
tabmiss mergerintensity 1-mergerintensity7  
276 ' 
gen mergerintensityaltl= mergerintensity+ mergerintensity1 + mergerintensity2+ mergerintensity3+ mergerintensity4+  
mergerintensity5+ mergerintensity6+ mergerintensity7  
!436 missing!  
for num 1/7: replace mergerintensityX=O if mergerintensityX= .  
gen mergerintensityalt2=mergerintensity+ mergerintensity1 + mergerintensity2+ mergerintensity3+ mergerintensity4+  
mergerintensity5+ mergerintensity6+ mergerintensity7  
!nonemissing!  
drop mergerintensity mergerintensity 1-mergerintensity7  
sort sic2digit yearquarterind  
merge sic2digit yearquarterind using "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\April14COMPUSTATCRSPSDCmerged.dta" 
tab_merge  
drop_merge  
tabstat mergerintensityaltl mergerintensityalt2, by(tdummy) stats(mean sd min p1  p5 plO p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 p99 max n)  
columns( statistics) longs tub  
!generate variables that rely on financial data!  
tsset gvkey yearquarterind  
!panel variable: gvkey, 1000 to 265008 time variable:  yearquarterind, 1 to 123, but with gaps  
!generate 2 year sales growth!  
for num 1/8: gen netsalesX=LX.netsales  
gen salesgrowth2=[ (netsales-netsales8)/netsales8]  
for num 7/1: replace salesgrowth2=[ (netsales-netsalesX)/netsalesX] *(8/X) if salesgrowth2= .  
for num 8/2: replace salesgrowth2=[ (netsales 1-netsalesX)/netsalesX] *(8/(X-1 )) if salesgrowth2= .  
for num 8/3: replace salesgrowth2=[(netsales2-netsalesX)/netsalesX]*(8/(X-2)) if salesgrowth2= .  
for num 8/4: replace salesgrowth2=[(netsales3-netsalesX)/netsalesX]*(8/(X-3)) if salesgrowth2= .  
for num 8/5: replace salesgrowth2=[(netsales4-netsalesX)/netsalesX]*(8/(X-4)) if salesgrowth2= .  
for num 8/6: replace salesgrowth2=[(netsales5-netsalesX)/netsalesX]*(8/(X-5)) if salesgrowth2= .  
for num 8/7: replace salesgrowth2=[(netsales6-netsalesX)/netsalesX]*(8/(X-6)) if salesgrowth2= .  
277 ' 
for num 8/8: replace salesgrowth2=[(netsales7-netsalesX)/netsalesX]*(8/(X-7)) if salesgrowth2= .  
drop netsalesl-netsales8  
tabmiss salesgrowth2  
!generate pricerunup!  
tsset gvkey yearquarterind  
for num 118: gen pricecloseX=LX.priceclose  
gen pricerunup2=[(priceclose-priceclose8)/priceclose8]  
for num 711:  replace pricerunup2=[(priceclose-pricecloseX)/pricecloseX]*(8/X) if pricerunup2= .  
for num 8/2: replace pricerunup2=[ {priceclosel-pricecloseX)/pricecloseX] *(8/(X-1)) if pricerunup2= .  
for num 8/3: replace pricerunup2=[(priceclose2-pricecloseX)/pricecloseX]*(8/(X-2)) if pricerunup2= .  
for num 8/4: replace pricerunup2=[(priceclose3-pricecloseX)/pricecloseX]*(8/(X-3)) ifpricerunup2==.  
for num 8/5: replace pricerunup2=[(priceclose4-pricecloseX)/pricecloseX]*(8/(X-4)) if pricerunup2= .  
for num 8/6: replace pricerunup2=[(priceclose5-pricecloseX)/pricecloseX]*(8/(X-5)) if pricerunup2= .  
for num 817:  replace pricerunup2=[(priceclose6-pricecloseX)/pricecloseX]*(8/(X-6)) if pricerunup2= .  
for num 8/8: replace pricerunup2=[(priceclose7-pricecloseX)/pricecloseX]*(8/(X-7)) if pricerunup2==.  
drop priceclosel-priceclose8  
tabmiss pricerunup2  
!gen industry sales shock variable!  
bysort yearquarterind: egen totalsalesgrowth2=median(salesgrowth2)  
bysort sic2digit yearquarterind: egen indsalesgrowth2=median(salesgrowth2)  
gen salesshock=abs(indsalesgrowth2-totalsalesgrowth2)  
tabmiss salesshock  
drop indsalesgrowth2 totalsalesgrowth2  
gen salesshock2=salesshock*salesshock  
tabmiss salesshock  
!gen profitability, cash ratio, log assets!  
gen logassets=log(assets)  
tabmiss logassets  
278 ' 
tsset gvkey yearquarterind  
for num 118:  gen assetsX=LX.assets  
gen changeinassets=( assets-assets8)/assets8  
for num 7/1: replace changeinassets=((assets-assetsX)/assetsX)*(8/X) if changeinassets= .  
for num 8/2: replace changeinassets=[(assetsl-assetsX)/assetsX]*(8/(X-1)) if changeinassets= .  
for num 8/3: replace changeinassets=[(assets2-assetsX)/assetsX]*(8/(X-2)) if changeinassets= .  
for num 8/4: replace changeinassets=[(assets3-assetsX)/assetsX]*(8/(X-3)) if changeinassets= .  
for num 8/5: replace changeinassets=[(assets4-assetsX)/assetsX]*(8/(X-4)) if changeinassets= .  
for num 8/6: replace changeinassets=[(assets5-assetsX)/assetsX]*(8/(X-5)) if changeinassets= .  
for num 8/7: replace changeinassets=[(assets6-assetsX)/assetsX]*(8/(X-6)) if changeinassets= .  
for num 8/8: replace changeinassets=[ (assets? -assetsX)/assetsX]*(8/(X-7)) if changeinassets= .  
drop assets 1-assets8  
gen cashratio=cash!assets  
gen ROA=incomebefext/assets  
!gen growth-capitalaccess mismatch variables!  
bysort sic2digit yearquarterind: egen indsalesgrowth2=median(salesgrowth2)  
bysort sic2digit yearquarterind: egen indlongtermdebt=median(longtermdebt/assets)  
gen resourcecapitalmismatch=O  
replace resourcecapitalmismatch=l if (longtermdebt/assets>indlongtermdebt    salesgrowth2<indsalesgrowth2) I  
(longtermdebt/assets<indlongtermdebt    salesgrowth2>indsalesgrowth2)  
drop indsalesgrowth2 indlongtermdebt  
tabmiss resourcecapitalmismatch ROA cashratio changeinassets  
tabmiss resourcecapitalmismatch  
!no missings!  
!fourfirmconcentration!  
bysort sic2digit yearquarterind: egen totalindustrysales=sum(netsales)  
bysort sic2digit yearquarterind: egen maxl=max(netsales) if netsales-=.  
bysort sic2digit yearquarterind: egen max2=max(netsales) if netsales-=.    netsales-=maxl  
279 ' 
bysort sic2digit yearquarterind: egen max3=max(netsales) if netsales-=.  & netsales-=max1  & netsales-=maxZ  
bysort sic2digit yearquarterind: egen max4=max(netsales) if netsales-=.  & netsales-=max1  & netsales-=max2  & netsales-=max3  
gen fourfinnconcentration=(max 1 +max2+max3+max4 )/totalindustrysales if totalindustrysales-=.  & max 1-=.   max2-=.  & max3-=.  
max4-=.  ~ 
replace  fourfinnconcentration=(max1+max2+max3)/totalindustrysales if totalindustrysales-=.  & max1-=.   max2-=:=.  ~ max3-=:    
fourfinnconcentration= .  ·  ·  
replace  fourfinnconcentration=(max1+max2)/totalindustrysales iftotalindustrysales-=.  & max1-=.  & max2-=.    
fourfinnconcentration= .  
replace  fourfinnconcentration=(max 1 )/totalindustrysales if totalindustrysales-=.  & max 1-=.  & fourfinnconcentration==.  
drop max1-max4 totalindustrysales  
!high information asymmetry variable!  
gen MB=priceclose*sharesoutstanding/stockholdersequity  
gen shareturnover=sharestraded/sharesoutstanding  
bysort sic2digit yearquarterind: egen indMB=median(MB)  
bysort sic2digit yearquarterind: egen indshareturnover=median(shareturnover)  
gen hMBlshareturnover=O  
replace hMBlshareturnover=1 if MB>indMB  & shareturnover<indshareturnover  
drop indMB indshareturnover  
tab hMBlshareturnover  
tabmiss hMBlshareturnover shareturnover fourfinnconcentration  
tab tdummy  
!8092 bidders, 3855 targets, 515,209 nonmerging finn quarters!  
!lets look at years!  
drop yearquarterind  
egen yearquarterind=group(year quarter)  
tab year quarter if yearquarterind= 1 I yearquarterind= 110  •.·  
!1  (1977/3) to llO (2004/4)!  
280 ' 
tab yearquarterind tdummy if yearquarterind<20 I yearquarterind> 105  
!until yearquarterind=14, less than bidders and targets in each quarter and in yearquarterind==llO, only 9 bidders!  
!First 2 years needed for previous mergers calculations hence disregard them. Pool quarters 9-13 into one pool. Pool the 4th qu~er of  
2004 into 3rd quarter since there are only 9 bidders and no targets!  
egen yearquarterindadj=group(year quarter) if yearquarterind>8  
tab year quarter if yearquarterindadj= l I yearquarterindadj= l02  
!1979/3 to 2004/4, group first 5 quarters and last two quarters together due to data problems!  
replace yearquarterindadj=5 if yearquarterindadj= llyearquarterindadj= 2lyearquarterindadj= 3lyearquarterindadj= 4  
replace yearquarterindadj=lOl if yearquarterindadj= l02  
tab yearquarterindadj tdummy if yearquarterindadj<20 I yearquarterindadj> 100  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\April14COMPUSTATCRSPSDCmerged.dta", replace  
tabmiss ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2  pricerunup shareturnover hMBlshareturnover mergerintensityaltl  
mergerintensityalt2  cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergers  ..  
tab tdummy if ROA-=.    resourcecapitalmismatch-=.    salesshock-=.    salesshock2-=.    pricerunup-=.    shareturnover-=.    
hMBlsharetumover-=.    mergerintensityaltl-=.    cashratio-=.    logassets-=.    changeinassets-=.    fourfirmconcentratlon-=.    
previousmergers-=.  
tab tdummy if ROA-=.    resourcecapitalmismatch-=.    salesshock-=.    salesshock2-=.    pricerunup-=.    shareturnover-=.    
hMBlsharetumover-=.    mergerintensityalt2-=.    cashratio-=.    logassets-=.    changeinassets-=.    fourfirmconcentration-=.    
previousmergers-=.  
bysort gvkey fiscalyear: egen flag=count(_n)  
tab flag  
!upto 4 quarters in a gvkey in a fiscal year!  
drop flag  
tabmiss gvkey  
sort gvkey year  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\Aprill4COMPUSTATCRSPSDCmerged.dta", replace  
281 ' 
!Bidder and target candidacy models, analysis !  
cd C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Tables  
set more off  
!acquirers!  
quietly probit acquirordummy ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2  salesgrowth2 pricerunup sharetumover  
hMBlsharetumover mergerintensityaltl  cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergers if  
yearquarterindadj= 5  
quietly predict pa if e(sample)  
quietly predict xbA if e(sample ), xb  
quietly outreg  using "April14stageldynamicA.txt", replace bracket ctitle("4") bdec(4) noaster addstat("Pseudo R squared", e(r2_p), 
"X2", e(chi2), "df", e(df_m)) tdec(2)  
quietly mfx compute, at(median resourcecapitalmismatch=O hMBlsharetumover=O) nose  
quietly matrix bAS=e(Xmfx_dydx)'  
quietly matrix medianA5=e(Xmfx_X)'  
for XY in num 6/101: quietly  probit acquirordummy ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2  salesgrowth2 pricerunup  
sharetumover hMBlsharetum<;>ver mergerintensityaltl  cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergers if  
yearquarterindadj= XY\quietly predict patemp if e(sample)\quietly replace pa=patemp  if yearquarterindadj==XY    pa= ;\drop  
patemp\quietly predict xbAtemp if e(sample), xb\quietly replace xbA=xbAtemp  if yearquarterindadj= XY    xbA= .\drop  
xbAtemp\quietly outreg  using "April14stageldynamicA.txt", append bracket ctitle("XY") bdec(4) noaster addstat("Pseudo R  
squared", e(r2_p), "X2", e(chi2), "df", e(df_m)) tdec(2)\quietly mfx compute, at(median resourcecapitalmismatch=O  
hMBlsharetumover=O) nose\quietly matrix bAXY=e(Xmfx_dydx)'\quietly matrix medianAXY=e(Xmfx_X)'  
!target!  
quietly probit targetdummy ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2  salesgrowth2 pricerunup sharetumover  
hMBlsharetumover mergerintensityaltl  cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergers if  
yearquarterindadj= 5  
282 ' 
quietly predict pt if e(sample)  
quietly predict xbT if e(sample), xb  
quietly outreg  using "April14stageldynamicT.txt", replace bracket ctitle("4") bdec(4) noaster addstat("Pseudo R squared", e(r2_p), 
"X2", e(chi2), "df", e(df_m)) tdec(2)  
quietly mfx compute, at(median resourcecapitalmismatch=O hMBlsharetumover=O) nose  
quietly matrix bT5=e(Xmfx_dydx)'  
quietly matrix medianT5=e(Xmfx_X)'  
for XY in num 6/101: quietly  probit targetdummy ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2  salesgrowth2 pricerunup  
sharetumover hMBlsharetumover mergerintensityaltl  cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergers if  
yearquarterindadj= XY\quietly predict pttemp if e(sample)\quietly replace pt=pttemp  if yearquarterindadj= XY    pt= .\drop  
pttemp\quietly predict xbTtemp if e(sample), xb\quietly replace xbT=xbTtemp  if yearquarterindadj= XY    xbT= .\drop  
xbTtemp\quietly outreg  using "April14stage1dynamicT.txt", append bracket ctitle("XY") bdec(4) noaster addstat("Pseudo R  
squared", e(r2_p), "X2", e(chi2), "df", e(df_m)) tdec(2)\quietly mfx compute, at(median resourcecapitalmismatch=O  
hMBlsharetumover=O) nose\quietly matrix bTXY=e(Xmfx_dydx)'\quietly matrix medianTXY=e(Xmfx_X)'  
!Tdummy Data!  
tabtdummy  
!8092 bidders, 3855 targets, 515209 nonmerging!  
egen flagO=group(gvkey) if tdummy= O  
egen flagl=group(gvkey) if tdummy= 1  
egen flag2=group(gvkey) if tdummy= 2  
sum flagO flag1  flag2  
!3896 unique bidders, 3442 targets,  14105 nonmerging!  
drop flagO flag1  flag2  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\April14COMPUSTATCRSPSDCmerged.dta", replace  
283 ' 
drop flag  
gen flag=yearquarterindadj-4  
!Alt. 2!  
!acquiror!  
quietly probit acquirordummy ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2  salesgrowth2 pricerunup shareturnover  
hMBlshareturnover mergerintensityalt2  cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergers if  
yearquarterindadj= 5  
quietly predict paalt if e(sample)  
quietly predict xbAalt if e(sample), xb  
quietly outreg  using "Apri114stageldynamicAalt2.txt", replace bracket ctitle("4") bdec(4) noaster addstat("Pseudo R squared", 
e(r2_p), "X2", e(chi2), "df", e(df_m)) tdec(2)  
quietly mfx compute, at(median resourcecapitalmismatch=O hMBlsharetumover=O) nose 
quietly matrix bAalt5=e(Xmfx_dydx)'  
quietly matrix medianAalt25=e(Xmfx_X)'  
for XY in num 6/101: quietly  probit acquirordummy ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2  salesgrowth2 pricerunup  
shareturnover hMBlshareturnover mergerintensityalt2  cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfinilconcentration previousmergers if  
yearquarterindadj= XY\quietly predict paalttemp if e(sample )\quietly replace paalt=paalttemp  if yearquarterindadj= XY    
paalt= .\drop paalttemp\quietly predict xbAalttemp if e(sample), xb\quietly replace xbAalt=xbAalttemp  if yearquarterindadj= XY    
xbAalt= .\drop xbAalttemp\quietly outreg  using "Apri114stageldynamicAalt2.txt", append bracket ctitle("XY") bdec(4) noaster  
addstat("Pseudo R squared", e(r2_p), "X2", e(chi2), "df", e(df_m)) tdec(2)\quietly mfx compute, at(median  
resourcecapitalmismatch=O hMBlsharetumover=O) nose\quietly matrix bAaltXY=e(Xmfx_dydx)'\quietly matrix 
medianAalt2XY =e(Xmfx_X)'  
!target!  
probit targetdummy ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2  salesgrowth2 pricerunup shareturnover  
hMBlsharetumover mergerintensityalt2  cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergers if  
yearquarterindadj= 5  
284 ' 
quietly predict ptalt if e(sample)  
quietly predict xbTaltalt2 if e(sample ), xb  
quietly outreg  using "Apri114stage1dynamicTalt2.txt", replace bracket ctitle("4") bdec(4) noaster addstat("Pseudo R squared", 
e(r2_p), "X2", e(chi2), "df', e(df_m)) tdec(2)  
quietly mfx compute, at( median resourcecapitalmismatch=O hMBlshareturnover=O) nose  
quietly matrix bTalt5=e(Xmfx_dydx)'  
quietly matrix medianTalt5=e(Xmfx_X)'  
for XY in num 6/101: quietly  probit targetdummy ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2  salesgrowth2 pricerunup  
shareturnover hMBlshareturnover mergerintensityalt2  cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergers if  
yearquarterindadj= XY\quietly predict ptalttemp if e(sample)\quietly replace ptalt=ptalttemp  if yearquarterindadj= XY    
ptalt= .\drop ptalttemp\quietly predict xbTaltalt2temp if e(sample), xb\quietly replace xbTaltalt2=xbTaltalt2temp  if  
yearquarterindadj= XY  & xbTaltalt2==.\drop xbTaltalt2temp\quietly outreg  using "Apri114stage1dynamicTalt2.txt", append bracket  
ctitle("XY") bdec(4) noaster addstat("Pseudo R squared", e(r2_p), "X2", e(chi2), "df', e(df_m)) tdec(2)\quietly mfx compute,  
at(median resourcecapitalmismatch=O hMBlshareturnover=O) nose\quietly matrix bTaltXY=e(Xmfx_dydx)'\quietly matrix 
medianTaltXY =e(Xmfx_X)'  
tabstat pa pt, by(tdummy) stats(mean sd p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 n) columns(statistics) longstub  
matrix bA=[bA5]  
for num  6/101: matrix bA=[bA, bAX]  
matrix bT=[bT5]  
for num  6/101: matrix bT=[bT, bTX]  
!bt9 not conforming!  
matrix list bT9  
matrix  
bT9temp=[bT9[1,1],bT9[2,1],bT9[3,1],bT9[4,1],bT9[5,1],bT9[6,1],bT9[7,1],0,bT9[8,1],bT9[9,1],bT9[10,1],bT9[11,1],bT9[12,1],bT9  
[13,1]]  
matrix  bT9=bT9temp'  
285 ' 
matrix bT=[bT5]  
for num  6/101: matrix bT=[bT, bTX]  
!bt22 not conforming!  
matrix list bT22  
matrix  
bT22temp=[bT22[1,1],bT22[2,1],bT22[3,1],bT22[4,1],bT22[5,1],bT22[6,1],bT22[7,1],0,bT22[8,1],bT22[9,1],bT22[10,1],bT22[11,1],  
bT22[12,1], bT22[13,1]]  
matrix  bT22=bT22temp'  
matrix bT=[bT5]  
for num  61101:  matrix bT=[bT, bTX]  
matrix medianA=[medianA5]  
for num  6/101: matrix medianA=[medianA, medianAX]  
matrix  
medianT9temp=[medianT9[1,1],medianT9[2,1],medianT9[3,1],medianT9[4,1],medianT9[5,1],medianT9[6,1],medianT9[7,1],0,media  
nT9[8,1],medianT9[9,1],medianT9[10,1],medianT9[11,1],medianT9[12,1],medianT9[13,1]]  
matrix  medianT9=medianT9temp'  
matrix  
medianT22temp=[medianT22[1,1],medianT22[2,1],medianT22[3,1],medianT22[4,1],medianT22[5,1],medianT22[6,1],medianT22[7,1  
],O,medianT22[8,1],medianT22[9,1],medianT22[10,1],medianT22[11,1],medianT22[12,1], medianT22[13,1]]  
matrix  medianT22=medianT22temp'  
matrix medianT=[medianT5]  
for num  61101:  matrix medianT=[medianT, medianTX]  
drop if tdummy= 2  
keep cusip gvkey dateannounced1  
svmat bA, name(aperiod)  
svmat bT, name(tperiod)  
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svmat medianA, name(medianaperiod)  
svmat medianT, name(mediantperiod)  
keep aperiodl-aperiod97 tperiodl-tperiod97 medianaperiodl-medianaperiod97 mediantperiodl-mediantperiod97  
save "C: \Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\April14marginalcoefficients.dta", replace  
outsheet aperiodl-aperiod97 tperiodl-tperiod97 using "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\April14marginalcoefficients.txt", replace 
outsheet medianaperiodl-medianaperiod97 mediantperiodl-mediantperiod97 using  
"C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\April14marginalcoefficientsl.txt", replace  
!File 3!  
!transpose the data, create period variable, name the variables in excel!  
insheet using C: \Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data \April14marginalcoefficients.txt, clear 
rename vl tdummy  
rename v2 period  
rename v3 ROA  
rename v4 resourcecapitalmismatch  
rename v5 salesshock  
rename v6 salesshock2  
rename v7 salesgrowth2  
rename v8 pricerunup  
rename v9 sharetumover  
rename vlO hMBlshareturnover  
rename vll mergerintensity  
rename v12 cashratio  
rename v13logassets  
287 ' 
rename v 14 changeinassets  
rename v15 fourfirmconcentration  
rename v16 previousmergers  
for any ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2  salesgrowth2 pricerunup shareturnover hMBlsharetumover  
mergerintensity  cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergers: replace X=. if X= O  
tabstat ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2  salesgrowth2 pricerunup sharetumover hMBlsharetumover  
mergerintensity  cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergers if tdummy= O, stats(mean sd p25 p50 p75  
n) columns(statistics) longstub  
tabstat ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2  salesgrowth2 pricerunup shareturnover hMBlsharetumover  
mergerintensity  cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergers if tdummy= 1, stats(mean sd p25 p50 p75  
n) columns(statistics) longstub  
for any ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2  salesgrowth2 pricerunup shareturnover hMBlshareturnover  
mergerintensity  cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergers: ttest X=O if tdummy= O  
for any ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2  salesgrowth2 pricerunup shareturnover hMBlshareturnover  
mergerintensity  cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergers: ttest X=O if tdummy= 1  
destring period, replace force  
sort tdummy period  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\April14marginalcoefficients.dta", replace  
insheet using C: \Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data \April14marginalcoefficients 1. txt, clear  
rename v1  tdummy  
rename v2 period  
rename v3 medianROA  
rename v4 medianresourcecapitalmismatch  
rename v5 mediansalesshock  
rename v6 mediansalesshock2  
rename v7 mediansalesgrowth2  
rename v8 medianpricerunup  
rename v9 medianshareturnover  
288 ' 
rename vlO medianhMBlshareturnover  
rename vll medianmergerintensity  
rename v12 mediancashratio  
rename v13 medianlogassets  
rename v14 medianchangeinassets  
rename v15 medianfourfirmconcentration  
rename v16 medianpreviousmergers  
for any medianROA medianresourcecapitalmismatch mediansalesshock mediansalesshock2  mediansalesgrowth2 medianpricerunup  
medianshareturnover medianhMBlshareturnover medianmergerintensity  mediancashratio medianlogassets medianchangeinassets  
medianfourfirmconcentration medianpreviousmergers: replace X=. if X= lOOOOOO  
sort tdummy period  
merge tdummy period using "C: \Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data \April14marginalcoefficients.dta"  
tab_merge  
drop_merge  
!paste R2 and likelihood test from April14stageldynamicA and T!  
rename var31 R2  
rename var32 X2  
tabstat  R2 X2, stats(mean sd p25 p50 p75 n) columns(statistics) longstub by(tdummy)  
gen strlO testtype="main"  
rename period quarter  
for any medianROA medianresourcecapitalmismatch mediansalesshock mediansalesshock2 mediansalesgrowth2 medianpricerunup  
medianshareturnover medianhMBlshareturnover medianmergerintensity mediancashratio medianlogassets medianchangeinassets  
medianfourfirmconcentration medianpreviousmergers: rename X XO  
rename  medianROAO ROAO  
rename medianresourcecapitalmismatchO resourcecapitalmismatchO  
rename mediansalesshockO  salesshockO  
rename mediansalesshock20 salesshock20  
289 ' 
·rename mediansalesgrowth20 salesgrowth20  
rename medianpricerunupO pricerunupO  
rename mediansharetumoverO sharetumoverO  
rename medianhMBlsharetumoverO hMBlsharetumoverO  
rename medianmergerintensityO mergerintensityO  
rename mediancashratioO cashratioO  
rename medianlogassetsO logassetsO  
rename  medianchangeinassetsO changeinassetsO  
rename medianfourfirmconcentrationO fourfirmconcentrationO  
rename medianpreviousmergersO previousmergersO  
for any ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2 salesgrowth2  pricerunup sharetumover  hMBlsharetumover  
mergerintensity cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergers:rename X Xl  
reshape long  ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2 salesgrowth2 pricerunup hMBlsharetumover mergerintensity  
cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergers sharetumover, i(tdummy quarter) j(coefficientormedian)  
gen str15 coefficientormedianl="coefficient" if coefficientormedian= l  
replace coefficientormedianl="median" if coefficientormedian= O  
drop coefficientormedian  
rename coefficientormedianl coefficientormedian  
rename  previousmergers  previousmergersl  
rename hMBlsharetumover  hMBlsharetumover  
rename mergerintensity mergerintensityaltl  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\Apri114marginalcoefficients.dta", replace  
tabstat ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2 salesgrowth2 pricerunup sharetumover hMBlsharetumover  
mergerintensityaltl cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergersl if tdummy= O    
coefficientormedian= "coefficient", stats(mean sd p25 p50 p75 n) columns(statistics) longstub  
290 ' 
tabstat ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2 salesgrowth2 pricerunup sharetumover hMBlsharetumover  
mergerintensityaltl cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergers1 if tdummy= 1    
coefficientormedian= "coefficient", stats(mean sd p25 p50 p75 n) columns(statistics) longstub  
for any ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2 salesgrowth2 pricerunup sharetumover hMBlsharetumover  
mergerintensityaltl cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergers 1: ttest X=O if tdummy= O    
coefficientormedian=  "coefficient"  
for any ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2 salesgrowth2 pricerunup sharetumover hMBlsharetumover  
mergerintensityaltl cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergers1: ttest X=O if tdummy= 1    
coefficientormedian= "coefficient"  
save "C: \Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\April14marginalcoefficients.dta", replace  
append using "C: \Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\April30marginalcoefficientsrob 1.dta"  
append using "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\April30marginalcoefficientsrob2.dta"  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\may3allmarginalcoefficients.dta", replace  
log close  
! Robustness, STATIONARITY OF PARAMETERS, Section 7.1.4.!  
use "C: \Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\April14marginalcoefficients.dta", clear  
gen post92dummy=1 if quarter>48  
replace post92dummy=O if quarter<49  
tab post92dummy  coefficientormedian if tdummy= O  
tab post92dummy  coefficientormedian if tdummy= 1  
291 ' 
==
==
==
==
tabstat ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2 salesgrowth2 pricerunup sharetumover hMBlsharetumover  
mergerintensityaltl cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergersl if tdummy= O    
coefficientormedian= "coefficient", by(post92dummy) stats(mean sd p25 p50 p75 n) columns(statistics) longstub  
matrix z=O  
matrix p=O  
matrix chi=O  
for any ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2 salesgrowth2 pricerunup sharetumover hMBlshareturnover  
mergerintensityaltl cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergers: ranksum X if tdummy= O    
coefficientormedian= "coefficient", by(post92dummy)\ matrix z={z,r(z))\ksmimov X if tdummy= O    
coefficientormedian= "coefficient", by(post92dummy)\matrix p={p, r(p) )\kwallis X if tdummy= O    
coefficientormedian= "coefficient", by(post92dummy)\matrix chi= ( chi, r(chi2_adj))  
matrix final= (z',  p', chi')  
matrix list final  
tabstat ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2 salesgrowth2 pricerunup sharetumover hMBlshareturnover  
mergerintensityaltl cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergersl if tdummy= l    
coefficientormedian= "coefficient", by(post92dummy) stats(mean sd p25 p50 p75 n) columns(statistics) longstub  
matrix z= O  
matrix p=O  
matrix chi=O  
for any ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2 salesgrowth2 pricerunup sharetumover hMBlshareturnover  
mergerintensityaltl cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergers: ranksum X if tdummy= l    
coefficientormedian= "coefficient", by(post92dummy)\ matrix z={z,r(z))\ksmimov X if tdummy= l    
coefficientormedian="coefficient", by(post92dummy)\matrix p=(p, r(p))\kwallis X iftdummy= l    
coefficientormedian="coefficient", by{post92dummy)\matrix chi=( chi, r( chi2_adj))  
matrix final=(z', p', chi')  
matrix list final  
292 ' 
use "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\April14COMPUSTATCRSPSDCmerged.dta", clear  
gen flag=yearquarterindadj-4  
gen post92dummy=O if flag<49  
replace post92dummy=l if flag>48  
for any ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2  salesgrowth2 pricerunup2 sharetumover hMBlsharetumover  
mergerintensityaltl  cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergers: gen Xpost92=X*post92dummy  
probit acquirordummy post92dummy ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2  salesgrowth2 pricerunup2 sharetumover  
hMBlsharetumover mergerintensityaltl  cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergers  ROApost92  
resourcecapitalmismatchpost92 salesshockpost92 salesshock2post92 salesgrowth2post92 pricerunup2post92 sharetumoverpost92  
hMBlsharetumoverpost92 mergerintensityaltl post92 cashratiopost92 logassetspost92 changeinassetspost92  
fourfirmconcentrationpost92 previousmergerspost92,cluster(gvkey)  
test ROApost92=0  
for any resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2  salesgrowth2 pricerunup2 sharetumover hMBlsharetumover  
mergerintensityaltl  cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergers: test Xpost92=0, accum 
matrix p=O  
for any ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2  salesgrowth2 pricerunup2 sharetumover hMBlsharetumover  
mergerintensityaltl  cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergers: test X+Xpost92=0\matrix p=(p, r(p))  
probit targetdummy post92dummy ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2  salesgrowth2 pricerunup2 sharetumover  
hMBlsharetumover mergerintensityaltl  cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergers  ROApost92  
resourcecapitalmismatchpost92 salesshockpost92 salesshock2post92 salesgrowth2post92 pricerunup2post92 sharetumoverpost92  
hMBlsharetumoverpost92 mergerintensityaltl post92 cashratiopost92 logassetspost92 changeinassetspost92  
fourfirmconcentrationpost92 previousmergerspost92, cluster(gvkey)  
test ROApost92=0  
for any resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2  salesgrowth2 pricerunup2 sharetumover hMBlsharetumover  
mergerintensityaltl  cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergers: test Xpost92=0, accum  
293 ' 
matrix p=O  
for any ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2  salesgrowth2 pricerunup2 sharetumover hMBlsharetumover  
mergerintensityaltl  cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergers: test X+Xpost92=0\matrix p=(p, r(p))  
!File 4!  
log using C: \Basak\Mergers\March2006\0utput\april20out.smcl, replace  
use "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\April14COMPUSTATCRSPSDCmerged.dta", clear  
dropiftdummy= 2  
tabtdummy  
!8092 bidders and 3855 targets!  
tab tdummy if pa-=.  
!7559 bidders with pa!  
tab tdummy if pt-=.  
!3564 targets with pt!  
tab multipleanninquarterbytdummy multipleannincusipquarter  
!11,727 single, 212 double, 7 triple, 1 four!  
!put the data into long version, quarters to dates!  
reshape long dealnumber1 dealnumber2 dealnumber3 dealnumber4 dealnumber5 dealnumber6 dateannounced  
multipleannouncementsbytdummy multipleannouncements, i(uniquecusipquartertdummyid) j(announcementmonthrank)  
tabmiss dealnumber1  dealnumber2 dealnumber3 dealnumber4 dealnumber5 dealnumber6  
drop if dealnumber1= .  & dealnumber2==.  &dealnumber3= .  &dealnumber4= .  &dealnumber5= .  &dealnumber6= .  
tabmiss dealnumberl  
!12,174= 11,727+(212*2)+(7*3)+(1 *4), actual is 12,174 2 missing !  
tab multipleannincusipquarter  
!problem doubles it is 422 instead of 424!  
294 ' 
!we are going to reshape using gvkey, so we need gvkey double counts!  
tab multipleanngvkeyinquarter  
! all single!  
drop multipleanngvkeyinquarter  
bysort gvkey yearquarterind: egen multipleanngvkeyinquarter=count(_n)  
tab multipleanngvkeyinquarter  
!420 doubles!  
tab multipleanngvkeyinquarter multipleannincusipquarter  
list gvkey dateannounced dealnumber1 dealnumber2 yearquarterindadj if multipleanngvkeyinquarter= 1    
multipleannincusipquarter =2  
!2 problematic deals!  
list gvkey dateannounced dealnumberl dealnumber2 yearquarterind  yearquarterindadj multipleanngvkeyinquarter  
multipleannincusipquarter if  gvkey= 129635, nodisplay  
list gvkey dateannounced dealnumber1 dealnumber2 yearquarterind  yearquarterindadj multipleanngvkeyinquarter  
multipleannincusipquarter if  gvkey= 5555, nodisplay  
!both deals single announcements, the others must have been not matched!  
tabtdummy  
!12,174 obs, 8266 bidders and 3908 targets!  
tab tdummy if pa-=.  
!7724 bidders with pal  
tab tdummy ifpt-=.  
!3613 targets with pt!  
!count how many announcements in one day!  
tab multipleannouncements  
!12,028 single announcements, 134 double ann., 8 triple ann. 3 four ann.,  1 6 ann.!  
!For now, we are going to exclude multiple announcements in the analysis!  
sort dateannounced cusip tdummy drop uniquecusipquartertdummyid  
295 ' 
egen uniquecusipquartertdummyid=group(yearquarterind tdummy gvkey)  
sum uniquecusipquartertdummyid  ·  
!12, 17 4 obs, 1194 7 unique!  
sort uniquecusipquartertdummyid  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\April20secondstage.dta", replace  
!we need to obtain CAR from EVENTUS. This is to obtain the input file to EVENTUS! 
keep dateannounced cusip  
gen year=year( dateannounced)  
gen month=month( dateannounced)  
gen day=day(dateannounced)  
gen str2 months=string(month)  
gen length=length(months)  
replace months="O"+months if length= l  
drop length  
gen str2 days=string(day)  
gen length=length(days)  
replace days="O"+days if length= l  
drop length  
gen str4 years=string(year)  
gen str8 date=years+months+days  
gen length=length( cusip)  
replace cusip="OOO"+cusip if length= 3  
replace cusip="OO"+cusip if length= 4  
replace cusip="O"+cusip if length= 5  
replace cusip=cusip+"lO"  
outsheet cusip date using C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\Eventus.txt, replace nonames noquote  
!input this file into EVENTUS database, output is a SAS file which then I convert into a txt file!  
296 ' 
tabmiss cusip  
!12,174 bidders and targets!  
use "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\April20secondstage.dta", clear  
gen year 1 =year( dateannounced)  
gen month1=month( dateannounced)  
gen dayl=day(dateannounced)  
gen str2 months=string(month1)  
gen length=length(months)  
replace months="O"+months if length=  I  
drop length  
gen str2 days=string(dayl)  
gen length=length( days)  
replace days="O"+days if length= 1  
drop length  
gen str4 years=string(year1)  
gen str8 eventdat=years+months+days  
drop year1 month1 day1  years months days  
destring eventdat, replace force  
sort eventdat cusip  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data \April20secondstage.dta", replace  
insheet using "C: \Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\Eventus0utApril202006. txt", clear  
tabmiss cusip  
!11,325 bidders and targets, 12174-11325=849 missing!  
rename cusip cusip8  
gen str6 cusip=substr(cusip8,1,6)  
drop cusip8  
297 ' 
sort eventdat cusip  
merge eventdat cusip using "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\April20secondstage.dta"  
tab_merge  
tab _merge tdummy  
!97 unmatched from EVENTUS, 946 of which are bidders and targets from CRSP-SDC, 11,228 matched!  
!11,228+97=11,325, 11,228+946=12,174 exact from COMPUSTATSDC data! 
drop if _merge= 1  
drop_merge  
sort permno eventdat  
gen flag=1  if ROA-=.    resourcecapitalmismatch-=.    salesshock-=.    salesshock2-=.    pricerunup-=.    shareturnover-=.    
hMBlshareturnover-=.    mergerintensityaltl-=.    cashratio-=.    logassets-=.    changeinassets-=.    fourfirmconcentration-=.    
previousmergers-=.  
replace flag=O if flag= .  
bysort flag:  tabstat carwindow1 carwindow2 carwindow3, by(tdummy) statistics(mean sd p25 p50 p75 n) columns(statistics) longstub  
for any carwindow1 carwindow2 carwindow3: ranksum X if tdummy= O, by( flag)  
for any carwindow1 carwindow2 carwindow3: ranksum X if tdummy= 1, by( flag)  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\April20secondstage.dta", replace  
tabmiss dealnumber1  
!12,174 nonmissing deals!  
tab multipleannouncements  
!doubles 134, triples 8, fours 3, sixes 1!  
!reshape such that seperate dealnumbers for dates that have more than one announcement!  
egen uniquegvkeydatetdummyid=group(gvkey dateannounced tdummy)  
sum uniquegvkeydatetdummyid  
!12,174 unique ids!  
drop uniquegvkeydatetdummyid  
298 ' 
reshape long  dealnumber, i(gvkey dateannounced tdummy) j(announcementrank)  
!Number of obs. 12174  ->  73044, Number of variables 126  ->122,j variable (6 values)->  announcementrank!  
tabmiss dealnumber  
!60706 missing!  
drop if dealnumber= .  
tab tdummy  
!8406 bidders and 3932 targets total12338!  
!Before was 8266 bidders and 3908 targets total 12,174. 12,338=12,174+ 134+ 16+9+5 EXACT! 
sort permno eventdat  
!Descriptive statistics!  
gen flagmultipleann=O  
replace flagmultipleann=1 if multipleannouncements> 1  
bysort tdummy: tabstat carwindow1 carwindow2 carwindow3, statistics(mean sd p25 p50 p75 n) by(flagmultipleann) longstub 
columns( statistics)  
sort dealnumber tdummy  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\April20secondstage.dta", replace  
!EXECOMP, IRRC, CRSP checks refer to previous do file!  
insheet using "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\Dec122005outputSDC.tx.t", clear  
tabmiss dealnumber dateannounced  
drop if dateannounced= '"'  
tabmiss dealnumber dateannounced  
!18,325 deals!  
gen str 1 onedigitsica=substr( acquirorprimarysic, 1, 1)  
gen str 1 onedigitsict=substr(targetprimarysic, 1,1)  
drop if onedigitsica= "6"  
drop if onedigitsict= "6"  
299 ' 
drop onedigitsict onedigitsica  
tabmiss dealnumber dateannounced  
!18272 deals!  
gen dateannounced1=date(dateannounced, "mdy")  
format dateannounced1  %dN/D/Y  
gen dateeffective1=date(dateeffective, "mdy")  
format dateeffective1 %dN/D/Y  
gen datewithdrawn1=date( datewithdrawn, "mdy")  
format datewithdrawn1  %dN/D/Y  
drop dateannounced datewithdrawn dateeffective  
rename dateannounced1 dateannounced  
rename dateeffective1 dateeffective  
rename datewithdrawn1 datewithdrawn  
gen sameacquirortargetcusip=match(acquirorcusip,targetcusip)  
tab sameacquirortargetcusip  
!check if acquiror and target cusip same, 41 with same!  
list targetname acquiromame dealnumber if sameacquirortargetcusip= 1  
!checked names, acquiror and target names and cusips same, hence drop these deals!  
drop if sameacquirortargetcusip= 1  
drop sameacquirortargetcusip  
tabmiss dealnumber  
!18,231 deals!  
bysort acquirorcusip dateannounced: egen multipleacquirorannouncements=count(_n)  
bysort targetcusip dateannounced: egen multipletargetannouncements=count(_n)  
tab multipleacquirorannouncements  
!multiple acquiror announcements 249 firms with 2 ann. (249*2=498 double counts), 22 with 3, 6 with 4, 3 with 5, 2 with 6!  
tab multipletargetannouncements  
!multiple target announcements  54 firms with 2 (54*2=108 multiples), 1 with 3, 3 with 4!  
300 ' 
drop multipleacquirorannouncements multipletargetannouncements  
gen sameindustry=match( acquirorprimarysiccode, targetprimarysiccode)  
tab sameindustry  
gen mktpowerincrease=  
!make a long list of acquirers and targets with identifier tdummy=O if acquirer and tdummy=l if target!  
rename targetname name1  
rename acquiromame nameO  
rename acquirorcusip cusipO  
rename targetcusip cusip1  
rename acqtickersymbol tickerO  
rename targettickersymbol tickerl  
rename acquirorprimarysiccode siccodeO  
rename targetprimarysiccode siccode1  
rename targetpublicstatus publicstatus1  
rename acqpublicstatus publicstatusO  
rename acqclosingprice1 daypriortoann price1 daypriortoannO  
rename targetclosingprice1 daypriortoann price 1 daypriortoann 1  
rename acqclosingprice1 wkpriortoann pricel wkpriortoannO  
rename targetclosingprice1 weekpriortoan pricel wkpriortoann1  
rename acquirorclosingprice 1 dayafterann price 1 dayafterannO  
rename targetclosingprice 1 dayafterannda price 1 dayafterann 1  
rename acquirorclosingprice1 weekafteran price1 weekafterannO  
rename targetclosingprice1 weekafterannd pricel weekafterann1  
rename acquirorclosingpriceatann priceatannO  
rename targetclosingpriceatanndate priceatann1  
301 ' 
reshape long name cusip ticker siccode publicstatus price1daypriortoann price1 wkpriortoann price1dayafterann price1 weekafterann 
priceatann, i(dealnumber) j(tdummy)  
tabmiss dealnumber  
tabtdummy  
!36,462 bidders and targets; 18231 each!  
sort dealnumber tdummy  
merge dealnumber tdummy using "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\April20secondstage.dta" 
tab_merge  
!24,124 1 (master unmatched) and 12338 matched, EXACT!  
drop if _merge= 1  
drop_merge  
tab multipleannouncements  
!We now have 11,787 single ann. 268 double ann., 24 triple ann.  12 four ann., 4 6 ann. exact!  
save "C: \Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\April20secondstage.dta", replace  
!VARIABLES!  
cd C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Tables  
gen defensedummy=O  
replace defensedummy=1 if defense= "Yes"  
gen HotileorUnsolAttitude=O  
replace HotileorUnsolAttitude=1 if attitude= "Hostile" I attitude= "Unsolic." ·  
gen targetbankruptdummy=O  
replace targetbankruptdummy= 1 if targetbankrupt= "Y es"  
gen allequity=O  
replace allequity=1 if ofstock= 100  
!FIT!  
302 ' 
gen publicdummy=O  
replace publicdummy=l if publicstatus= "Public"  
gen samestate=O  
replace samestate=l if intrastate= "Yes"  
sort dealnumber  
save "C: \Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data \April20secondstage.dta", replace  
gen lambdaA=normden( -pa)/(1-norm( -pa))  
gen lambdaT=normden(-pt)/(1-norm( -pt))  
! Univariate Analysis!  
egen percent25a=pctile(pa) if multipleannouncements= l  & tdummy==O,p(25)  
egen percent75a=pctile(pa) if multipleannouncements=l  & tdummy==0,p(75)  
gen anticipateda25=0 if pa<percent25a   pa-=.  & multipleannouncements==l  & tdummy==O  
replace anticipateda25=1 if pa>percent75a   pa-=.  & multipleannouncements==l  & tdummy==O  
egen medianpa=median(pa) if tdummy= O  & multipleannouncements==l  
gen anticipateda50=0 if pa<medianpa   pa-=.  & multipleannouncements==l  & tdummy==O  
replace anticipateda50=1 if pa>medianpa   pa..:..=.& multipleannouncements= l  & tdummy==O  
drop medianpa percent25a percent75a  
egen percent25t=pctile(pt) if tdummy= l  & multipleannouncements==l ,p(25)  
egen percent75t=pctile(pt) if tdummy= l  & multipleannouncements==l,p(75)  
gen anticipatedt25=0 if pt<percent25t   pt-=.   tdummy= l  & multipleannouncements==l  
replace anticipatedt25=1 if pt>percent75t   pt-=.  & tdummy==l  & multipleannouncements==l  
egen medianpt=median(pt) if tdummy= l  & multipleannouncements==l  
gen anticipatedt50=0 if pt<medianpt   pt-=.   tdummy= l  & multipleannouncements==l  
replace anticipatedt50=1 if pt>medianpt   pt-=.  & tdummy==l  & multipleannouncements==l  
drop medianpt percent25t percent75t  
303 ' 
tabstat carwindowl carwindow2 carwindow4 carwindow5 if multipleannouncements= l    tdummy= O, stats(mean sd  n)  
columns(statistics) longstub by(anticipateda25)  
tabstat carwindowl carwindow2 carwindow4 carwindow5 if multipleannouncements= l    tdummy= O, stats(mean sd  n)  
columns(statistics) longstub by(anticipateda50)  
tabstat carwindowl carwindow2 carwindow4 carwindow5 if multipleannouncements= l    tdummy= O, stats(pl p5 plO p25 p50 p75  
p90 p95 p99) columns(statistics) longstub by(anticipateda25)  
for any carwindowl carwindow2  carwindow4 carwindow5: gen absX=abs(X)  
matrix t=O  
for any abscarwindowl abscarwindow2  abscarwindow4 abscarwindow5: ttest X if multipleannouncements= l  &  tdummy==O,  
by(anticipateda25)\matrix t=(t,r(t))  
matrix tl=t'  
matrix list tl  
matrix t=O  
for any carwindowl carwindow2  carwindow4 carwindow5: ttest X if multipleannouncements= l    tdummy= O,  
by( anticipateda25)\matrix t=( t,r(t))  
matrix list t  
matrix f=O  
for any carwindowl carwindow2  carwindow4 carwindow5: sdtest X if multipleannouncements= l    tdummy= O,  
by(anticipateda25)\matrix f=(f,r(p ))  
matrix list f  
matrix z=O  
for any carwindowl carwindow2  carwindow4 carwindow5: ranksum X if multipleannouncements= l    tdummy= O,  
by(anticipateda25)\ matrix z=(z,r(z))  
matrix z=z'  
matrix p=O  
304 ' 
for any carwindowl carwindow2  carwindow4 carwindow5: ksmimov X if multipleannouncements= l    tdummy= O,  
by( anticipateda25)\matrix p=(p, r(p))  
matrix p=p'  
matrix chi=O  
for any carwindowl carwindow2  carwindow4 carwindow5: kwallis X if multipleannouncements= l    tdummy= O,  
by( anticipateda25)\matrix chi=( chi, r( chi2_adj))  
matrix chi=chi'  
matrix final=(z, p, chi)  
matrix list final  
matrix t=O  
for any abscarwindowl abscarwindow2  abscarwindow4 abscarwindow5: ttest X if multipleannouncements= l    tdummy= O,  
by(anticipateda50)\matrix t=(t,r(t))  
matrix tl=t'  
matrix list t1  
matrix t=O  
for any carwindowl carwindow2  carwindow4 carwindow5: ttest X if multipleannouncements= l    tdummy= O;  
by(anticipateda50)\matrix t=(t,r(t))  
matrix list t  
matrix f=O  
for any carwindowl carwindow2  carwindow4 carwindow5: sdtest X if multipleannouncements= l    tdummy= O,  
by( anticipateda50)\matrix f=(f,r(p))  
matrix list f  
tabstat carwindowl carwindow2 carwindow4 carwindow5 if multipleannouncements= l  & tdummy==l, stats(mean sd  n)  
columns( statistics) longstub by( anticipatedt25)  
tabstat carwindowl carwindow2 carwindow4 carwindow5 if multipleannouncements= l  & tdummy==l, stats(mean sd  n)  
columns(statistics) longstub by(anticipatedt50)  
305 ' 
tabstat carwindowl carwindow2 carwindow4 carwindow5 ifmultipleannouncements==l    tdummy= l, stats(pl p5 plO p25 p50 p75  
p90 p95 p99) columns(statistics) longstub by(anticipatedt25)  
matrix t=O  
for any abscarwindowl abscarwindow2  abscarwindow4 abscarwindow5: ttest X if multipleannouncements= l    tdummy= l,  
by(anticipatedt25)\matrix t=(t,r(t))  
matrix tl=t'  
matrix list t1  
matrix t=O  
for any carwindowl carwindow2  carwindow4 carwindow5: ttest X if multipleannouncements= l    tdummy= l,  
by(anticipatedt25)\matrix t=(t,r(t))  
matrix t=t'  
matrix list t  
matrix f=O  
for any carwindowl carwindow2  carwindow4 carwindow5: sdtest X if multipleannouncements= l    tdummy= l,  
by(anticipatedt25)\matrix f={f,r(p))  
matrix f=f  
matrix list f  
matrix z=O  
for any carwindowl carwindow2  carwindow4 carwindow5: ranksum X if multipleannouncements= l  &  tdummy==l,  
by(anticipatedt25)\ matrix z=(z,r(z))  
matrix z=z'  
matrix p=O  
for any carwindowl carwindow2  carwindow4 carwindow5: ksmimov X if multipleannouncements= l    tdummy= l,  
by( anticipatedt25)\matrix p=(p, r(p))  
matrix p=p'  
matrix chi=O  
306 ' 
for any carwindowl carwindow2  carwindow4 carwindow5: kwallis X if multipleannouncements= l    tdummy= l,  
by(anticipatedt25)\matrix chi=( chi, r(chi2_adj))  
matrix chi=chi'  
matrix final=(z, p, chi)  
matrix list final  
matrix t=O  
for any abscarwindowl abscarwindow2  abscarwindow4 abscarwindow5: ttest X if multipleannouncements= l    tdummy= l,  
by( anticipatedt50)\matrix t=(t,r( t))  
matrix tl=t'  
matrix list t1  
matrix t=O  
for any carwindowl carwindow2  carwindow4 carwindow5: ttest X if multipleannouncements= l    tdummy= l,  
by(anticipatedt50)\matrix t=(t,r(t))  
matrix t=t'  
matrix list t  
matrix f=O  
for any carwindowl carwindow2  carwindow4 carwindow5: sdtest X if multipleannouncements= l    tdummy= l,  
by( anticipatedt50)\matrix f=(f,r(p))  
matrix f=f  
matrix list f  
matrix z=O  
for any carwindowl carwindow2  carwindow4 carwindow5: ranksum X if multipleannouncements= l  &  tdummy==l,  
by(anticipatedt50)\ matrix z=(z,r(z))  
matrix z=z'  
matrix p=O  
for any carwindowl carwindow2  carwindow4 carwindow5: ksmimov X if multipleannouncements= l    tdummy= l,  
by(anticipatedt50)\matrix p=(p, r(p))  
matrix p=p'  
307 ' 
matrix chi=O  
for any carwindowl carwindow2  carwindow4 carwindow5: kwallis X if multipleannouncements= l  &  tdummy==l,  
by( anticipatedt50)\matrix chi=( chi, r( chi2_adj))  
matrix chi=chi'  
matrix final=(z, p, chi)  
matrix list final  
!For data purposes!  
tab tdummy  
!8406 bidders, and 3982 targets!  
tabmiss carwindowl carwindow2 carwindow4 carwindow5 if tdummy= O  
tabmiss carwindowl carwindow2 carwindow4 carwindow5 if tdummy= l  
! Data Restrictions !  
!CRSP-COMPUSTAT coverage!  
gen flag=O if ROA-=.    resourcecapitalmismatch-=.    salesshock-=.    salesshock2-=.    pricerunup-=.    shareturnover-=.    
hMBlsharetumover-=.    mergerintensityaltl-=.    cashratio-=.    logassets-=.    changeinassets-=.    fourfirmconcentration-=.    
previousmergers-=.  
replace flag=l if flag= .  
tabstat carwindowl carwindow2 carwindow4 carwindow5 if tdummy= O    multipleannouncements= l, statistics(mean sd n)  
columns(statistics) by(flag) longstub  
tabstat carwindowl carwindow2 carwindow4 carwindow5 if tdummy= l    multipleannouncements= l, statistics( mean sd n)  
columns(statistics) by(flag) longstub  
matrix t=O  
for any carwindowl carwindow2 carwindow4 carwindow5: ttest X if multipleannouncements= l    tdummy= O, by(flag)\matrix  
t=(t,r(t))  
matrix list t  
308 ' 
matrix t=O  
for any carwindowl carwindow2 carwindow4 carwindow5: ttest X ifmultipleannouncements==l    tdummy= l, by(flag)\matrix  
t=(t,r(t))  
matrix list t  
matrix t=O  
matrix z=O  
matrix p=O  
matrix chi=O  
for any carwindowl carwindow2 carwindow4 carwindow5: ttest X if multipleannouncements= l    tdummy= O, by(flag)\matrix  
t=(t,r(t))\ranksum X if multipleannouncements= l    tdummy= O, by(flag)\matrix z=(z,r(z))\ksmimov X if  
multipleannouncements= l    tdummy= O, by(flag)\matrix p=(p, r(p))\kwallis X if multipleannouncements= l    tdummy= O,  
by(flag)\matrix chi=(chi, r(chi2_adj))  
matrix final=(t', z', p', chi')  
matrix list final  
matrix t=O  
matrix z=O  
matrix p=O  
matrix chi=O  
for any carwindowl carwindow2 carwindow4 carwindow5: ttest X if multipleannouncements= l    tdummy= l, by(flag)\matrix  
t=(t,r(t))\ranksum X if multipleannouncements= l    tdummy= l, by( flag) \matrix z=(z,r(z))\ksmimov X if  
multipleannouncements= l    tdummy= l, by(flag)\matrix p=(p, r(p))\kwallis X ifmultipleannouncements==l    tdummy= l,  
by(flag)\matrix chi=( chi, r(chi2_adj))  
matrix final=(t', z', p', chi')  
matrix list final  
drop flag  
! Multivariate Analysis !  
!regressions with industry and year dummies!  
309 ' 
cd C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Tables  
!acquirers!  
drop year  
gen yearann=year( dateannounced)  
tab yearann if yearann>l980, gen (yeardummy)  
tab sic2digit, gen(inddummy)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaA allequity  inddummy1-inddummy57 yeardummy2-yeardummy24 if acquirordummy= 1    
multipleannouncements=  1  
outreg lambdaA allequity  using "april20regressionsacq.txt", replace bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy  inddummy1-inddummy57  
yeardummy2-yeardummy24 if acquirordummy= 1    multipleannouncements= 1  
outreg lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy using "april20regressionsacq.txt", append 
bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaA allequity  sameindustry samestate publicdummy  inddummy1-inddummy57 yeardummy2- 
yeardummy24 if acquirordummy= 1    multipleannouncements= 1  
outreg lambdaA allequity  sameindustry samestate publicdummy using "april20regressionsacq.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 
3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate  
publicdummy  inddummy1-inddummy57 yeardummy2-yeardummy24 if acquirordummy= l    multipleannouncements= l  
outreg lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
"april20regressionsacq.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2 allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy  
inddummyl-inddummy57 yeardummy2-yeardummy24 if e(sample)  
outreg allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
"april20regressionsacq.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
tabstat lambdaA if e(sample), stats(mean sd p25 p50 p75 n)  
!economic significance .1320974(sd)*3.66 to 3.83 = 48 to 51 basis points!.  
310 ' 
!targets!  
regress carwindow2  lambdaT allequity  inddummyl-inddummy57 yeardummy2-yeardummy24 iftargetdummy==l    
multipleannouncements= l  
outreg lambdaT allequity  using "april20regressionstar. txt", replace bracket rdec( 4) bdec( 4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy  inddummyl-inddummy57  
yeardummy2-yeardummy24 if targetdummy= l    multipleannouncements= l  
outreg lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy using "april20regressionstar.txt", append 
bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaT allequity  sameindustry samestate publicdummy  inddummyl-inddummy57 yeardummy2- 
yeardummy24 if targetdummy= l    multipleannouncements= l  
outreg lambdaT allequity  sameindustry samestate publicdummy using "april20regressionstar.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 
3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate  
publicdummy  inddummyl-inddummy57 yeardummy2-yeardummy24 if targetdummy= l    multipleannouncements= l  
outreg lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
"april20regressionstar.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2 allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy  
inddummyl-inddummy57 yeardummy2-yeardummy24 if e(sample)  
outreg allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
"april20regressionstar.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
tabstat lambdaT if e(sample), stats(mean sd p25 p50 p75 n)  
!regressions with no industry    year dummies!  
cd C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Tables  
!acquirers!  
311 ' 
regress carwindow2  lambdaA allequity  if acquirordummy= 1  & multipleannouncements==1  
outreg lambdaA allequity  using "april20regressionsacq_nodummies.txt", replace bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
outreg lambdaA allequity  using "april20regressionsacq_nodummiesl.txt", replace bracket rdec(4) sebdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy  if acquirordummy= l    
multipleannouncements= 1  
outreg lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy using  
"april20regressionsacq_nodummies.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
outreg lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy using  
"april20regressionsacq_nodummiesl.txt", append bracket rdec(4) se bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaA allequity  sameindustry samestate publicdummy  if acquirordummy= l    
multipleannouncements=  1  
outreg lambdaA allequity  sameindustry samestate publicdummy using "april20regressionsacq_nodummies.txt", append bracket 
rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
outreg lambdaA allequity  sameindustry samestate publicdummy using "april20regressionsacq_nodummiesl.txt", append bracket 
rdec(4) se bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate  
publicdummy  if acquirordummy= l    multipleannouncements= l  
outreg lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
"april20regressionsacq_nodummies.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
outreg lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
"april20regressionsacq_nodummiesl.txt", append bracket rdec(4) se bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2 allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy  if  
e(sample)  
outreg allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
"april20regressionsacq_nodummies.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
outreg allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
"april20regressionsacq_nodummiesl.txt", append bracket rdec(4) se bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
tabstat lambdaA if e(sample), stats(mean sd p25 p50 p75 n)  
312 ' 
!targets!  
regress carwindow2  lambdaT allequity  if targetdummy= l    multipleannouncements= l  
outreg lambdaT allequity  using "april20regressionstar_nodummies.txt", replace bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
outreg lambdaT allequity  using "april20regressionstar_nodummiesl.txt", replace bracket rdec(4) se bdec(4) 3aster tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy  if targetdummy= l    
multipleannouncements= l  
outreg lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy using  
"april20regressionstar_nodummies.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
outreg lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy using  
"april20regressionstar_nodummies 1. txt", append bracket rdec( 4) se bdec( 4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaT allequity  sameindustry samestate publicdummy  if targetdummy= l  & multipleannouncements==l  
outreg lambdaT allequity  sameindustry samestate publicdummy using "april20regressionstar_nodummies.txt", append bracket 
rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
outreg lambdaT allequity  sameindustry samestate publicdummy using "april20regressionstar_nodummiesl.txt", append bracket 
rdec(4) se bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate  
publicdummy  if targetdummy= l    multipleannouncements= l  
outreg lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
"april20regressionstar_nodummies.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
outreg lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
"april20regressionstar_nodummiesl.txt", append bracket rdec(4) se bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2 allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy  if  
e(sample)  
outreg allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
"april20regressionstar_nodummies.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
313 ' 
outreg allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
"april20regressionstar_nodummiesl.txt", append bracket rdec(4) se bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
tabstat lambdaT if e(sample), stats(mean sd p25 p50 p75 n)  
!sample characteristics!  
gen sampleflag=O  
regress carwindow2  lambdaA allequity  if acquirordummy= l    multipleannouncements= l  
replace sampleflag=l if e(sample)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaT allequity  if targetdummy= l    multipleannouncements= l  
replace sampleflag=1 if e(sample)  
tab tdummy sampleflag  
!5771 bidders and 2829 targets with data!  
bysort cusip: egen numberofbidders=count(_n) if sampleflag= 1    tdummy= O  
bysort cusip: egen numberoftargets=count(_n) if sampleflag= 1    tdummy= 1  
tab numberofbidders  
!1->1504, 2->1142/2=571, 3->834/3=278, 4->576/4=144,  5->325/5=65, 6->354/6=59,7->17517=25, 8->224/8=28, 9->144/9=16,10- 
>40/10=4, 11->132/11=12, 12->72/12=6, 13->39113=3, 14->56/14=4, 15_;>45/15=3, 17->17/17=1, 19->19/19=1, 20->40/20=2, 33- 
>33/33=1 TOTAL=  
tab numberoftargets  
!1->2,217, 2->472/2=236,  3->117/3=39,  4->8/4=2,  5->15/5=3, TOTAL=2,497!  
drop numberofbidders numberoftargets  
bysort dealnumber: egen numberofdeals=count(_n) if sampleflag= 1  
tab numberofdeals  
!6202 single deals, 2398 doubles total8600, TOTAL=6202+239812=7401! 
!FOR TABLE 3!  
tabstat carwindow2 if sampleflag, by(tdummy) statistics(mean sd p25 p50 p75 n)  
314 ' 
tabstat  allequity  publicdummy defensedummy  competedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy  sameindustry  
samestate relativevalue if sampleflag, by(tdummy) statistics(mean sd p25 p50 p75 n) columns(statistics) longstub  
! Returns to equally anticipated bidder and targets!  
ttest carwindow2 if multipleannouncements= 1  & (pa-=.1  pt-=.), by(tdummy) unequal  
matrix p=r(p)  
matrix dif=r(mu_2)-r(mu_1)  
matrix N1=r(N_1)  
matrix N2=r(N_2)  
for num .1  .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1: ttest carwindow2 if multipleannouncements= 1  & ((pa<=X  & pa>(X-.1)  & tdummy==O)I(pt<=X    
pt>(X-.1)  & tdummy==1)), unequal by(tdummy)\matrix p=(p,r(p))\matrix dif=(dif,r(mu_2)-r(mu_1))\matrix N1=(N1,r(N_1))\matrix  
N2=(N2, r(N_2))  
matrix final=(dif,p',N1 ',N2')  
matrix list final  
ttest carwindow2 if multipleannouncements= 1  & (pa-=.1  pt-=.), by(tdummy) unequal  
matrix p=r(p)  
matrix dif=r(mu_2)-r(mu_1)  
matrix N1=r(N_1)  
matrix N2=r(N_2)  
for num  1115: ttest carwindow2 if multipleannouncements= 1  & ((tdummy==O  & pa<=(X/100)  & pa>((X/100)-.01))1(tdummy==1    
pt<=(X/100)& pt>((X/100)-.01))), by(tdummy) unequal\matrix p=(p,r(p))\matrix dif=(dif,r(mu_2)-r(mu_1))\matrix  
N1=(N1,r(N_1))\matrix N2=(N2, r(N_2))  
for num .20 .25 .30 .35:ttest carwindow2 if multipleannouncements= 1  & ((tdummy==O  & pa<=X  & pa>(X-.05))1(tdummy==1    
pt<=X& pt>(X-.05))), by(tdummy) unequal\matrix p=(p,r(p))\matrix dif=(dif,r(mu_2)-r(mu_1))\matrix N1=(N1,r(N_1))\matrix 
N2=(N2, r(N_2))  
315 ' 
for num  .45 .55 .65 .75: ttest carwindow2 if multipleannouncements= 1  & ((tdummy==O  & pa<=X  & pa>(X-.1))1(tdummy==1    
pt<=X& pt>(X-.1))), by(tdummy) unequal\matrix p=(p,r(p))\matrix dif=(dif,r(mu_2)-r(mu_1))\matrix N1=(N1,r(N_1))\matrix 
N2=(N2, r(N_2))  
ttest carwindow2 ifmultipleannouncements==1  & ((tdummy==O  & pa<=1  & pa>.75)l(tdummy==1  & pt<=1  & pt>.75)), by(tdummy)  
unequal  
matrix p={p,r{p))  
matrix dif=(dif,r(mu_2)-r(mu_1))  
matrix N1=(N1,r(N_1))  
matrix N2=(N2, r{N_2))  
matrix final=( dif ,p' ,N1 ',N2')  
matrix list final  
! File 5!  
! Robustness, Annual event window and EXECOMP IRRC variables, Sections 7.1.1 and 7.1.2!  
log using C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\0utput\april25.smcl, replace  
insheet using  "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\April29CRSPannualdata.txt", clear  
tabmiss gvkey dnum  
!187,172 obs!  
desc  
log off  
tab dnum  
logon  
!dropping sic's excluded in SDC, all dnum with 6000-6999!  
drop if dnum>5999  & dnum <7000  
tabmiss fyenddt fybegdt fyr gvkey  
316 ' 
!145,785 non missing data!  
drop if datal= ""    data6= .    data9= ""    datal2= .    datal8= ""   data24= .    data25= '"'    data28= .    data60= ""    
data85= ""  
tabmiss fyenddt fybegdt fyr gvkey  
!145,346 obs!  
!check for double counted firms, by cusip and fiscalquarters!  
!fybegdt and fyenddt gives true financial statement coverage!  
!if a firm has the same cnum and financial statement coverage, it means it is double counted!  
bysort cnum fybegdt fyenddt:  egen samecnumdate=count(_n)  
tab samecnumdate  
!66 with 2 counts, 9 with 3 counts, 8 with 4 counts. Check if data same!  
bysort gvkey fybegdt fyenddt cnum  fyr datal data6 data9 datal2 datal8 data24 data25 data28 data60 data85 coname: egen  
samegvkeycnumdatadate=count(_n)  
tab  samegvkeycnumdatadate  
!all unique!  
drop samegvkeycnumdatadate samecnumdate  
tabmiss gvkey cnum  
!145,346 non missing data!  
!check for cnum double counts!  
bysort cnum fyenddt datal data6 data9 datal2 datal8 data24 data25 data28 data60 data85 coname: egen datecusipdatasame=count(_n)  
tab datecusipdatasame  
!all unique!  
drop datecusipdatasame  
bysort fyenddt gvkey cnum: egen samedategvkeycnum=count(_n)  
tab  samedategvkeycnum  
!all unique!  
bysort fyenddt cnum: egen samedatecnum=count(_n)  
317 ' 
tab  samedatecnum samedategvkeycnum  
!all due to repeated cusip and different gvkey!  
list gvkey cnum fyenddt fybegdt datal2  data6 if  samedatecnum= 4  
list gvkey cnum fyenddt fybegdt data12  data6 if  samedatecnum= 2  
!all due to repeated cusip and different gvkey!  
bysort fyenddt cnum gvkey fyr:  egen samedatecnumfyr=count(_n)  
tab samedatecnumfyr  
drop samedatecnumfyr samedatecnum samedategvkey  
bysort fyenddt gvkey: egen samegvkey=count(_n)  
tab samegvkey  
drop samegvkey  
!gvkey is unique identifier!  
!check if 2 gvkeys in a year!  
gen year=int(fyenddt/10000)  
gen month=int(fyenddt/1 00)-year* 100  
rename yeara fiscal year  
bysort year cnum: egen samedatecnum=count(_n)  
tab  samedatecnum  
! 896 double counts and 9 triple counts and 8 4 counts!  
drop samedatecnum  
bysort year gvkey: egen samedatecnum=count(_n)  
tab  samedatecnum  
!822 double counts!  
list fyr year  fyenddt cnum gvkey data6 if samedatecnum= 2  
!change in fyr in the year, causes multiple counts!  
drop samedatecnum  
bysort year gvkey: egen samedatecnum=count(_n)  
tab  samedatecnum  
318 ' 
drop samedatecnum  
!822 doubles!  
bysort gvkey year: egen flag=min(_n)  
drop if flag-= _n  
!411 = 822/2  dropped!  
drop flag  
bysort year gvkey: egen samedatecnum=count(_n)  
tab  samedatecnum  
! all unique!  
drop samedatecnum  
bysort year cnum: egen samedatecnum=count(_n)  
tab  samedatecnum  
!74 double counts and 9 triple counts and 8 4 counts!  
list fyr year  fyenddt cnum gvkey data6 coname if samedatecnum= 4, nodisplay  
!differing gvkeys same cusips causing problem!  
rename cnum cusip  
desc datal data6 data9 datal2 datal8 data24 data25 data28 data60 data85  
destring datal, gen( cash) force  
destring data9, gen(longtermdebt) force  
destring datal8, gen(incomebefext) force  
destring data25, gen(sharesoutstanding) force  
destring data60, gen(stockholdersequity) force  
destring data85, gen(commonstock) force  
rename  data6 assets  
rename  datal2 netsales  
rename data24 priceclose  
rename data28 sharestraded  
drop datal data9 datal8 data25 data60 data85  
319 ' 
bysort gvkey year: egen samegvkey=count(_n)  
tab samegvkey  
!unique!  
drop samegvkey  
tabmiss gvkey  
!144,935!  
!I need unique gvkey and cusips!  
bysort year cusip: egen flag=count(_n)  
tab flag  
drop if flag> 1  
drop flag  
bysort year gvkey: egen flag=count(_n)  
tab flag  
drop if flag> 1  
drop flag  
sort cusip year  
tabmiss cusip  
!144,844 obs!  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\april29annualdata.dta", replace  
insheet using "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\0ata\Dec122005outputSDC.txt", clear  
desc  
drop if dateannounced= '"'  
tabmiss dealnumber dateannounced  
!18,325 deals!  
gen str 1 onedigitsica=substr( acquirorprimarysic, 1,1)  
gen str 1 onedigitsict=substr(targetprimarysic, 1,1)  
320 ' 
drop if onedigitsica= "6"  
drop if onedigitsict= "6"  
drop onedigitsict onedigitsica  
tabmiss dealnumber dateannounced  
! 18272 deals!  
gen dateannounced1=date(dateannounced, "mdy")  
format dateannounced1  %dNIDN  
gen dateeffective1=date(dateeffective, "mdy")  
format dateeffective1 %dN/D/Y  
gen datewithdrawn1=date(datewithdrawn, "mdy")  
format datewithdrawn1 %dN/D/Y  
drop dateannounced datewithdrawn dateeffective  
rename dateannounced1 dateannounced  
rename dateeffecti ve 1 dateeffective  
rename datewithdrawn1 datewithdrawn  
gen sameacquirortargetcusip=match( acquirorcusip,targetcusip)  
tab sameacquirortargetcusip  
!check if acquiror and target cusip same, 41  with same!  
list targetname acquiromame dealnumber if sameacquirortargetcusip= 1  
!checked names, acquiror and target names and cusips same, hence drop these deals!  
drop if sameacquirortargetcusip= 1  
drop sameacquirortargetcusip  
tabmiss dateannounced  
! 18,231 deals!  
bysort acquirorcusip dateannounced: egen multipleacquirorannouncements=count(_n)  
bysort targetcusip dateannounced: egen multipletargetannouncements=count(_n)  
tab multipleacquirorannouncements  
!multiple acquiror announcements 249 firms with 2 ann. (249*2=498 double counts), 22 with 3, 6 with 4, 3 with 5, 2 with 6!  
321 ' 
tab multipletargetannouncements  
!multiple target announcements  54 firms with 2 (54*2=108 multiples), 1 with 3, 3 with 4!  
!make a long list of acquirers and targets with identifier tdummy=O if acquirer and tdummy=1 if target!  
keep dealnumber dateannounced  targetname acquiromame acquirorcusip targetcusip acqtickersymbol targettickersymbol 
rename targetname name 1  
rename acquiromame nameO  
rename acquirorcusip cusipO  
rename targetcusip cusip1  
rename acqtickersymbol tickerO  
rename  targettickersymbol ticker1  
reshape long name cusip ticker, i(dealnumber) j(tdummy)  
!Number of obs. 18231  ->  36462, Number of variables 8  ->  6 j variable (2values)->  tdummy xij variables: nameO name1  ->  
name, cusipO cusip1  ->  cusip, tickerO tickerl  ->  ticker!  
bysort dateannounced cusip tdummy :egen multipleannouncementsbytdummy=count(_n)  
tab multipleannouncementsbytdummy tdummy  
!find multiple announcements on the same day by tdummy, 303 firms with double (249+54), 23 with 3 (22+1), 9 with 4 (6+3),  3 with  
5, 2 with 6!  
bysort dateannounced cusip:egen multipleannouncements=count(_n)  
tab·multipleannouncementsbytdummy multipleannouncements  
!318 with double, hence 16 both recieved and made bids, 1 made a bid and received 2 offers!  
!For each bidder at each announcement organize bids into dealnumber1, ... , dealnumber6, and each target the same way! 
gen announcementrank= 1  
sort cusip tdummy dateannounced  
bysort cusip tdummy: replace announcementrank=2 if dateannounced[_n]= dateannounced[_n-1]  
bysort cusip tdummy: replace announcementrank=3 if dateannounced[_n]= dateannounced[_n-2]  
bysort cusip tdummy: replace announcementrank=4 if dateannounced[_n]= dateannounced[_n-3]  
bysort cusip tdummy: replace announcementrank=5 if dateannounced[_n]= dateannounced[_n-4]  
322 ' 
bysort cusip tdummy: replace announcementrank=6 if dateannounced[_n]= dateannounced[_n-5]  
egen uniquecusipdateidentifier=group(cusip tdummy dateannounced)  
sum uniquecusipdateidentifier  
!36064 unique cusips, acquirer-target identity and dateannounced out of 36462 observations.  
( 606/2+69/3+ 3614+ 15/5+ 12/6+ 35724=36064)!  
reshape wide dealnumber, i(uniquecusipdateidentifier) j(announcementrank)  
!Number of obs. 36462  ->  36064; Number of variables 10  ->  14; j  variable (6 values)  announcementrank  ->  (dropped);  
variables:dealnumber  ->  dealnumberl dealnumber2 ... dealnumber6!  
drop uniquecusipdateidentifier  
tabmiss dateannounced  
!36064 unique cusips, acquirer-target identity and dateannounced deals!  
gen year=year( dateannounced)  
gen month=month( dateannounced)  
bysort cusip tdummy year:egen multipleannouncementsinyear=count(_n)  
tab multipleannouncementsinyear  
!find multiple announcements on the same month by tdummy, 3798 double announcements, 987 triple ann., 380 four ann., and 125  
five ann., 72 6 ann., 42 7 ann., 16 8 ann., 30 10 ann., 1111 ann.,  12  12 ann.,  17  17 ann.!  
bysort cusip year:egen multipleanninyearnotdummy=count(_n)  
tab multipleanninyearnotdummy  
!4338 double announcements, 1101 triple ann., 428 four ann., and 135 five ann., 72 6 ann., 35 7 ann., 32 8 ann., 30 10 ann., 11  11  
ann.,  12 12 ann.,  17  17 ann.!  
tab multipleanninyearnotdummy  multipleannouncementsinyear  
!some firms both make and recieve bids in the same year!  
sort cusip  
tabmiss dateannounced  
!36,064 observations!  
gen announcementrankyear=1  
323 ' 
sort cusip tdummy dateannounced  
for num 2/17: bysort cusip tdummy year: replace announcementrankyear=X if dateannounced[_n]>dateannounced[_n-X+ 1]  
tab announcementrankyear  
!32,948 single rank, of which 30,574 have only one ann. in year!  
keep if announcementrankyear= 1  
tabmiss cusip  
!32,948 obs!  
drop multipleanninyearnotdummy announcementrankyear  
bysort cusip year:egen multipleanninyearnotdummy=count(_n)  
tab multipleanninyearnotdummy  
!doubles 796!  
drop dealnumber2-dealnumber6  
rename dealnumberl dealnumber  
gen numberofannouncementsinyear=multipleannouncementsinyear+ multipleannouncements-1  
tab numberofannouncementsinyear  
!upto 17 announcements!  
tabmiss cusip  
!32,948 obs!  
gen SDCid= _n  
replace year=year-1  
sort cusip year  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\April292006mergecusipsfyr.dta", replace  
merge cusip year using "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\april29annualdata.dta"  
tab_merge  
!matched(3) 10615, CRSP 134,455  SDC 22,333 . 32,948 obs in SDC, after merge 10,615+22333 =32,948 ->exact. 144,844 obs in  
CRSP, 134455 +10,615=145,070 -> 226 extra!  
!Clean CRSP extras: these should be due to multiple announcements in same year!  
324 ' 
tab  multipleanninyearnotdummy  
tab  multipleanninyearnotdummy _merge  
!452/2=226 merged firms with double announcements, these are the ones causing the problems. !  
drop if _merge= 1  
replace tdummy=2 if _merge= 2  
tabmiss cusip  
!145,070 obs.!  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\april29annualdata.dta", replace  
!make sure there is only one bidder and target in each year!  
drop year month  
gen year=int(fyenddt/1 0000)  
gen yearann=year( dateannounced)  
tab year  
!1974 to 2005!  
dropifyear= 2005  
tab year tdummy  
tab multipleannouncementsinyear  
!upto 12, some of which is no longer in!  
bysort cusip yearann: egen multipleannouncementflag= count(_n) if tdummy-=2  
tab multipleannouncementflag tdummy  
!doubles 452, recieving and bidding in the same year!  
gen announcementyearrank=1 if tdummy= 21 multipleannouncementflag==1 I (multipleannouncementflag= 2    tdummy= O)  
replace announcementyearrank=2 if multipleannouncementflag= 2    tdummy= 1  
tab announcementyearrank tdummy  
drop multipleannouncementflag  
bysort gvkey year announcementyearrank: egen flag=count(_n)  
tab flag  
325 ' 
!all unique!  
drop flag  
tabmiss cusip  
!1444 77  obs!  
drop_merge  
drop SDCid ticker name  
drop multipleannouncementsbytdummy multipleannouncements multipleannouncementsinyear multipleanninyearnotdummy  
!make sure one cusip in each year, even if they recieve and solicit bids in the same year!  
reshape wide dealnumber dateannounced tdummy numberofannouncementsinyear, i(cusip year) j(announcementyearrank)  
!Number of obs. 144477  ->  144251; Number of variables 29  -> 32; j variable (2 values)announcementyearrank ->  (dropped)!  
tab tdummy1  
tab tdummy2  
save "C: \Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\april29annualdata.dta", replace  
tabmiss cusip  
! 144251  obs!  
bysort year cusip: egen flag=count(_n)  
tab flag  
!unique!  
drop flag  
bysort year gvkey: egen flag=count(_n)  
tab flag  
!unique!  
drop flag  
!lets look at years!  
tab year tdummy1  
!1976 1 announcement, 2004 no announcements!  
326 ' 
tab year tdummy2  
! 1980-2003!  
!drop 74-75, 2004 no ann., drop 76 only one announcement!  
drop if year<1977l year==2004  
tabmiss cusip  
! 128912 obs!  
tab tdummy1  
! 6789 bidders, 3599 targets, 118,524 nonmerging firm quarters!  
tab tdummy2  
!226 targets!  
!first generate variables that rely on merger history!  
!Generate bids made, bids recieved!  
tsset gvkey year  
gen numberofannouncementsinyear1lag1=L1.numberofannouncementsinyear1  
gen numberofannouncementsinyear2lag1=L1.numberofannouncementsinyear2  
for num 1/2: replace numberofannouncementsinyearXlag1=0 if numberofannouncementsinyearXlag1= .  
for num 112:  replace numberofannouncementsinyearX=O if numberofannouncementsinyearX= .  
gen previousmergers 1=(numberofannouncementsinyearllag1 +numberofannouncementsinyear 1)  
gen previousmergers2=(numberofannouncementsinyear2lag1 +numberofannouncementsinyear2)  
tabmiss previousmergers 1 previousmergers2  
!2 digit sic industry classification!  
gen sic2digit=int(dnum/100)  
replace sic2digit=sic2digit*10 if sic2digit<10  
!sic 10-99, nothing between 60-69!  
bysort sic2digit year: egen firmsinindustryq=count(_n)  
replace sic2digit=int(sic2digit/1 0)* 10 if firmsinindustryq<5  
drop firmsinindustryq  
327 ' 
bysort sic2digit year: egen firmsinindustryq=count(_n)  
tab firmsinindustryq if firmsinindustryq <10  
!all industry-quarters have more than 4 firms!  
drop firmsinindustryq  
sort sic2digit year  
save "C:\Basak:\Mergers\March2006\Data\april29annualdata.dta", replace  
!merger intensity!  
gen acquirordummy=O  
replace acquirordummy=1 if tdummy1= 0  
gen targetdummy=O  
replace targetdummy=1 if tdummy1= 1 I tdummy2= 1  
gen mergerdummy=O  
replace mergerdummy=1 if acquirordummy= 11 targetdummy==1  
bysort sic2digit year: egen mergerfirmsinindustry=sum(mergerdummy)  
bysort year sic2digit: egen firmsinindustry=count(_n)  
tab firmsinindustry  
tabmiss firmsinindustry  
gen mergerintensity=mergerfirmsinindustry/firmsinindustry  
tabmiss mergerintensity  
keep mergerintensity year sic2digit  
egen unique=group(sic2digit year)  
sum unique  
! 14 79 industries in quarters!  
drop unique  
bysort sic2digit year: egen firmsinindustry=count(_n)  
tab firmsinindustry  
!max. of 1006 firms in an industry in a quarter!  
bysort sic2digit year: egen flag=min(_n)  
328 ' 
drop if _n-=flag  
tabmiss sic2digit  
!1479 obs!  
drop flag  
tsset sic2digit year  
gen  mergerintensity 1 =Ll.mergerintensity  
tabmiss mergerintensity1 mergerintensity  
gen mergerintensityaltl= mergerintensity+ mergerintensity1  
!62 missing!  
drop mergerintensity mergerintensity1  
sort sic2digit year  
merge sic2digit year using "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\april29annualdata.dta"  
tab_merge  
drop_merge  
tabstat mergerintensityaltl, by(tdummy1) stats(mean sd min pl p5 plO p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 p99 max n) columns(statistics) longstub  
tabstat mergerintensityaltl, by(tdummy2) stats(mean sd min p1  p5 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 p99 max n) columns(statistics) longstub  
!generate variables that rely on financial data!  
tsset gvkey year  
!panel variable: gvkey, 1000 to 230796 time variable:  year, 1977 to 2003, but with gaps  
!generate 2 year sales growth!  
for num 112:  gen netsalesX=LX.netsales  
gen salesgrowth2=[ (netsales-netsales2)/netsales2]  
replace salesgrowth2=[ (netsales-netsales 1 )/netsales 1] *2 if salesgrowth2= .  
drop netsales 1-netsales2  
tabmiss salesgrowth2  
!generate pricerunup!  
tsset gvkey year  
329 ' 
for num 112:  gen pricecloseX=LX. priceclose  
gen pricerunup2=[(priceclose-priceclose2)/priceclose2]  
replace pricerunup2=[ (priceclose-priceclose 1 )/priceclose 1] *2 if pricerunup2= .  
drop priceclose 1-priceclose2  
tabmiss pricerunup2  
!gen industry sales shock variable!  
bysort year: egen totalsalesgrowth2=median(salesgrowth2)  
bysort sic2digit year: egen indsalesgrowth2=median(salesgrowth2)  
gen salesshock=abs(indsalesgrowth2-totalsalesgrowth2)  
tabmiss salesshock  
drop indsalesgrowth2 totalsalesgrowth2  
gen salesshock2=salesshock*salesshock  
tabmiss salesshock salesshock2  
!gen profitability, cash ratio, log assets!  
gen logassets=log( assets)  
tabmiss logassets  
tsset gvkey year  
for num 112:  gen assetsX=LX.assets  
gen changeinassets=( assets-assets2)/assets2  
replace changeinassets=( (assets-assets 1 )/assets 1 )*2 if changeinassets= .  
drop assets 1-assets2  
gen cashratio=cash/assets  
gen ROA=incomebefext/assets  
!gen growth-capitalaccess mismatch variables!  
bysort sic2digit year: egen indsalesgrowth2=median(salesgrowth2)  
bysort sic2digit year: egen indlongtermdebt=median(longtermdebt/assets)  
gen resourcecapitalmismatch=O  
330 ' 
replace resourcecapitalmismatch=1 if (longtermdebt/assets>indlongtermdebt  & salesgrowth2<indsalesgrowth2) I  
(longtermdebt/assets<indlongtermdebt  & salesgrowth2>indsalesgrowth2)  
drop indsalesgrowth2 indlongtermdebt  
tabmiss resourcecapitalmismatch ROA cashratio changeinassets  
!fourfirmconcentration!  
bysort sic2digit year: egen totalindustrysales=sum(netsales)  
bysort sic2digit year: egen max1=max(netsales) if netsales-=.  
bysort sic2digit year: egen max2=max(netsales) if netsales-=.  & netsales-=max1  
bysort sic2digit year: egen max3=max(netsales) if netsales-=.  & netsales-=max1  & netsales-=max2  
bysort sic2digit year: egen max4=max(netsales) if netsales-=.  & netsales-=max1  & netsales-=max2  & netsales-=max3  
gen fourfirmconcentration=(max1+max2+max3+max4)/totalindustrysales if totalindustrysales-=.  & max1-=.  & max2-=.  & max3-=.  
max4-=.  
replace  fourfirmconcentration=(max1+max2+max3)/totalindustrysales iftotalindustrysales.-..=.  & max1-=.  & max2-=.  & max3-=.    
fourfirmconcentration= .  
replace  fourfirmconcentration=(max1 +max2)/totalindustrysales if totalindustrysales-=.  & max1-=.   max2-=.    
fourfirmconcentration= .  
replace  fourfirmconcentration=(max 1 )/totalindustrysales if totalindustrysales-=.  & max 1-=.  & fourfirmconcentration==.  
drop max 1-max4 totalindustrysales  
!high information asymmetry variable!  
gen MB=priceclose*sharesoutstandinglstockholdersequity  
gen shareturnover=sharestradedlsharesoutstanding  
bysort sic2digit year: egen indMB=median(MB)  
bysort sic2digit year: egen indshareturnover=median( shareturnover)  
gen hMBlshareturnover=O  
replace hMBlshareturnover=1 if MB>indMB  & shareturnover<indshareturnover  
drop indMB indshareturnover  
tab hMBlshareturnover  
tabmiss hMBlshareturnover shareturnover fourfirmconcentration  
331 ' 
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\april29annualdata.dta", replace  
tabmiss ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2  pricerunup sharetumover hMBlsharetumover mergerintensityaltl  
cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergers1 previousmergers2  
tab tdummy1 if ROA-=.  & resourcecapitalmismatch-=.  & salesshock-=.  & salesshock2-=.  &  pricerunup-=.  & sharetumover-=.  
hMBlsharetumover-=.  & mergerintensityaltl-=.  & cashratio-=.  & logassets-=.  & changeinassets-=.  & fourfirmconcentration-=.  
previousmergers 1-=.  
  
  
tab tdummy2 if ROA-=.  & resourcecapitalmismatch-=.  & salesshock-=.  & salesshock2-=.  &  pricerunup-=.  & sharetumover-=.  
hMBlsharetumover-=.  & mergerintensityaltl-=.  & cashratio-=.  & logassets-=.  & changeinassets-=.  & fourfirmconcentration-=.  
previousmergers2-=.  
tabmiss gvkey  
!128912  obs!  
sort gvkey year  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\april29annualdata.dta", replace  
  
  
!EXECOMP variables!  
insheet using "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\may9execomp.txt", clear 
tabmiss year gvkey  
!144108!  
tab year  
!1992 to 2004!  
egen firmid=group(gvkey)  
sumfirmid  
!2610 unique gvkeys and 144,108 firm-director years!  
tabmiss ceoann  
gen ceodummy=1 if ceoann= "CEO"  
332 ' 
gen index=index(titleann, "CEO")  
!if there is something after CEO, it is not goodie. like division or subsidiary!  
gen length=length(titleann)  
gen str50 leftpiece=substr(titleann, index, length)  
replace ceodummy=1 if ceodummy= .    index-=0   leftpiece= "CEO"  
replace ceodummy=O if ceodummy= .  
tab ceodummy  
drop leftpiece length index  
gen execdirdummy=O if exec_dir= "FALSE"  
replace execdirdummy= 1 if exec_dir= "TRUE"  
bysort year gvkey: egen numexecdir=sum(execdirdummy)  
replace execdirdummy=2 if exec_dir= ""  
dropifceodummy-=1  
bysort year gvkey: egen countgvkey=count(gvkey)  
tab countgvkey  
list gvkey year titleann  if countgvkey= 4  
!some firms have more than one ceo in the same year. May be due to co-CEO's, may be due change in CEOs, or wrong data!  
gen index=index(titleann, "CEO")  
gen index1=index(titleann, "co-CEO")  
gen flag= 1 if index -=0  
replace flag=O if index= O  
tab flag countgvkey  
drop if flag= O   countgvkey> 1  
drop countgvkey  
bysort year gvkey: egen countgvkey=count(gvkey)  
333 ' 
tabulate countgvkey  
gen index2=index(titleann, "to CEO")  
drop if index2-=0  
drop index2  
gen index2=index(titleann, "former CEO")  
drop if index2-=0  
drop index2  
gen index2=index(titleann, "CEO (former)")  
drop if index2-=0  
drop index2  
gen index2=index(titleann, "CEO-sub")  
drop if index2-=0  
drop index2  
drop countgvkey  
bysort year gvkey: egen countgvkey=count(gvkey)  
tabulate countgvkey  
list gvkey year titleann  if countgvkey= 4  
!these ones seem to have more than one CEO, so take the averages for these!  
gen percompfromstockop=(tdc 1-tcc )/tdc 1  
gen pershrown= shrown/ shrsout  
bysort gvkey year: egen meanpercompfromstockop=mean(percompfromstockop)  
bysort gvkey year: egen meanshrown=mean(shrown)  
bysort gvkey year: egen meanshrsout=mean(shrsout)  
bysort gvkey year: egen meanpershrown=mean(pershrown)  
bysort gvkey year: egen meannumexecdir=mean(numexecdir)  
bysort gvkey year: egen meanage=mean(p_age_2)  
bysort gvkey year: egen meanretirementyears=mean(retyrs)  
334 ' 
bysort year gvkey: egen mingvkey=min(_n)  
dropif_n-=mingvkey  
keep gvkey year fyr meanpercompfromstockop meanshrown meanshrsout meanpershrown meannumexecdir meanage 
meanretirementyears  
rename year fiscal year  
tab fiscal year  
!1992 to 2004!  
!generate real reporting year!  
gen year=fiscalyear if fyr>5  
replace year=fiscalyear+ 1 if fyr<5  
sort  gvkey year  
tabmiss fiscal year year fyr gvkey meanpercompfromstockop meanshrown meanshrsout meannumexecdir meanpershrown meanage 
meanretirementyears  
bysort year gvkey: egen countgvkey=count(gvkey)  
tabulate countgvkey  
drop countgvkey  
sort gvkey year  
merge gvkey year using "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\april29annualdata.dta"  
tab_merge  
! CRSPSDC unmerged 113830, merged 15099-> total 128,929, CRSP before merge is 128912!  
drop if _merge= 1  
tab tdummy1 if meanpercompfromstockop-=.    meanshrown-=.    meanshrsout-=.    meanretirementyears-=.  
!bidders 1635, targets 439, nonmerging  12707 !  
tab tdummy2 if  meanpercompfromstockop-=.    meanshrown-=.    meanshrsout-=.    meanretirementyears-=. 
!49 targets!  
335 ' 
rename _merge _mergeEXECOMP ' 
sort cusip year ' 
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\april29annualdata.dta", replace ' 
!IRRC data!  
insheet using "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\IRRCmay92005.txt", clear ' 
tabmiss  gindex year cn6 ' 
tab year ' 
!1990 to 2004! ' 
egen firmid=group( cn6) ' 
sum firmid ' 
!3469 unique cusips and 12104 cusip-years! ' 
rename cn6 cusip ' 
gen length=length( cusip) ' 
tab length ' 
. drop length  
tabmiss coname year gindex antigreen blankcheck cboard dutiesnf fairprice lachtr labylw lspmt lwcnst ppill supermajor uneqvote  
advnr cumvote cumvotess dirliab dirind dirindc compplan sparachute pparachute cusip secretballot goldenparachute severance firmid  
bysort cusip year: egen flag=count(_n) ' 
tab flag ' 
!4 double counts! ' 
list coname year gindex cusip if flag= 2  
! 2 are financial institutions so we can drop one (none will be merged anyway), the other one is the same firm repeated! ' 
bysort cusip year: egen flag1=min(_n) ' 
drop if _n-=flag1   flag>1 ' 
drop flag flag1 ' 
bysort cusip year: egen flag=count(_n) ' 
336 ' 
tab flag  
drop flag  
keep cusip year gindex  
sort  cusip year  
merge cusip year using "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\april29annualdata.dta"  
tab_merge  
!merged 7732, CRSPSDC  121197!  
drop if _merge= 1  
tab tdummy1 if gindex-=.  
!bidders 720, targets 234, nonmerging  6778!  
tab tdummy2 if gindex -=.  
!21  targets!  
rename _merge _mergeiRRC  
sort cusip year  
save "C: \Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\april29annualdata.dta", replace  
cd C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Tables  
set more off  
gen acquirordummy=O  
replace acquirordummy=1 if tdummy1= 0  
gen targetdummy=O  
replace targetdummy=1 if tdummy1= 1  I tdummy2= 1  
!ROBUSTNESS, Annual Predictions!  
!acquirers!  
337 ' 
quietly probit acquirordummy ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2  salesgrowth2 pricerunup shareturnover  
hMBlsharetumover mergerintensityaltl  cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergers1 if  year-=1979  
quietly predict pa if e(sample)  
quietly predict xbA if e(sample), xb  
quietly outreg  using "April30rob1A.txt", replace bracket ctitle("4") bdec(4) noaster addstat("Pseudo R squared", e(r2_p), "X2",  
e(chi2), "df", e(df_m)) tdec(2)  
quietly mfx compute, at(median resourcecapitalmismatch=O hMBlsharetumover=O) nose  
quietly matrix bA1979=e(Xmfx_dydx)'  
quietly matrix medianA1979=e(Xmfx_X)'  
for XY in num 1980/2003: quietly  probit acquirordummy ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2  salesgrowth2  
pricerunup sharetumover hMBlsharetumover mergerintensityalt1  cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration  
previousmergers1 if  year= XY\quietly predict patemp if e(sample)\quietly replace pa=patemp  if year==XY  & pa==.\drop  
patemp\quietly predict xbAtemp if e(sample), xb\quietly replace xbA=xbAtemp  if year= XY   xbA= .\drop xbAtemp\quietly outreg  
using "April30rob1A.txt", append bracket ctitle("XY") bdec(4) noaster addstat("Pseudo R squared", e(r2_p), "X2", e(chi2), "df',  
e(df_m)) tdec(2)\quietly mfx compute, at(median resourcecapitalmismatch=O hMBlsharetumover=O) nose\quietly matrix  
bAXY=e(Xmfx_dydx)'\quietly matrix medianAXY=e(Xmfx_X)'  
quietly probit acquirordummy ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2  salesgrowth2 pricerunup sharetumover  
hMBlsharetumover mergerintensityalt1  cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergers1 if  year= 1979  
gen sampleflag=1 if e(sample)  
for XY in num 1980/2003: quietly  probit acquirordummy ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2  salesgrowth2  
pricerunup sharetumover hMBlsharetumover mergerintensityaltl  cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration  
previousmergers1 if  year= XY\replace sampleflag=1 if e(sample)  
!target!  
replace previousmergers1=previousmergers2 if tdummy2= 1  
quietly probit targetdummy ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2  salesgrowth2 pricerunup sharetumover  
hMBlsharetumover mergerintensityalt1  cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergers1 if year= 1979  
338 ' 
quietly predict pt if e(sample)  
quietly predict xbT if e(sample), xb  
quietly outreg  using "April30rob1T.txt", replace bracket ctitle("4") bdec(4) noaster addstat("Pseudo R squared", e(r2_p), "X2", 
e(chi2), "df'', e(df_m)) tdec(2)  
quietly mfx compute, at(median resourcecapitalmismatch=O hMBlshareturnover=O) nose 
quietly matrix bT1979=e(Xmfx_dydx)'  
quietly matrix medianT1979=e(Xmfx_X)'  
for XY in num 1980/2003: quietly  probit targetdummy ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2  salesgrowth2  
pricerunup sharetumover hMBlsharetumover mergerintensityaltl  cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration  
previousmergers1 if year= XY\quietly predict pttemp if e(sample)\quietly replace pt=pttemp  if year= XY    pt= .\drop  
pttemp\quietly predict xbTtemp if e(sample), xb\quietly replace xbT=xbTtemp  if year= XY    xbT= .\drop xbTtemp\quietly outreg  
using "April30rob1T.txt", append bracket ctitle("XY") bdec(4) noaster addstat("Pseudo R squared", e(r2_p), "X2", e(chi2), "df'',  
e(df_m)) tdec(2)\quietly mfx compute, at(median resourcecapitalmismatch=O hMBlshareturnover=O) nose\quietly matrix 
bTXY =e(Xmfx_dydx)'\quietly matrix medianTXY =e(Xmfx_X)'  
tabstat pa, by(acquirordummy) stats(mean sd p25 p50 p75 n) columns(statistics) longstub  
tabstat pt, by(targetdummy) stats(mean sd p25 p50 p75 n) columns(statistics) longstub  
for XY in num 1979/2003: quietly  probit targetdummy ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2  salesgrowth2  
pricerunup shareturnover hMBlshareturnover mergerintensityaltl  cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration  
previousmergers1 if year= XY\replace sampleflag=1 if e(sample)  
tab tdummy1 if sampleflag= 1  
tab tdummy2 if sampleflag= 1  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\april29annualdatarob 1.dta", replace  
matrix bA=[bA1979]  
339 ' 
for num  1980/2003: matrix bA=[bA, bAX]  
matrix bT=[bT1979]  
for num  1980/2003: matrix bT=[bT, bTX]  
matrix medianA=[medianA1979]  
for num  1980/2003: matrix medianA=[medianA, medianAX]  
matrix  
medianT=[medianT1979[1,1],medianT1979[2,1],medianT1979[3,1],medianT1979[4,1],medianT1979[5,1],medianT1979[6,1],median  
T1979[7,1],medianT1979[8,1],medianT1979[9,1],medianT1979[10,1],medianT1979[11,1],medianT1979[12,1],medianT1979[13,1],0] 
I  
matrix  
medianT1980=[medianT1980[1,1],medianT1980[2,1],medianT1980[3,1],medianT1980[4,1],medianT1980[5,1],medianT1980[6,1],me  
dianT1980[7,1],medianT1980[8,1],medianT1980[9,1],medianT1980[10,1],medianT1980[11,1],medianT1980[12,1],medianT1980[13, 
1],0]'  
for num  1980/2003: matrix medianT=[medianT, medianTX]  
svmat bA, name(aperiod)  
svmat bT, name(tperiod)  
svmat medianA, name(medianaperiod)  
svmat medianT, name(mediantperiod)  
keep aperiod1-aperiod25 tperiod1-tperiod25 medianaperiod1-medianaperiod25 mediantperiod1-mediantperiod25  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\April30marginalcoefficients.dta", replace  
outsheet aperiod1-aperiod25 tperiod1-tperiod25 medianaperiod1-medianaperiod25 mediantperiod1-mediantperiod25 using  
"C: \Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data \April30marginalcoefficientsrob 1. txt", replace  
!transpose data!  
insheet using "C: \Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data \Apri130marginalcoefficientsrob 1. txt", clear  
rename v1  coefficientormedian  
rename v2 tdummy  
rename v3  year  
340 ' 
rename v4 ROA  
rename vS resourcecapitalmismatch  
rename v6 salesshock  
rename v7 salesshock2  
rename v8 salesgrowth2  
rename v9 pricerunup  
rename v10 sharetumover  
rename v11  hMBlsharetumover  
rename v12 mergerintensityaltl  
rename v13  cashratio  
rename v14logassets  
rename v 15 changeinassets  
rename v16 fourfirmconcentration  
rename v17 previousmergers1  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\April30marginalcoefficients.dta", replace  
tabstat ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2 salesgrowth2 pricerunup sharetumover hMBlsharetumover  
mergerintensity cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergers1 if coefficientormedian= "coefficient"    
tdummy= O, stats(mean sd p25 pSO p75 n) columns(statistics) longstub  
tabstat ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2 salesgrowth2 pricerunup sharetumover hMBlsharetumover  
mergerintensity cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergers1 if coefficientormedian= "coefficient"    
tdummy= 1, stats(mean sd p25 pSO p75 n) columns(statistics) longstub  
matrix t=O  
for any ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2 salesgrowth2 pricerunup sharetumover hMBlsharetumover  
mergerintensity cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergers1: ttest X=O if  
coefficientormedian= "coefficient"    tdummy= O\matrix t=(t,r(t))  
matrix t=t'  
matrix list t  
341 ' 
matrix t=O  
for any ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2 salesgrowth2 pricerunup shareturnover hMBlshareturnover  
mergerintensity cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergers 1: ttest X=O if  
coefficientormedian= "coefficient"   tdummy= 1 \matrix t=(t,r(t))  
matrix t=t'  
matrix list t  
! File 6!  
log using C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\0utput\april30.smcl, replace  
!Annual data robustness, Stage 2!  
use "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\april29annualdatarob1.dta", clear  
dropiftdummy1= 2  
tab tdummy1  
!6791 bidders and 3599 targets!  
tab tdummy1 if pa-=.  
!5921 bidders with pal  
tab tdummy1 if pt-=.  
tab tdummy2 if pt-=.  
!3176+194 targets with pt!  
drop if pa= .   pt= .  
!put data into long by tdummy!  
reshape long mergerintensityalt dealnumber tdummy dateannounced numberofannouncementsinyear, i(gvkey fiscalyear) j(doubles)  
tabmiss tdummy  
342 ' 
drop if tdummy= .  
tabtdummy  
!5921 bidder, 3370 target, total=9291!  
keep gvkey cusip tdummy dateannounced pa pt  
gen year=year( dateannounced)  
sort cusip year tdummy  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\may15AnnualRobMerge.dta"  
use "C: \Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\April20secondstage.dta", clear  
drop xbA pt xbT pa  
sort cusip year tdummy  
merge cusip year tdummy using "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\may15AnnualRobMerge.dta"  
tab _merge  
!merged 8332, unmerged pa-pt 2028, total= 10360 due to more than one announcement in year!  
drop if _merge-=3  
gen lambdaA=normden( -pa)/(1-norm( -pa))  
gen lambdaT=normden( -pt)/(1-norm( -pt))  
cd C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Tables  
! acquirers!  
regress carwindow2  lambdaA allequity  if acquirordummy= l    multipleannouncements= l  
outreg lambdaA allequity  using "May15regressionsRobustAnnual.txt", replace bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy  if acquirordummy= l    
multipleannouncements= l  
343 ' 
outreg lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy using "May15regressionsRobustAnnual.txt", 
append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaA allequity  sameindustry samestate publicdummy  if acquirordummy= l    
multipleannouncements= l  
outreg lambdaA allequity  sameindustry samestate publicdummy using "May15regressionsRobustAnnual.txt", append bracket rdec(4) 
bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate  
publicdummy  if acquirordummy= l    multipleannouncements= l  
outreg lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
"May15regressionsRobustAnnual.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2 allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy  if  
e(sample)  
outreg allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
"May15regressionsRobustAnnual.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
tabstat lambdaA if e(sample), stats(mean sd p25 p50 p75 n)  
!economic significance = 48 to 51 basis points!  
!targets!  
regress carwindow2  lambdaT allequity  if targetdummy= l    multipleannouncements= l  
outreg lambdaT allequity  using "May15regressionsRobustAnnual.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy  if targetdummy= l    
multipleannouncements= l  
outreg lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy using "May15regressionsRobustAnnual.txt", 
append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaT allequity  sameindustry samestate publicdummy  if targetdummy= l    multipleannouncements= l  
outreg lambdaT allequity  sameindustry samestate publicdummy using "May15regressionsRobustAnnual.txt", append bracket rdec(4) 
bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
344 ' 
regress carwindow2  lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate  
publicdummy  if targetdummy= l    multipleannouncements= l  
outreg lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
"May15regressionsRobustAnnual.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2 allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy  if  
e(sample)  
outreg allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
"May15regressionsRobustAnnual.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
tabstat lambdaT if e(sample), stats(mean sd p25 p50 p75 n)  
!Robustness, EXECOMP and IRRC data, Section 7.1.1 Stage 1   2!  
use "C: \Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data \april29annualdata.dta", clear  
cd C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Tables  
set more off  
gen acquirordummy=O  
replace acquirordummy=l if tdummyl= O  
gen targetdummy=O  
replace targetdummy=l if tdummyl= l I tdummy2= 1  
gen CEOequity= meanshrown/ meanshrsout  
gen flagEXECOMP=l if meanpercompfromstockop= . I meanretirementyears= . I CEOequity= .  
replace flagEXECOMP=O if flagEXECOMP= .  
tab tdummyl if flagEXECOMP= O  
tab tdummy2 if flagEXECOMP= O  
drop flagEXECOMP  
gen flagiiRC=l if gindex= .  
replace flagiiRC=O if flagiiRC= .  
345 ' 
tab tdummy1 if flagliRC= O  
tab tdummy2 if flagliRC= O  
tab tdummy1 flagiiR.C  
tab tdummy2 flagiiR.C  
drop flagiiR.C  
!acquirers!  
quietly probit acquirordummy ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2  salesgrowth2 pricerunup shareturnover  
hMBlshareturnover mergerintensityaltl  cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergersl  
meanpercompfromstockop meanretirementyears CEOequity gindex if  year= 1993  
gen sampleflag=1 if e(sample)  
quietly predict pa if e(sample)  
quietly predict xbA if e(sample), xb  
quietly outreg  using "Apri130rob2A.txt", replace bracket rdec(4) pvalue ctitle("4") bdec(4) noaster addstat("Pseudo R squared", 
e(r2_p), "X2", e(chi2), "df', e(df_m)) tdec(2)  
quietly nifx compute, at(median resourcecapitalmismatch=O hMBlshareturnover=O) nose  
quietly matrix bA1993=e(Xmfx_dydx)'  
quietly matrix medianA1993=e(Xmfx_X)'  
for XY in any 1995 1998 2000 2002: quietly  probit acquirordummy ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2  
salesgrowth2 pricerunup shareturnover hMBlshareturnover mergerintensityaltl  cashratio logassets changeinassets  
fourfirmconcentration previousmergers1  meanpercompfromstockop meanretirementyears CEOequity gindex if  year= XY\quietly  
predict patemp if e(sample)\quietly replace pa=patemp  if year= XY    pa= .\drop patemp\quietly predict xbAtemp if e(sample),  
xb\quietly replace xbA=xbAtemp  if year= XY    xbA= .\drop xbAtemp\quietly outreg  using "Apri130rob2A.txt", append bracket  
rdec(4) pvalue ctitle("XY") bdec(4) noaster addstat("Pseudo R squared", e(r2_p), "X2", e(chi2), "df", e(df_m)) tdec(2)\quietly mfx  
compute, at(median resourcecapitalmismatch=O hMBlshareturnover=O) nose\quietly matrix bAXY=e(Xmfx_dydx)'\quietly matrix  
medianAXY=e(Xmfx_X)'\replace sampleflag=1 if e(sample)  
346 ' 
!target!  
replace previousmergers 1 =previousmergers2 if tdummy2=  1  
quietly pro bit targetdummy ROA resourcecapitalmismatch sales shock salesshock2  salesgrowth2 pricerunup shareturnover  
hMBlsharetumover mergerintensityaltl  cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergers1  
meanpercompfromstockop meanretirementyears CEOequity gindex if year= 1993  
replace sampleflag=l if e(sample)  
quietly predict pt if e(sample)  
quietly predict xbT if e(sample), xb  
quietly outreg  using "Apri130rob2T.txt", replace bracket rdec(4) pvalue ctitle("4") bdec(4) noaster addstat("Pseudo R squared", 
e(r2_p), "X2", e(chi2), "df', e(df_m)) tdec(2)  
quietly mfx compute, at(median resourcecapitalmismatch=O hMBlsharetumover=O) nose  
quietly matrix bT1993=e(Xmfx_dydx)'  
quietly matrix medianT1993=e(Xmfx_X)'  
for XY in any 1995 1998 2000 2002: quietly  probit targetdummy ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2  
salesgrowth2 pricerunup shareturnover hMBlshareturnover mergerintensityaltl  cashratio logassets changeinassets  
fourfirmconcentratlon previousmergersl  meanpercompfromstockop meanretirementyears CEOequity gindex if year= XY\quietly  
predict pttemp if e(sample)\quietly replace pt=pttemp  if year= XY    pt= .\drop pttemp\quietly predict xbTtemp if e(sample),  
xb\quietly replace xbT=xbTtemp  if year= XY    xbT= .\drop xbTtemp\quietly outreg  using "April30rob2T.txt", append bracket  
rdec(4) pvalue ctitle("XY") bdec(4) noaster addstat("Pseudo R squared", e(r2_p), "X2", e(chi2), "df', e(df_m)) tdec(2)\quietly mfx  
compute, at(median resourcecapitalmismatch=O hMBlsharetumover=O) nose\quietly matrix bTXY=e(Xmfx_dydx)'\quietly matrix  
medianTXY=e(Xmfx_X)'\replace sampleflag=1 if e(sample)  
tabstat pa, by(acquirordummy) stats(mean sd p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 n) columns(statistics) longstub  
tabstat pt, by(targetdummy) stats(mean sd p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 n) columns(statistics) longstub  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\april29annualdatarob2.dta", replace  
matrix bA=[bA1993]  
347 ' 
for XY in any 1995 1998 2000 2002: matrix bA=[bA, bAXY]  
matrix bT=[bT1993]  
matrix bT2002=[bT2002[1,1], bT2002[2,1],bT2002[3,1], bT2002[4,1], bT2002[5,1],  
bT2002[6,1],bT2002[7,1],0,bT2002[8,1],bT2002[9,1],bT2002[10,1],bT2002[11,1],bT2002[12,1],bT2002[13,1],bT2002[14,1],bT2002  
[15,1],bT2002[16,1],bT2002[17,1]]'  
for XY in any 1995 1998 2000 2002: matrix bT=[bT, bTXY]  
matrix medianA=[medianA1993]  
for XY in any 1995 1998 2000 2002: matrix medianA=[medianA, medianAXY]  
matrix medianT=[medianT1993]  
matrix medianT2002=[medianT2002[1,1], medianT2002[2,1],medianT2002[3,1], medianT2002[4,1], medianT2002[5,1],  
medianT2002[6,1],medianT2002[7,1],0,medianT2002[8,1],medianT2002[9,1],medianT2002[10,1],medianT2002[11,1],medianT2002[  
12,1],medianT2002[13,1],medianT2002[14,1],medianT2002[15,1],medianT2002[16,1],medianT2002[17,1]]'  
for XY in any 1995 1998 2000 2002: matrix medianT=[medianT, medianTXY] 
svmat bA, name(aperiod)  
svmat bT, name(tperiod)  
svmat medianA, name(medianaperiod)  
svmat medianT, name(mediantperiod)  
keep aperiod1-aperiod5 tperiod1-tperiod5 medianaperiod1-medianaperiod5 mediantperiod1-mediantperiod5  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\April30marginalcoefficientsrob2.dta", replace  
outsheet aperiod1-aperiod5 tperiod1-tperiod5 medianaperiod1-medianaperiod5 mediantperiod1-mediantperiod5 using  
"C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\April30marginalcoefficientsrob2.txt", replace 
!transpose data!  
insheet using "C: \Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data \Apri130marginalcoefficientsrob2.txt", clear  
rename v1  coefficientormedian  
rename v2 tdummy  
rename v3  year  
rename v4 ROA  
348 ' 
rename v5 resourcecapitalmismatch  
rename v6 salesshock  
rename v7  salesshock2  
rename v8  salesgrowth2  
rename v9 pricerunup  
rename vlO shareturnover  
rename vll hMBlshareturnover  
rename v12 mergerintensityaltl  
rename v13  cashratio  
rename v14logassets  
rename v15 changeinassets  
rename v16 fourfirmconcentration  
rename v17 previousmergersl  
rename v18 meanpercompfromstockop  
rename v19 meanretirementyears  
rename v20 CEOequity  
rename v21  gindex  
gen strlO testtype="robust2"  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\April30marginalcoefficientsrob2.dta", replace  
replace hMBlshareturnover=. if hMBlshareturnover= O   coefficientormedian= "coefficient"  
sort coefficientormedian tdummy year  
mkmat ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2 salesgrowth2 pricerunup shareturnover hMBlsharetumover  
mergerintensity cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergersl meanpercompfromstockop  
meanretirementyears CEOequity gindex if coefficientormedian= "coefficient"    tdummy= O, matrix(biddertable)  
tabstat ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2 salesgrowth2 pricerunup sharetumover hMBlshareturnover  
mergerintensity cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergersl meanpercompfromstockop  
349 ' 
meanretirementyears CEOequity gindex if coefficientormedian= 11coefficient11    tdummy= l, stats(min p25 p50 p75 max)  
columns( statistics) longstub  
matrix t=O  
for any ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2 salesgrowth2 pricerunup shareturnover hMBlshareturnover  
mergerintensity cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergersl meanpercompfromstockop  
meanretirementyears CEOequity gindex: ttest X=O if coefficientormedian= 11coefficient11    tdummy= O\matrix t=(t,r(t))  
matrix t=t'  
matrix list t  
matrix t=O  
for any ROA resourcecapitalmismatch salesshock salesshock2 salesgrowth2 pricerunup shareturnover hMBlshareturnover  
mergerintensity cashratio logassets changeinassets fourfirmconcentration previousmergers 1 meanpercompfromstockop  
meanretirementyears CEOequity gindex: ttest X=O if coefficientormedian= 11coefficient11    tdummy= l \matrix t=(t,r(t))  
matrix t=t'  
matrix list t  
use IIC:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\may3allmarginalcoefficients.dta11 ,  clear  
tabstat R2 X2 if tdummy= O    coefficientormedian= 11coefficient11    testtype= 11robustl II,  statistics( mean sd p25 p50 p75 n)  
columns( statistics) longstub  
tabstat R2 X2 if tdummy= l    coefficientormedian= 11coefficient11    testtype= 11robustl II, statistics(mean sd p25 p50 p75 n)  
columns( statistics) longstub  
gen robltestflag=O if testtype= 11mainll  & coefficientormedian==11median11  
replace robltestflag=l if testtype= 11robust1 11    coefficientormedian= "median11  
ranksum ROA if tdummy= O, by(robltestflag)  
use "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\april29annualdatarob2.dta11 ,  clear  
drop if tdummy1= 2  
350 ' 
tab tdumrny1  
!6791 bidders and 3599 targets!  
tab tdumrny1 if pa-=.  
!552 bidders with pal  
tab tdumrny1 if pt-=.  
tab tdumrny2 ifpt-=.  
!148+17 targets with pt!  
!put data into long by tdumrny!  
reshape long mergerintensityalt dealnumber tdumrny dateannounced numberofannouncementsinyear, i(gvkey fiscalyear) j(doubles)  
tabmiss tdumrny  
drop if tdumrny= .  
tab tdumrny  
!552 bidder, 165 target, total=717!  
keep gvkey cusip tdumrny dateannounced pa pt  
gen year=year( dateannounced)  
sort cusip year tdumrny  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\may15EXECOMPIRRCRobMerge.dta", replace  
use "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data \April20secondstage.dta", clear  
drop xbA pt xbT pa  
sort cusip year tdumrny  
merge cusip year tdumrny using "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\may15EXECOMPIRRCRobMerge.dta"  
tab_merge  
!merged 9510, unmerged pa-pt 2349!  
drop if _merge-=3  
!IRRC AND EXECOMP DATA!  
351 ' 
gen flagEXECOMP=l if meanpercompfromstockop= . I meanretirementyears= . I CEOequity= .  
replace flagEXECOMP=O if flagEXECOMP= . ' 
gen flagiRRC=l if gindex= . ' 
replace flagiRRC=O if flagiRRC= . ' 
tabstat carwindowl carwindow2 carwindow4 carwindow5 if tdummy= O    multipleannouncements= l, statistics(mean sd n) 
columns(statistics) by(flagEXECOMP) longstub  
tabstat carwindowl carwindow2 carwindow4 carwindow5 if tdummy= l  & multipleannouncements==l, statistics(mean sd n)  
columns(statistics) by(flagEXECOMP) longstub  
matrix t=O ' 
matrix z=O ' 
matrix p=O ' 
matrix chi=O ' 
for XY in any carwindowl carwindow2 carwindow4 carwindow5: ttest XY if multipleannouncements= l    tdummy= O,  
by(flagEXECOMP)\matrix t=(t,r(t))\ranksum XY if multipleannouncements= l    tdummy= O, by(flagEXECOMP)\matrix  
z=(z,r(z))\ksmimov XY ifmultipleannouncements= l    tdummy= O, by(flagEXECOMP)\matrix p=(p, r(p))\kwallis XY if  
multipleannouncements= l    tdummy= O, by(flagEXECOMP)\matrix chi=(chi, r(chi2_adj))  
matrix final=(t', z', p', chi')  
matrix list final  
matrix t=O  
matrix z=O  
matrix p=O  
matrix chi=O  
for XY in any carwindowl carwindow2 carwindow4 carwindow5: ttest XY if multipleannouncements= l    tdummy= l,  
by(flagEXECOMP)\matrix t=(t,r(t))\ranksum XY if multipleannouncements= l    tdummy= l, by(flagEXECOMP)\matrix  
. z=(z,r(z))\ksmimov XY ifmultipleannouncements= l    tdummy= l, by(flagEXECOMP)\matrix p=(p, r(p))\kwallis XY if  
multipleannouncements= l    tdummy= l, by(flagEXECOMP)\matrix chi=( chi, r(chi2_adj)) ' 
matrix final=(t', z', p', chi') ' 
matrix list final ' 
352 ' 
tabstat carwindowl carwindow2 carwindow4 carwindow5 if tdummy= O    multipleannouncements= l, statistics(mean sd n)  
columns(statistics) by(flagiRRC) longstub ' 
tabstat carwindowl carwindow2 carwindow4 carwindow5 if tdummy= l    multipleannouncements= l, statistics( mean sd n) ' 
columns(statistics) by(flagiRRC) longstub ' 
matrix t=O ' 
matrix z=O ' 
matrix p=O ' 
matrix chi=O ' 
for XY in any carwindowl carwindow2 carwindow4 carwindow5: ttest XY if multipleannouncements= l  &  tdummy==O,  
by(flagiRRC)\matrix t=(t,r(t))\ranksum XY if multipleannouncements= l    tdummy= O, by(flagiRRC)\matrix z=(z,r(z))\ksmimov  
XY if multipleannouncements= l    tdummy= O, by(flagiRRC)\matrix p=(p, r(p))\kwallis XY if multipleannouncements= l    
tdummy= O, by(flagiRRC)\matrix chi=( chi, r(chi2_adj))  
matrix final=(t', z', p', chi')  
matrix list final  
matrix t=O  
matrix z=O  
matrix p=O  
matrix chi=O  
for XY in any carwindowl carwindow2 carwindow4 carwindow5: ttest XY if multipleannouncements= l    tdummy= l,  
by(flagiRRC)\matrix t=(t,r(t))\ranksum XY if multipleannouncements= l    tdummy= l, by(flagiRRC)\matrix z=(z,r(z))\ksmimov  
XY if multipleannouncements= l    tdummy= l, by(flagiRRC)\matrix p=(p, r(p))\kwallis XY if multipleannouncements= l    
tdummy= l, by(flagiRRC)\matrix chi=( chi, r(chi2_adj))  
·matrix final=(t', z', p', chi')  
matrix list final  
drop flagEXECOMP  
drop flagiRRC  
drop if pa= .    pt= .  
353 ' 
gen flagiRRCEXECOMP=1 if meanpercompfromstockop= . I meanretirementyears= . I CEOequity= . I gindex= . ' 
replace flagiRRCEXECOMP=O if flagiRRCEXECOMP= . ' 
destring valueoftransactionmil, gen( deal value) force ' 
gen relvalue= dealvalue/(sharesoutstanding*priceclose) ' 
tabstat dealvalue allequity if acquirordummy= 1, by(flagiRRCEXECOMP) statistics (mean sd n) ' 
ttest dealvalue if acquirordummy, by(flagiRRCEXECOMP) ' 
tabstat dealvalue allequity if targetdummy= 1, by(flagiRRCEXECOMP) statistics (mean sd n) ' 
gen lambdaA=normden( -pa)/(1-norm( -pa)) ' 
gen lambdaT=normden( -pt)/(1-norm( -pt)) ' 
cd C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Tables ' 
!acquirers! ' 
regress carwindow2  lambdaA allequity  if acquirordummy= 1    multipleannouncements= 1 ' 
outreg lambdaA allequity  using "June13regressionsRobustExecompiRRC.txt", replace bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2) ' 
regress carwindow2  lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy  if acquirordummy= 1   ' 
multipleannouncements= 1  
outreg lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy using  
· "June13regressionsRobustExecompiRRC.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaA allequity  sameindustry samestate publicdummy  if acquirordummy= 1    
multipleannouncements= 1  
outreg lambdaA allequity  sameindustry samestate publicdummy using "June13regressionsRobustExecompiRRC.txt", append bracket 
rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate  
publicdummy  if acquirordummy= 1    multipleannouncements= 1  
outreg lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
"June13regressionsRobustExecompiRRC.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
354 ' 
regress carwindow2 allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy  if  
e(sample)  
outreg allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
"June13regressionsRobustExecompiRRC.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
tabstat lambdaA if e(sample), stats(mean sd p25 p50 p75 n)  
!economic significance = 48 to 51  basis points!  
!targets!  
regress carwindow2  lambdaT allequity  if targetdummy==l  & multipleannouncements==l  
outreg lambdaT allequity  using "June13regressionsRobustExecompiRRC.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy  if targetdummy= l    
multipleannouncements=  1  
outreg lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy using  
"June13regressionsRobustExecompiRRC.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaT allequity  sameindustry samestate publicdummy  if targetdummy= l  & multipleannouncements==l  
outreg lambdaT allequity  sameindustry samestate publicdummy using "Junel3regressionsRobustExecompiRRC.txt", append bracket  
rdec( 4) bdec( 4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate  
publicdummy  if targetdummy= l  & multipleannouncements==l  
outreg lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
"Junel3regressionsRobustExecompiRRC.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2 allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy  if  
e(sample)  
outreg allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
"Junel3regressionsRobustExecompiRRC.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
tabstat lambdaT if e(sample), stats(mean sd p25 p50 p75 n)  
355 ' 
! standard errors! ' 
! acquirers! ' 
regress carwindow2  lambdaA allequity  if acquirordummy= l    multipleannouncements= l ' 
outreg lambdaA allequity  using "June13regressionsRobustExecompiRRCl.txt", replace bracket rdec(4) se bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2) ' 
regress carwindow2  lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy  if acquirordummy= l   ' 
multipleannouncements=  1 ' 
outreg lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy using ' 
"June13regressionsRobustExecompiRRCl.txt", append bracket rdec(4) se bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2) ' 
regress carwindow2  lambdaA allequity  sameindustry samestate publicdummy  if acquirordummy= l   ' 
multipleannouncements= l ' 
outreg lambdaA allequity  sameindustry samestate publicdummy using "June13regressionsRobustExecompiRRCl.txt", append '
bracket rdec(4) se bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2) ' 
· regress carwindow2  lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate  
publicdummy  if acquirordummy= l    multipleannouncements= l  
outreg lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
"June13regressionsRobustExecompiRRCl.txt", append bracket rdec(4) se bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2 allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy  if  
e(sample)  
outreg allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
"June13regressionsRobustExecompiRRCl.txt", append bracket rdec(4) se bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
tabstat lambdaA if e(sample), stats(mean sd p25 p50 p75 n)  
!economic significance = 48 to 51  basis points!  
!targets!  
regress carwindow2  lambdaT allequity  if targetdummy= l  & multipleannouncements==l ' 
outreg lambdaT allequity  using "June13regressionsRobustExecompiRRCl.txt", append bracket rdec(4) se bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2) ' 
356 ' 
regress carwindow2  lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy  if targetdummy= l    
multipleannouncements= l  
outreg lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy using  
"June13regressionsRobustExecompiRRCl.txt", append bracket rdec(4) se bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaT allequity  sameindustry samestate publicdummy  if targetdummy= l    multipleannouncements=l  
outreg lambdaT allequity  sameindustry samestate publicdummy using "June13regressionsRobustExecompiRRCl.txt", append 
bracket rdec( 4) se bdec( 4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate  
publicdummy  if targetdummy= l    multipleannouncements= l  
outreg lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
"June13regressionsRobustExecompiRRCl.txt", append bracket rdec(4) se bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2 allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy  if  
e(sample)  
outreg allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
"June13regressionsRobustExecompiRRCl.txt", append bracket rdec(4) se bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
tabstat lambdaT if e(sample), stats(mean sd p25 p50 p75 n)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaT allequity  iftargetdummy==l    multipleannouncements= l  
gen flagl=l if e(sample)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaA allequity  if acquirordummy= l    multipleannouncements= l  
replace flagl=l if e(sample)  
tabstat sameindustry samestate publicdummy defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy if flagl= l,stats(mean sd  
p25 p50 p75 n) longstub columns(statistics)  
drop flagl  
! File 7!  
357 ' 
! Robustness, industry fixed effects, Section 7.1.3!  
use "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\December20COMPUST ATCRSPSDCmerged.dta", clear  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\April14COMPUSTATCRSPSDCmerged.dta", replace  
!I need unique gvkey yearquarterind. However I have firms making bids and recieving bids with same gvkey in the same quarter!  
bysort yearquarterind gvkey: egen multipleanngvkeyinquarter=count(_n)  
tab multipleanngvkeyinquarter tdummy  
!42 bidders and 31  targets, 23 nonmerging!  
list gvkey cusip fyr yearquarterind netsales coname if multipleanngvkeyinquarter= 2    tdummy= 2, nodisplay  
!Drop the firms which make and recieve bids in the same quarter for now. Think about it later!  
drop if multipleanngvkeyinquarter= 2  
tabtdummy  
!8092 bidders , 3855 targets , 550,711 no merger firm quarters!  
append using C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\SDCunmatchedfirmsMay52006.dta  
tab tdummy  
!17681 bidders , 18079 targets , 550,711 no merger firm quarters!  
keep SDCsic cusip gvkey dnum fyr fiscalyear fiscalquarter fqenddt fqbegdt coname tdummy dealnumber11 dealnumber21  
dealnumber31 dealnumber41 dealnumber51 dealnumber61 dateannounced1 multipleannouncementsbytdummy1  
multipleannouncements1 dealnumber12 dealnumber22 dealnumber32 dealnumber42 dealnumber52 dealnumber62 dateannounced2  
multipleannouncementsbytdummy2 multipleannouncements2 dealnumber23 dealnumber23 dealnumber33 dealnumber43  
dealnumber53 dealnumber63 dateannounced3 multipleannouncementsbytdummy3 multipleannouncements3 dealnumber11  
dealnumber21 dealnumber31 dealnumber41 dealnumber51 dealnumber61 multipleannouncementsbytdummy4  
multipleannouncements4 multipleannouncements4 name statementmatchmonth year month dealrtumber1 dealnumber2 dealnumber3  
dealnumber4 dealnumber5 dealnumber6 dateannounced  
358 ' 
gen newyear=year(fqenddt)  
gen newquarter=quarter(fqenddt)  
replace newquarter=quarter( dateannounced)-1 if new quarter==.  
replace newyear=year( dateannounced) if newyear= .    newquarter-=0  
replace newyear=year( dateannounced)-1 if newyear= .    newquarter= O  
replace newquarter=4 if newquarter= O  
tabmiss SDCsic if tdummy= O I tdummy==1  
! all nonmissing!  
tabmiss dnum if tdummy= 2  
!all nonmissing!  
replace SDCsic="9999" if SDCsic= "999D" ISDCsic=="999E"  
replace SDCsic="499" if SDCsic= "499A"  
destring SDCsic, replace  
gen flag=O if SDCsic= dnum    SDCsic-=.    dnum-=.  
replace flag=l if SDCsic-=dnum    SDCsic-=.    dnum-=.  
tab flag  
!6231 disagreement!  
drop flag  
replace SDCsic=SDCsic*10 if SDCsic~1000 
replace dnum=dnum* 10 if dnum<1000  
gen SDCsic2=int(SDCsic/100)  
gen CRSPsic2=int( dnum/1 00)  
gen flag=O if SDCsic2= CRSPsic2   SDCsic2-=.   CRSPsic2-=.  
replace flag=1 if SDCsic2-=CRSPsic2    SDCsic2-=.    CRSPsic2-=.  
tab flag  
359 ' 
!2494 disagreement, 9466 agreed, 20.88% disagree!  
drop flag  
gen finalsic=CRSPsic2 if tdummy= 2  
replace finalsic=SDCsic2 if tdummy-=2  
bysort newyear newquarter finalsic: egen numberoffirms=count(_n)  
replace finalsic=int(finalsic/10)*10 if numberoffirms<5  
drop numberoffirms  
replace finalsic=99 if finalsic= 90  
bysort newyear newquarter finalsic: egen numberoffirms=count(_n)  
tab numberoffirms  
drop numberoffirms  
!lets look at years!  
tab tdummy newyear if newyear<1990  
drop if newyear<1977  
tab tdummy newyear if newyear> 1989  
drop if newyear= 2005  
drop ifnewyear==1977    (newquarter= 1lnewquarter= 2)  
egen yearquarterind=group(newyear newquarter)  
tab newyear newquarter if yearquarterind= 1 I yearquarterind= 110  
!1  (1977/1) to 112 (2004/4)!  
tab yearquarterind tdummy if yearquarterind<20 I yearquarterind> 105  
!until yearquarterind=12, less than bidders and targets in each quarter and in yearquarterind==110, only 9 bidders!  
! Pool quarters 1-4 (77-3 to 78-2), 5-8 (78-3 to 79-2), 9-12 (79-3 to 80-2) into one pool. Pool the 4th quarter of 2004 into 3rd quarter  
since there are only 9 bidders and no targets!  
egen yearquarterindadj=group(newyear newquarter)if yearquarterind>9  
replace yearquarterindadj=. if yearquarterindadj= 1 I yearquarterindadj= 2 lyearquarterindadj==3  
360 ' 
·replace yearquarterindadj=1 if yearquarterindadj= .    (yearquarterind= 11 yearquarterind==2lyearquarterind= 3  
lyearquarterind= 4) ' 
replace yearquarterindadj=2 if yearquarterindadj= .    (yearquarterind= 5 I yearquarterind= 6 lyearquarterind==7 ' 
lyearquarterind= 8) ' 
replace yearquarterindadj=3 if yearquarterindadj= .    (yearquarterind= 9 I yearquarterind= lO lyearquarterind==11 ' 
lyearquarterind=  12) ' 
replace yearquarterindadj=lOO if yearquarterindadj= 101 ' 
tab newyear newquarter if yearquarterindadj<5 I yearquarterindadj>99 ' 
tabtdummy ' 
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\May52006COMPUSTATCRSPSDCmerged.dta", replace  
tab finalsic, gen(inddummy)  
cd C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Tables ' 
set more off ' 
gen acquirordummy=O ' 
replace acquirordummy=1 if tdummy= O ' 
gen targetdummy=O ' 
replace targetdummy=1 if tdummy= 1 ' 
!acquiror!  
quietly probit acquirordummy inddummy1-inddummy57 if  yearquarterindadj= 1  
quietly predict pa if e(sample)  
quietly predict xbA if e(sample), xb  
quietly outreg  using "May5Robust3A.txt", replace bracket ctitle("1 ") bdec(4) noaster addstat("Pseudo R squared", e(r2_p), "X2",  
e(chi2), "elf", e(df_m)) tdec(2) ' 
quietly mfx compute, at(zero) nose ' 
361 ' 
quietly matrix bAl=e(Xmfx_dydx)'  
quietly matrix medianAl=e(Xmfx_X)'  
;· & for XY in num 2/100: quietly  probit acquirordummy inddummyl-inddummy57 if  yearquarterindadj= XY\quietly predict patemp if  
e(sample)\quietly replace pa=patemp  if yearquarterindadj= XY    pa= .\drop patemp\quietly predict xbAtemp if e(sample),  
xb\quietly replace xbA=xbAtemp  if yearquarterindadj= XY    xbA= .\drop xbAtemp\quietly outreg  using "May5Robust3A.txt",  
append bracket ctitle("XY") bdec(4) noaster addstat("Pseudo R squared", e(r2_p), "X2", e(chi2), "df', e(df_m)) tdec(2)\quietly mfx  
compute, at(zero) nose\quietly matrix bAXY=e(Xmfx_dydx)'\quietly matrix medianAXY=e(Xmfx_X)'  
!target!  
probit targetdummy inddummyl-inddummy57 if yearquarterindadj= 5  
quietly predict pt if e(sample)  
quietly predict xbT if e(sample), xb  
quietly outreg  using "May5Robust3T.txt", replace bracket ctitle("4") bdec(4) noaster addstat("Pseudo R squared", e(r2_p), "X2", 
e(chi2), "df", e(df_m)) tdec(2) ' 
quietly mfx compute, at( zero) nose ' 
quietly matrix bTl=e(Xmfx_dydx)' ' 
quietly matrix medianTl=e(Xmfx_X)' ' 
for XY in num 21100: quietly  probit targetdummy inddummyl-inddummy57 if yearquarterindadj= XY\quietly predict pttemp if  
e(sample)\quietly replace pt=pttemp  if yearquarterindadj= XY    pt= .\drop pttemp\quietly predict xbTtemp if e(sample), xb\quietly  
replace xbT=xbTtemp  if yearquarterindadj= XY    xbT= .\drop xbTtemp\quietly outreg  using "May5Robust3T.txt", append bracket  
ctitle("XY") bdec(4) noaster addstat("Pseudo R squared", e(r2_p), "X2", e(chi2), "df', e(df_m)) tdec(2)\quietly mfx compute, at(zero)  
nose\quietly matrix bTXY=e(Xmfx_dydx)'\quietly matrix medianTXY=e(Xmfx_X)'  
tabstat pa pt, by(tdummy) stats(mean sd p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 n) columns( statistics) longstub  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\May52006COMPUSTATCRSPSDCmerged.dta", replace  
drop if tdummy= 2  
362 ' 
keep cusip gvkey dateannounced1  
for num 1/100: svmat bAX, name(aperiodX)  
for num 11100:  svmat bTX, name(TperiodX)  
for num 1/100: rename aperiodX1 aperiodX  
for num 11100: rename TperiodX1 TperiodX  
keep aperiod1-aperiod100 Tperiod1-TperiodlOO  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\INDROBUSTNESSmarginalcoefficients.dta", replace  
outsheet aperiod1-aperiod100 Tperiod1-TperiodlOO using  
"C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\INDROBUSTNESSmarginalcoefficients.txt", replace  
use "E:\May52006COMPUSTATCRSPSDCmerged.dta", clear  
tab tdummy if pa -=.  
tab tdummy if pt -=.  
!17,681 acquirers, 18,079 targets 436463 nonmerging!  
!SIC disagreeement!  
gen SICsameflag=1 if SDCsic2=  CRSPsic2   tdummy-=2   (SDCsic2-=.   CRSPsic2-=.)  
replace SICsameflag=O if SDCsic2-=CRSPsic2   tdummy-=2   (SDCsic2-=.   CRSPsic2-=.)  
tab SICsameflag  
!2494 not matching, 9453 matching!  
sort yearquarterind cusip tdummy  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\lndRobustnessData.dta", replace  
drop if tdummy= 2  
tabtdummy  
!17,681 acquirers, 18,079 targets!  
363 ' 
!we have multiple announcements in data in the samequarter!  
drop inddummy1-inddummy58  
tabmiss dateannounced dateannounced1 dateannounced2 dateannounced3  
count if dateannounced= .  &dateannounced1= .  & dateannounced2==.  & dateannounced3==.  
!0!  
gen yeara=year( dateannounced)  
for any dateannounced1 dateannounced2 dateannounced3: replace yeara=year(X) if yeara= .  
gen montha=month( dateannounced)  
for any dateannounced1 dateannounced2 dateannounced3: replace montha=month(X) if montha= .  
keep  cusip gvkey dnum coname fiscal year fiscalquarter fqenddt fqbegdt tdummy name statementmatchmonth SDCsic2 CRSPsic2  
finalsic yearquarterind yearquarterindadj acquirordummy targetdummy pa xbA pt xbT yeara montha  
rename cusip cusip6  
gen length=length(cusip6)  
gen str8 cusip=cusip6  
replace cusip="OOO"+cusip6 if length= 3  
replace cusip="OO"+cusip6 if length= 4  
replace cusip="O"+cusip6 if length= 5  
replace cusip=cusip6+"10"  
sort yeara montha cusip  
save "C: \Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data \lndRobustnessDatamerge.dta", replace  
insheet using "C: \Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\EventusOutApril202006.txt", clear  
tabmiss cusip  
!11,325 bidders and targets, 12174-11325=849 missing!  
gen str6 cusip6=slibstr(cusip,1,6)  
gen yeara=int( eventdat/1 0000)  
gen montha=int( eventdat/100)-yeara * 100  
sort yeara montha cusip  
364 ' 
merge yeara montha cusip using "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\lndRobustnessDatamerge.dta"  
tab _merge  
tab _merge tdummy  
!1043 unmatched fromEVENTUS, 10,282 matched!  
keep if _merge= 3  
drop_merge  
drop weightl weight2 weight3 weight4 weightS weight6 length  
sort eventdat tdummy  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\lndRobustnessDatamerge.dta", replace  
in sheet using "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data \Dec 122005outputSDC.txt", clear  
tabmiss dealnumber dateannounced  
drop if dateannounced= ""  
tabmiss dealnumber dateannounced  
!18,325 deals!  
gen str1 onedigitsica=substr(acquirorprimarysic,1,1)  
gen str1 onedigitsict=substr(targetprimarysic,1,1)  
drop if onedigitsica= "6"  
drop if onedigitsict= "6"  
drop onedigitsict onedigitsica  
tabmiss dealnumber dateannounced  
!18272 deals!  
gen dateannounced1=date(dateannounced, "mdy")  
format dateannounced1 %d.N/D/Y  
gen dateeffective1=date(dateeffective, "mdy")  
format dateeffective1 %d.N/D/Y  
gen datewithdrawn1=date(datewithdrawn, "mdy")  
format datewithdrawn1 %dN/D/Y  
365 ' 
drop dateannounced datewithdrawn dateeffective  
rename dateannounced1  dateannounced  
rename dateeffective1  dateeffective  
rename datewithdrawn1 datewithdrawn  
gen sameacquirortargetcusip=match( acquirorcusip,targetcusip)  
tab sameacquirortargetcusip  
!check if acquiror and target cusip same, 41  with same!  
list targetname acquirorname dealnumber if sameacquirortargetcusip= 1  
!checked names, acquiror and target names and cusips same, hence drop these deals!  
drop if sameacquirortargetcusip= 1  
drop sameacquirortargetcusip  
tabmiss dealnumber  
!18,231 deals!  
bysort acquirorcusip dateannounced: egen multipleacquirorannouncements=count(_n)  
bysort targetcusip dateannounced: egen multipletargetannouncements=count(_n)  
tab multipleacquirorannouncements  
!multiple acquiror announcements 249 firms with 2 ann. (249*2=498 double counts), 22 with 3, 6 with 4, 3 with 5, 2 with 6!  
tab multipletargetannouncements  
!multiple target announcements  54 firms with 2 (54*2=108 multiples), 1 with 3, 3 with 4!  
drop multipleacquirorannouncements multipletargetannouncements  
gen sameindustry=match( acquirorprimarysiccode, targetprimarysiccode)  
tab sameindustry  
!make a long list of acquirers and targets with identifier tdummy=O if acquirer and tdummy=1 if target!  
rename targetname name1  
rename acquirorname nameO  
rename acquirorcusip cusipO  
rename targetcusip cusip1  
366 ' 
rename acqtickersymbol tickerO ' 
rename targettickersymbol tickerl ' 
rename acquirorprimarysiccode siccodeO ' 
rename targetprimarysiccode siccode1 ' 
rename targetpublicstatus publicstatus1 ' 
rename acqpublicstatus publicstatusO ' 
rename acqclosingprice1 daypriortoann price 1 daypriortoannO ' 
rename targetclosingprice1daypriortoann price1daypriortoann1 ' 
rename acqclosingprice1 wkpriortoann price1 wkpriortoannO ' 
rename targetclosingprice1 weekpriortoan price1 wkpriortoann1 ' 
rename acquirorclosingprice 1 dayafterann price 1dayafterann0 ' 
rename targetclosingprice 1dayafterannda price1dayafterann 1 ' 
rename acquirorclosingprice1 weekafteran pricel weekafterannO ' 
rename targetclosingprice1 weekafterannd price1 weekafterann1 ' 
rename acquirorclosingpriceatann priceatannO ' 
rename targetclosingpriceatanndate priceatann 1 ' 
reshape long name cusip ticker siccode publicstatus price1daypriortoann price1 wkpriortoann price1dayafterann pricel weekafterann  
priceatann, i(dealnumber) j(tdummy)  
tabmiss dealnumber  
tab tdummy  
!36,462 bidders and targets; 18231 each!  
gen year1=year(dateannounced)  
gen month1=month( dateannounced)  
· gen dayl=day(dateannounced)  
gen str2 months=string(month1)  
gen length=length(months)  
replace months="O"+months if length= 1  
367 ' 
drop length  
gen str2 days=string(day1)  
gen length= length( days)  
replace days="O"+days if length= 1  
drop length  
gen str4 years=string(year 1)  
gen str8 eventdat=years+months+days  
drop year1  month1 day1  years months days  
destring eventdat, replace force  
sort eventdat tdummy  
merge eventda tdummy using "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\lndRobustnessDatamerge.dta"  
tab_merge  
! 12,035 1 (master unmatched) and 24,427 matched, EXACT!  
drop if _merge= 1  
drop_merge  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\lndRobustnessDatamerge.dta", replace  
!VARIABLES!  
gen defensedummy=O  
replace defensedummy=1 if defense= "Yes"  
gen HotileorUnsolAttitude=O  
replace HotileorUnsolAttitude=1 if attitude= "Hostile" I attitude= "Unsolic."  
gen targetbankruptdummy=O  
replace targetbankruptdummy=1 if targetbankrupt= "Yes"  
gen allequity=O  
replace allequity=1 if ofstock= lOO  
!FIT!  
gen publicdummy=O  
368 ' 
replace publicdummy=l if publicstatus= "Public"  
gen samestate=O  
replace samestate=l if intrastate= "Yes"  
sort dealnumber  
save "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\IndRobustnessDatamerge.dta", replace  
gen lambdaA=normden( -pa)/(1-norm( -pa))  
gen lambdaT=normden( -pt)/(1-norm( -pt))  
bysort cusip tdummy dateannounced: egen multipleannouncements=count(_n)  
egen medianpa=median(pa) if multipleannouncements= l  & lambdaA-=.& tdummy==O  
gen anticipateda50=0 if pa<medianpa  & multipleannouncements==l  & lambdaA-=.& tdummy==O  
replace anticipateda50=1 if pa>medianpa  &multipleannouncements= l  & lambdaA-=.& tdummy==O  
drop medianpa  
tabstat carwindowl carwindow2 carwindow3 carwindow4 carwindow5 if multipleannouncements= l  & lambdaA-=.& tdummy==O,  
stats(mean sd p25 p50 p75 n) columns(statistics) longstub by(anticipateda50)  
!acquirers!  
cd C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Tables  
regress carwindow2  lambdaA allequity  if acquirordummy= l  & multipleannouncements==l  
outreg lambdaA allequity  using "INDrobustnessregressionsJune13.txt", replace bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy  if acquirordummy= l    
multipleannouncements= l  
outreg lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy using  
"INDrobustnessregressionsJune13.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaA allequity  sameindustry samestate publicdummy  if acquirordummy= l    
multipleannouncements= l  
369 ' 
outreg lambdaA allequity  sameindustry samestate publicdummy using "INDrobustnessregressionsJune13.txt", append bracket 
rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate  
publicdummy  if acquirordummy= l    multipleannouncements= l  
outreg lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
"INDrobustnessregressionsJune13.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2 allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy  if  
e(sample)  
outreg allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
"INDrobustnessregressionsJune13.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2) 
tabstat lambdaA if e(sample), stats(mean sd p25 p50 p75 n)  
!targets!  
regress carwindow2  lambdaT allequity  if targetdummy= l    multipleannouncements= l  
outreg lambdaT allequity  using "INDrobustnessregressionsJune13.txt'\ append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy  if targetdummy= l    
multipleannouncements=  1  
outreg lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy using "INDrobustnessregressionsJune13.txt", 
append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaT allequity  sameindustry samestate publicdummy  if targetdummy= l  & multipleannouncements==l  
outreg lambdaT allequity  sameindustry samestate publicdummy using "INDrobustnessregressionsJune13.txt", append bracket rdec(4) 
bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate  
publicdummy  if targetdummy= l    multipleannouncements= l  
outreg lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
"INDrobustnessregressionsJune13.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
370 ' 
regress carwindow2 allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy  if  
e(sample)  
outreg allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
"INDrobustnessregressionsJune13.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
tabstat lambdaT if e(sample), stats(mean sd p25 p50 p75 n)  
!se!  
! acquirers!  
cd C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Tables  
regress carwindow2  lambdaA allequity  if acquirordummy= 1   multipleannouncements= 1  
outreg lambdaA allequity  using "INDrobustnessregressionsJune13_l.txt", replace bracket rdec(4) se bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy  ifacquirordummy= 1    
multipleannouncements=  1  
outreg lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy using  
"INDrobustnessregressionsJune13_l.txt", append bracket rdec(4) se bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaA allequity  sameindustry samestate publicdummy  if acquirordummy==1    
multipleannouncements=  1  
outreg lambdaA allequity  sameindustry samestate publicdummy using "INDrobustnessregressionsJune13_l.txt", append bracket  
rdec(4) se bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate  
publicdummy  if acquirordummy= 1  & multipleannouncements==1  
outreg lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
"INDrobustnessregressionsJune13_l.txt", append bracket rdec(4) se bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2 allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy  if  
e(sample)  
outreg allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
"INDrobustnessregressionsJune13_l.txt", append bracket rdec(4) se bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
371 ' 
tabstat lambdaA if e(sample), stats(mean sd p25 p50 p75 n)  
!targets!  
regress carwindow2  lambdaT allequity.  if targetdummy= l    multipleannouncements= l  
outreg lambdaT allequity  using "INDrobustnessregressionsJune13_l.txt", append bracket rdec(4) se bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy  if targetdummy= l    
multipleannouncements= l  
outreg lambdaT allequity  defensedummy ·HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy using  
"INDrobustnessregressionsJune13_l.txt", append bracket rdec(4) se bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaT allequity  sameindustry samestate publicdummy  if targetdummy= l    multipleannouncements= l  
outreg lambdaT allequity  sameindustry samestate publicdummy using "INDrobustnessregressionsJune13_l.txt", append bracket 
rdec(4) se bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate  
publicdummy  if targetdummy= l    multipleannouncements= l  
outreg lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
"INDrobustnessregressionsJune13_l.txt", append bracket rdec(4) se bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2 allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy  if  
e(sample)  
outreg allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
"INDrobustnessregressionsJune13_l.txt", append bracket rdec(4) se bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
tabstat lambdaT if e(sample), stats(mean sd p25 p50 p75 n)  
· ! File 8!  
! Robustness, Alternative event windows, Section 7.2.1!  
use "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data \April20secondstage.dta", clear  
372 ' 
cd C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Tables  
gen lambdaA=normden(-pa)/(1-norm(-pa))  
gen lambdaT=normden( -pt)/(1-norm( -pt))  
regress carwindowl  lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate  
publicdummy  if acquirordummy= l    multipleannouncements= l  
outreg lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
"June13regressionsRobCAR.txt", replace bracket bdec(4) 3aster  rdec(4)  tdec(2)  
tabstat lambdaA if e(sample), stats(sd)  
for any carwindow2 carwindow4 carwindow5: regress X lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude  
targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy  if acquirordummy= l    multipleannouncements= l \tabstat lambdaA  
if e(sample), stats(sd)\outreg lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry  
samestate publicdummy using "June13regressionsRobCAR.txt", append bracket bdec(4) 3aster  rdec(4)  tdec(2)  
for any carwindowl carwindow2 carwindow4 carwindow5: regress X lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude  
targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy  if targetdummy= l    multipleannouncements= l \tabstat lambdaT if  
e(sample), stats(sd)\outreg lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate  
publicdummy using "June13regressionsRobCAR.txt", append bracket bdec(4) 3aster  rdec(4)  tdec(2)  
for any carwindowl carwindow2 carwindow4 carwindow5: regress X lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude  
targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy  if acquirordummy= l    multipleannouncements= l \tabstat lambdaA  
. if e(sample), stats(sd)  
for any carwindowl carwindow2 carwindow4 carwindow5: regress X lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude  
targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy  if targetdummy= l    multipleannouncements= l \tabstat lambdaT if  
e(sample), stats(sd)  
!Robustness for multiple announcements, Section 7.2.2!  
use "C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\April20secondstage.dta", clear  
373 ' 
gen lambdaA=normden(-pa)/(1-norm(-pa)) ' 
gen lambdaT=normden( -pt)/(1-norm(-pt)) ' 
drop flag ' 
gen flag=1 if ROA-=.    resourcecapitalmismatch-=.    salesshock-=.    salesshock2-=.    pricerunup-=.    shareturnover-=.   ' 
hMBlsharetumover-=.    mergerintensityaltl-=.    cashratio-=.    logassets-=.    changeinassets-=.    fourfirmconcentration-=.   ' 
previousmergers-=. ' 
replace flag=O if flag= . ' 
tab multipleannouncements tdummy ' 
gen multipleannouncementsdummy=O if multipleannouncements= 1 ' 
replace multipleannouncementsdummy=1 if multipleannouncements> 1 ' 
tabstat carwindow1 carwindow2 carwindow4 carwindow5 if tdummy= O   flag= 1, stats(mean sd p25 p50 p75 n) columns( statistics)  
longstub by(multipleannouncementsdummy)  
tabstat carwindow1 carwindow2 carwindow4 carwindow5 if tdummy= 1    flag= 1, stats(mean sd p25 p50 p75 n) columns(statistics)  
longstub by(multipleannouncementsdummy)  
matrix z=O  
matrix p=O  
·matrix chi=O  
matrix pt=O  
for any carwindow2 carwindow2 carwindow4 carwindow5: ranksum X if flag= 1    tdummy= O,  
by(multipleannouncementsdummy)\ matrix z=(z,r(z))\ksmimov X if flag= 1   tdummy= O,  
by(multipleannouncementsdummy)\matrix p=(p, r(p ))\kwallis X if flag= 1    tdummy= O, by(multipleannouncementsdummy)\matrix  
chi=(chi, r(chi2_adj))\ttest X if flag= 1    tdummy= O, by(multipleannouncementsdummy)\matrix pt=(pt, r(p))  
matrix final=(z', p', chi',pt')  
matrix list final  
matrix z=O  
matrix p=O  
374 ' 
matrix chi=O  
matrix pt=O  
for any carwindow2 carwindow2 carwindow4 carwindow5: ranksum X if flag= l  & tdummy==l,  
by(multipleannouncementsdummy)\ matrix z=(z,r(z))\ksmimov X if flag=  I    tdummy= l,  
by(multipleannouncementsdummy)\matrix p=(p, r(p))\kwallis X if flag= l    tdummy= l, by(multipleannouncementsdummy)\matrix  
chi=(chi, r(chi2_adj))\ttest X if flag= l    tdummy= l, by(multipleannouncementsdummy)\matrix pt=(pt, r(p))  
matrix final=(z', p', chi', pt')  
matrix list final  
for any carwindow2 carwindow2 carwindow3 carwindow5: ttest X=O if multipleannouncements= l  tdummy==O  
for any carwindow2 carwindow2 carwindow3 carwindow4 carwindow5: ttest X=O if multipleannouncements= l  tdummy==l  
for any carwindow2 carwindow2 carwindow3 carwindow4 carwindow5: ranksum X if multipleannouncements= l    flag=  I,  
by(tdummy)\ksmimov X if multipleannouncements= l    flag=  I, by(tdummy)\kwallis X if multipleannouncements= l    flag=  I, 
by(tdummy)  
cd C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Tables  
regress carwindow2 lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate  
publicdummy if acquirordummy= l    multipleannouncementsdummy= O  
outreg lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
"June13regressionsMultAnn.txt", replace bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
tabstat lambdaA if e(sample), stats(sd)  
gen bidderflag=O if e(sample)  
regress carwindow2 lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate  
publicdummy if acquirordummy= l    multipleannouncementsdummy= l  
outreg lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
"June13regressionsMultAnn.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
tabstat lambdaA if e(sample), stats(sd)  
375 ' 
replace bidderflag=Uf e(sample)  
regress carwindow2 lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate  
publicdummy if acquirordummy= l  
tabstat lambdaA if e(sample), stats(sd)  
outreg lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
"June13regressionsMultAnn.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2 lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate  
publicdummy if targetdummy= l    multipleannouncementsdummy= O  
tabstat lambdaT if e(sample), stats(sd)  
outreg lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
"June13regressionsMultAnn.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
gen targetflag=O if e(sample)  
regress carwindow2 lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate  
publicdummy if targetdummy= l    multipleannouncementsdummy= l  
tabstat lambdaT if e(sample), stats(sd)  
outreg lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
"June13regressionsMultAnn.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
replace targetflag=l if e(sample)  
regress carwindow2 lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate  
publicdummy if targetdummy= l  
tabstat lambdaT if e(sample), stats(sd)  
outreg lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
"June13regressionsMultAnn.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
ttest pa if tdummy= O    flag= l, by(bidderflag)  
ttest pt if tdummy= l    flag=  I, by(targetflag)  
ttest carwindow2 iftdummy==O    flag= l, by(bidderflag)  
ttest carwindow2 iftdummy= l    flag= l, by(targetflag)  
376 ' 
!Robustness for multiple announcements, Section 7.2.3!  
use IIC:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data \April20secondstage.dta II,  clear  
gen lambdaA=nonnden(-pa)/(1-nonn( -pa))  
gen lambdaT=nonnden(-pt)/(1-nonn( -pt))  
gen index=index( valueoftransactionmil, 11 , 11  )  
gen str30 dealvalue=valueoftransactionmil if index= O  
replace dealvalue=substr( valueoftransactionmil, 1 ,index -1 )+substr( valueoftransactionmil,index + 1,.) if index -=0  
destring dealvalue, replace  
replace dealvalue=dealvalue/1000  
gen relvalue=dealvalue*1000/(priceclose*sharesoutstanding)  
cd C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Tables  
!acquirers!  
regress carwindow2  lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate  
publicdummy  if acquirordummy= 1    multipleannouncements= 1  
outreg lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
11june13regressionsREL V ALUE.txt11 ,  replace bracket rdec( 4) bdec( 4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
tabstat lambdaA if e(sample), stats(mean sd p25 p50 p75 n)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate  
publicdummy dealvalue relvalue  if acquirordummy= 1  & multipleannouncements==1  
outreg lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy  
dealvalue relvalue using 11june13regressionsRELV ALUE.txt11 ,  append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
tabstat lambdaA if e(sample), stats(mean sd p25 p50 p75 n)  
377 ' 
!economic significance .1320974(sd)*3.66 to 3.83 = 48 to 51 basis points!  
!targets!  
regress carwindow2  lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate  
publicdummy  if targetdummy= l    multipleannouncements= l  
outreg lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
11june13regressionsRELVALUE.txt11 ,  append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
tabstat lambdaT if e(sample), stats(mean sd p25 p50 p75 n)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate  
publicdummy deal value relvalue  if targetdummy= l  & multipleannouncements==l  
outreg lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy  
dealvalue relvalue using 11june13regressionsRELV ALUE.txt11 ,  append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
tabstat lambdaT if e(sample), stats(mean sd p25 p50 p75 n)  
!Robustness, Identification Strategy, Section 7.3!  
use 11C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\April20secondstage.dta11 ,  clear  
gen lambdaA=normden(-pa)/(1-norm(-pa))  
gen lambdaT=normden(-pt)/(1-norm( ..:pt))  
gen index=index( valueoftransactionmil, 11 , 11  )  
gen str30 dealvalue=valueoftransactionmil if index= O  
replace dealvalue=substr( valueoftransactionmil, 1 ,index -1 )+substr( valueoftransactionmil,index + 1 ,. ) if index -=0  
destring deal value, replace  
replace dealvalue=dealvalue/1 000  
gen relvalue=dealvalue* 1000/(priceclose*sharesoutstanding)  
378 ' 
cd C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Tables  
! acquirers!  
regress carwindow2  lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate  
publicdummy  if acquirordummy= l    multipleannouncements= l  
outreg lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
"June13regressionsiDENTIFICATION.txt", replace bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
for any  previousmergers logassets cashratio mergerintensityaltl: regress carwindow2  lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  
HotileorUnsolAttitude t~getbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy X if acquirordummy= l    
multipleannouncements= l \outreg lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry  
samestate publicdummy X using "Junel3regressionsiDENTIFICATION.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
corr lambdaA previousmergers logassets cashratio mergerintensityaltl allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude  
targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy if e(sample)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate  
publicdummy  dealvalue relvalue if acquirordummy= l    multipleannouncements= l  
outreg lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy  
dealvalue relvalue using "June13regressionsiDENTIFICATION.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
for any  previousmergers logassets cashratio mergerintensityaltl: regress carwindow2  lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  
HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy X  dealvalue relvalue if acquirordummy= l    
multipleannouncements= l \outreg lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry  
samestate publicdummy X dealvalue relvalue using "June13regressionsiDENTIFICATION.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  
tdec(2)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate  
publicdummy  dealvalue relvalue previousmergers logassets if acquirordummy= l    multipleannouncements= l  
379 ' 
outreg lambdaA allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy  
dealvalue relvalue previousmergers logassets using "June13regressionsiDENTIFICATION.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  
tdec(2)  
!targets!  
regress carwindow2  lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate  
publicdummy  if targetdummy= l   multipleannouncements= l  
outreg lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy using  
"June13regressionsiDENTIFICATION.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
for any  previousmergers logassets cashratio mergerintensityaltl: regress carwindow2  lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  
HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy X  if targetdummy= l    
multipleannouncements= l \outreg lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry  
samestate publicdummy X using "June13regressionsiDENTIFICATION.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
corr lambdaT previousmergers logassets cashratio mergerintensityaltl allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude  
targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy if e(sample)  
regress carwindow2  lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate  
publicdummy dealvalue relvalue if targetdummy= l  & multipleannouncements==l  
outreg lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy  
dealvalue relvalue using "June13regressionsiDENTIFICATION.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  tdec(2)  
for any  previousmergers logassets cashratio mergerintensityaltl: regress carwindow2  lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  
HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy X dealvalue rei value  if targetdummy= l    
multipleannouncements= l \outreg lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry  
samestate publicdummy X dealvalue relvalue using "June13regressionsiDENTIFICATION.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster  
tdec(2)  
380 ' 
regress carwindow2  lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate  
publicdummy  dealvalue relvalue previousmergers logassets if targetdummy= 1  & multipleannouncements==l  
outreg lambdaT allequity  defensedummy  HotileorUnsolAttitude targetbankruptdummy sameindustry samestate publicdummy  
dealvalue relvalue previousmergers logassets using "June13regressionsiDENTIFICATION.txt", append bracket rdec(4) bdec(4) 3aster 
tdec(2)  
!Robustness, Cross-section, Section 7.4!  
use "C: \Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data \April20secondstage.dta", clear  
gen lambdaA=normden(-pa)/(1-norm(-pa))  
gen lambdaT=normden(-pt)/(1-norm(-pt))  
egen percent25a=pctile(pa) if multipleannouncements= 1  & tdummy==O,p(25)  
egen percent75a=pctile(pa) if multipleannouncements= 1  & tdummy==O,p(75)  
gen anticipateda25=0 if pa<percent25a  & pa-=.  & multipleannouncements==1  & tdummy==O  
replace anticipateda25=1 if pa>percent75a   pa-=.  & multipleannouncements==1  & tdummy==O  
egen medianpa=median(pa) if tdummy= O  & multipleannouncements==l  
gen anticipateda50=0 if pa<medianpa  & pa-=.  & multipleannouncements==l  & tdummy==O  
replace anticipateda50=1 if pa>medianpa   pa-=.& multipleannouncements= 1  & tdummy==O  
drop medianpa percent25a percent75a  
egen percent25t=pctile(pt) if tdummy= l  & multipleannouncements==l ,p(25)  
egen percent75t=pctile(pt) if tdummy= l  & multipleannouncements==l,p(75)  
gen anticipatedt25=0 if pt<percent25t  & pt-=.  & tdummy==1  & multipleannouncements==l  
replace anticipatedt25=1 if pt>percent75t  & pt-=.  & tdummy==1  & multipleannouncements==l  
· egen medianpt=median(pt) if tdummy= 1  & multipleannouncements==1  
gen anticipatedt50=0 if pt<medianpt   pt-=.  & tdummy==1  & multipleannouncements==1  
replace anticipatedt50=1 if pt>medianpt  & pt-=.  & tdummy==l  & multipleannouncements==1  
381 ' 
drop medianpt percent25t percent75t  
gen index=index( valueoftransactionmil. 11 , 11  )  
gen str30 dealvalue=valueoftransactionmil if index= O  
replace dealvalue=substr( valueoftransactionmil, 1 ,index -1 )+substr( valueoftransactionmil,index + 1 ,. ) if index -=0  
destring dealvalue, replace  
replace dealvalue=dealvalue/1 000  
gen relvalue=dealvalue*1000/(priceclose*sharesoutstanding)  
egen mediandeala=median(dealvalue) if dealvalue-=.   multipleannouncements= 1   tdummy= O  
egen mediandealt=median(dealvalue) if dealvalue-=.    multipleannouncements= 1    tdummy= 1  
gen bigdeala=O if dealvalue<mediandeala    dealvalue-=.    multipleannouncements= 1    tdummy= O  
replace bigdeala=1 if  dealvalue>mediandeala    dealvalue-=.    multipleannouncements= 1    tdummy= O  
drop mediandeala  
gen bigdealt=O if dealvalue<mediandealt    dealvalue-=.    multipleannouncements= 1    tdummy= 1  
replace bigdealt=1 if dealvalue>mediandealt    dealvalue-=.    multipleannouncements= 1    tdummy= 1  
drop mediandealt  
gen equitybigdealsa=1 if bigdeala= 1    allequity= 1  
replace equitybigdealsa=O if equitybigdealsa= .  
tabstat dealvalue if e(sample)    dealvalue-=., stats(mean sd plO p25 p50 p75 p90)  
!dealvalue  .4408771  2.502438  .00385 .011395  .039579  .165793  .64843!  
gen bigdeal25=0 if dealvalue<.011395    e(sample)    dealvalue-=.  
replace bigdeal25=1 if dealvalue>.165793   e(sample)   dealvalue-=.  
gen equitybigdeals25=1 if bigdeal25= 1  & allequity==1  
replace equitybigdeals25=0 if equitybigdeals25= .  
table allequity  anticipateda50 if tdummy= O, contents( mean carwindow2 n carwindow2)  
for num 0/1: ttest carwindow2 if tdummy= O    allequity= X    carwindow2-=., by( anticipateda50)  
382 ' 
for num 011:  ttest carwindow2 if tdummy= O    anticipateda50= X, by(allequity)  
table bigdeala  anticipateda50 if  tdummy= O, contents( mean carwindow2 n carwindow2)  
for num 0/1: ttest carwindow2 if tdummy= O    bigdeala= X    carwindow2-=., by(anticipateda50)  
for num 0/1: ttest carwindow2 if tdummy= O    anticipateda50= X, by(bigdeala)  
383 ' 
Appendix D- Command file that downloads CAR data from EVENTUS  
Panel A reports the web-query file  that downloads CAR data from EVENTUS database.  Panel B reports the  data-request-summary file  that the  web-query 
produces.  
Panel A -Web query  
Eventus  
Queries  
Basic Event  
Study  
(Daily)  
Basic Event  
Study  
(Monthly)  
Fama  
French  
Model  
Output for  
Cross- 
Sectional  
Analysis  
Event  
Parameter  
Eventus Query (Version 8.0)- Output for Cross-Sectional Analysis  
This Eventus Query will produce a SAS dataset containing the cumulative abnormal return for each firm and  
specified window for further cross-sectional analysis. Note SAS dataset is the only output format available.  
Data Query I Documentation I Eventus Manuals I Retrieve from myWRDS Queries  
Step One : Request File   Search  
Select identifier used in Request File  
Request File  
Note: The saved query was reading from the file  
C:\Basak\Mergers\March2006\Data\Eventus.txt  .  
You need to use  'Browse' to select the file from your local  
computer or you can select another file to run the query.  
384 ' 
Approach  
I Codei~ku; 
Group datafile options:  
(  none  
Step Two : Select Market Indices and Benchmark Options 
 
Market Index:  
Index or Indicies for Market Model Estimation:  
CRSP Equally Weighted  
D  Exclude Dividends (NODIVIDX)  
Benchmark Type: [_~_ .. :1  
Step Three : Market Model Estimation 
 
Estimation period:  
End Before Event Date (EST) 1.-31  .. . 1  
.Select the desired,c  ; ··  
ihel!ci~es aael bene~,.  a  
385 ' 
Minimum Estimation Length (MINES TN) L ' 3~·~·· 
Maximum Estimation Length CESTLEN) [:~.5~... i  
rJ  POOL  
AUTODATE  
l ..  ~one····· 
Step Four : Event Windows 
 
Event Period:  
~ rso--j 
PRE L:~_._JPOST L~... J  
D  Allow OVERLAP with estimation period  
Windows:  
Begin  
1.  E1  
I -3  l 2.  
End  
386 ' 
..  
l 3.  tm~5 ....  mj  ~m~?m.: 
-,·_  
  
4.  L~mm• J  
5.  ~~~~j L ~ 4 • mm  
6.  ~ ?m  ~ E  
How  'Save Query' works-- Using myWRDS Queries ' 
Unless otherwise noted, all material is  
Copyright 1994-2006: The Wharton School. of the University of Pennsylvania  
All rights reserved  
387 ' 
==
Panel B -Data-request-summary file 
 
[rD;_;ca=t~=-~=·······.'?=9=. .':l=.~~=···~.. =ID=·········~~~~~~~~~~~=·r,Q=·~···=!1..;;.;;2=····~=?3;...;;;····5=······=·=·····=_;__.;;;;;;;...;;;;;;;.;;;;...;;;.;;;;..;;;;.;;;;...;;;.;;;;_;...;;;;;;;.;;;"'-"!  
!r-'L=ib=r=····£lfl=·······=··~·=s/D=··=<l=.ta=···=·~·=~t=··~============·.il~yts/gtler:y.l..  
IFr~gt1ei"l~:YJ'Dat~ gai"l~e ~~(li!Y/.~ 
i!s~~~~Y<lr!<l~!~ r= ;;;;_;.;;;_;;;;;;_c;;_;;;;;.;;;_;_;_;_;;;;..;,.._;;;;;;_;.;_;__;_;;.;_·······.;.;.;····· .·;...;;;;.;_···;..;;.__.::.!  
1 Input Codes  29117310  19771116  
12174 item(s)  54634710  19780126  
27805810  19780626  
:58507210  19780417  
171582410  19780605  
! -etc- 
ir:l.c,=_.?=;=···.~=·.t=l·o=.~~~=:.~=i=.. ·~=!a=..... ~=~m=.=... ~=I"lt=s=. .. JII"l!<l   .....  "  
ilro=u=tp=u=t=f=?=Tm=·=(lti=C=·······;_;;;o=1TI=P=re=s=s.;;;..io=I"l=·· ======;...;;;.;;;..;...;;;.::.=.::..::.ils<ls?~~atJ 
'j"y~(l~l'?~.~'?l~~t~~ ..  w  
Your output is complete. Click on the link below to open the output file.  
q021128735.sas7bdat (1.7MB, 11325 observations 323 variables)  
Download instructions  
Netscape users ... Shift-click ' 
Internet Explorer users ... Right-click and select "Save Target As ... " ' 
Notice:  
Your use of WRDS and this data extract must comply with the WRDS Terms of Use. There may be additional usage  
restrictions that are governed by your institution's licensing of specific databases. If you have any questions about data  
licensing and appropriate usage, please contact wrds-support@wharton.upenn.edu.  
388 ' 
Appendix E- Command me that downloads data from EXECOMP  
Panel A reports the web-query file  that downloads quarterly data from EXECOMP database. Panel B reports the data-request-summary file that the  web-query 
produces.  
Panel A- Web query  
Annual 
 
Updates 
 
9  Compustat Executive Compensation 
 
Data Query I Documentation I Data Manuals I Retrieve from myWRDS Queries ' 
Canadian ' 
Step One: Date Range  Industrial •  
Annual  r---;:1 199=2:::::;11;;---;1=2=004=;;1' .;-,---------, sere~.·. 
I Beginning  .................................  Ending  .  i  •  ~~, 

Industrial ' ~-------------------------------------------------J 
Quarterly  
Step Two: Search  
Prices,  
Dividends  
Earnings  
  
•  Segments  
..  Index  
Fundamenta  
ls  
Choose 1 Of 3 Methods  
C  1. Company Codes  
L ..  ... .  icode Lookup  m  
C  2. File Containing Company Codes  
389 ' 
Other  
Products  
.,  Audit Fees  
.,  Executive  
Com_Qensati  
on  
.,  Global  
..  Emerging  
Markets  
Preliminru:y  
History  
Unrestated  
Quarterly  
Point in  
Time  
Tools  
Balance  
Sheet and  
Income  
Statement  
Extract  
fl  3. Entire Database  
* COMPUSTAT executive compensation data contains both active  
and inactive companies  
Conditional Statements (Optional)  
I --- Select a Variable --- .....  mm  ml  
E:l  AND[l  OR  
I  
t'  )  ·v  .  &Q&ti~·\   
letmc  
coQ8erl  
pe.r:i~. 
E"v~lib.•.  ~~~-~~~-,'
ibm 
 
msft 
 
dell 
 
3.  AU oil~~·.,:~~;·< 
,cJ{tY,J~. ·  if ,  T ,·  ~·f~~· ~: 
390 ' 
Financial ' 
Statements -' 
Annually ' 
Updated ' '~Q·~; 
D'ATA'6"?> lOOM Quarterly  
...  A~·· .... :;"~z~.:Updates ...  D4;;f Al! > ~! ..  
Step Three: Variables  
Company Information  
~ Company Name ~ Ticker Symbol D  Stock Exchange  
D  Industry Group Description ° Industry Group D  Company  
ID Number Pl  CUSIP and Issue Number D  Street Address  
D  City D  State 0  Zip Code 0  Area Code 0  Telephone  
Number D  S&P Index ~ SIC Code D  SIC Code Description  
Executive Information  
Pl  Executive ID Number 0  Name Prefix ° First Name  
D  Middle Name 0  Last Name ~ Age 0  Gender D  Most  
Recent Title ~ Annual CEO Flag ~ Annual Title D  Footnote  
Text~ Retirement Years~ Executive Is Director ° Current  
CEO D  Date Became CEO 0  Date Joined Company 0  Date  
Rejoined Company 0  Date Left as CEO 0  Date Left Company  
391 ' 
D  Date Releft Com:gany D  Reason Left Com:gany D  Current  
Rank by Salary + Bonus  
Main Compensation  
R  Sal~ (~Thous} P'  Bonus (~Thous} R  Other Annual  
(~Thous} R1  P' Total Current Com:gensation (~Thous} ···  ··  Total  
Com:gensation Including O:gtion Grants D  Total Com:gensation  
Including O:gtions Exercised 2  Long Term Incentive Payouts  
2  All Other Total ~ All Other Paid 2  Shares Owned (Excl  
O:gtions} 2  Percentage of Com:gany Stock Held D  Sal~ Percent  
Change Year-to-Year D  TCC Percent Change Year-to-Y ear  
D  TDCl Percent Change Year-to-Year 0  TDC2 Percent Change  
Year-to-Year D  Shares Owned Includes O:gtions Flag 0  Interlock  
Flag 0  Short-Term Footnote Flag D  Long-Term Footnote Flag  
392 ' 
ANNDIRRE-- Annual Orector Retainer for Each  Orector ($lhous)  
DIRMT'GFE -- Orector Meeting Fee Received by Each Orector ($lhous)  
NUM\ITGS -- Nurrber of Board Meetings  
PCXJMVFEE -- Orector Cormittee Meeting Fees Rag  
PEXEOJIR -- Exec Orectors Receive Orectr Fees Flag 
•  •  '"~~"~""''''~''''~ ·~•• ••'>> ... o••~••"M••""'''''' o  o. ,.,, ,  ,,,,,,. ,M"""''""'''••• o  o  
Com  an  Data Items  
SALES -- Net Sales  
SALECHG -- Sales  1 Year Percent Olange  
SALE3LS -- Sales 3 Year Growth Rate (least squares)  
SALE>LS --Sales 5 Year Growth Rate (least squares)  
0180 -- Operating Income Before Depreciation  
... ~~.:~ .. <?!~!? .. ~ ... ~E!~r. ~.r.<::e.n~ .. ~.~~.~E!..  
Step Four: Output ' 
Output Format ' 
E-Mail Address (Optional) ' 
A Wll\JUM -- Aw ard Nurrber k:!entifier  
Nl.JM3et -- Nurrber of Units Awarded  
PERIOD-- Perforrmnce Period (years)  
VAL 11-IRES -- Threshold Future Payout ($)  
VAL TARG -- Target Future Payout ($)  
V ALMAX -- Maxil'll:lr,t'l ~~!urE! ~Y()~t ($) .  
Director Related Items  
:ra -' 
393 ' 
How  'Save Query' works -- Using myWRDS Queries ' 
Unless otherwise noted, all material is.  
Copyright 1994-2006: The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania  
All rights reserved  
394 ' 
Panel B - Data Request File  
Data Request Summary  
!Dat~~~ql1~stiJ.) 1~?82 
:1Fr~ql1~~c~!J)~~~ ~~~~~ WJIF.·~=?=·-·='·=!9=?=.····~=·····.·.·~=2=0=2=~~=:·===========~===....;.;.;;;;! '[~~~~~Y~~~le.... ijr=g=y=~=·····='f=···=···=====~======================.:;.;....;;.;., 
, ~~f~~~~~es . JIF.~~=·l=l~=····====================~~ ;lg()?.9J~i()J1~1 ~t~t~l11~Ilt~ JF!llf=····~=···===================================c.;;;;;;:;! ~:~~(;oml're~si~OJl J~b 1 ___  __  ~ -~ ~~ _  ~ ~ _ ~ 
Variables Selected  CONAME TICKER CUSIP SIC EXECID P _AGE_2 CEOANN  
TITLEANN RETYRS EXEC_DIR SALARY BONUS OTHANN  
TCC TDC1  LTIP ALLOTHTO ALLOTHPD SHROWN  
::=======~! SHROWNPC BLK_ V ALU SOPTEXSH SHRSOUT FYR  
Extra Variables and  
Parameters Selected  
Your output is complete. Click on the link below to open the output file.  
221219982.txt (21.2MB, 153981 observations 27  variables)  
Download instructions  
Netscape users ... Shift-click  
Internet Explorer users ... Right-click and select "Save Target As ... "  
Notice:  
395 ' 
restrictions that are governed by your institution's licensing of specific databases. If you have any questions about data  
licensing and appropriate usage, please contact wrds-support@wharton.upenn.edu.  
396 ' 
Appendix F- Command tlle that downloads data from IRRC  
Panel  A  reports  the  web-query  file  that  downloads  quarterly  data  from  IRRC  database.  Panel  B  reports  the  data-request-summary  file  that  the  web-query 
produces.  
Panel A- Web query  
10  IRRC Governance Data Request  
Data Query I Documentation I Data Manuals  
Step One: Date Range  
I ...B_e_g~_·n_n_in_g_~_.1_":9_-~_:JI_I_._E_ndi_·n_g_j_20_ ............~!
_0~~-·~·_JI_:_· ___ 
Step Two: Search  
Search By t enS  I mm  
I Choose 1 Of 3 Methods  
· C  1. Company Codes  
L·--·~··--·-·--····Jcode Lookup  
C  2.  File Containing Company Codes  
397 ' 
E1  3. Entire Database  ibm  
·msrt  
dell  
3.  A,f:1  companies  
Step Three: Variables  
-~ Company Information  
I ~1:o~:~;Name 0  Ticker Symbol R1  Cusip  
First 6-digits 0  Stock Exchange Q  IRRCPage  
Number 0  Year of reincorporation ° State of  
incorporation ° Delaware Incorporation D  Dual  
Class Stock  
R1  Governance Index (Gompers, Ishii, Metrick)  
Delay Provisions  
Select AllClear  
R1  Blank Check R1  Classified Board R1  Limits to  
Call Special Meeting R1  Limits for Written Consent  
R1  Advance Notice Requirements * ' 
Protection Provisions ' 
398 ' 
Select AllClear  
~ Compensation Plans t;?l  Indemnification  
Contracts ~ Golden Parachutes t;?l  Severance  
WI  Director Indemnification WI  Director Liability  
Voting Provisions  
Select AllClear  
~ Limits to Amend Bylaws ~ Limits to Amend  
Charter~ Cumulative Voting~ Secret Ballot  
~ Super Majority to Approve Merger ~ Unequal  
Voting~ Cumulative Voting for Substantial  
Shareholder *  
Other Provisions  
Select AllClear  
~ Antigreenmail ~ Director's Duties--Nonfinancial  
Impact ~ Fair Price ~ Pension Parachutes  
WI  Poison Pill ~ Silver Parachutes  
399 ' 
D  Control Share Acquisition Law (CSA)  
Opt in - Opt outs  
Select All Clear  
D  Opt out of BusComb/Freezeout D  Opt in to  
BusComb/Freezeout (GA) D  Opt out of Fair Price  
D  Opt in to Fair Price (GA) D  Opt out of Recapture  
of Profits D  Opt out of Control Share Cash out (PA)  
D  Opt out of Directors Duties D  Opt out of CSA  
D  Opt in to CSA (TN)  
* Variables not included in the Governance Index. ' 
Step Four: Output 
 
Output Format  
E-Mail Address (Optional)  
[~~'"'~--   
400 ' 
Unless otherwise noted, all  material is  
Copyright 1994-2006: The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania  
All rights reserved  
401 ' 
========
=====================
=====
Panel B - Data Request Summary 
 
~~~!; ~~~~~~t}D ...  ··r:,2=2=12=2=·i=26=9=·.· =-'-'-'-''--"-'--= '  
jLibrarie;fD~taSets ........  li~~l&s~t/ 
lse':l~~~Y.~t:i~~le .  ·r=c=n=6= I 
Input Codes  
aU  item(s)  .  c:..;;.;_= l :IF-a=l=l~=···=··· l<;o~~it:i<)~':ll St':lt~~~.~!sJIF~... .':l·=··· =  
Output  • txt 1  
format/Compr~ssion 
Variables Selected  1 CONAME CN6 GINDEX BLANKCHECK CBOARD LSPMT  
LWCNST ADVNR COMPPLAN DIRINDC  
; GOLDENP ARACHUTE SEVERANCE DIRIND DIRLIAB  
1 LABYL W LACHTR CUMVOTE SECRETBALLOT  
SUPERMAJOR UNEQVOTE CUMVOTESS ANTIGREEN  
DUTIESNF FAIRPRICE PPARACHUTE PPILL SPARACHUTE  
Ex  'ari::~hles 

Par:ram<~ter,s:s ' 
Your output is complete. Click on the link below to open the output file.  
Warning! Fixed-width files that have many data variables have extra header lines that will cause problems when importing to  
other programs. If you plan to import this data into Excel for example, please use another file format instead.  
221221269.txt (2.4 MB, 12103 observations 28 variables)  
402 ' 
Download instructions  
Netscape users ... Shift-click  
Internet Explorer users ... Right-click and select "Save Target As ... "  
Notice:  
Your use of WRDS and this data extract must comply with the WRDS Terms of Use. There may be additional usage  
restrictions that are governed by your institution's licensing of specific databases. If you have any questions about data  
licensing and appropriate usage, please contact wrds-support@wharton.upenn.edu.  
403 ' 
Panel B - f)ata-request-summary  file' 
ifOutput 
brmat/Compression 
Selected 
lvariables  
tgiiirVrriables and 
ilParameters Selected 
ne 99 
,,ltab I 
iI{PERMI{O  NPERMCO LINKTYPE  LNKFLAG CI{IIM CIC  
SMBL COI{AME NCORP STK SPCCYR  SPCCQTR  STATE 
DNUM I\iAICS FYR FQBEGDT FQENDDT  DATA1 DATA?  i : 
4'TA6 DATAS DATA14  DATA18 DATAzO DATA}TDATA}}i 
DATA24DATA3O  DATA31 DATA36 DATA37 DATA38  i 
ATA44 DATA46 DATA51 DATA'  DATA6O DATA61 
4TA69 DATAgO DATA1OI 
LC L{J LX LD LF LS LN LO 
Your  output  is complete.  Click on the link below  to open the output file. 
02L0A2646.txt (2L9.6 MB ,726377 observations  45 variables) 
Download instructions 
Netscape  users... Shifrclick 
Internet  Explorer users... Right-click and select "Save Target As..." 
Notice: 
Your use of WRDS and this data extract must comply with the WRDS Terms of 
Use. There may  be additional usage restrictions  that are governed by your 
institution's licensing of specific databases.  If you have any questions about data 
licensing  and appropriate usage, please contact wrds- 
support @ wharton. upenn.  edu. 
404' 
